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THE METAPHYSICS
OF
VALUE
(Vol. I)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE KINGDOM OF VALUES

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

(IN KANNADA)

UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE

THE
METAPHYSICS OF VALUE
(VOL. I)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE KINGDOM OF VALUES

BY

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PREFACE

I should begin by referring to the plan of the work. This plan has been explained sufficiently, I hope, in the last section of the first chapter, but here I wish to say that the theory of value adopted in the work has necessitated the examination of almost all the important types of value-experience immediately after the determination of the nature and characteristics of value, with the result that one-half of the present volume has been devoted to such a "critique" of concrete values. More specifically, the first six chapters (forming part I of the present volume) are devoted to a discussion of the general principles and problems of value including a chapter on the psychology of valuation; the next seven chapters (constituting part II of the volume) offer a "critique" of concrete values in which the operation of the general principles of value in the "Kingdom" of concrete values is exhibited; the last chapter takes up the thread of the discussion of general principles in the I part. The writer's hope is that this discussion would be continued in the second volume of the work. This second volume (which is under preparation) will contain, in addition to a treatment (in the I part) of the general principles of value such as the measurability and comparability of values, the commensurability of values etc., a discussion of the *summum bonum* of man as well as a consideration (in the II part) of the metaphysical *implications* or philosophical *deductions* of the value theory expounded in the work.

Any constructive work in philosophy must necessarily have a definite standpoint conditioning the manner of approach to its problems. A philosophy without a standpoint has yet to be written—however much writers on philosophy may ostensibly repudiate all presuppositions—and when one is adopted it is bound to colour your whole treatment of problems. And in such circumstances a writer lays himself open to the charge of

trying to unlock every door with the same master-key. I hope, however, that the attempt made in these pages does not savour of artificiality but represents a natural mode of interpretation disclosed by an analysis of facts themselves. And so all that I claim for the work is that it is an honest endeavour to think out consistently, *i.e.*, from a definite standpoint, some of the problems that arise in connection with the concept of value. I have shirked no issue, however complex, though I have had to postpone to the second volume the consideration of certain ultimate philosophical issues whose discussion in the present volume would have appeared as being too much in the nature of a digression.

One great difficulty in such a work as the present is that the whole subject being still fresh and many of its fields still virgin, I have had to set before myself my own problems before trying to discover solutions to them. The solutions, wherever offered, have generally been restricted to what appeared to me to be warranted at the level of our value-experience, *i.e.*, by an analysis of value-experience as such. I have shown, for instance, that an analysis of the categorial structure of value *per se* leads one to the acceptance of the independent reality of plural entities; but whether pluralism itself is philosophically justifiable is a question I have not considered in this volume; such ultimate metaphysical questions properly belong, as I have already observed, to the second volume of the work. So also with other similar problems. I hope that those who may do me the honour of reading what I have written will kindly remember this limitation which I have had to impose on myself in these pages. The structure of the work as well as the limitation of procedure I have described is responsible for the appearance of many loose ends and ragged edges in the present volume, but this could hardly have been helped and I must content myself with the promise of a second volume for the completion of many lines of thought suggested in the first.

Regarding some of the solutions—particularly of economic and political problems—some of my readers may shrug their

shoulders and say that I have yielded to the temptation of offering nostrums and panaceas and Morrison's pills. But when so many unphilosophical—nay, anti-philosophical—nostrums are sought to be forced down our throats in this twentieth century of grace, why not at least consider a philosophically thought-out—*i.e.*, in any case harmless—solution? Philosophers are often accused of being dreamers and visionaries; when they come out with practical plans of reform and reconstruction, they are derided as offering nostrums! Yet I believe that the suggestions made in these pages are not in the nature of nostrums: they embody the permanent principles for the realisation of which humanity has been struggling from its very birth; principles like liberty, equality and universal brotherhood. These words have become more or less slogans. It is worth while trying to rescue them from this fate and restoring to them their rightful resplendent concrete content in relation to the life of the human spirit—spirit which is no less divine because it is human. From first to last, the philosophy sketched in these pages is a philosophy of freedom: freedom in the economic, social and political spheres, freedom gained by knowledge and truth, freedom enjoyed in aesthetic contemplation, freedom achieved by living the moral life; freedom in this world even when spirit regards itself as merely human, freedom transcendental when it comes to realise its essential divine heritage.

The second Armageddon is with us and upon us. The demon of destruction is stalking the streets of the world naked. All the precious values that humanity has cherished are being scorched from out of the earth. Hell seems to be round the corner. Only one value appears to be valued above everything else, *viz.*, power. The lust for power seems well-nigh insatiable—the cry of the day is for power, more power and still more power! Nietzsche indeed has found his reward; he worshipped power—in the superman; let him go now to the super-states which have robbed the individuals of all their power and arrogated it to themselves. Perhaps there is something in the very notion of *value* which inevitably connotes power—and domination? It is worth while examining this possibility and if it is found true, to reinterpret value in

spiritual terms. This is the suggestion thrown out in the last chapter of this volume and it must await its full development in the second volume. Hence while a pursuit of values is really part of the game of life, such pursuit must be informed by the light of that which goes beyond value and which makes things valuable to us—herein called spirit, worth or worthiness. In the pursuit of the one as well as in the realisation of the other, philosophy is our only guide—philosophy not as a mere game of the speculative intellect, but as a soul-stirring realisation of the meaning of life, as a *Way of Life*. Otherwise, the cultivation of the mere intellect has gone to such an extent that the modern man finds

"His moral powers gone idiot

"And his intellect sane, to watch them."

The cultivation of character—the culture of the emotions and the heart—must keep pace with the development of the intellect, and that is a lesson which only philosophy can teach. Hence in the "New Order" of things that is going to emerge out of the present holocaust of humanity and human values, let us hope that philosophy would be given its proper place as the primary science which helps to keep man always in remembrance of his human nature first and foremost.

I must conclude this preface with the pleasant task of acknowledging obligations. Where I have profited so much by reading the works of others it is futile to try to acknowledge obligations to individual writers: the foot-notes on almost every page of the work bear ample testimony to my indebtedness to such writers. Still I may mention among western thinkers the names of S. Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, Dewey and R. B. Perry as the chief sources of my inspiration in the treatment of the philosophy of value. Nearer home, I owe the whole idea of writing a work on value to my revered teacher, *Rajaseva-sakta* Sri A. R. Wadia, B.A., (Cantab) Bar-at-Law, for twenty-five years Professor of Philosophy in the Mysore University, now Director of Public Instruction in the Mysore State. Students of Prof. Wadia can never forget the enthusiasm with which he

taught philosophy in the Maharaja's College, and—what is rare indeed—which he succeeded in transmitting in greater or less measure to his pupils. The unique feature of his teaching was that being a teacher of Sociology also at the same time, he was able to throw on Indian social organisation and institutions the critical and constructive light emanating from a study of philosophy: it is no exaggeration to say that for more than two decades he has acted as the gadfly of Indian social institutions. It was soon after I joined the philosophy staff of the Maharaja's College in the year 1924, that Prof. Wadia pointedly drew my attention to the incompatibility that exists between the cosmopolitan teachings of the Upanishads—and particularly of the Vedanta—on the one hand, and the narrow sectarian caste-ridden injunctions of the Dharma Shastras on the other. And yet both represent a continuity of thought and experience in the life of the Indian peoples through the centuries, and both are considered to be equally orthodox! Here was a real socio-philosophical problem, showing that philosophy is not sundered from life. Naturally it set me thinking on problems of value and before long—even before the appearance of Perry's *General Theory of Value*—I began to conceive the idea that a science of human welfare or well-being in general, as I then called it, must be different from a science of pure morality or individual moral and spiritual perfection as such.¹ Following this line of thought, I contributed a number of papers to the Indian Philosophical Congress, and finally, under the fostering care and critical encouragement of Prof. Wadia, formed the idea of writing a book on the Metaphysics of Value. Every chapter of the work has received the benefit of his searching criticism and he has been responsible for a number of modifications, re-statements and refinements of my views—too numerous to mention—though, even as it is, I dare not think that everything I say in the book has his approval. If there is any merit in the work, it is, as the writer himself sees it, the attempt to correlate social with philosophical sciences, and this could

1. *Vide* my paper, "The Theory of 'Moral Goods'," *Proc. of the Ind. Phil. Cong.*, 1925.

have been done in India only by one who was a student of Prof. Wadia. Had it been in my power, I should have considered it a privilege to dedicate the work to one who has in the literal sense of the terms been my guide, philosopher and friend. As it is I can only console myself with the thought that this work represents in some humble measure the appreciation of a disciple for his master's teachings.

But the work could not have seen the light of day had it not been for the kindness of *Rajakaryapraveena* Sri N. S. Subba Rao, M.A. (Cantab), Bar-at-law, lately Vice-Chancellor of the Mysore University, who gave generous encouragement to research and original work while he was in office in the University. To him therefore and to the Mysore University, I owe a special debt of gratitude for having made the publication of this work possible.

I have for purposes of my book made use of several papers of mine contributed to the Indian Philosophical Congress, and articles published in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, and the *Journal of the Mysore University*. I must thank the editors of the journals and the Secretary of the Congress for permission to utilise them in this book. I have sought permission of Prof. Cunnigham, Editor of the *Philosophical Review*, America, for having utilised in the book part of an article of mine on the Notion of Dependence which appeared in that valuable journal; owing to conditions of war, the reply has not yet been received. I hope, however, there is no discourtesy involved in my procedure.

I should have liked to consult Ross' *Foundations of Ethics* in connection with the examination of the ethical views of the Oxford Moralists in the last but one chapter; unfortunately this work reached my hands only when my own had already left them.

I am grateful to my pupil, M. V. Sheshachar, for helping me in the preparation of the Index.

"TULASIVASA"
V. V. PURAM,
MYSORE.
19th APRIL 1942. }

K. R. SREENIVASA IYENGAR.

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THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (*continued*). 533-581

(A Critique of Neo-Intuitionism in Contemporary Ethics)

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That Light whose smile kindles the universe,
That Beauty in which all things work and move,
That Benediction which the eclipsing curse
Of birth can quench not, that sustaining Love
Which, through the web of being blindly wove
By man and beast and earth and air and sea,
Burns bright or dim, as each are mirrors of
The fire for which all thirst, now beams on me,
Consuming the last clouds of cold mortality.

—*Shelley*
(*From Adonais*)

THE BEST THING IN THE WORLD.

What's the best thing in the world ?
June-rose, by May-dew impearled ;
Sweet south-wind, that means no rain ;
Truth, not cruel to a friend ;
Pleasure, not in haste to end ;
Beauty, not self-decked and curled
Till its pride is over-plain ;
Light, that never makes you wink ;
Memory, that gives no pain ;
Love, when so you're loved again.
What's the best thing in the world ?
—Something out of it, I think.

—*Mrs. Browning.*

PART I

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF VALUE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF A SCIENCE OF VALUE.

1. In a sense philosophy is the most practical of all the sciences. It was for this reason perhaps that in *The Republic* dialectic was reserved to the very end as the culminating part of the education of the guardians—the persons who were engaged in the most intense form of practical activity, viz., the administration of a state. It is a misconception to think that philosophy is sundered from life and life's concerns, though it must be admitted that the explanation of life offered by philosophers is often couched in vague unintelligibilities and strange-sounding polysyllables. And not unoften have philosophers indulged in abstractions that appeared entirely out of context in relation to the burning problems of human life. But such obscurities and refinements of statement are unavoidable in any highly developed science. A few years ago it was stated that press reporters sat through a meeting of the American Philosophical Association and "listened doggedly, frantically hoping for some tangible item, some faint connection with the ordinary world of things and people, to emerge from the torrent of abstract incomprehensibilities."¹ If this was true, then the blame lay as much with the press reporters as with the sage persons who discoursed in that august assembly! Whatever the defects of the *medium* through which philosophical discourse is conducted, there is no doubt that a large part of the philosophical interest everywhere is in the "ordinary world of things and people"—in some one or other of the multifarious problems and anxious questionings that make up the content of human existence in the modern world. Art, religion, science, society and the problem of its betterment, state and the problem of political advancement, the economic life of the people, their education, their private and public morality—every one of these questions of human life is becoming a matter of vital interest to philosophy

1. Helen Huss Parkhurst (*Jnl. of Phil.*) Vol. 25, 1928, p. 98. Pages 98-99 are particularly worth reading as indicating the unusual efforts of philosophers to make their discourses appear humorous and interesting!

and to philosophers so that it is no exaggeration to say that at present philosophy is brought down from the heavens to the very hearths and homes of living people. This, however, is not to deny the value of pure metaphysics as such. Much less does it imply that it is possible by any means for a philosopher to escape metaphysics at some point or other of his philosophical investigations—whatever be the specific nature of the problem on hand. Nevertheless it remains true to say that, as Urban has put it, there has appeared in the modern world "what may without exaggeration be described as a gradual shifting of the philosophical centre of gravity from the problem of knowledge to the problem of values."¹

2. Theory of value *per se*, is a comparatively recent science though as we shall see, it has long been masquerading under a different name and enjoying the hospitality of thinkers and critics under a different shelter. The reasons for this are not far to seek. Philosophy, as is well known, meant for the ancients "love of wisdom" (*philosophia*) and the term "wisdom" was taken comprehensively enough so as to include knowledge of nature—of the several (now so-called) "positive" sciences—as well as knowledge of man and his life in the universe. Hence not until the time of Aristotle was there felt a need for studying the several sciences separately. Aristotle—the "Father of them that know"—introduced the distinction between the physical sciences on the one hand and *metaphysics* on the other,² and also demarcated the spheres of *economics*, *ethics* and *politics* respectively. Ever since his day, it has been customary to treat every one of these branches of human knowledge as more or less an independent science, each having a more or less clearly defined province of its own.³ So far as philosophy is concerned, however, epistemology and metaphysics are usually ranked as philosophical disciplines *par excellence*, as concerned with the most general principles of knowledge and existence, while subjects like *ethics*, *political philosophy* etc. occupy the borderline between pure philosophy and the social sciences. For our purpose, however, it is pertinent to note that while the physi-

1. *Valuation, Its Nature and Laws* p. 1.

2. Not, of course, precisely as we distinguish them at present.

3. This is not strictly true. Even so recently as the end of the last century, physics, chemistry, biology, geology etc. used to be grouped under "philosophical knowledge" or "natural philosophy."

cal sciences in all their diversified ramifications considered the physical and material needs of man, the so-called "mental and moral sciences"¹ shouldered the responsibility of investigating his moral and spiritual requirements. The domain of possible human interests having thus been partitioned between the different sciences, it is small wonder that for a long time the need for a general science of human welfare should not have been felt by philosophers. In consequence, it was only in recent years that philosophers began to suspect that there could be such a study as a Theory of Value which should attack the problem of value in general and examine the contributions in value made by the different sciences to the sum of human well-being. The first ploughshare was laid on the soil only fifty or sixty years ago although rich harvests have already been reaped and the workers in the field are legion. But, as has already been observed, the consciousness of the problem had by no means been absent in the minds of previous thinkers, and theory of value had been leading a parasitical existence from the very beginning. And one is not sure that even to-day the majority of thinkers have been able explicitly to sunder this study from dependence upon other sciences or even to tolerate such a severance. Economics, for instance, has for a long time been studying the theory of value though, of course, with special reference to economic value or what is known as value in exchange.² Though thus confined to one type of value in particular, economics has had yet to discuss the notion of value in general notwithstanding that only scant justice could be done to it. Aesthetics again has more professedly than economics stood for impersonal or over-individual values like art and beauty and the dictum of the poet "Beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all Ye know on earth and all ye need to know", as well as the contention of "art for art's sake", have seemed to many like a monopolisation of all values which certainly implies an underlying assumption as to the nature and meaning of value in itself. Religion, once more, both as a practical illuminator of life's path

1. Under which was included in recent times the science of sociology.

2. For a full discussion of the dependence of most of the social and philosophical sciences upon a general theory of value, see *General Theory of Value* by Prof. Perry, pp. 4-9. I am here interested only in pointing out how far the other sciences were already (and still are) studying the problem of value before the consciousness of a general science of value arose.

as well as a theoretical science (in the form of Philosophy of Religion) has long been proclaiming the supremacy of religious values and the imperativeness of realising the Supreme Value, God, and in this it has not only implied a certain definition regarding the nature of value, but it has also attempted to rationalise and unify, in its own way, the different realms of value, both psychological and historical or institutional. When Jesus said, "I am the way, the light, the life,"¹ he was certainly propounding a doctrine of real values which demands to be tested and criticised. But it is ethics that, more than any other science, has from the very beginning laid pretensions to monopolise the study of value and it is such a study of the problem of value in treatises on ethics, purfunctorily undertaken by some writers (who while vaguely feeling the distinction between the two studies are not yet clearly conscious of their difference), and systematically carried out by others under other colours (who are blissfully oblivious of any such difference), that has prevented an early development of a general science of value. A work like Moore's *Principia Ethica* is fundamentally a study in the general problem of value. Of a similar character, though not so pronounced, are works like Alexander's *Moral Order and Progress*, Rashdall's *Theory of Good and Evil*, Brentano's *Origin of the Sense of Right and Wrong*, and the recent volumes on ethics by Nicolai Hartmann. So far as these works treat of the problem of value, they are really important contributions to the science of value seriously to be reckoned with by any one who undertakes its study. The extraordinary thing, however, is that so many of them should have confounded the problem of ethics with the problem of value and virtually converted ethics into a science of value. This confusion has been made possible by the adoption of the category of "good" or "goodness"—the most ambiguous term in philosophy—as the fundamental category of moral science. And for a long time in the history of ethical thought the supreme question asked by thinkers (in this following the tradition laid down by Plato and Aristotle) has been nothing else than: what is the supreme good of man, the *summum bonum*, meaning thereby the thing of most worth or value to him? This confusion of stand-

1. Which may be taken as representing the unification of cognitive, affectional and volitional value.

points, of the ethical with the valuatory, I propose to call "the Great Confusion" or "the Great Error" in ethics, and because of its fundamental importance for our study of the value-problem, I should like to discuss it at some length in the following paragraphs.¹

3. The question, it was said, usually asked in all treatises on ethics has been: what is *the* good or the highest good of man, the *summum bonum*, the absolute end, that for the sake of which all other things are valued or valuable only as means? The determination of this supreme end or value has generally been known as fixing the standard or norm in ethics by reference to which the value of subordinate ends or subsidiary modes of action could be judged. This gives rise to what are called the teleological systems of ethics, or systems of ethics based upon the conception of a governing purpose or end treated as of supreme value. There are doubtless, side by side, jural systems of ethics—or systems based upon the conception of law as supreme, or systems which conceive the nature of morality to consist in obedience to a mandate or law laid upon the moral agent either by his own moral nature or by some external authority, divine or human. But these, where they have not already struck a compromise with the teleological systems by looking upon the law as the practical expression of the end to be realised, or as means to such realisation, have, like Kant's categorical imperative, fallen into disrepute, although it must be said that the prevailing note of the modern world, as compared with the ancient, has been legalistic rather than teleological. Now to ask a question like, what is the highest good of man? implies several things. It implies (1) that there is such a thing as good (which in this context can mean nothing else than value) and that it is objective in nature—the question of generic value; (2) that its nature can be understood; (3) that goods (or values) can be ranked according to a scale of quantity or quality or both—the question of comparative value; (4) that goods are commensurable; and (5) that out of the congeries of human goods available, it is possible to pick out one that can be said to be absolute or the highest—the question of so-called intrinsic

1. See my papers "The Theory of Moral Goods" and "Some Suggestions toward a New Ethic" in the *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1925 and 1928 respectively.

versus instrumental value. (6) Again, whether this supreme good is a single good by itself or a synthesis of all the other goods is not very clear. All these questions, it will immediately be recognised, are metaphysical questions of value *per se*, and ethics, I humbly submit, has, as pre-eminently a science of morals, no more right to discuss them than economics or politics. It may be that after all when the sun has for ever set in the far horizon and everything is enveloped in a dark mist of eternity, nothing is really worth while, nothing is really better than any other thing, and the best is only the figment of a fond fancy! It may be so, or it may not be so—the moralist at any rate cannot tell. What is it then that the moralist could tell? That can be decided only after theory of value has discussed and pronounced upon the several questions concerning generic and comparative, intrinsic and instrumental, values. Such a theory might then hand over its findings to the several social and philosophical sciences every one of which would then adjust its programme accordingly and attempt to work out or illustrate those conclusions in detail. It should then be possible for ethics, (as it has been found possible for economics) to content itself with the discussion of the principles of *moral value* in particular, as it has been found possible for economics to content itself with the discussion of the principles of *economic value* in particular. It would thus properly belong to its sphere to consider questions of conduct, questions of right and wrong, of what ought or ought not to be done, in the light of the general conclusions supplied by theory of value regarding what is worth while and how far every one of the special sciences can contribute to the total well-being of humanity.

4. Not that ethics now discusses systematically the metaphysical questions of value of the sort illustrated above. Far from it. It only touches upon them here and there with implicit assumptions and prejudices. But when ethics does not confine itself to its proper scope of conduct and character, and asks questions concerning the ideal of life to be realised etc., it not only trenches upon the jurisdiction of other sciences generally and of the science of value in particular, it lays the axe of destruction at its own root most effectively. For then it proposes to consider, not conduct or character in particular, but human well-being as a whole, And human well-being manifestly con-

sists not in one or two particular goods, but in a sufficiency of all the available goods of life. The realisation of the highest ideal of human life would mean the incorporation into that life not only of virtue and pleasure, but of letters, arts, learning, the contemplation of beauty etc.. "Goods" *i.e.*, things which are valuable, are of numerous kinds: knowledge, beauty, power, wealth, health, a good position in life, political freedom, happiness, religious consolation, and, perhaps, also virtue! If possession of all or most of these goods be the goal of our ethical endeavour—as it is held to be by all the present-day schools of ethics—we should then be engaged in an eternally incomplete task of appropriating as many of them for ourselves as possible, and that too each in the highest degree, and the difficulties that then rise up are such as to annihilate or nullify the very claims and considerations of a moral life. Not to anticipate what properly belongs to later chapters, we need mention here only a few of such difficulties. Consider, for instance, the well-known doctrine of the commensurability of values. It implies that when we have to choose between a higher and a lower good we can compare them and pronounce that the one possesses a greater value than the other. Accordingly, bribery, unfaithfulness, disloyalty etc. could be justified if we could thereby achieve some greater "hedonistic good." A moral agent may even find it necessary to adopt a morally degrading profession for the sake of producing a higher good! The ethics of "goods" is an ethics of consequences and the question of motives is plainly irrelevant. Consequently, no one would be justified in purchasing his own moral purity at the cost of other people's well-being? Virtue is only one of the "goods" of a blessed life, and where an individual happens to possess virtue in abundance and the other goods only in an insignificant measure, his ethical development is of a very inferior sort indeed.¹ Where, on the contrary, a person possesses abundant wealth, robust health, a cultivated intellect, a keen aesthetic sense, but little moral sensibility, he must ethically rank very high forsooth, for has he not realised a majority of the available goods? Morality is thus only a part of an ethical life so that no one is

1. To avoid possible misunderstanding here, I hasten to add that all this represents, not the writer's own standpoint, but the standpoint of ideal and evolutionary utilitarianism which he is criticising.

completely ethical unless, in addition to being moral, he or she is a scientist, an artist, a philosopher, a keen sportsman, a happy husband or wife, a beloved parent etc.. Unfortunately what happens very often in life is that in trying to acquire all these goods, so much time and energy are taken up that the individual has little of either left to acquire that other good, *viz.*, virtue; and besides the acquisition of this last good is so often found to be an obstacle to acquiring the others that it is thoroughly inconvenient to begin life with it; this is perhaps the reason why so many people are generally found to become members of moral clubs and Bible societies only after retirement—from active life, I mean.

Was it not from a sense of this same disparity between virtue and prudence that Leslie Stephen denied that the precise development of sympathy which will be most useful to society will also be most conducive to the happiness of the sympathetic individual? Did he not point out that the type best adapted for social tissue included many qualities besides those popularly called moral? "Nature", he wrote, "wants big, strong, hearty, eupeptic, shrewd, sensible human beings; and would be grossly inconsistent if she bestowed her highest reward of happiness upon a bilious, scrofulous, knock-kneed saint merely because he had a strong objection to adultery, drunkenness, murder and robbery, or an utter absence of malice or even highly cultivated sympathies."¹ Stephen's final conclusion was that an individual, if he consults his own happiness, need moralise himself only in a moderate degree—in that degree, in fact, which would reserve for the individual the freedom to subordinate his virtue when necessary to the supreme control of prudential reason.

In short, the logic of such an ethics necessarily is that the more we develop our wants and try to supply them, the wider and more numerous our interests in life, the more and more are we developing morally. Morality or virtue, it comes to be assumed, increases *pari passu* with our culture and status in life. And according to the same logic, a charity of a hundred rupees is more moral than one of ten rupees only (irrespective of the agent's ability to pay, and the circumstances of payment); to do a great right we must do a little wrong; to obtain a great

1. *Science of Ethics*, Ch. X. Section II, pp. 393 sqq. The whole section in fact is extremely instructive in this connection.

material good a small moral value may be sacrificed—for we are here concerned with the ethics of consequences, of producing and obtaining better and still better "goods." The end justifies the means, all is fair in love and war, nay, all is well that ends well.

A second difficulty would relate to the incompatibility of the various "goods." On the view that ethical life consists in the realisation of life's "values," it is impossible to resolve the double contradiction existing in the very heart of morality—so ably pointed out by Bradley—a contradiction which, he thinks, justifies him in dismissing goodness as an appearance. It is impossible to combine goodness or purity of will with objective efficacy of action, to reconcile the desire for self-development with the equally legitimate desire for self-sacrifice inherent in the very nature of the self, to harmonise the claims of the partial self with the claims of the total self. It is sometimes suggested that "reason clearly pronounces" for self-sacrifice in such cases, but reason cannot stifle its own voice by such a pronouncement, it must justify itself by producing a clear reason as to *how* or *why* it advises such self-surrender. The idealistic doctrine of the common good in which the individual can find his own true good does not mend matters either, for though it is generally true that my good as a whole can be secured only by subserving the interests of society at large, it is idle to suggest, at the level of thought we are now considering, that there can possibly be no cases in which I as an individual can stand only to gain by following a particular line of action which is harmful to others in the community I live in. What ought to be my conduct in such cases, *and why*?

Yet another difficulty of viewing ethics as a science of goods or values is revealed in the competitive character of the various "goods." This competition is two-fold. Since it is not possible to realise all the available goods in an individual life, the individual has to choose between them and select those most after his heart or capacity. There is thus a competition amongst the goods themselves for their own individual acceptance and realisation. (Imagine, for instance, a great scientist called upon to serve in the army). According to the way of thinking we are now discussing, however, every life in which one or more of the goods remain unrealised is *pro tanto* devoid of "true blessed-

ness," and no life can therefore be said to attain the true end of its being.¹ Secondly competition enters amongst the individuals for the possession of the largest share of these goods both in number and quantity. This phase of the question needs no elaboration. Sidgwick recognises this competitive character of the goods more clearly than any other thinker.² There is no gainsaying the fact that any system of ethics based on the conception of good as an objective fact, of the ideal as consisting of various intrinsically valuable goods, *ipso facto* renders the ideal competitive in character. And the admission of competition in the ethical field, in the appropriation of goods, leads, as Sidgwick recognises, to moral lapses no less grave than those involved in economic competition.³

Such is the fate of an ethics which passes beyond its jurisdiction and attempts to discuss the question of the highest good or value. For such an ethics makes several implicit assumptions regarding the nature of value of which the chief-most is that value is an objective existent independent of any necessary relation to the appreciating consciousness, and that the several values of life—pleasure, freedom etc.,—are out there beckoning to us to go forward and appropriate, realise and enjoy them. And thus ethics forgets that its primary concern is with one only of the numerous values, *viz.*, moral value, and insensibly transforms itself into the larger science of human welfare. But having done so, it does not systematically discuss the general problems of value either⁴,—it cannot, of course, in the nature of things, for it is blissfully unconscious of the fact that there are such problems at all to discuss—it simply takes certain obvious solutions of such problems for granted. The result is a perpetual and most bewildering confusion between the standpoint of morality or virtue proper and the standpoint of the larger science of human well-being or happiness. Sometimes it seems as if we are studying not ethics, but economics, politics etc.. The question may be narrowed down to one of the relation

1. Rashdall: *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II pp. 98-101. Of the whole standpoint of ethics as a science of "goods" or "moral goods" that we are now discussing, this work affords an excellent illustration.

2. *Lectures on the Ethics of Green* etc., pp. 65-68.

3. *Ibid*, p. 70.

4. Such as the commensurability of values, their incompatibility, competitiveness etc., noticed above.

between virtue and happiness. I do not want to raise just now the problem whether it is not possible ultimately to obtain, even through a perfectly virtuous life, happiness of some sort. Taking the word happiness in its ordinary, non-religious connotation, I ask, if happiness is our goal of life (as almost all systems of ethics assume at present), is it not the case that this often comes into conflict with the requirements of a virtuous life? Did not Kant and Sidgwick recognise this fact and in consequence postulate the existence of God as the only solution to the problem? Is not ethics passing beyond its boundaries in accepting any such postulate? How then can ethics, as a science of character and conduct,¹ place before itself a goal which cannot be attained through the means ordinarily open to it, an end which is not *in pari materia* with the means adopted, an end which in fact requires the sacrifice of the means most often? If it be thought that this characterisation of happiness and virtue as end and means respectively is misleading and that both of them are co-ordinate ends of moral life, then, how, I ask, can the same plan of life be fitted to realise two ends which are ordinarily contradictory of each other? It may be said that the opposition between character and value is unreal, because character is itself a *value*. True, but character is opposed to value in the same sense in which the good is the enemy of the better, the narrow the foe of the wider. We may seek character alone as a value; or we may seek happiness by itself as a realisation of the major values of life; or we may seek happiness *and* character in *separate* acts and processes of life. But we may not seek happiness *through* character or *vice versa*; we may not, at any rate, make happiness, or the question of the highest good, the primary concern of a science whose professed subject-matter is moral life. Well may Leslie Stephen write that "it is only upon condition of an alliance with the other useful qualities that we suppose virtue to imply happiness. Now as most men are very far from possessing the other qualities in perfection, it may be that their virtues should be diminished in proportion in order to produce a maximum of happiness. This, for example, is sometimes insinuated in the cynical maxim

1. There is a further difficulty here—even in the very definition of the scope and subject-matter of "ethics"—which will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter on "Moral Values."

which recommends us to keep our hearts cold and our stomachs warm, for this seems to be an epigrammatic assertion of the theory that warm affections are apt to be injurious to the digestion." Where a man does not observe this maxim of prudence, "We may either say that the man has too much virtue for his prudence, or that he has too little prudence for his virtue."¹ In short, the principles of human welfare do not coincide with the principles of character and conduct; the problem of righteousness is not identical with the problem of goodness. The scientist, the statesman, the law-giver etc., may, from the standpoint of value or social happiness, advocate certain things, as Plato has done in his communism of wives and property, or Nietzsche has done in his conception of the Superman, which may not, from a strictly moralistic point of view, be quite commendable. And the moralist may, from the standpoint of character-building and soul-purification, preach certain things, as Jesus has done in his Sermon on the Mount, which may not, from the point of view of collective and individual happiness, appear quite acceptable to the sociologist or the social psychologist or the practical statesman.

5. The fact of the matter is that there are two questions, two standpoints or emphases, in fact, two sciences, involved here which have not been distinguished, and recognised as distinct, in ethics so far. Ethics has all along been mixing them up and thus giving rise to endless troubles both in its theoretical and practical aspects. The confusion was started in Greek ethics and is being worse confounded in modern systems. The Greek outlook on life was pre-eminently that of value, the good, the *summum bonum*, or happiness; the modern note is predominantly that of duty, obligation, character, individual soul-purification. Yet Plato and Aristotle, not to speak of their master, Socrates, were as much concerned with virtue as a fitness of the soul as with virtue as outward efficiency in act, as strength, capacity, ability to realise good consequences. The dual conception of justice in Plato's *Republic*, both as an inward attunement of the parts of the soul—a justice which works "in the soul of him who possesses it, unseen by gods and men"—and as an outward expression of this harmony in that temperance or good understanding which

1. *Op. Cit.* pp. 395–396.

makes each part of the soul and each class of the state mind its own business without encroaching upon the spheres of the others, so as to realise the happiness of the *whole* soul and of the *whole* state—this two-fold conception of justice, I say, has justly become famous. But probably Greek thinkers in general did not feel that there was any opposition between personal integrity of character and happiness. The morality of a Greek citizen consisted, it is said, in his civic excellence. The Stoics were the first clearly to perceive the distinction, even the opposition, between goodness as moral purity and external "goods" of life which they called *adiaphora*, and they were right in rejecting the latter as unessential to the attainment of the former. But their complete rejection of goods *as such* for *life as a whole*, their division of mankind into wise men and fools and other such exaggerations and aberrations, naturally brought odium on their whole system of thought and practice and clouded the significance even of the good points in it. The teachings of Jesus have often been assailed—even by orthodox bishops themselves—as inadequate for living a full life and impracticable in a work-a-day world. But Jesus was simply not concerned with the question of human values in general—of how to make possible a life of happiness on the whole. He was occupied solely with calling upon men to reform their personal moral life and to lead, if possible, the life of God. Such a life need not necessarily mean a life of happiness, as we ordinarily understand the term. To criticise Jesus on this score is like criticising a man who is only five feet tall for not being five feet six inches tall. Nietzsche made this mistake when he attacked the morality of Christ's teachings as "servile" or "herd" morality, though probably there was justification for his condemnation in the exaggerated tendencies of the latter in his day. But an early disciple of Tolstoy and Schopenhauer that he was, he should have known better what their "negation of life" really stood for. Nevertheless the lasting merit of Nietzsche's thought consisted in that he discovered for the moderns the realm of values and its *prima facie* opposition to the demands of a moral life.

This opposition Kant had felt, even before Nietzsche and his masters, when he deliberately chose *right* as the funda-

mental concept of moral life and subordinated good to it.¹ Kant perceived that good was primarily a value concept and as such had nothing to do with rightness of conduct or goodness of character. He made the moral point of view supreme in ethics and where good, *i.e.*, value, touched the field of morals, it was under sufferance from right: whatever course of conduct was independently right, was also good morally, *i.e.*, had value for morality. As for the non-moral values *per se*, they were, according to Kant, indifferent to a moral life. Because he felt that good was primarily a value concept, he was so extremely averse to basing morality on empirical human nature, that is to say, upon a foundation of value or disvalue. For the interests of morality would be jeopardised so soon as you raised the question of its value or disvalue. This was what Kant meant when he said that morality should be formulated only in categorical, not in hypothetical, imperatives. But the defect of Kant's view was that he did not see that good was not merely a value concept, but essentially and primarily a concept of *generic* value of which natural value (like pleasure or happiness) and moral value (a good will) are two broad subdivisions. He seems to have identified value with natural value alone and therefore ruled out all value from the purview of ethics which for him was fundamentally a science of character. But value in the generic sense, it must be noted, does not necessarily conflict with moral value² and has prior right for consideration over moral value, for morality or no morality, the ultimate question of value is inexpugnable from the human consideration of things.

None of these thinkers, ancient or modern, have been able clearly to perceive that value and character represent two different interests which, while being opposed to each other at a certain level, are still both necessary for living the true human life. Greek ethics identified both, while emphasising value; Kant resented this identification and the emphasis and maintained that morality was primarily a problem of character;

1. This is the usual interpretation of Kant's thought. There are, however, thinkers who question it: *vide*, Joseph's *Some Problems in Ethics*, pp. 108-112; Muirhead's *Rule and End in Morals*, p. 78.

2. It is not in this sense that we are maintaining that there is a conflict between value and character, but in the sense of the specific non-moral values as contributing to the sum of human happiness.

Nietzsche scoffed at this "morality" and preached the doctrine of the Beyond-man who was super-moral, beyond good and evil. But in the mind of one and all, there has been, more than identification or separation, *confusion* between the two stand-points. While stressing the importance of character, they cannot brush aside happiness with a gesture; while welcoming the values which make for a whole life, a free life, and a wholesome life, they are painfully aware that such a life is by itself lacking in some fundamental quality, the quality of moral life, that it is the play of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Not perceiving the *distinctness* of the two problems, they are unable to discern the true *relation* between them. And so, as I have urged modern ethics, labouring under this confusion, has become janus-faced, so to say, with one face turned upon the world, the world of matter and material goods, of acquisition and possession, of creation and conservation of values; the other, more or less turned inwards upon itself, and engaged in the eternal task of self-creation, of creation of character, of moral self-purification. And the one often cannot bear the sight of the other. This is the real significance of the distinction, as I understand it, which McDougall draws between Universalistic and Nationalistic ethics in his thought-provoking work, *Ethics and Some World-Problems*. The confusion may also be illustrated by reference to two illustrious thinkers in contemporary ethics. Green, the idealist, rightly believes that it is not the *doing* of good actions, but the *being* good, that is the true sign of moral progress. The only true good, he considers, is to *be* good. Yet this supremacy of the character point of view in ethics is confused with the standpoint of external goods when Green declares that the *moral* ideal is self-realisation, realisation, that is, of the various powers and potentialities of the self, such as knowledge, beauty etc.. The true self is the rational self, the self which lives in the universe of rational insight. But what is the content of this universe? It is as wide as the universe of actual fact, and self-realisation would thus come to mean realising completely the world in which we live and acting constantly in the light of this understanding. Moral life is here expanding into a life of "goods," "values," and the dangers of stating the moral problem in this way have already been noticed. But Green himself appears to be blissfully obli-

vious of the fact that his view of good is slipping through his fingers. Sidgwick's chapter, "The Moral Ideal" in his *Lectures on the Ethics of Green etc.*, is an admirable elucidation of the confusion in Green's thought between ethics as a science of character, and ethics as a science of "goods." Writes Sidgwick: "And this [the fact that the promotion of the specifically moral virtues would leave no room for the cultivation of art and science] would, I think, have been clear to Green if he had not somehow allowed his thought to swing like a pendulum between a wider and a narrower ideal of true good, sometimes expanding it to culture, sometimes narrowing it to Virtue and the Good Will. When he thinks of full realisation of human capabilities, he brings in the development of artistic faculties and the cultivation of taste, as well as the development of scientific faculties and the pursuit of knowledge of all kinds; when he wants to bring out its non-competitive character, we find it shrunk to virtue and goodness of will. The wider ideal is in his mind when he speaks of social duty—for instance, when he speaks of the duty of securing for the poor 'real opportunity of self-development'.....Yet the most unrelenting competition does not interfere with the exercise of virtue on the part of the weakest competitor....."¹

Prof. Moore, again, the realist, thinks that the two fundamental questions of ethics are the definition of the nature of good and the determination of what things are good. He thus equates ethics, as observed before, with the science of value, and seems to relegate the question of conduct—of what ought to be done—to the background. And yet when he makes capital out of the point that of any definition of good (*i.e.*, value) that is offered—such as good is pleasure or good is beauty *etc.*—it is always possible to ask the significant question, *Is it* (*i.e.*, pleasure or beauty in terms of which good is defined) good? one cannot help suspecting that unless this is a verbal puzzle, the question is significant only because of the *moral* implications which it embodies. Otherwise, when one has explained exhaustively the meaning of goodness by identifying it with something else (you may agree or not with this identification and it *may* give rise to a naturalistic fallacy, but this is hardly relevant), to ask of the latter whether

1. Lecture V. pp. 71–72.

it is itself good is surely absolutely meaningless. It acquires a meaning only because we are now asking whether a value like pleasure or beauty (with which goodness in general is identified) is still *morally* worthy or admissible in life. This is why we can, even of Moore's ideals, *viz.*, pleasures of social intercourse and contemplation of beauty, ask the significant question, Are they good, *i.e.*, morally worthy ideals to be followed? Prof. Urban also witnesses to this same confusion in his writings.

I think I have sufficiently explained and illustrated what I have called "the Great Error" in modern ethics, the confusion of good as value in general with good as *moral* value in particular. Moral goodness is not equivalent to goodness of life as a whole. A good life is not the same as a life which is good. The two questions belong to two different inquiries which certainly touch each other at certain points but which cannot be merged the one in the other. The scope of the science of value will presently be defined. As regards ethics, it must adopt the point of view of a general theory of value in respect of the definition and meaning of generic value and the general problems that necessarily appertain to such a theory. Since a general theory of value determines not only the meaning of generic value, but the nature of specific values as well and their individual contribution to human happiness as a whole, ethics, as the science of a specific value, must receive from the larger science the definition of the meaning of morality or moral value and the fundamental principles of moral life. How these principles are applied in practical moral life, what is the significance of the so-called "virtues," the problems arising from the interrelations of these virtues as moral sub-values, the realisation of these values both in the individual and in the society at large, these and many other questions of a like nature belong to the science of ethics.

The question, then, what is the *summum bonum* of life, is not properly speaking a question for ethical science, but essentially one for the science of value. And so the discussion of the *meaning* of good, *i.e.*, of the notion of value, is entirely *ultra vires* in ethics. Such perfunctory discussion of it as is generally offered in treatises on ethics conduces only to confusion of issues as above described. Generally speaking, such discussions of value questions from the standpoint of ethics as such results

in a double danger. On the one side it must ignore or cover up the peculiar problems of moral value; on the other, it would give an unduly moralistic bias to, and distort the general problems of, value. Moore's *Principia Ethica* is a classical example of the first result. What with his indefinability of good, his laws and tests of intrinsic value, and his conception of organic wholes as ideals of perfection, it is hardly easy to make out whether one is reading a work on value or morals, and the uncertainty is deepened by the discovery that in a work ostensibly dealing with ethical problems, there is only one insignificant chapter devoted to conduct.¹ A most impressive work illustrating the second result is the recent *Ethics* of Prof. Hartmann of Berlin. While recognising, for the first time in the history of ethical thought, the distinctness of the two problems involved in ethics, Hartmann's great work suffers from the fact that his major conclusions on the general theory of value appear to be warped by the moralistic bias which lies patently on every page of that work.²

It is the part of wisdom, then, to keep the two enquiries separate and distinct as far as possible.

But, it may be said, there is presupposed throughout the argument a wrong conception of the nature of morality. Morality is not an independent value by itself which may be realised in abstraction from the other values of life such as knowledge, culture, beauty, economic competency etc.. Sundered from these concrete contents of life, moral life would be but an empty name and an unsubstantial form. If this be so, then the opposition between virtue and values becomes unreal, for virtue lives in values, it is the form of a life whose inner content consists of values. Man does not live by virtue alone. This objection raises an important issue regarding the separate existence or the independent reality of the so-called moral value—an issue which cannot be discussed at the present stage of our argument. Even granting, for argument's sake, that morality, as merely the formal aspect of a life of values, has no

1. The 5th, "Ethics in relation to Conduct."

2. A substantiation of this contention will be found in the writer's Presidential address on "Ethics and 'Normatics'" before the Ethics and Religion Section of the Tenth Indian Phil. Congress 1934; vide *Proceedings*, pp. 23—44.

independent existence, it does not follow that it has no uniqueness of its own. A dependent entity—a slave depending on his master, a child depending on its mother etc.,—still has a nature of its own—that peculiar nature by virtue of which it is made dependent upon other entities, and such a nature requires investigation on its own account. That is to say, morality cannot be confused with the other values of life—the concrete ends or purposes of life—whose investigation forms a different enquiry altogether. And when it is remembered that morality or virtue, though bearing a necessary relation to the other values of life, is still not their *dependent*, but their *master* and *superior*, that which regulates them and determines the manner of their realisation, the ineptness of looking upon ethics as a science of values becomes quite apparent.¹

6. From the preceding discussion of the legitimate scope of the social and philosophical sciences in general and of ethics in particular, it should be clear that the scope of a science of value is very wide indeed. Its scope, as I conceive it, is only next to that of philosophy itself, or perhaps co-extensive with it. If philosophy attempts to rationalise human experience as a whole, the science of value (normatics, axiology) tries to evaluate that experience. If philosophy asks ultimate questions regarding the nature of reality and human destiny, normatics² asks equally ultimate questions regarding the final significance and value of various phases of reality-experience. If philosophy criticises the root-assumptions or postulates of various sciences such as the concepts of space and time, of matter and energy, cause and effect, life and mind etc., normatics criticises the root-concepts of life as a whole such as use or utility, value and disvalue, validity and invalidity, good and evil, purpose and function, end or ideal, norm or standard. If philosophy essays to correlate the results of all the sciences so as to present a harmonious picture of the universe in its living moving aspect, normatics aspires equally to co-ordinate the results of all the sciences, especially the social sciences, so as to discover their significance, their value, to human life. In fact, it is not surpri-

1. See Ch. XII, § 1.

2. The science dealing with norms and their application—the name I suggest for the science of value in general, or the general theory of value. See Ch. II.

sing that the provinces of philosophy and normatics should, to a certain extent, overlap. For philosophy also endeavours in a sense to understand the significance and meaning of life and experience as a whole, and, in this, is to be distinguished from the positive sciences which, for the most part, are concerned with questions of fact rather than with questions of validity. There is, however, this distinction between philosophy and normatics, that the former (in this being one with the positive sciences) essentially expresses the theoretical desire to know, to understand, *the universe in general*, to make *things in general* intelligible (maybe sometimes more through the heart than through the head, more by experience than by the mere intellect), while the latter, as a science of value, estimates what things are needed to *live*, what things have *value for life*, what kind of life has *quality* or *worth* in it—questions all of which presuppose the discussion of the ultimate question, what is the notion of value. In short, wherever the aspect of value or worth is in question, be it in economics, in ethics, in politics, in jurisprudence, in theory of knowledge, in philosophy of religion etc., the enquiry properly belongs to Normatics or the Science of Value. In every one of these sciences, the really philosophical problems are problems of value. In logic and epistemology, for instance, it is a question of probability and certainty, truth and falsity, knowledge and opinion and belief—establishing, that is, a scale of logical values; in aesthetics, the criticism of art, the meaning and criterion of beauty, the place of art in life etc.,—all these being value-problems; in religion it is a question of conservation or transmutation of values; likewise in jurisprudence, economics, politics and philosophy of education. Thus the problems of normatics are central in or basic to all philosophy and not merely incidental to other problems.

Normatics, in short, is the science of human well-being *par excellence*. It is a separate independent science with peculiar problems of its own. It considers the nature of human welfare, the kind of well-being that is suited to human persons with their characteristic desires, feelings and endowments. It asks the question, what is human good, as well as the question, what is the highest human good, the *summum bonum*, whether it is one or many, a unity or a multiplicity, a harmony or a medley. And in the light of its answer, it considers what share every element

of human nature—passional, emotional, volitional, moral, intellectual, spiritual—ought to have in this total well-being, and what contribution every science or group of sciences which expresses one fundamental need of human nature makes to that well-being. It seeks in other words to collect all the different "goods" of life—goods in economics, in ethics, in politics, in religion, in the material sciences etc.—and to consider each in its bearing upon human well-being as a whole. It thus helps to live a full life, a whole life, a wholesome life. Its task in one sense exceeds that of philosophy and the social sciences, for it evaluates these sciences and studies them from the standpoint of human well-being, while in another sense (which is quite obvious) it is only one of the sciences and is lesser than philosophy. What philosophy is to all the sciences, what sociology is to all the social sciences, that normatics is to all the social and philosophical sciences. It is a science of human life in general.

Metaphysics is sometimes claimed to be a purely non-value study. Prof. Urban's contention (in *The Intelligible World*) that the very distinction between the real and the unreal, being and non-being, the existent and the "non-existent, presupposes the acknowledgment of value, and that therefore metaphysics is a value-science *par excellence*, is rather of doubtful force. But I would say this much: if the real is treated as the significant or the meaningful, if the conception of "degrees of reality" is interpreted as meaning degrees of perfection or excellence, if the All-whole or All-soul implies not mere quantitative comprehensiveness but also qualitative richness, then surely metaphysics is at bottom a study in value. But if reality be interpreted merely as existence, and the primary concern of metaphysics is to determine what exists, then existence is not a value category—not everything that exists has value or is value. Then metaphysics would properly belong to the class of the positive sciences, concerned of course with the determination of the broad *a priori* characters of the existent and their relations.

7. There are two main functions, then, which a science of value has to fulfil. In the first place, there are certain very general questions which constitute what may be called the general theory or metaphysics of value. Such are the questions: what is the meaning of value, and what are its relations both to the object having value and the subject who values; the genesis

of value and its fluctuations; the psychological presuppositions of the value-judgment; the relation of fact to value, of existence to worth, of "ought" to "is." In line with these questions are the further questions, what in general is the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value; the measurability and comparability of values; the commensurability of values; the nature of human good or well-being; what constitutes such well-being; is there and if so, in what sense can there be, an absolute good or value; and last, but by no means the least, the question of the metaphysical implications of a study of value. In the second place, there remains the empirical study, so to say, of the different realms of value—the question of the contribution of the different sciences to human well-being as a whole, and the determination of the relative position which should be assigned to each type of value—economic, political, ethical, aesthetic etc., in the economy of life as a whole. This study may therefore properly be called "the Critique of Values." Normatics thus comprises the whole range of value-experience in human life. Though the theory or metaphysics of value and the critique or philosophy of values form two natural divisions of the science of value, the present work, owing to the theory which it holds regarding the nature of value, does not follow this clear-cut line of demarcation. Since it holds that value is in its nature "emergent" upon the affective-volitional life of man brought into relation with the outside world, it has perforce to show how every important value is thus brought into existence. And the general theory of value adopted in these pages is of such a character that a discussion of the *origin* of a value involves at the same time a discussion of the *meaning*, the *significance* or the *essential nature* of the value in question. Accordingly, after a consideration of some of the main problems relating to the general nature of value in five or six chapters, the rest of the present volume is mainly devoted to a critique of the concrete values. The determination of the respective contribution of these specific values to human well-being as a whole, and what that well-being consists in, is not, however, undertaken in this volume. It, together with other questions that appertain to the pure theory of value, especially in regard to its metaphysical implications narrowly so-called, forms the material for a second volume of the present work.

CHAPTER II

THE NORMATIVE POINT OF VIEW.

1. I have called the science of value "Normatics" and perhaps this word requires some explanation before we can proceed any further. And it is as well that we begin with a discussion of this point, for such a discussion will naturally lead to the conception of value adumbrated in the following pages. The distinction between the "normative" and the "positive" sciences has been familiar to all students of philosophy who learn in their undergraduate days that logic, ethics and aesthetics are normative sciences because they judge, evaluate, estimate their subject-matters from the standpoint of a norm or standard, while psychology, physics, chemistry etc., are positive sciences since they simply describe natural phenomena just as they occur without raising the question of their correctness or incorrectness, rightness or wrongness, value or disvalue. And they are further told that this distinction cannot be taken as absolute or ultimate, for on the one hand the question of the value of a thing necessarily involves its study as a fact, while a fact as such cannot be studied profitably without raising the question of its significance.) The larger issues of this problem which appears under various guises such as the antithesis between genesis and validity, appreciation and description etc., do not directly concern us here, but the precise meaning of this distinction and its bearing upon our present problem must surely be determined. The point of the distinction ultimately turns upon the following question: Is there or is there not an element in appreciation which in the last analysis is left untouched by description? To the present writer at any rate it appears indubitable that there is such an element. (Consider, for instance, the case of a lover waiting for his beloved at a rendezvous on a bright moonlight night when the north-easter is gently blowing in his face. The situation is susceptible of easy scientific analysis and description. The physicist may analyse the moon's rays into their constituent elements, and determine the degree of their cooling effect upon the human body. The weather expert may specify the exact direction of

the blowing wind, and he may be capable also of calculating the exact percentage of moisture and of heat conveyed in its waves. The psychologist again could, by means of his emotometer, measure the intensity of the lover's emotions and, by a few judicious questions wisely put, find out the degree of the subordination of intellect to passion and emotion in such a case. All these are facts of observation to be *described* or scientifically *interpreted*. There may be other elements in the situation left out in the present analysis, but if there are, even these would likewise be capable of description or interpretation in terms of causal relatedness. The scientist—of whatever class he be—could find nothing that was not strictly capable of such causal explanation. But if a poet were to study the same situation, or if the lover were himself a poet, he would perhaps say that the moon's rays *scorched* the heart and the body of the impatient lover while the cold north-easter *wafted and softly whispered warm words* of affection and quick arrival from the beloved. Here is a possible experience that would baffle the best efforts of the psychologist, the physicist and the weather expert. If the experience be real, no sort of causal categories are *adequate* to explain it. For here enters what Lloyd Morgan has happily called the element of dramatic explanation—the explanation of events and experiences from the standpoint of the agent's *motive* or *purpose* or *expectation*. Doubtless motives or purposes are themselves capable of causal interpretation by being related to antecedent motives etc., and an experience such as the one above described is also amenable to description in causal terms. But what is contended here is that such an interpretation in causal terms is *inadequate* to render the experience thoroughly intelligible and so calls for dramatic explanation. Now explanation in terms of purpose is of course not contradictory of, or incompatible with, interpretation in terms of causal relatedness; in fact it may itself be called teleological causation. But the discussion of this is not to our point here. What, however, I wish to suggest is that if dramatic explanation be a possible and legitimate mode of explaining experience, then every such explanation has to do with an element of appreciation that is over and above the "facts" covered by description.

2. It is not to the point to argue, as Urban, for example,

urges,¹ that appreciation of value is itself a fact, or that value can be cognised as a fact as well as appreciated. Nor does it obliterate the distinction between appreciation and description to say that there can be no kind of scientific description without an element of appreciation. Appreciation of value may itself be a fact; and value may be cognised as a fact (though this is a more doubtful proposition). But appreciation itself is not of a fact though it may be *about* a fact. That is, it is not value that is appreciated, nor the norm applied, but the conformity or otherwise of a fact to the norm; value is born in such appreciation. A fact *as such* (be it even the value fact or the norm fact) cannot be appreciated, but only cognised, though in common parlance we do speak of appreciating facts. What we really mean when we talk of appreciating a fact, say a person's conduct, is that his conduct conforms or approximates to a type of conduct ideally conceived and that it is this conformity or approximation that we appreciate. And here the conformity or non-conformity is not a *fact* in the same sense in which my toothache, or pleasure in eating puddings, or an out-break of cholera, or the flowers on a plant, or the moon's rays, or the blowing of the north-easter, or the thoughts in the lover's mind, may be said to be a fact or facts. It is a matter of opinion, judgment, criticism, or even blind feeling if you like, provided it is remembered that neither this opinion nor judgment nor criticism nor feeling—every one of which is a fact, to be sure,—is itself the conformity or non-conformity in question which is the point of appreciation or valuation. The conformity etc., is a *meaning* or *significance* ideally perceived.² Opinion, judgment etc., are only the means or vehicles of appreciation of this meaning, or, if the phrase be preferred, they are its *expression*. "Facts"—as ordinarily understood—can be proved or demonstrated by all or any of the methods and weapons employed by science—by observation and experiment, measurement, calculation etc., whereas the fact (if it be one) appreciated, *i.e.*, the element of

1. *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*. It must be noted here that the entire spirit of this work—the bringing together of the descriptive (scientific) and the valuatory (normative) points of view—has been given up by the author in his latest work on value "*The Intelligible World*." This latter work represents a standpoint which can only be explained by saying that it is a swing to the other extreme.

2. What precisely is meant by "meaning" here will be determined in a subsequent chapter (IV).

conformity or non-conformity to an ideal standard, cannot thus be proved. Secondly, facts of nature taken as such *can* be interpreted in terms of physical and mental relatedness alone as in accordance with the order of nature, while the conformity etc., cannot thus be adequately interpreted but also requires to be explained in terms of dramatic regard, with reference, that is, to an ideal or aspiration, a hope or an expectation. Even here, be it noted, the conformity etc., is not *caused* (in the ordinary physical sense of the term) by the ideal but only explained by it; the physical act which along with its mental antecedents and consequents we call conduct may in a true sense be said to have been *caused* (teleological causation) by the ideal, but not the conformity etc.. This is no more *caused* by the ideal (or anything else) than the difference, say, between two and three, or between a big stone and a small stone, is caused by either number or either stone. And thirdly a fact as such is an event, an occurrence having a particular location in time and space—it is an event-particle or a point-instant. The conformity etc., like a genuine universal—and indeed much more truly than a universal—is something out of time and space. Appreciation as a *fact* may have a spatial and temporal location but that which is appreciated *viz.*, the element of conformity etc., as an ideal meaning or significance, can have no such determination.

It may be urged, of course, on the other side of the question, that, as has already been pointed out, every true scientific description contains an element of appreciation. We shall first consider this question from the standpoint of the more simple and elementary "fact." A little reflection would be sufficient to convince any one that what we ordinarily call "a fact" is not itself the datum but the datum with a good deal of interpretation inseparably mixed with it. The given *i.e.*, the basis in sense-perception, plus the element of construction put upon it, constitutes "the fact."¹ And doubtless the abstraction from concrete experience which we designate as the given, as well as the construction or interpretation put upon it, are both undertaken with a definite purpose. It is with a certain definite

1. I am using the term "fact" in its ordinary signification for my present purpose without raising the question whether, metaphysically speaking, a fact, as McTaggart defines it, for instance, exists or not.

interest indeed that we single out a particular person from the mass of humanity and call him or her brother or sister. So far we may agree. But I cannot see how the element of *appreciation* enters here. Appreciation involves not merely purpose or interest, but, as has already been shown, the element of conformity or approximation to a type or standard. When I call a blood-relation of mine "brother," or when I describe the properties of moon's rays or the characteristics of the north-easter, what is the element of conformity or approximation to a standard herein involved? None, so far as I can see. No doubt "brothers" are expected to stand in certain moral relations towards one another in virtue of their blood-connection, but a brother of mine who fails to fulfil such expectations is still a "brother" for all that—a *fact* which cannot be altered. But should I choose to call a stranger who has behaved kindly towards me "brother," then the element of appreciation comes in, for I am implicitly judging his conformity to the standard of what a brother ought to be. The actual properties or the characteristics of the object as they can be determined by scientific analysis and experiment are the subject-matter of scientific description. This is what is usually meant when it is said that scientific description must be "true to facts," "impartial" "disinterested," and that the scientific investigator must be prepared to follow the lead of facts whithersoever they may take him. If this is not what is meant, then the whole history and methods of science must be revised. If this is the real meaning and nature of a "fact," the same, on merely an enlarged scale, is true of every kind of scientific description however complex or vast be the subject-matter on hand.

3. Scientific description, *per se*, then, cannot in any sense be said to contain any element of appreciation. This is not, however, to say that scientific enterprise is totally devoid of appreciation. Far from this being the case, a good deal of theoretical and practical science is largely appreciative. The task of framing a hypothesis in order to explain an observed fact or group of facts is nothing but a form of appreciation, for here the investigator expects that the facts will conform to the theoretical deductions possible from his hypothesis and it is this element of conformity etc., which is the backbone of the hypothetical method, that justifies or condemns the hypothesis.

Further, appreciation always involves an element of risk, of chance, of the fact not conforming to the ideal or norm. It takes its stand on an *als ob*. It proceeds as if the facts conformed to the ideal but it might turn out that they did not. Just because there is this element of uncertainty about it, does it deserve to be called appreciation and not description, possibility and not "fact." Likewise a hypothesis always takes a leap, makes a jump, into the region of the unknown, and because of its hypothetical nature it is inappropriate to call it a "fact" before it is verified. Thus framing a hypothesis is in a real sense appreciating or valuing the facts, it is not description. Where things are known to be what they are, where they cannot but be otherwise than what they are, valuing or appreciating is entirely meaningless: description is the only legitimate method to be employed. To value on the other hand means to be uncertain, to choose between alternatives, to risk, to dare. Appreciation is daring in face of doubts and perplexities.

It may be argued that not only the framing of hypotheses but also the ordinary descriptions of science involve conformity etc., to a norm. When a rod is measured and found to be five feet long, when sodium and chlorine are mixed and observed to form sodium chloride according to the statement in the text-book, when the cause of fever is discovered to lie in the bite of malarial mosquito according to expectation, in all these cases, it may be said, we have certain facts to start with which subsequently are examined and found to conform or not to the standard—the foot-rule, the formula, the expectation. And if conformity etc., is of the essence of appreciation, then we seem to have that element in the descriptive work of science. Yes, but we must carefully discriminate between cases. As a general rule we may lay down that wherever we have the element of suggestion prominently involved, or the method of hypothesis employed, we have the process of appreciation or valuation in germ. And by this criterion, surely much of the work of science is appreciative or valuatory. But where a problematic element is not involved, where there is no *as if*, where the concern is with "brute" or "naked" fact as such, we have only description but not appreciation. The experiment with sodium and chlorine according to the text-book formula is not scientific investigation proper, but only learning at second-hand the accumulated

knowledge of science, and when *first* sodium and chlorine were mixed together and found to form sodium chloride, there was no standard or hypothesis to which the facts could be expected to conform. Measuring an object with a foot-rule, again, merely to find out its length, is determining the brute fact simply with no element of chance or risk in it. As for the methods of determining causal connection, here also the same criterion holds. If the element of suggestion or hypothesis were present from the beginning and controlled the investigation throughout, it is justly the work of appreciation; where, on the other hand, cause and effect are determined purely by investigation of facts with no element of suggestion involved, we have only description, but not appreciation.

4. This conclusion is sometimes challenged on various grounds. It is said that even in ordinary perception, apart from scientific construction of hypotheses, as when we see an object before us and call it a horse, the application of a norm is involved in so far as we understand by that object something which every being which is to be called a horse is expected to be. A fact, in other words, can only be understood through a norm, an ideal, to which it is expected to conform. But the interpenetration of fact and ideal involved in this view is not pertinent to our inquiry, for it is the presupposition of all intelligent experience and it is not in this sense that we are trying to understand the relation of description to appreciation. What is involved in common perception is an idea rather than an ideal—unless of course we are prepared to affirm that all ideas, universals, are ideals, a view which has its own difficulties. Otherwise whatever is meaningful would therefore be ideal or normative. But we agree to treat a certain class of meanings, that is to say, interpretations, such as the meanings of perceptual experience, as given in experience,¹ and what we are now asking is whether over and above these conventional meanings, there is an additional meaning in perception—or scientific interpretation—which is not given, a meaning which is involved in exclaiming, for instance, that yonder tree is grand! And it is clear that such a meaning does not exist in perception or scientific interpretation. To treat perception itself as normative

1. Vide Ch. X, "Intellectual Value."

is to deny the given entirely, for at no point in perceptual experience can we dissociate the element of the given from that of construction, and to regard therefore everything as given or everything as construction is to disregard all useful distinctions.

The problem threatens to widen out into a discussion of the relation of the actual (fact) to the ideal, which is not germane to the present issue. But Prof. Taylor's view that the distinction between a normative science and a positive science is unjustified on the ground that all sciences (including even the physical) deal with the "ought-to-be" and not merely with "what is", needs some consideration. His point is that the "ought-to-be" is only a further stage in the "is"; the ideal is ideal only to the present stage, but an actual in the development of a fact at a later stage. Logic, for example, is concerned with how we ought to reason, and aesthetics with the way in which certain perceived contents ought to affect the spectator's emotions. But so also the man of medicine might say: "There ought to be altered light reflexes along with the symptoms of this patient, but hitherto I have failed to distinguish them." The ought-to-be is determined in the different sciences by a close study of what is, so also should it be in ethics. If only we study the actual moral life of different people, we would be able to determine the ideal at some point or other. The ought can be known from the is.

Considering the question in its general aspect as the problem of the meaning of normativity in the natural sciences, and without stressing the specific character of ethical normativity (which is obviously different from logical or even aesthetic normativity), we must begin by admitting that no science—neither logic, nor ethics, nor aesthetics—is purely normative just as no science—not even physics or mathematics—is entirely factual or positive. But this should not blind us to the fact that the *general standpoint* of a natural science is non-normative, in the strict sense of the term, and that if any kind of normativity is attributable to it at all, it would be in a different sense altogether. To say that a scientific phenomenon ought to be different from what it is means that it is not in agreement with some hypothesis formed before. But if the present fact has been observed correctly, the discrepancy condemns not the fact observed but the hypothesis suggested. In logical thinking

or moral practice, on the contrary, disagreement of a present fact (thought or act) with the ideal (truth or goodness) convicts not the ideal but the fact itself. In no sense then can a general principle of science be said to correspond to a moral or logical norm. It has no absoluteness.

That something ought to be means that it is not, that it might be different from what it is. Has any natural phenomenon this power to be different from what it is? Facts are what they are. We might indeed wish them to be otherwise, but our wishes have never been consulted in the constitution of the world of nature which is a world of necessity. "Ought" has really no significance with reference to natural facts. Investigate facts however far we may, we can never stumble upon an ideal amongst them at any stage. Ideals and norms are only for conscious beings who can perceive the difference between the present fact and the ideal-to-be and aspire to realise the latter. In what sense then can we understand Taylor's statement that the *ought* can be known from the *is*, that the distinction between a normative and a positive science is false? Only in the sense that these are two aspects of a science which cannot entirely be dissociated from each other, that the ought must somehow be related to the *is*. But these are contentions that we have already granted and to them we have nothing more to add at present.¹

I have discussed this question of appreciation *versus* description at some length because it is sometimes contended on the one hand that the normative standpoint is not, strictly speaking, a standpoint of actual experience and that all true scientific work is description and nothing more, while, on the other, extravagant claims are sometimes put forward for science in the statement that there is no description without appreciation and *vice versa*. In the light of our above discussion the limits within which scientific work can be called "normative" must now be clear. (There is, however, a further limitation which will be discussed immediately). Indeed, if it is true that science aims at discovering—in some sense—the truths of nature, one cannot see how science can escape being valuatory, for it is a commonplace that truth is one of the values.

1. *Vide* Ch. IV.

Nevertheless the general standpoint of science, it needs to be re-affirmed, is purely intellectualistic, abstractionist, non-valuatory. It delights in reducing the world of objects and persons, of love and hate and social intercourse—of concrete experience, in short,—to a string of mathematical formulae or logical abstractions from which the aspect of concrete meaning or *value* has completely fled. The story is told of a funny incident that happened at one of Russell's lectures on the "Philosophy of Physics" delivered under the auspices of the British Philosophical Institute during the Lent term of 1928. "At the conclusion of one of these evening discourses (which I had been regularly attending)—and this was on the nature of substance—one elderly gentleman, an artist by profession, took the lead during the question-time and made the telling remark: 'I have followed with rapt attention the framework of the Physical universe which the lecturer this evening has unscrolled before our admiring eyes. But when I am told in the name of a Philosophy of Physics to believe that my wife sitting next to me is a mere 'formula' representing a group of events in the series— $x + f_1(x) dt + f_2(x) dt^2 + \dots + f_n(x)$ being a continuous function of time, it sends a thrill of horror through my blood.' The whole house burst into a peal of laughter, but the redoubtable Mr. Russell rose equal to the occasion and replied with a characteristic smile: 'I cannot help it: such is in the abstract the character of the universe and I was not consulted at the time of its creation'."¹

Apart from the humour of the situation, the retort of Mr. Russell unmistakably brings out the vicious abstractionism and intellectualism of the method of science against which literary and art critics like Mr. Middleton Murry,² and religiously inclined thinkers like Mr. Lawrence Hyde,³ have alike been complaining. Where is room for value in such a scheme of things as science portrays?

5. What then is the normative standpoint and how does this represent the science of value? Normativity implies (1) the dominance of purpose, some end in view, of a conscious agent

1. *Towards a Systematic Study of the Vedanta* : S. K. Das, p. 276.

2. In the pages of the *Adelphi*. Also vide, *God : An Introduction to Metabiology*.

3. *The Learned Knife*.

who judges, criticises, values, appreciates, in the light of such a purpose ; (2) the employment of a norm or standard ideally conceived ; (3) conformity or non-conformity of the fact—object or event—to this standard ; (4) appreciation or estimation of this conformity etc.. Everyone of these factors—logically analysable indeed but inseparable in concrete experience—has its own peculiar significance and is thus fundamental for the normative standpoint. The prevalence of purpose in experiences of value can be granted by all. It is not, however, forgotten that a powerful school exists and has existed in the realm of art which has popularised the slogan of "art for art's sake." A detailed consideration of this question is not called for in this connection, because the dictum, if it be one, does not obviously apply to any normative science other than aesthetics. Even as applied to art, however, the dictum is only a half-truth, for, apart from the question whether art can be justified without a moral basis, there is the wider consideration that purpose of *some* sort—not necessarily moral—must inspire every portrayal, be it in letters, on the canvas, or on the harp. It may be the purpose of holding a mirror up to nature, or the purpose of transcribing life as it is—neither softening nor thickening the colours—or it may be the purpose of pure unalloyed pleasure, of catching in a moment's eye the wide expanse of eternity. In any case, to talk of art without a purpose is to talk to no purpose. Now, purpose, properly interpreted, connotes utility, widely conceived. I am not now suggesting or defending the doctrine of utilitarianism in morals and politics—that doctrine which has been much maligned in the history of philosophy. The realisation of any purpose whatever—be it even of disinterested morality—is so far a result, something achieved or accomplished—a useful result—and in so far we may speak of our standpoint as being utilitarian.

Utilitarianism in this sense must be taken to express the philosophy of all conduct. For conduct as such aims at the realisation of some useful result—in whatever sense this may be conceived. Conduct means deliberate action and such action is always aimed at something—some desirable end or consequence which the agent wants to bring about by means of his action. This aspect of the concrete situation must not be lost sight of in any interpretation of conduct. Conduct implies

some desirable result or consequence. There is or can be no conduct which is unrelated to its proper fruit. In this sense then motive and intention—end and result—idea and realisation—are identical, and the question often discussed in ethics whether the moral worth of an action depends on the motive or the consequences of the act—the distinction between subjective and objective rightness—seems to be devoid of meaning,¹ for a motive without its consequence, and a consequence without the motive which inspired it, are both unreal abstractions from concrete experience and as such have no validity. The concrete act is one and indivisible and the effecting of some useful result, the bringing about of some desirable consequence, is the guiding light which illumines the action from beginning to end. This is nothing but the realisation of some purpose and purpose is therefore unintelligible apart from some useful result or consequence. To purpose is to intend or design something,—it may be in idea to begin with, it must be in action in the long run—that is, it must be some result in the concrete, and no result will be desired except in so far as it is believed to be *useful*, conducive to the agent's or others' well-being in some sense. Purpose, then, is equivalent to desirable (believed to be such, at any rate) or useful result or achievement; at all events this is its life and soul and essence. Purpose is thus always utilitarian. If we would analyse the notion of "usefulness" or "utility" further, we should find that it always involves a relation to one's life and consciousness. A thing is "useful" in so far as it favourably affects (or is believed so to affect) one's life either in relation to one's practical conduct or in relation to one's mental and spiritual development or well-being. Apart from its *effects* upon the life and consciousness of the agent or of some other person, the agent cannot judge a thing to be "useful." Indeed the very notion of "usefulness" implies being useful or conducive to the furtherance of some aspect of life, or being positively related to some wider universe which includes that aspect of the agent's life and to which the agent is mentally attached. Well, now, if utility is thus necessarily related to life and consciousness, and purpose always implies utility, it is clear that purpose can have

1. See Ch. XII. Where, however, unforeseen consequences ensue from an action, the case is different, for such consequences could not be said to have been willed by the moral agent.

no significance apart from the *effects upon* or relation to the life and consciousness of some agent. Our normative standpoint will then imply that an object is judged, criticised or appreciated only with reference to some useful result for or effect upon the life and consciousness of some agent.¹ Nothing is then good or beautiful or "useful" (in the narrow economic sense) which is not in some sense related to the life and consciousness of living beings. The case of "truth" is rather doubtful, for here it is not so very clear that the "true" must necessarily be related to life and consciousness. Yet on mature reflection it would appear that the accumulation of knowledge for its own sake is not so very desirable or laudable an enterprise as when it is brought into relation with the life of living beings at some point or other. This much at any rate is clear; if knowledge is to be called a value or appreciated as such, it must at some point touch life. Knowledge *for its own sake* is no more a "value" to be striven for than the construction of tanks for their own sakes—merely in order that rain-water may collect itself in one place—is an enterprise to be undertaken. The unravelling of nature's secrets undertaken by science and the increasing control thereby gained by man over nature's operations, can be said to have the ultimate aim of increasing the sum of human happiness, and the enterprise of the scientist is justified only when it has this possibility latent in it. Nevertheless, the immediate question is not about the grounds upon which knowledge can be called a "value," but about the grounds upon which a given account of a matter can be called "true." This naturally involves epistemological considerations which go beyond the scope and intention of the present chapter.² Our question is: does the judgment that something is true necessarily involve an appraisal of its relation to human life and consciousness? It involves, in *some* cases, *appreciation* or *estimation* as we have seen; and in so far as is a normative judgment. But is the appreciation, even in the limited cases, based upon an element of purpose as defined above? This is rather debatable and it is for this reason that

1. It will be seen that the above account of appreciation is diametrically opposed to that of Prof. Urban who holds that valuation is primarily an experience of "simple appreciation" undetermined by any conscious purpose or practical attitude (*Vide, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*, pp. 31—33).

2. See Chapter X.

physical sciences like physics, chemistry etc., are generally described as "positive" sciences and contrasted with "normative" sciences. It is this which constitutes a further limitation upon the normative character of physical sciences. All social sciences—all sciences which bear an intimate relation to human life and consciousness—are essentially normative sciences, *i.e.*, fall within the purview of "Normatics" or the Science of Value.

6. Now as regards the norm or standard. What does the norm represent? Is it subjective or objective? In the first place, the norm is that standard by reference to which the value of an object is appreciated. But appreciation, it will be remembered, is always in terms of the interest-fulfilment of the subject, in terms of the utility or usefulness of the object in furthering some aspect of life, in terms of the useful effects upon the life and consciousness of the subject. If this is true, the norm, conformity or non-conformity to which is judged in appreciation, must stand for the object of the highest interest of the subject in any given realm of value, defined as that degree of interest which while meeting with the highest point of satisfaction that under the circumstances it is possible to attain, remains unsatisfied and insatiate either in quality or quantity or in both. This may appear to be a peculiar definition of a norm or standard, but a little reflection will convince any one that it is nearer the truth than any other definition that could be offered. A norm, to be a norm, must be incapable of realisation or actualisation. If it ever *could* be realised, it at that moment ceases to be a norm, and something greater—nobler, higher, larger etc.—will *ipso facto* take its place. In morals, for instance, the standard conduct is that to which actual conduct can only *approximate*. Nobody ever realised ideal justice or benevolence or veracity etc.. It may be pointed out that if B acts precisely in the same manner as A and in the same circumstances, B may be said to have realised the standard of A. But in this case one must distinguish between acting *in accordance with A's* conduct and acting *in conformity with it*. If B had in reality taken A's conduct as his norm or ideal, he himself would be the first to admit that he could not and did not realise that ideal; if he merely acted in conformity with A's conduct, there may be any degree of conformity to it. In the field of art again, to judge that a portrait is beautiful is to admit that it could

have been better, for the norm with reference to which its value is judged, viz., the original, whether in reality or idea, existed with a more dazzling brilliance and beauty of which but a small part has been transmitted on to the canvas through paint and brush. In economics, again, the price of an article is always a fluctuating quantity determined at any given time by the demand in the market. The so-called "normal" price does never in reality represent the possible price which it may fetch under different circumstances. In ordinary life, too, to say that an object is "useful" is to indicate only a degree of its usefulness as determined by the particular need of the particular individual at the moment. For others or under other circumstances its utility may reach any conceivably higher degree. Gold is an exceedingly valuable element at present; but to say that it is valuable is only to make an indication of its possible value. In general, therefore, it may be said that the practical attainment of value, however great it may be in quantity and quality, falls short of the "normal" value and that the norm in this sense stands for untold possibilities or potentialities of appreciation in any given realm of value. This use of the term "normal," it will be seen, corresponds to the Greek use of the term "natural." Just as the "natural" state of an object is that in which it realises the highest potentialities latent in it, even so the "normal" value of an object is always *in possibility* higher than the highest that we can ascribe to it.

Thus interpreted, the "norm" we are talking of would be equivalent to Green's conception of an "ideal best" in moral progress. This conception has often been criticised on the ground that we are not aware of such a "best" in our every day conduct. Such an idea is unreal and moral progress, it is concluded, is therefore illusory. Some others—like A.P. Brogan—have suggested, in view of this criticism, that the notion of "betterness" is quite adequate for our purpose and that we need not run after the will-of-the-wisp of the best. Indeed they have even defined value in terms of "betterness." To all such criticisms the sufficient reply is that whether we are psychologically conscious or not of the "ideal best" to begin with, it is the logical presupposition of all our notions of good and better. The task of philosophy consists in elucidating the implications and presuppositions of our every-day thought and conduct, and we find that in this

connection we cannot have a simple notion of a "better" without assuming an ideal best. "Betterness" is by itself an incomplete idea; to judge that *x* is better than *y*, we require a standard of comparison which is better than both *x* and *y*. If *this* is the betterness which is said to be adequate for our purpose of valuation, then it is the same as what we mean by the "best" and the norm as that which is higher than all that we are aware of or that we have realised is inexpugnable from life and philosophy.¹

Not that we are totally ignorant of what is thus said to be the best. To the extent that we know the present fact in all its strength and weakness we know the norm also, for without an idea of the norm as a logical presupposition, we cannot know either the weakness or the strength of the present fact. But at no stage do we know the ideal fully, for to know it fully would be to realise it fully, and an ideal realised completely would, we have said, be no longer an ideal. As we advance in knowledge and practice, the ideal unfolds itself gradually, but at every stage it is presupposed in its still higher and yet unrevealed aspects.

The ideal *as ideal* is never actualised. It is important to stress this, because it is sometimes held that the higher, *i.e.*, the ideal, is nothing but the *perfection of the lower*. This is different from saying that any form of finite existence involves something higher than it. The perfection of the lower is only a higher *degree* of perfection but it is not the highest perfection possible, *i.e.*, the ideal. What is involved as something higher than any given stage of realisation is always this ideal best, and this ideal best is *not* simply the perfection of the lower. To hold that it is would give rise to two difficulties which are well-nigh insoluble. Consider three stages of progress, A, B and C, B the perfection realised of A, and C of B. What is the ideal B here? If it is an actual, *i.e.*, perfected B, then that B becomes C. But any actualised B is itself the actualised perfection of A. How then to ascertain an ideal B which remains B without lapsing into a perfected A on the one hand or merging into a C on the other? Hence, the higher *i.e.*, the ideal stage, is not the perfection of the lower. It is always some aspect of the ideal that is actualised as the perfection of the lower, but the ideal remains ideal always

1. For further criticism of Brogan's notion of betterness as constituting the value-category, see Ch. IV, section 13.

at every stage, *i.e.*, higher than the given stage, unrealised and unrealisable in its entirety. Secondly, if it is held that the perfection of the lower is itself the actualisation of the higher, *i.e.*, the ideal, then the moment the lower fact becomes the ideal realised, the fact as such is destroyed and something that is not it takes its place. Continuity in progress is broken and substitution of one fact for another takes place. Such continuity can be preserved only by holding that the perfection of the lower always remains imperfect from the standpoint of the ideal.

What then is the genesis of the norm? The norm, as we have seen, is never the given, the actual. It is always an ideal construction which is the product of the interaction and mutual criticism of individual appreciations resulting in a pattern, sometimes collective or racial, and sometimes remaining only individual, that, as already observed, subsumes the individual appreciations under itself and at the same time goes beyond them. The process of interaction and criticism, however, is one which may be described as evaluatory of the present accepted modes of valuation as well as generative of higher levels of value-perception. The second is of course the more important consequence of the two: the first in fact exists for the sake of the second. The whole, however, is one concrete process of value experience in which the two moments of criticism and generation are distinguishable but not separable. When two current ideals or modes of appreciation come into contact with each other, they not only criticise each other but in and through such criticism undergo a process of self-criticism or modification or refinement which is the attainment of a higher level of value-perception. Further, when a new situation is confronted within practical life, there naturally arises a fresh mode of mental relatedness to that situation which is the source of the perception of a fresh level of value. Such delicate *nuances* are especially fitted to call forth new experiences of value which sooner or later lead to the perception of higher levels of value known as norms. These are the empirical ways in which the norm manifests itself in human experience. It has, however, a metempirical character which will be discussed in the last chapter of this volume.

To the question whether the norm is subjective or objective, it must be replied that it is in origin subjective (as has already

been shown) while in function it is objective. All processes of valuation have a psychological origin and are therefore subjective. Further, the process of generating norms is largely a process of individual minds and in this also they are subjective. But after their genesis, they come to be objectified and acquire independence of individual acknowledgment or allegiance. They become more or less the expressions of collective mind which have an authority, though not always the power, to control individual feelings or judgments of appreciation on matters pertaining to the same realm of value. This function of controlling and determining individual appreciations of value, of becoming the demand or postulate of further processes of valuation, gives the norm an aspect of objectivity that may well be described by slightly adapting Bosanquet's definition of the objective: The objective is that which obliges us to think and feel and act in conformity with itself. Or in the words of Prof. Urban, "The normative judgment represents at the same time a subjective appreciation and an objective description. Its subjective reference is seen in the fact that it is only through these projected ideal objects, assumed to exist independently of the subject, that the subject's individual feelings can be communicated..... Its objective character is apparent, on the other hand, in that having passed beyond the subjective control of the moment and become, through its character as a presupposition of belief, the condition of further subjective appreciations, it in turn exercises control over those feelings."¹

7. With reference to the third and fourth characteristics of normativity, only a few words need be said, since conformity and appreciation have already been discussed in some detail in the beginning of this chapter. Here all that I wish to suggest is that the conformity etc. does not exist, logically speaking, prior to the act of appreciation. This may appear a little paradoxical at first sight, but on the principles herein adopted (as will become more apparent in the succeeding chapter), no other position is tenable. The conformity etc., it has been maintained, is not a "fact," but it is a matter of opinion, judgment, appreciation etc.. By this is meant that the conformity etc. does not exist except through such judgment, appreciation etc.. The "brute fact"—the naked object, act or event—exists and must exist before appre-

1. *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*: p. 18.

ciation ; but whether it conforms or not to a given norm can only be determined *through* appreciation. This is as much as to say that value does not exist prior to appreciation, and, for better or worse, this will be the position maintained in this work. For the present, however, be it sufficient to consider two possible objections against such a view of conformity. Firstly, it may be said that this view is unable to explain cases of conduct which are observed by nobody and which would therefore escape appreciation. Is it the case, it may be asked, that because, say, an act of generosity or, conversely, an act of meanness, has been observed and appreciated by nobody, the said act does not, as such, conform to any rule of moral conduct ? But here it must be remembered that we are inclined to believe in its conformity etc. because we believe that the act is *susceptible* of a *possible* appreciation by beings *capable* of appreciating it. If nobody *had* ever appreciated such an act before, or if human beings *were incapable* of appreciating it, to say that it possessed value or disvalue would be entirely meaningless. And there lurks another and subtler fallacy in such cases, *viz.*, that in the very act of *supposing* such contingent events, the supposer is surreptitiously introducing his own or others' standard of appreciation in the half-light of which the act is judged to possess value or disvalue. Secondly, if the conformity etc. is made to depend upon appreciation, where different people appreciate the same act in different terms, should we say that the act at the same time both conforms and does not conform or conforms differently to the same standard ? This argument has no particular force against the position here maintained, for it may as well apply to the position of those who uphold the independent existence of values as inhering in the object, act or event. However, such differences in appreciation are to be explained by the considerations that possibly the real facts of the case might not be available completely to the different judges, that judgment holds some proportion to the attitude, the desire or the attachment of the judges, that more particularly bias or confusion regarding the precise nature of a situation or the true spirit and scope of the principles to be applied, or the difficulty of reading aright the motives in others' minds etc., may becloud the judge's mind in the act of appreciation. Nevertheless, even granting that ideal conditions of judgment are present, this does not

remove the dependence of conformity etc. upon the appreciating mind.

What finally are we to understand by appreciation? Is it an act of feeling or of reason or of both? What are the psychological presuppositions of the value-experience? This is indeed an important question which, however, can be considered profitably only after we have treated of the nature of value and the value-experience.

The aptness of calling value science "Normatics" is now, it is hoped, evident. That science has no received name honoured by tradition and general usage. It is sometimes called "Axiology" and although in itself a good name, for some reason or other it has not come into vogue. The science itself is still in such a nebulous condition, its problems and scope still so uncertain, its very existence as an independent science still so much a matter of doubt, that it is small wonder that it has received no definite name. It is essentially a science of valuation or evaluation. And valuation involves the application of standards, ideals, *norms*, with reference to which the values of given objects are appraised. The term "Normatics" is suggested not only because it denotes the scope of the science as dealing with the value, significance, or meaning of objects from the humanistic standpoint, but also because it connotes this special feature of appreciation or appraisal of their value with reference to norms or standards.

8. What now is the bearing of this whole discussion of the normative standpoint upon the science of value? Value is always normative or standard value, *i.e.*, value as determined by a norm of expectation. Value-in-itself or, if we may so call it, primary value, the value of an object for itself without reference to anything else, is, it must be maintained, an impossible conception. The reasons for this are not far to seek. Firstly, the value of an object is, as we have seen, always in terms of its utility (interpreted broadly), *i.e.*, in terms of its useful effects upon the life and consciousness of living beings. It is, in other words, instrumental or contributory value, never the so-called intrinsic value.¹ And instrumental value in its very nature involves the idea of comparison with or determination by a norm of expectation. It is not, however, comparative value in

1. This statement will receive modification in a later (XIV) Chapter.

the sense in which it is opposed to generic value¹—in the sense of being superior or inferior to some other value taken to be good in the same sense. The comparison with *another* value involving ideas like *more* or *less*, *higher* or *lower*, is not implied in the statement that value in the *generic sense itself* is comparative or normative value. What exactly is implied herein is this. Satisfaction is never entirely the appeasement of desire as such, but also in its own degree the fulfilment of an expectation, either reaching or failing to reach a goal set before himself by the individual. Even in such purely organic processes such as the satisfaction of hunger, for example, it is not merely the appeasement of hunger as such, but the fulfilment or the failure to fulfil our individual expectations of dining that we consider. In the enjoyment of a piece of poetry or song, again, the enjoyment always holds some proportion to the poetry or song "coming up to" or "falling below" our expectation, and its value is also judged likewise. In every desire therefore we may distinguish two aspects, (1) an aspect of fulfilment of an impulse, which, however, exists in and through (2) the aspect of its meeting one's expectation or realising a definite goal. And secondly, value, we have seen, does not exist prior to valuation, and valuation is a process of comparison and estimation—an assumption which will have to be justified later on.

It is clear that in both these respects the notion of value necessarily involves judgment or *thought*. The problem raised here will have to be discussed at greater length in another connection but here it must be pointed out that the conception, held by some writers, of dual value—of primitive value and of standard value²—of prizing or esteeming and of appraising or estimating; of holding things dear, cherishing and caring for them and of *judging* them valuable;³ of value created or generated or determined as to its existence, and value discovered or apprehended (through valuation)—is an illegitimate conception, untrue to logic as well as to experience. Value is

1. *General Theory of Value*, pp. 19–20.

2. A distinction drawn by Stephen C. Pepper in a paper read before the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, 1921, a summary of which is published in the *Phil. Review*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 177–178.

3. A distinction once held by Dewey (in his discussion with Messrs. Prall and Perry) in a paper published in the *Journal of Philosophy* Vol. XII, p. 520.

certainly not the *act* or *process* of valuation, but to say that "values are, in fact, wholly independent of our valuations" is to commit an error which can only arise through the confusion of values (objects of value) with *value* in the generic sense. The question is, is there a process of mind which merely determines or conditions the *existence* of value and in this sense generates value, and which is different from the process of mind which *apprehends, knows* or *discovers* value through valuation? Messrs. Perry, Prall, Sheldon, Reid etc., think there is while the argument of the present work is against such a view. Dewey once believed in the distinction but later he adopted the sounder view that judgment is always a condition of the occurrence of things possessed of value. The relation of judgment to things possessing value is, he declares, "as direct and integral as that of liking." "I shall go further" he declares, "than to hold that judgment is *sometimes* a condition of the occurrence of things possessed of value. I hold that thought as well as liking, an affective thought or a thoughtful reflection, is *always* the condition of the occurrence of value-things. There is no reason for assuming the factual incompatibility of thought and a motor-affective act; on the contrary, a motor-affective act that has no element of judgment in it is a purely animal act..... Only when the act contains discriminated *meaning* does it constitute an act capable of being called taste, appreciation, or that sort of a motor-affective act which determines the existence of a value."¹ In another place, but with reference to the same controversy,² he says that the experience of "immediate good in its immediacy or isolation"—of pure appetitive liking—is so much interwoven with prior judgments of value that "this naive innocence of value is something to be recovered." The experience of infants and the lower animals may be different—a child may have a pure appetitive liking for milk unaffected by any element of thought—but in such cases we should simply say that for the child or the cow no value exists. To think otherwise is to commit a mistake akin to the "psychologist's fallacy," the mistake of interpreting the child's mind in terms which are appropriate only to the analysis of the experience of the adult.

1. *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XX, p. 618.

2. "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge", *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXI. p. 329.

Value therefore cannot be independent, as regards its existence, of the cognitive processes involved in its apprehension; in fact, as will be shown later, the act of cognising or apprehending value is identical with the act of mind which constitutes or creates value. Mr. L. A. Reid argues that the two activities are distinct and holds that "this complete mental activity" which conditions the existence of value is one in which "the life of action seems to play the most prominent part." "It is only through the active objective life of discovery, trial and error, experiment, expression, creation, that values begin to appear."¹ But if so, it is exceedingly strange to hold that "this complete mental activity" excludes or is incompatible with *valuing* unless we believe that *valuing* is *merely* a process of cognition (exclusive of other factors), which again this writer recognises is not the case.² If value is independent, as regards its existence, of cognitive processes as well as of our desires and feelings with regard to it,³ what are the constituents of "this complete mental activity" which is said to be responsible for the generation of value?

1. *The Monist*, Vol. XXXVII, p. 89.

2. *Ibid*, p. 88.

3. *Ibid*, p. 87.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE AND DEFINITION OF VALUE.

1. Our study in the previous chapter of the normative point of view—of the function of appreciation in the several sciences which study values from the standpoint of norms—must have already prepared the way for a determination of the nature of value. This of course is the very heart of the problem of value, the very basis of a science of value. Upon it will turn the course of our future investigation of the other numerous problems connected with the science of value. The question has been a bone of contention amongst philosophers, a veritable "apple of discord" which has strongly divided thinkers into differing sects. In discussing this question, several methods have been followed by thinkers according to the prevailing fashion of their respective schools. The idealists—the high priests of the temple of philosophy have, true to their office, followed the "high priori" road of the reasonable, the rational whole, reality coming round to square with thought etc.. The realists—the torch-bearers in the temple—have as usual adopted the pains-taking method of logical searching analysis of the facts and discrimination of shades of meaning. The humanists—the multitude of worshippers at the shrine—have clamoured loudly for keeping a firm hold of the concrete situation, the facts of life, encountered in the process of valuation. For our part, however, we shall neither scorn any method nor adore any exclusively but shall make use of all the three as need dictates. We shall start with the facts of concrete life, certainly; and starting with facts, we shall try to analyse them and discover, if possible, their rational significance, the intelligible conception which they may embody, or by which they may be unified.

In such a process, then, the concrete situation which gives rise to the problem of value must be constantly kept in mind and closely studied. And so the remark of Mr. Ward is very pertinent in this connection: "This then is the experience and the specific situation and justness to such a situation or experience is and will remain the test of [a] theory of value."¹

1. *Philosophy of Value*, by Leo Richard Ward, London, 1930 pp. 17, 4, 132.

What, then, is this situation? It is, that every living being constantly, ceaselessly, acts, goes on a quest. "Persons and all other agents, if we but look upon them, are marching and counter-marching, and this doing of theirs is to be explained."¹ This is certainly to be admitted, and it should be admitted also that action is always for something, is always aimed. We may even admit, as has already been admitted previously, that action is aimed at good, at well-being. But spite of these admissions, it is not so very clear that it is not "premature" to say that persons and other agents find the things possessed of value—otherwise, they would not act. To say so is not only "premature" but "naive," "hurried," "abstruse," and "ecstatic." Let us analyse the facts. I act, beings act; I want some things, every conscious being, or perhaps every living being, wants things. And we not merely want things one after another, we even select and reject, judge, approve or condemn. What in general is action for? What does it mean to act? Why is any object wanted at all?

2. It must be observed to begin with that the situation is capable of analysis into several elements. Firstly, there is the subject called the agent who acts, wants, strives, reaches out for things. Secondly, there is his wanting, striving, longing, desiring. Thirdly, there is the end or purpose which the agent wants to realise. Fourthly, there is the object—thing, person, event, state of mind, truth, beauty—which the person longs for or desires. Fifthly, there is the character or quality of the existent in respect of which it is desired. And lastly, there is the relation between the subject's mental direction and the object upon which the mind is directed. These then are the "constants" in the value-situation. If we carefully inspect them, we shall find that they can be reduced to three irreducible factors: (1) the conative-affective activity of the agent—determined by the purpose or end which he wants to realise; (2) the object which he desires and towards which the action is directed; (3) the relation between the subject and the object, the agent and the existent. When the elements of the situation thus stand out clearly before one's mind, one is easily tempted to determine the *locus* of value. Action is appropriation, claiming, laying

1. *Ibid*, p. 4.

siege to the object, and since it is the object we want, value must evidently belong to the object. Value, whatever it may turn out to be, manifestly resides in the object; the object possesses the value, and because it does so, we want to possess the object, it is valuable to us. Otherwise, who would run after the object, after wife, child, money, status, knowledge, landscape etc.? "When I act, what I act for has value for me. Else I would not act. My acting is a demonstration that the object has value for me."¹ And even when I do not act, the object may be said to possess a kind of "static or non-functioning value," which means value that *might* be acted for. This is not only good common-sense but it can also be justified by sound philosophical considerations. We sometimes have vague desires, knowing not precisely what we want. When in our fumbling about we lay our hands upon something, it seems to satisfy us. Again value does not cease merely because in a particular instance or in many instances valuing ceases. A person is fond of Thackeray, we shall suppose; but simply because after some time he cannot suffer that writer, it does not follow that the novelist has lost his value. Variability of valuation, once more, may appear to be dependent upon the agent's needs; but more often it depends upon the change in the object. Finally if realists are earnest about their realism, then just as knowing does not affect the thing known, valuing (which admittedly is in part a knowing) has a potential meaning and does not affect the object valued or its value.²

Thus we have examined the possible weapons in the armoury of humanistic-realism and the conclusion seems to be forced upon us that value finds its locus in the thing, and as such it is the "end, the first principle of action, which moves the agent."³

What, then, is value? Obviously, it is "the capacity of an existent to be the end of action. Value is the character or quality of an existent on account of which character or quality the existent is or can be the end of action."⁴ The existent—ens—being—cannot be created by us, it is given. And it is the back-bone of value, for it creates, awakens, desire and thus reveals its own value.⁵

1. *Ibid*, p. 133. 2. *Ibid*, pp. 146—150. 3. *Ibid*, p. 153. 4. *Ibid*, pp. 180—181. 5. *Ibid*, p. 182.

3. The fallacy underlying the above argument can be made clear when we remember that realistic-humanism is too eager to assert the supremacy of the object because on a first reading of the facts it is clearly for objects that we act. And in the interest of the object, it is prepared to ignore or at least to slight the importance of the subject and his conative-affective life and its significance. Having taken pretty good care to keep a firm hold on the value-situation, we should not feel disappointed if we should happen to come to a different conclusion concerning the locus and nature of value. We shall first begin by admitting the truth in the above argument. It is that we desire the object on account of the specific qualities which it possesses. I want sugar, for instance, because sugar possesses the specific qualities which alone can satisfy my need—the need of tasting sweet coffee. But are these qualities value? It would be strange to say so. They may be a condition of value but do not in themselves constitute or contain value. The object itself (relatively to speak so) possesses qualities or characters, doubtless; but surely it does not possess value also? The confusion that has been the cause of this belief is the failure to make a distinction between the qualities of the object in themselves and the *qualities as related to my conscious need and desire* when alone the conception of value emerges. Value is an entity that is neither in the object (which has only qualities) nor in the subject (who has only needs and desires and purposes) but in the interrelation between these needs or desires and those qualities or characters. Otherwise, should we say that the qualities themselves constitute value, the value of the object must be patently perceptible to any one to whom the qualities are so perceptible. As a matter of fact nobody can perceive value in an object (if he does not want it) just as he can perceive its qualities—its shape, size, colour etc., either by mere observation or by chemical analysis. Again, just as the qualities are pretty constant and common to all normally constituted persons, likewise the value, if it were a quality or one with quality, should be common and constant to all, whereas, really speaking, even for the same person the value of an object is not constant, and no two people find the same value in the same object. There is no parallelism at all between mathematical and axiological judgments, as the phenomenologists think there

is. If, accordingly, there is a doubt in epistemology whether the qualities of an object exist independently of the knowing subject, there is not even the shade of a shadow of doubt in axiology that value cannot exist apart from the desire of the conscious subject. It is sugar indeed that I want, not salt, when I want to drink sweet coffee, but this is when I *do want* coffee. When I do *not* want it, or when people in general, we shall suppose, do not want coffee, would sugar still retain its value, so far at least as its indispensableness to coffee was concerned? It would no doubt still retain its *quality* (supposing for the moment that secondary qualities belong to the object) of making coffee taste sweet, but certainly not the *value* that we now ascribe to it. To talk of a "static" or "non-functioning" value is to talk of a meaningless phrase. Indeed the attribution of value to, or its superimposition upon, the object, say sugar, implied in the statement that sugar is valuable or that coffee is valuable etc., is only by way of a kind of transferred epithet or, as Prof. Perry has put it, by way of a pathetic fallacy;¹ what we really mean or ought to mean is simply that the object would be found satisfying some one's desire, if some one desired it, and so long as the existence of the same universe of desire was guaranteed. But the fact that we sometimes find value in an object and at other times find little or none in it ought to be sufficient to open the eyes of thinking people to the truth that the value, if not exactly *created* by our desire, at any rate *occurs* or *emerges* only when the subjective desire comes into relation with an objective quality capable of satisfying it. Value is sustained by the universe of our conative-affective life. A cart-load of fuel has great value to people living in towns or cities; but to those living in forests it has none or only a very slight value. The object is the same in both cases, whence then this difference in its value? Plainly, to unsophisticated minds it would appear to be due to the difference in the need, the desire, of the subject in the two cases. Indeed the very phrase, carrying coals to Newcastle, ought to be an eye-opener in this connection. The value-formula may be expressed thus: given such and such a desire, the corresponding value of the object arises.

We should not be far from the truth, then, should we say, not indeed simply that desire creates value, but that desire cre-

1. *General Theory of Value*, p. 56.

ates value out of the object. But owing to the tendency of the human mind to think in figures of speech, we talk of an object's value or disvalue. If we must adhere to this usage of common speech, we should at least remember that value is not a "quality" but a "property" of the object, *i.e.*, a feature newly acquired by it when it enters into effective relatedness with a mind.¹ The value inheres in neither end of the value relation, but if we must account for it by invoking the agency of either term, we should unhesitatingly say that desire generates, produces,² value (when it enters into effective relatedness with the object), for objects and their qualities do not change observably, and yet their value changes. What else could cause this change but the change in subjective need or desire? It may be said that variability in valuation is often dependent upon the change in the object (or in its qualities). "A broken window, a cracked vase, a blocked road is good for nothing" because the quality of the object has changed in each case. But here the situation has not been correctly analysed. Our desire was for the unbroken window, the uncracked vase, and the open road, and *then* these had value. We never desired the broken window etc.. And because our desire is still for the unbroken window etc., the broken window etc., get no value, because these have no positive relation to our desire. Or they have a disvalue now, because they are now negatively related to our desire. Again if it should so happen that for some reason or other you prefer a damaged or second-hand article to a sound new one, may be for its cheapness on the whole (when broken pieces of glass are required, for instance, for the compound wall), you would certainly go in for it, and it would have greater value for you than a sound article. In all these cases, then, it is the desire that determines the value of the object. In this connection too, it is worth nothing that it is not always true that the existent, the object, evokes desire in the subject. This is true only in rare cases; in the daily concerns of life, it is the desire which determines what kind of object we shall have. It is hunger which determines what food

1. The distinction here drawn is the useful one which Lloyd Morgan draws in *Emergent Evolution* between a "quality" and a "property."

2. This terminology is not exact, for value, according to the present view, "emerges" and is only figuratively "created."

we require. 'When the stomach is full the sight of food awakens not desire but disgust or nausea. To take Prof. Perry's examples, wine, cold water and tepid water have each a kind of value for the thirsty person. Ordinarily he would, I suppose, prefer cold water to tepid, and wine to cold water. But if his thirst be great and only tepid water be available, it might attain any conceivably high degree of value. And if his purpose be bathing and not drinking, tepid water which in the universe of drinking stood lowest in the scale of values, would in that of bathing stand highest. In all these cases, the objects and their qualities remain the same; it is the change in the subject's desires that determines the kind of objects required and the difference in their value.

4. What, now, is the precise locus of value? Value is to be located in the interrelation between the subjective desire and the objective quality and its attribution to the object is a kind of superimposition on it. Is it then a mere relation, the relation between the subject and the object, whereby the subject finds the object capable of satisfying his want? So some have said, notably Prof. M. Picard,¹ D. W. Prall,² R. B. Perry,³ and Ehrenfels.⁴ But though from our analysis of the constant elements in the value-situation the temptation to such a conclusion is strong, it should be resisted, for the relation between the subject and the object is asymmetrical, it can only be the source of value. Nor do the two relations involved here together constitute value, for value is the *product* of the interplay of the two relations and not their *sum*. It is

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1. "Values are relations of interests between conscious activity and environment." *Values: Immediate and Contributory* : p. 119.
 2. Value is "the existence of an interest relation between a subject and its object"; value is "constituted in a relation which occurs only where there is a motor-affective attitude." *A Study in the Theory of Value* : pp. 250, 254.
 3. "Value is thus a specific relation into which things possessing any ontological status whatsoever, whether real or imaginary, may enter with interested objects"; *General Theory of Value* : p. 116; "Value might be defined as the relation of an object to a valuing subject"; Value is "the peculiar relation between any interest and its object"; *Ibid*, pp. 122, 124.
 4. "Value is a relation between an object and a subject which expresses the fact that the subject either actually desires the object or would desire it in case he were not convinced of its existence." (quoted in *General Theory of Value*, p. 121).

the *function*, so to say, of desire and objective quality¹. Value is in the relation but not of it. In short, value is the status of satisfyingness of an object emerging out of its contemplation by a subject, both determined by a universe of desire which is realisable by means of the former and to which the latter is attached. This definition is not very original but it attempts, I think, to be just to the value-situation, bringing out the necessary elements which constitute its nature. It shows, first and foremost, that value cannot exist apart from the conative-affective activity of the subject. Next, it shows that the value of an object is not a "constant" but is, in its very nature, subject to fluctuation: it always remains in an unstable equilibrium, because it is necessarily dependent upon the need and desire of the subject which may conceivably vary. Thirdly, the definition points out that value is not a quality inherent either in the object or in the subject but an entity—a property, if you like—which occurs in or emerges out of the interrelation of the two (locus of value). Fourthly, it emphasises the fact that the value of an object is to be determined only with reference to a norm employed in appreciation *viz.*, the given universe of desire to which the agent is attached. Finally the definition makes it clear that we value objects immediately required not for their own sakes, but for the sake of a wider interest (universe of desire) which has a higher or deeper value for us. This in its turn may be valuable only as contributory to some yet wider universe which would thus have a still higher value, and so on. In fine, the definition is intended to anticipate what is one of the fundamental contentions of the present work, *viz.*, that value is always contributory or instrumental—an assumption which will have to be discussed at greater length in a subsequent chapter. Another significant feature of the definition is that it brings out the fact that value is an emergent out of the value-situation and not a "static" or "dynamic" quality of either term of the relation. It is the object of the present work to treat of value as an emergent at every level of the value-experience. Hence this aspect of the problem requires some consideration

1. Or, if we consider "the function itself" (the interrelation), value would be "the value" (dependent variable) of the two "arguments" (independent variables), *viz.*, desire and objective quality. We can represent this by the formula, $a=b \times c$, or more generally by, $f(xy)$.

here. Owing, however, to the importance of the problem, its consideration is postponed to a subsequent chapter of the work.

5. But it must be noted that the precise sense in which "emergence" has been adopted in the present work is not the same as that which it bears in current evolutionary thought. An emergent, according to the latter, at any given stage in the evolutionary process, is any new quality, entity or essence—e.g., life, mind, reflective thought—which is not a mere summation of the old elements from which it has emerged, but possesses new qualities and new forms of relatedness which do make a difference to the go of the events they have emerged from. It itself is the result of a new and effective mode of relatedness of the elements of the previous stage, of a new "fellowship" as Morgan puts it. And prior to such emergence, the quality, entity or essence is absolutely unpredictable. The hierarchy of such emergents forms a progressive order of the universe which is susceptible both of a natural (causal) as well as a moral or purposive explanation. It is not necessary to enter here into a detailed treatment of a concept and a theory which are so very familiar to all students of philosophy, but I should like to emphasise the difference between the usual connotation of "emergence" and its significance as used in the present connection. In addition to the above characteristics (all of which are accepted in the present usage of the term), "emergence" in current usage signifies that the emergent—quality—entity or essence—is a natural existent which has come to stay. In scientific regard, it is not known who or what is responsible for the appearance of the several levels of reality, but when once a particular stage has emerged, it is a part of reality which can never as such be wiped out of existence. Before life appeared on the scene, it was unpredictable, but after it did emerge owing to particular modes of effective relatedness of the molecules of matter, it remains a permanent aspect of reality which, as a member of the natural order, will preserve itself along with other members. But the emergence of value, is not imprinted with this mark of permanence. A value, which has emerged as the outcome of a particular mode of relatedness of mind and its given environment, may entirely disappear some time later when the same mind disengages or detaches itself from that environment. Value, it has been shown, is conditioned

by the desire of the subject, it emerges out of the interrelation of the subject's desire and the objective environment. This interrelation, it has been pointed out, is one of attachment on the part of the subject's mind and capacity to fulfil his need or desire on the part of the object. When this interrelation ceases, *i.e.*, when the subject's mind is no longer favourably disposed towards the object or (as humanist-realists might put it), when the object is found to be no longer capable of satisfying the needs of the agent, the original value would naturally decrease or may even completely disappear. Because value is dependent upon the vacillating conative-affective activity of the subject, its permanence as a feature of reality cannot be guaranteed. It may be summoned into life or ordered out of existence by the magic wand of subjective desire. This process of the disappearance of value may be characterised as a process of disintegration of the whole into parts. Consciousness entering into a relation of interestedness with the objective environment forms a whole out of which springs value. (This is not, however, the doctrine that such a whole has a greater intrinsic value than the sum of the values of the parts). Whether the whole has value or not is not in question here; the value that we are speaking of inheres neither in the parts separately nor in the whole as such but in the interrelation between the parts which constitute the whole. When consciousness enters into a mode of effective relatedness of attachment with an environment which is appreciated from the standpoint of the material well-being of the agent, there springs what is known as *economic* value from the interrelation. When it attaches itself effectively to an object which in the result conduces to the moral development of the subject, there emerges *moral* value out of the interrelation. And likewise with the intellectual, social, aesthetic and other levels of value-experience.¹ In all these cases, value disappears when the whole breaks up into parts by the detachment of mind from the objective environment. Because value is essentially a mind-engendered entity sustained by the existence of a given universe of desire, it is bound to disappear with the disappearance of this universe. Is not value, then, an existent? And if it is, can an existent vanish entirely in

1. The emergence of value at the various levels of value-experience will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

this manner? These are questions which must be left to be answered in a succeeding chapter.

It must also be remembered in this connection that when value is sought to be interpreted in terms of physical and mental relatedness, such interpretation is not to be taken as an adequate explanation of value-experience; we shall all along have to fall back upon, as already suggested in the previous chapter, the concept of teleological causation or dramatic explanation, or explanation in terms of purpose or end, to make the experience thoroughly intelligible. Evolution is thus sought to be explained in this scheme, as Lamarck long ago explained it, both in terms of mental *urge* ("desire precedes function") and natural relatedness. The concept of agency or purposive causation is here central—at least to the evolution of values.

6. The chiefmost characteristic of value contained in the definition has yet to be discussed. It has already been pointed out that the structure of value consists of three irreducible "constants." These constants may now be stated in a form slightly different from the one in which they were stated at the beginning of the chapter. They are: (1) the desire of the agent for a particular object or experience; (2) the universe or system of desires of which the particular desire is an expression; and (3) the particular object or class of objects which by virtue of its possession of certain qualities is believed to be capable of realising the desire of the agent and is as such valued. It is clear that every one of these constants is real and has a nature underived from, and undetermined by, the others. A town municipality, let us say, votes for the introduction of tram service within its area. Here the desire for the introduction of tram service is in its nature different from, and undetermined by, the desire (on the part of the same municipality) to afford greater and better facilities of travel and traffic to the public. This latter forms the universe of desire which may express itself in many ways and which has its own unique nature and significance as compared with other dominant systems of desire. Both these factors, again, are obviously different from the object of desire, in this particular case, tram-cars. While in their individual essence or character these constants are underivable from one another and have their own reality, in their mode of existence, they involve one another and enter into an inseparable union

or co-operation which helps every one of them to realise or actualise its significance or character. A reality has its own essence; in order to actualise its essence, realise its nature, fulfil its object or purpose, in short, in order to *function* as a reality, it needs to enter into a peculiarly close relationship with other realities which also thereby realise the significance of their own being. Such a union or relationship of co-operation, so to call it, does not destroy the individuality of the elements which enter into it, but on the other hand, enhances it. We distinguish, then, the being or essence of a reality from its mode of existence. While all the three constants thus make themselves responsible for bringing into existence a value-whole, it is necessary to determine further the particular relations that hold between the different members of such a whole. And here it is certain that the universe of desire plays the central part in the generation of value. The particular desire and the particular object of desire are both determined, as regards their mode of existence or manner of self-fulfilment, by the nature of the dominant system of desire. It is the universe of collective utilities or conveniences which determines the desire for better means of traffic as well as for the object which is calculated to achieve the desire. The agent is said to be attached to this universe in a sense which has already been explained before. And in so far as the object in question achieves the particular desire of the agent, it may be said to realise his universe of desire also. It is the larger interest or system of interests, then, that moulds, shapes, controls and directs the manner of action or functioning of the smaller interests and their objects. In this sense, we may say that both the desire and its object "presuppose" or "depend upon" the dominant system of desires. Each has its own individuality, and each has a function corresponding to that nature. As regards the desire and its corresponding object, however, how that individuality is consummated, and how its function is fulfilled, are determined by the governing universe to which the individual is attached, and with which they enter into vital union. As subserving and realising it, they fulfil and realise their own destiny. And as members of a whole in which they exist in inseparable or inalienable union, the three factors together generate a new entity, *viz.*, value, which is thus said to be emergent upon their relatedness. The union, however, which

gives birth to value, is partly at least a causal or functional union, there being no inner necessity of nature among the three factors which compels them to be related logically. The value relationship is largely factual or functional, not strictly logical or *a priori*. Value judgments are causal or synthetic judgments.¹

Such then is the three-fold structure of all value and such the relationship that subsists among the different parts of that structure. In all kinds of value, there are two or three elements of which one is dominant and the others dependent; the dominant element controls, directs and determines the manner of being of the dependent elements which are yet as real and underived in their being as the former; it is only in such a whole of parts ruled by the relationships of subordination and superordination that value is born.

7. Further, value, as has already been indicated, does not exist prior to valuation or appreciation. Whether, and if so how far, the object fulfils or realises the interest (or universe of desire) of the subject can only be determined through the judgment of value or the appreciatory judgment. In other words, valuation or appreciation is of the conformity or non-conformity of the object to the norm of expectation. Conformity then (as above interpreted) is the general character in the object (corresponding to the subject's desire) which is in a general sense the object of appreciation. But conformity has a different categorial structure in different cases, and thus the constitution of different values, of truth, goodness, beauty etc., is necessarily different. Likewise "satisfyingness" is the generic value that emerges in each case; but according as the objective situation with which mind or consciousness, led partly by natural causes and partly by purpose, enters into effective relatedness, is different in different cases, we name the emergents differently and speak of every one of them as a value, e.g., beauty, goodness, freedom, love, truth etc.. In every case, the primary matrix out of which various kinds of value emerge is the motor-affective continuum of psychical life, just as in Alexander, Morgan and others, the matrix out of which life, mind, reflective thought etc., emerge is the space-time continuum of the physical universe. There is a value frame-work for life just as there is a spatio-temporal

1. The exact nature of the relationship will be determined later on.

frame-work for reality. Desire is the *terminus a quo*, value is the half-way house, appropriation is the *terminus ad quem*.

8. The fundamental task of a value philosophy is to attempt to elucidate the meaning of the notion of value in the generic sense. Of such attempts, the doctrine that "value is created by valuing"¹ or that "awareness of value makes value" is one. And, barring inaccuracies of expression, it must be declared to be essentially a sound doctrine, notwithstanding the charge of subjectivism often brought against it. Bosanquet, Bradley, Prall, Russell, Perry, Santayana, Leighton, Montague etc., are amongst the upholders of this view in some form or other. There is a great difference between this view and the view adopted in the present work, as will be evident to judicious readers; but the essence of both lies in the fact that value is not inherent in the object, but generated in the act of appreciation. Our desire creates value out of the object or confers value upon it (in a figurative sense, of course). Santayana expresses this truth very aptly when he says: "No doubt any desire, however capricious, represents some momentary partial interest, which lends to its objects a certain real and inalienable value."² The strength and soundness of this doctrine have already been demonstrated in the preceding pages; here it only remains to consider the objections raised against it. Firstly, it is a travesty of this doctrine to state that it implies the creation of real being or *ens* and then to point out that *ens* cannot be created, but must always be given.³ Nobody has held that the creation of value is the creation of being such as that of the table or the paper I write on. And yet does not the scientist in the laboratory create truth in a sense when he frames hypotheses and subsequently converts them into theories? Does not the artist create beauty when he embodies the charms and delights of his mind in song, stone or canvas? Are not truth and beauty *ens* in some sense real enough? And are they not values also created in the same process which gave them birth? The question how far value over-rides or coincides with existence—whether and if so in what sense value is an existent—must be postponed to a later part of the work for consideration.

1. D. W. Prall: *A Study in the Theory of Value*: p. 268.

2 *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 146.

3. *Philosophy of Value* by Ward, pp. 182—3.

Secondly, it has been said that the distinct quale of value—admitted to exist in objects according to realistic-humanistic theory—which we have desiderated in them, is to be found in the quality of being desirable—"a quality which enters into experience quite as readily as the quality of being coloured."¹ Value then means desirable. But this, besides rendering the theory open to all the attacks of psychological and ethical hedonism, forces value into the subjectivistic camp itself, and indeed this is the chiefmost objection of G. E. Moore to the equation of good or valuable with desirable. An example of Durkheim is very relevant in this connection regarding the *locus* of value. If value were at any time in the object itself, he says, the divine value which idolaters seem to ascribe to stocks and stones *must* be in the stocks and stones themselves. Otherwise it should be concluded that people worship stocks and stones *as if* they were gods, *as if* they possessed divine attributes. The value ascribed to these objects is therefore necessarily ideal, subjective, dependent upon an *als ob*. This confirms the view set forth in these pages that appreciation proceeds *as if* the facts conformed to the ideal, that valuation means risking. To Durkheim the reply has been made that for the idolaters "the stone or wood does possess every bit of value which they ascribe to it."² But this is negated by the statement which immediately follows, that "what they worship is an existent which for them is there; either symbolically or conceptually." Nobody worships "stone and wood as such." If so, it is clear, that it is not stocks and stones *as by themselves* possessing divine value that are worshipped, but these objects as symbolically *standing for* God *i.e.*, *as if* they were God, that become the recipients of the allegiance and worship of their devotees.

While admitting the essential soundness of the subjectivistic doctrine of value, it must be pointed out that most of those who uphold it do not seem to be clearly aware of the distinction we have drawn between valuation and value on the one hand, and the relation of interest and the emergent of this relation on the other. This latter, as we have seen, is an important distinction which differentiates the present theory from all other theories. Most of these theories find value in the subject or his need or

1. *Ibid*, 139.

2. *Philosophy of Value*. pp. 140—1.

desire while we have shown it to lie in the interrelation of subject and object.

* * * * *

9. The peculiar cast of the present view may be brought out more clearly by comparing it with that of Prof. R. B. Perry and the comparison will be found instructive as much because of the close resemblance, as because of the important differences, between the two views. In the first place it may be instructive to note that although Prof. Perry relates value to interest or the "motor-affective life" of the agent, he inserts, in the space of one chapter,¹ no less than *five different* definitions of value. Firstly, as is evident from the title of the chapter in question, he identifies value with the object of interest: "Value as Any Object of Any Interest." This is evidently a confusion, for the *object* of interest cannot be the notion of value in the generic sense which, Prof. Perry claims, is the special and original theme of investigation of his work.² In the second place, however, he says "that which is an object of interest is *eo ipso* invested with value" or that "any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it."³ Here, the object of interest is *endowed* with value or *acquires* value—how or by whom or what, is not made clear. Is it the interest or act of interest or the relation between interest and object that endows the object with value? But immediately, in the foot-note attached to this definition, we are told that "an object is valuable when *qualified* by an act of interest relation to interest assuming, in the experience or judgment of value, the role of adjective."⁴ Here obviously there is no suggestion that the object "acquires" value in the act of interest or that interest makes the object valuable; the definition simply implies that the object's value comes into *evidence* when interest qualifies it—the value possibly *existing* in the object independently of all interest. This view appears to be confirmed in another passage⁵ wherein Prof. Perry states that value is "that special character of an object which consists in the fact that interest is taken in it"—which means that value is a kind of capacity or quality in the object although this quality is defined in terms of the interest taken in the object. Soon, however, we come upon

1. *General Theory of Value*: Ch. V. 2. *Ibid*, p. 118.

3. *Ibid*. pp. 115—116. 4. Foot-note, 2.

5. *Ibid*, p. 104.

a fourth definition, viz., that "value is thus a specific relation into which things, possessing any ontological status whatsoever, whether real or imaginary, may enter with interested subjects."¹ In this, value is said to be a *relation* which contradicts all the previous definitions of value, for a relation can be neither an object, nor anything investing that object, nor any character of that object. As if this were not sufficient, Prof. Perry next talks of "identifying value with interest," the motor-affective attitude of the subject as "constituting" value.² Variation of value as well as conditional values are to be determined, he says, by variation and condition of interest, and in fact interest itself is "constructive of value in the basic sense."³ To crown all, in a previous connection, he had said that "value in the generic sense *has to do with* a certain constant that we may call bias or interest,"⁴ while in a still earlier work he had written, "To like or dislike an object is to create that object's value."⁵

It is true that the general theory of value of Prof. Perry is "construed in terms of interest," but it is a little difficult to find out which of the half a dozen definitions of value quoted above really represents the heart of his view. They represent a gradual transition from the object of interest to the interest itself. Value is said to be first something *which has to do with* interest, then the *object* of interest, then, something *acquired* by the object, then a *character* of the object, then a *relation* between object and interest, then *interest* itself. Out of this plethora of conceptions one thing stands out clearly and unambiguously, and that is, that value is in some sense related to or dependent upon interest, or the conative-affective life of the agent, and *that*, like Descartes's *cogito* in metaphysics, seems to be the bed-rock foundation of his theory of value, and in fact, ought to be so for any theory of value. But what specially merits attention in this place is Prof. Perry's further distinction between "value" and "valuing", between the identification of value with interest and the assignment of value by the subject to the object.⁶ Value is defined as the relation of an object to a valuing subject. But what is the content of this act of valuing? If it consists simply

1. *Ibid.*, p. 116. 2. *Ibid.*, p. 123. 3. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

4. "The Definition of Value", *Jnl. of Philosophy*, V. 11 (1914), p. 149.

5. *The Moral Economy*: (New York) 1909, p. 15.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-124, 128-134.

in "liking, desiring or being otherwise favourably disposed to the object," Prof. Perry agrees; but if it includes "finding, deeming, or judging valuable," then such a view, which is characterised as being "viciously or sceptically relative" or "merely redundant," is to be condemned. Now it will be seen that this latter is precisely the view which has been maintained in the present work, else our whole discussion of the normative point of view and calling the science of value "normatics" would have no point whatsoever. It is the view of the present writer that value does not exist prior to valuation,¹ and valuation it has been shown, is the act of judging, criticising, or appreciating the conformity or non-conformity of an object to a norm or standard. It is not meant, of course, that valuation is entirely or exclusively a process of judgment or criticism and that no feeling tone is present in it. The psychology of appreciation or evaluation will be discussed separately.² Suffice it to say here that appreciation may be in terms of judgment and feeling, or judgment-feeling. Any way what is essential for the present doctrine is that in order that value may occur there shall be *perception* of the conformity etc.. Otherwise there may be interest in the subject attaching itself to the object capable of satisfying it, but *value* as such would not occur anywhere in such a relation. I am not saying now that perception *directly* creates value, for such a terminology, it has already been remarked, is inexact and misleading. Perception (judgment-feeling) is of the conformity etc., and when this takes place, value occurs or emerges. Hence it may be said that perception is rather a condition or means of expression of value rather than its *cause*. The cause, as we have seen, lies in the effective relatedness into which the agent's desire and the object enter. It may here be objected that if the relatedness is the cause and the value the effect, given the cause the effect naturally follows, and the necessity for appreciation through which alone value is said to occur, disappears. Not so, however; for it is an observed fact of nature that a cause can produce its effect only under determinate conditions. A certain drug *a* has the property of curing fever, we shall say, or of producing the effect *b*, but it

1. It must be remembered in this connection that the view thus admitted *viz.*, that value comes into existence only in valuation, is strictly different from that other view which we have condemned that value *is* valuation or appreciation. 2. See Chapter V.

may be that it can do so only when administered through water or honey, so that if this latter condition were not present, the desired result would not ensue. Likewise appreciation as judgment-feeling is the indispensable determining condition of the emergence of value. It is not true then that, as Prof. Perry believes, mere desiring or liking or interest will produce value. Interest acts only to appropriate or possess the object, and this process of interest-possessing-or-enjoying-object may go on for any length of time without there occurring any value in the whole process. This is perfectly in keeping with the doctrine that value is neither in the object nor in the subject (or his interest) but in the interrelation between the interest and the object. And the interrelation has been interpreted to consist in the fact of being interested on the part of the subject and the capacity to satisfy this interest on the part of the object. Now the crucial point in this analysis of the situation is the distinction between *being* interested and mere interest. *To be* interested, it seems to me, is something concretely different from merely *having* interest or *feeling* interest. Not that feeling is absent in the former, but in addition to feeling interest, it implies that the subject is *aware* of his interest, and it is this *awareness* of his own interest in the object and of the object's capacity to fulfil that interest that provides the necessary condition for the emergence of value. Indeed Prof. Perry himself appears to admit as much in the important question which he raises: "What is implied in being favourably or unfavourably disposed to anything?"¹

Let us take Prof. Perry's own instances² to see whether the above analysis of value is correct. To prove his theme that interest creates value in objects he appeals to facts like these: The silence of the desert is without value until some wanderer finds it lonely and terrifying; the cataract, until some human sensibility finds it sublime etc.. Now if the wanderer is to *find* the desert terrifying, he should necessarily *judge* it to be terrifying, or be *aware* of its terrifying character, which implies that he is *aware* of his being terrified by the given cause. Else, he may simply be struck with terror, in which case he may attribute it to any conceivable cause; but he would not *find the desert*

1. *Ibid*, p. 141.

2. *Ibid*, p. 125. I have quoted the very sentences of Prof. Perry.

terrifying. Likewise with the other cases cited in the text. In fact, Prof. Perry himself concludes, "there is no entity that can be named that does not, in the very naming of it, take on a certain value through the fact that it is selected by the *cognitive purpose* of some interested mind."¹ And yet in another connection wherein he is discussing interest as object of cognition, he states that "although interest cannot exist without cognition, it can and does exist without cognition of itself.....Being known is something that may or may not happen to an act of interest."² This is perfectly true, but our contention is that in cases where it does not happen to an act of interest (where interest exists without cognition of itself), value does not arise or occur either. Hence Prof. Perry's conclusion that "a value acquires existence when an interest is generated, regardless of any knowledge about it,"³ is unsupported by experience. A child likes milk naturally, and he will cry for it when he is hungry and does not get it. But does he value it? To be capable of this he should be aware of his own desire for milk, or of the milk's capacity to satisfy his interest. Else milk has no *value* for him any more than it has for the cat who likes it equally strongly. The value conception can arise only through an act of reflection. The root error in Prof. Perry, Prof. Prall⁴ and others of their school of thought is the indiscriminate identification of value with interest. Where interest itself is said to be value, it is enough that an interest should exist if value is to exist. Interests and their objects "do not have to obtain from anybody's knowledge of them, permission either to exist or to be what they are."⁵ This is perfectly true, but perfectly unrelated to the question of the existence or occurrence of value. That this is so is admitted in Prof. Perry's other definition quoted previously that value is something with which an "object of interest" is "invested" or which it "acquires." What the object is "invested with" or "acquires" as the result of the subject's taking interest in it must certainly be different from the interest taken in it, and *that* surely requires permission to exist from the subject who is to "invest" the object with it.⁶

1. *Italics mine.* 2. *Ibid.*, p. 358.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 140. 4. *A study in the Theory of Value* : pp. 215, 227.

5. *The General Theory of Value*, p. 140.

6. The subject is discussed further in Ch. V.

10. What is the charge of Prof. Perry against the view that value exists only in appreciation?¹ It is that it leads to a vicious and sceptical form of relativism, and implies "the impossibility of knowing anything whatsoever about value."² And after pointing out how the theory, according to G. E. Moore, could be distinguished into two forms both of which are shot through with the vicious relativism, he attempts to show that his own view is immune from this self-stultifying error. Firstly, it may be held that any assertion of an action to be good or bad, right or wrong, merely means that the person making the assertion himself has some particular feeling towards the action in question. The assertion, in other words, merely refers to *his own present feeling* about the action, and if so, the view leads to the mutual irrelevance of all value judgments since no two judges could ever agree or disagree with one another, nor indeed could the same judge reiterate or rectify his own past opinions. With regard to this criticism, it must be pointed out at the outset that its force derives from the fact that Prof. Moore, who is concerned to maintain the existence of intrinsic value in objects as a simple indefinable quality unaffected by the vagaries of one's affective life, purposely considers cases in which it is one's feeling (and if feeling, then only *present* feeling) alone that is supposed to be at work.³ Such a case, it can be seen at once, is not apt enough to illustrate our present theory, for we do *not* maintain that appreciation is entirely a matter of feeling. On the contrary, it involves *judgment, criticism* etc.. If so, the contingencies supposed regarding agreement or disagreement on matters of value need not and cannot occur, and it is quite possible to have judgment or opinion in the ordinary sense of these terms. But it may be as well to point out with reference to the above argument (although it does not affect our theory) that it does not prove that the two persons who have opposite feelings towards an object which they respectively call good and bad do not refer to the same object of experience, *i.e.*, are not making incompatible statements about it. When A says that he is pleased

1. This doctrine is not strictly identical with the view that "awareness of value makes value" although Prof. Perry considers them to be so and criticises the doctrine in the text from that standpoint.

2. *Ibid*, p. 128.

3. "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" in *Philosophical Studies*.

with X's conduct and B says that he is displeased with it, it is true enough that they have opposite feelings, but this may be because the same characteristics of X's conduct may affect A and B differently and there is a real point at issue between them. Good and bad may mean simply pleasing or displeasing, but what pleases one and displeases another may in itself be one and the same thing neutral in its moral character. A and B in such a case are as truly at variance with each other—one saying that the object is pleasure-producing and the other that it is pain-producing—as they would be if they were referring to an identical quality. Thus one of the most powerful¹ arguments (as it is considered by Profs. Moore and Ross) for the objectivity of good as a quality is shown to be inconclusive. The statements of A and B are not compatible with each other in the same sense in which their assertions would be if one had said "I came from Bombay" and the other had said "I came from Madras." As to how it should be possible for the same neutral object to excite different feelings in different men, the difficulty is not greater here than in answering the question, how it should be possible for one and the same quality—supposing one such exists—to be perceived differently by different people.

Secondly, it may be held that the assertion in question means merely that somebody or other thinks the action to be right or wrong, which "generalised and simplified" is tantamount to the adage "There is nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so." Here it is necessary to point out that this is not the doctrine maintained in the present work. To say that value exists only in appreciation is not to say that it exists or occurs only *because* of appreciation. Thought or awareness does indeed *condition* value but it does not *cause it*. Hence, the "fundamental difficulty" involved in the above view, *viz.*, that one would then have no *object* to think about but one's own mere *thought* or *belief* that a thing is valuable,² disappears into thin air.

1. *Ross: The Right and the Good*, pp. 82-83, 95. It should be noticed that for any sort of incompatibility to arise in our statements, they should have some *common* objective reference—be it to the object or to its characteristics. And this even a feeling theory of value provides. And it is on these same lines that Ross defends his view of the subjectivity of beauty; *Ibid.*, pp. 128-129.

2. For "if a thing is valuable by virtue of being believed to be valuable, then when one believes a thing to be valuable, one believes that it is believed to be valuable, or one believes that it is believed to be believed

11. In short such criticisms apply only to views which are too precise, too clear-cut, too rounded and simple, and no value-theory that has so far been put forward is so rounded and simple as all that. The view criticised by Prof. Ross in *The Right and the Good* is a sample of such a theory. Reproducing in effect the argument of Prof. Moore, Prof. Ross writes: ".....to say that S thinks X good leaves it an open question whether X is good. For opinion has the characteristic which feeling has not, of being either true or false. If S thinks falsely that X is good, then X is not good; and if S thinks truly that X is good, then X's being good is neither identical with nor dependent upon S's thinking it good." Are our moral judgments made and are they to be interpreted as simply as all this? When S thinks X good or bad, can we determine so easily the truth or falsity of S's thinking? And is X's conduct or character such an open book that he who runs may read and judge? Will there not always be elements in a person's conduct or character that one person notices and another fails to notice, and that consequently make a difference to their respective judgments? To state the matter otherwise, is goodness or badness really a given quality such that there can ordinarily speaking be no divergence in the perceiving of it? Is it not on the assumption that it is that the whole force of the argument rests? Would not those who do not accept this implication be justified in believing that our judgments of good and bad characterise not so much what a person in himself is or does as our emotional and intellectual reactions to what he is or does? And are not our reactions determined by our own tastes, feelings, beliefs and judgments as much as by what we notice or fail to notice in the other person's conduct or character? Else, how to explain the fact that the *self-same* object of judgment—say, the institution of polygamy—is judged to be good, or at least not bad, by some people and definitely bad by others? How to account for the fact that lying is considered right under some circumstances by some thinkers and unmitigatedly wrong under all circumstances by others? Moral life in short is infinitely more complex than moral theory.

to be valuable, and so on *ad infinitum*" (*General Theory of Value*, p. 129). Here substitute "only where it is perceived to conform to a standard" for "by virtue of being believed to be valuable" and the absurd *ad infinitum* vanishes.

Criticisms such as those of Prof. Moore and Prof. Ross are applicable to almost all views which accept thought and feeling as in some sense involved in valuation. If value is relative to interest at all (to take Prof. Perry's view first), then interest need not be your interest (even supposing interest to extend beyond the present moment) and no two judges could ever agree or disagree with one another since they do not refer to any independent quality possessed by the action but to their own interest in the matter. And as for Prof. Moore's doctrine of intrinsic value as an independent quality of the object, it is sufficient to quote Prof. Perry's own criticism of it: "There is no difficulty over the meaning of terms connoting empirical qualities, nor is there any serious difference of opinion as to their distribution But no one who has read Mr. Moore's solemn observations concerning what things are or are not good can for an instant be deceived into supposing that his perception has lit upon a quality whose evident presence he reports for our benefit. He speaks with an air of hesitation and vague conjecture. He imputes goodness in a miscellaneous way to things that 'appear' or are 'commonly held' to be good....."¹

12. Prof. Ross's criticisms of the "psychological" theories of value merit careful consideration.² On the whole, it may be said that they are a re-statement and in many cases a reinforcement of Prof. Moore's views. In general, however, they suffer from two defects. In the first place, great confusion is caused by the failure to distinguish between value in the generic sense and good or goodness as a specifically moral value. Again and again considerations which are appropriate or relevant only in the later connection are urged to support contentions belonging to the former context. In the second place, appeal is now and again made to *popular* modes of thought and speaking which are uncritical and uncriticised, the author forgetting the salutary injunction of Bishop Berkeley that in such matters we should speak with the vulgar but think with the learned.

The criticism that a psychological theory in some of its forms leads to the mutual irrelevance of all value judgments since no two judges could ever agree or disagree with one

1. *Ibid.*, p. 30. The passages in question occur in Prof. Moore's *Principia Ethica*, Ch. VI and *Ethics* Ch. VII.

2. *The Right and the Good*, pp. 80-104.

another, has already been considered. One favourite argument of Prof. Ross against the "feeling-theory" (if we may for short call it so) of value is that supposing that one for the first time got a feeling of satisfaction from an object which had remained unaltered in its nature, "we should clearly judge not that the object had then first become good, but that its goodness had then first been apprehended." And, continuing the same argument, he wonders how goodness can be brought into being by the feeling of *some one or other*, no matter how vicious or stupid or ignorant he might be.¹ In reply it may be pointed out that coal in Newcastle—so long as it is to be found in plenty there—has no value or only a slight value, but that if for any reason whatsoever a scarcity should occur of that commodity, it would have, owing to the desire of the people, immense value *conferred* upon it. And anybody can bring value into existence, however vicious or stupid or ignorant he might be, for even vicious or stupid or ignorant people have their own desires and value objects should these have the capacity to satisfy their desires. One suspects, however, that it is the confusion between good as value in general and goodness as moral value in particular that lends plausibility to Prof. Ross's consideration.

In another connection Prof. Ross writes: "But it is surely a strange reversal of the natural order of thought to say that our admiring an action either is, or is what necessitates, its *being* good. We think of its goodness as what we admire in it, and as something it would have even if no one admired it, something that it has in itself."² Our admiring an action is not what necessitates its *being* good, but its being *called* or *characterised* as good. The action in itself is neither good nor bad; it only possesses certain characteristics which we compare with a standard of moral expectation in our own minds, and our admiring it simply means that in virtue of those characteristics the action "comes up" to our expectations. Our appreciating the action is the point at which its value is born.

If a relational theory of good be true, argues Ross, good must stand for a certain "complex," and then, if we use the word intelligently, we ought to have in our minds the notion of a definite relation between definite things. But, he adds, when

1. *Ibid*, p. 83 (italics in the original).

2. *Ibid*, p. 89. (italics mine).

we use the word in ordinary parlance, we have no such notion, and in consequence, good is a simple non-relational quality and hence indefinable.

Here Ross is maintaining the view of the indefinability of good made famous in ethics by Moore, and, of course, on the same grounds, *viz.*, that definition is possible only of the complex, and good being a simple unanalysable quality is not definable. I should not ordinarily desire to discuss the merits of a view which has been criticised *ad nauseam* for three decades and more and which its original protagonist himself has thought fit to modify if not to abandon altogether.¹ But as many thinkers besides Moore, like Ross and Laird, still hold the view to be possible, and as it is directly and diametrically opposed to the relational theory of value maintained in this work, I cannot take the truth of the latter theory as established unless I attempt to show, so far as it in me lies, the unsoundness of the view opposed to it. I cannot, however, claim that the criticisms of the view offered here are always my own and have never been suggested before.

Definition, according to the view we are now considering, must always be analytic, *i.e.*, it must consist in a resolution of a complex whole into its constituent parts. Now it is true that in science, especially biological sciences, we sometimes do have definitions of this kind which may be called structural definitions. But they are not logical definitions, for they do not state the essence, which consists of the differentiating features, of the object. To say, for example, that a horse is an animal with four legs, a head, a heart, a liver etc., all of them arranged in definite relations to one another, is not to *define* a horse, for these features are not sufficient to delimit or differentiate a horse, say, from an ass, an ox etc.. And any amount of specification that we may make with reference to such structure or composition would still not be sufficient for the purpose. This is because such a description, eminently useful no doubt in its own way, does not, as said before, give us the essence of the object. And the essence of the object is that single point of view which represents the object as a whole and which is connoted by the term "horse." Even when we enumerate all the parts of a horse, unless we think of

1. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement to Vol. XI. p. 127.

them as the parts of a horse, we cannot understand them as the parts of a horse and not as those of an ass, for instance. Definition, in other words, is not an attempt to resolve a thing into its separate parts each of which is relatively simple, but an effort to see the thing in all its intrinsic relations as constituting a whole and as differentiated from other such wholes. Parts do indeed have a meaning of their own, but this meaning comes to light, expresses itself, only when they enter into an effective relatedness so as to constitute a whole. The unity of the whole is as important in the constitution of the nature of an object as the diversity of its parts.

This implies, moreover, that there is another aspect to definition. The essence or the single point of view which represents the object as a whole can more often be understood better by inspecting its relations to other objects in experience than by resolving it into its constituents. This relation of an object to other objects is the other side of its relation to its own parts. It is through such self-relation as well as other-relation that the full meaning of an object develops and comes to light. Here also it should be remembered that relation to another does not *make* an object what it is in its entirety. Every object has its own unique nature to start with; but the effective relatedness into which it enters with other objects enhances its being and enables it to realise itself. A table, for example, is what it is by virtue of the unity of its parts; but its significance is fully brought out only by its relation to persons who may use it as an article of furniture, and the definition of a table in terms of such a possible purpose to which it may be put brings out its meaning or significance more clearly than the enumeration of its parts. Likewise the nature of a horse is better expressed by specifying the function which it fulfils in relation to other living beings in the animal or human world than by specifying its constituent parts.

The great need in science is not to analyse the anatomy of objects but to explain the nature of a thing by relating it, through general laws of behaviour, to other things and their characteristics. Oxygen is a gas, one of the non-metallic elements, existing free in air and combined in water and most minerals and organic substances and being essential to animal and vegetable life. Gravity is an attractive force by which bodies tend to the centre

of the earth. A planet is a heavenly body revolving in an approximately circular orbit round the sun. In these cases, a non-relational and analytic definition would mean nothing. Sometimes a relational explanation is given by telling just how an object comes into being—such are called genetic definitions; for example, water is a fluid formed by adding one part of oxygen to two parts of hydrogen; heat is a form of energy possessed by bodies derived from an irregular motion of their molecules.

If this view of definition as synthetic and relational, as revealing an aspect of experience which can throw light on another aspect, be correct, then it follows that good or value, to be truly intelligible, must be defined in the same relational manner.¹ It is not a question of whether we understand or not in some vague way the object of thought or experience denoted by the word "good" even if it is not defined; its comparison with yellow in this respect is misleading as Ross himself admits.² Everybody with normal eyes can see yellow and agree with everybody else that a given object is yellow in colour whatever the differences in shade may be. But when my conscience says that it is immoral to kill people even in war, or my parents urge that it is my duty to remain with them and tend them in their old age, while my country calls upon me to defend her against unprovoked aggressors; when my religion says that non-injury is the highest moral virtue and that even animals have got a right to live on their own account and not merely as means to man's welfare, while my science requires the practice of vivisection as a duty to mankind; it is clear beyond all doubt that, even granting that goodness or duty is apprehended only by intelligence and not, like yellow, by sense-perception, there is need for considerable hesitancy before concluding that even by such a thing as "conscientiousness"³ people do understand the same quality. The mere difference in two people's views as to whether a particular action is good does not show,

1. Vide the writer's article, "Outline of an Emergent Theory of Value" in *The International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XLV, 4, p. 416. The above criticism is essentially identical with the one made by Bosanquet years ago against the indefinability of good.

2. *Op. Cit.*, p. 87.

3. An example which Ross frequently makes use of to illustrate the objectivity of goodness.

argues Ross, that they do not mean by "goodness" a definite quality.¹ Possibly; but it is also possible that their difference is due as much to their failure to understand such a definite quality by goodness as to their failure to agree upon the location of the said quality (if existing at all) in a given act. Very probably they may be employing the same word, goodness or duty or whatever else it be, in their intercourse, but each of them may understand quite a different *thing* by it.

In showing then in what precisely the nature of goodness or value consists lies the need of defining it, and I have been suggesting that its nature can best be brought out by investigating the points at which it comes into contact with life and experience. I go further and suggest that we do not have goodness (or value) given to us or thrust upon us in things; it is born in appreciation; we achieve it in our life of desire. It is in relation to desire and in relation to an object which satisfies desire that goodness comes to be. It is indeed a complex notion since it necessarily involves a relation to a desiring mind. Whenever we think of goodness, we always have in our minds the notion of a definite relation between definite things.

But I cannot be sure that what I have said so far entirely settles the question of the definability of good. Moore and Ross might point out that after all what has been sought to be proved in these contentions is that good may be made intelligible to some extent by relating it to other things with which it generally goes. And this is what Moore himself has in a sense admitted when he says that you can say other things about good, that you could make a synthetic proposition about it like "pleasure is good," for instance, meaning that a thing which possesses the quality of pleasantness also possesses the quality of goodness. But nothing urged so far, they may contend, proves that good just *means* something else, that it *means* pleasure, for instance, or object of desire or interest. Even to have a significant relation to other things, it must in itself *be* something, and this something which goodness *is*, they may conclude, is just what is held to be indefinable. Everything is what it is and not another thing. And any attempt to define the *meaning* of good in this sense, Moore in particular would point out, simply substitutes some other thing—generally an object of the natural

1. *Ibid*, p. 88

world—for good. It consists in stating that goodness is some other quality which a thing might possess. In short, it commits the naturalistic fallacy.

A definition of course need not, as shown above, be merely substitutive, it is more often and more significantly relational. But supposing we substitute a term like "satisfyingness" for goodness, and say that goodness *is* satisfyingness and vice versa, what is meant by saying that we commit a fallacy here, naturalistic or other? The idea of goodness, we may maintain, is nothing else but the idea of satisfyingness in an object, it means or contains nothing more nor less. Substitutive or not, this definition—which is not, be it noted, circular—appears to be perfectly satisfying—and therefore good! Moore of course has a further question to ask: Is satisfyingness good? Is it good to desire objects in a particular way?¹ etc.. To my mind such questions convey no meaning. When I say "thirst means the desire to drink water," and you still ask, is the desire to drink water thirst? I can only reply, yes, it is, that is what thirst *means*. Similarly when we have exhausted the whole notion of goodness itself by identifying it with something else, to ask of the latter whether it is itself good is surely absolutely meaningless. Goodness is just the name we employ to denote a particular aspect in objects—their aspect of satisfyingness in relation to desire. And so good is not indefinable.²

Furthermore, which school, in the long history of ethical thought, is guilty of this naturalistic fallacy of identifying good—a quality of the intelligible world—with some object of the natural world?³ Let it be remembered that the fallacy arises only when the substantive "the good," and not the adjective "good," is defined. For when hedonists say that good is pleasure or good is happiness (do they say so, by the way, the statements, as they stand, seem to make nonsense), what they should mean, if the

1. It must be noted that the inclusion of "in a particular way" in the question (put by Moore) is not necessary for our definition of good which is generic relating only to the desiredness or satisfyingness of objects. Being desired or satisfying in a particular way is another and a different question.

2. See further chapter IV of this work.

3. Since Moore holds that the nature of the fallacy is the same whether the object substituted be one of the sensible or the ideal world, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the *naturalistic* character of the fallacy in particular.

fallacy of substitution is to arise here at all, is that the only or entire content of "the good"—the whole which is good—is pleasure in the one case, or happiness in the other. Otherwise, if they say that pleasure is good, or happiness is good, and their meaning is simply that *their* whole—either a whole of pleasure or of happiness—also seems to them to be good, *i.e.*, to possess the further attribute of goodness, no naturalistic fallacy arises. There is a significant difference between "good is pleasure" (pleasant?) and "pleasure is good." It is only when the moral whole of goodness is swept away and another whole of pleasure or happiness is put in its place that the alleged fallacy appears. But I suggest that this is not what hedonism or utilitarianism means. I suggest that their meaning is that no whole is good, *i.e.*, valuable, which does not contain a preponderating amount of pleasure or happiness. If therefore it is the adjective "good" that is said to be defined, no fallacy arises at all; if the substantive "the good", a fallacy indeed does arise, but no one has been guilty of this in the history of ethical thought.

Except Moore himself, I was going to add. But I am not sure. Does Moore commit a fallacy, naturalistic or other, when he says that "Intelligence is good and intelligence alone is good"?¹ Or, when, analysing one of the intrinsic goods, *viz.*, aesthetic enjoyment, he defines the beautiful as that of which the admiring contemplation is good in itself?² Shall we say that he is substituting one object for another in these cases—intelligence for goodness, goodness of contemplation for beauty—or—Moore being greater than his theory—explaining one aspect of experience by another in which it is involved? If beauty is necessarily and always connected with goodness, is not the nature of goodness itself revealed thereby to some extent? Else, why should beauty be saddled with the goodness of another's admiring contemplation? In a case where the admiring contemplation of a beautiful object is bad (as when the beauty of a human form is admired with lascivious thoughts), does the object cease to be aesthetically beautiful?

If good is an indefinable quality, goodness is something intuitively perceived but not known by logic or arguments. Moore, like Mill and Sidgwick, is an intuitionist in holding that questions of ultimate ends or ideals are incapable of proof or

1. *Op. Cit.* p. 9.

2. *Ibid.* p. 20.

disproof. But not only is intrinsic goodness thus indemonstrable, it is unrealisable also. For according to Moore's philosophy of practical ethics, conduct, owing to the unbridgeable causal gulf between intrinsic goods and their actualisation, is incapable of realising any kind of intrinsic goodness. But if there are only two things which are intrinsically good *viz.*, pleasures of human intercourse and aesthetic enjoyments, and these also, *ex hypothesi*, are incapable of being brought into existence, we have plainly missed our mark, *i.e.*, we have never seen or perceived intrinsic good of any kind. If goodness is really such a simple quality to be found in objects in more or less degree, then it should be capable of realisation in more or less degree; if it is impossible to realise it in conduct and life generally, then it were idle to talk of its being intuited and understood as a simple quality. And not having perceived or realised it in any circumstances, we cannot say anything about its definability.

Moreover, what prevents good or yellow from being *definable* even if they are simple? Why should simplicity go with indefinability or unanalysability, unless by simplicity we mean singleness or partlessness of being? Ross and Moore seem to think that definitions are possible only of what is numerically complex *i.e.*, what is or contains more than one, and that whatever is numerically one or partless cannot be defined.¹ This of course follows from their view of definition as analysis into parts; but it is based on a subtler and equally indefensible assumption regarding the nature of the simple and the complex. If we agree that philosophically speaking numbers are of no consequence, and that a thing can be simple in the sense of *being simple for conception* although it may contain many parts, while another thing may truly be complex for conception—in the sense of being vague, ill-defined, inchoate etc. — although numerically it may be singular, then we should recognise that the conceptually simple or definite can still very well be defined whereas the conceptually vague, hazy and indefinite (and therefore complex) cannot be defined at all. Simplicity and complexity have no necessary connection with numbers or parts.

Moreover, Moore holds that while the adjective "good" is indefinable, the substantive "the good" is definable. One would have thought that since the substantive derives all its meaning

1. Ross: *The Right and the Good*, p. 92.

from the adjective (e.g. the rich, the pious etc.), if the latter itself be indefinable, the former would be still more so. Moore might say, of course, that "the good" is defined by enumerating all those things which make up the content of the good, things such as pleasure, intelligence, beauty, contemplation etc.. His statements in this connection¹ imply that the good is the substantial whole to which the adjective "good" applies, and that this whole may have other adjectives besides "good" applicable to it, for instance, pleasant, intelligent etc.. It is clear from this that the various contents of this whole—whether taken in a substantial or adjectival sense—are of co-ordinate universality, each contributing its significance to the whole. If so, why should we designate the whole by the term "the good" alone? Why not call it "the pleasant" or "the intelligent"? Or why should the whole be characterised as good only, and not as intelligent or pleasant also, especially as these terms apply to the whole as such and not to the parts thereof? Further, if all the adjectives are co-ordinate, then just as we say pleasure is good and intelligence is good, might we as well say, considering the other elements of the whole, that intelligence is pleasant, beauty is intelligent, intelligence is beautiful, intelligence is affectionate etc.? Lastly, if all these adjectives contribute their meaning to the whole interestedly called "the good," do they not contribute their meaning to the definition of "good" itself? Such are some of the difficulties involved in holding to an atomistic analysis of value concepts.

To resume the consideration of Ross's criticisms of the relational theories of value. Drawing out the implications of Perry's statement that "the goodness of the primrose consists in its being desired,"² Ross argues that the object of desire is always something non-existent and that therefore "in so far as goodness were either identical with or dependent upon being desired, nothing could both exist and be good."³ But he thinks "that we are all convinced both that some things that exist now are good, and that things which may come into existence in the future, will be good if and when they exist." The desire theory of good, however, denies both these convictions and so (he concludes) is plainly false.⁴

Ross, who considers Perry's statement regarding the prim-

1. Op. Cit., p. 9.

3. Op. Cit., p. 96.

2. *The General Theory of Value*, pp. 132-133.

4. *Ibid*, p. 97.

rose to be "only a rough and ready description" of what we actually mean when we say that we desire a primrose,¹ fails to observe that our conviction both that some things that exist now are good and that future things would be good in the future, is *also* only a rough and ready description of what we actually mean to say happens in such cases. What we actually mean is, not that existing things *by themselves* are good, but that they would be good *if and when* desired. We may provisionally agree to say that nothing that exists is *as such* also good. As soon, however, as any one begins to desire anything,—the primrose itself, for instance, or the seeing or the smelling or the possessing of it (as Ross would say),—the goodness of the primrose or of its seeing etc., is born. Goodness is thus dependent upon being desired, and yet why should ethics go by the board or our interest in the topic of "good" suffer? One would on the contrary imagine that as soon as we recognise that we are the creators of "good", our interest in it would be kindled a hundred-fold more than when we passively recognised certain things to be good in themselves.

Next, Ross considers the difficulty that "the same object may be liked or desired by one man, and disliked or avoided by another" as insoluble on the basis of a relational definition of good². He will not accept the explanation that a thing *may* be good and bad at the same time to different persons. By saying that a thing may be "both good and bad," he thinks we can mean only one of two things, *viz.*, (1) that a thing may contain some elements that are good and some that are bad, or (2) that it may be judged from different points of view, say a moral and an intellectual, and found to be good from the one and bad from the other point of view. And a thing cannot be both good and bad in the same elements or from the some point of view. But this analysis begs the very question that is at issue, *viz.*, whether a thing *is* or *really contains* elements good and bad in themselves. If we do not grant this assumption, then a third possibility shows itself, *viz.*, that in respect of the same element or elements, a thing *may* appear good to one person and bad to another. For good and bad are names, as we have seen, for our own reactions to what the thing contains, reactions deter-

1. *Ibid*, p. 96.

2. *Ibid*, pp. 100-101.

mined by our own notions, customs, habits, likes and dislikes; and it is possible that while a custom, for instance, flesh-eating, is, say from the moral point of view, considered good by one race of people, it may from the same point of view be considered extremely bad by another. There is nothing surprising in this. It is most surprising, though, that (if good referred to a really existing absolute quality in objects) different persons should (as they not infrequently do) look at the same quality and one exclaim "It is good!" and another "It is bad!"

Lastly Ross thinks that the fact that in reality we judge many things to be bad in which nevertheless some one or other takes or has taken an interest is an obvious and insuperable objection to the relational theory of good!¹ Perry of course explains such a case by saying that while any object of interest would be good from the standpoint of generic value, some objects of interest may be condemned as bad from the specifically *moral* standpoint. Ross's contention is that our condemnation of some objects of interest need not necessarily be from the "narrowly ethical standpoint" but from "the most commanding point of view that can be taken with regard to the value of the things in the universe." It is from such a point of view, he says, that we consider that virtue, knowledge and pleasure, for instance, are good, and that vice, ill-founded opinion and pain are bad. It is clear, however, from these examples that Ross's "most commanding point of view" is simply the point of view of a theory of value (good) in general. And to say, from this standpoint, that ignorance and pain are bad is simply to say that ignorance and pain are disvalues (though in a case "where ignorance is bliss," it may be a positive value to some one!). Now if from such a general standpoint some people condemn as bad "many states of mind in which their owners have taken interest and found pleasure," it simply shows, not that good has no relation to interest, but that the condemners cannot take interest or find pleasure in such states of mind, and is an additional illustration of that general relativity of values to which reference has been made again and again. This presents therefore no special difficulty to Perry's or any other relational theory. What Perry has in mind is the condemnation of such states of mind from the specifically *moral* point of view, and the only explanation that

1. *Ibid*, pp. 101-103.

could be offered for this possibility is the one that Perry offers, *viz.*, that moral judgments do not deal with interests *per sé* but with a specific and complex aspect of them. If Ross does not find this explanation satisfactory, we can only suggest to him that even in "the most commanding standpoint" that one may adopt—whatever its nature,—there is the possibility of relativity of value judgment based upon relativity of interest.

13. Strangely enough, after having vigorously combated all relational theories of good, Ross succumbs to the temptation and himself offers a relational — and even a subjective — theory of beauty.¹ He holds in effect that beauty does not stand for an intrinsic form of value at all and that it is simply a *power* of producing a certain sort of experience in minds, the sort of experience we call aesthetic enjoyment or aesthetic thrill. To this we wholly agree.² But Ross who has all along insisted on what "right" and "good" *mean*, apart from their relation to a perceiving mind and the effects they may produce on it, sees that "beautiful" also cannot *mean* an attribute having this sort of reference to a mind, but something that entirely resides in the object. He nevertheless evades the difficulty by suggesting that "we are deceived in thinking that beautiful things have any such common attribute over and above the power of producing aesthetic enjoyment."³ Now, my question is: if we can thus be deceived in the case of beauty, what guarantee is there that we are not similarly deceived in the case of other value concepts such as truth and goodness? In fact, the whole of his constructive analysis of the concept of beauty beautifully applies to right and good also. And his efforts to show that it does not are most unconvincing. If a subjective theory of beauty is not incompatible with its objectivity, one sees small reason why subjective explanations of right and good should be considered incompatible with their objectivity.

1. *Ibid*, pp. 124-131.

2. A reservation being made, however, in regard to the use of the word "power." Would it not be better to get rid of the whole anthropomorphism once and for all by saying that even this power is what we ascribe to or superimpose on the object? *Vide* Ch. XI of this work.

3. *Op. Cit.* p. 123 (Foot-note).

The most important criticisms of a relational theory of value have so far been considered and found to be untenable. And it is incidentally shown that the theory of absolute value—that value is an absolute quality in objects—is unsupported both by logic and the facts of life. A theory of value—in so far as it involves *valuation*—must perforce be relational. And it has been shown also that a relational theory need not necessarily deny the objective character of value if by objectivity we mean a necessary basis in objects. The particular form of the relational theory upheld in this work—*viz.*, what has been called the *emergent* theory of value—seems to do justice to all the different aspects of the value situation, and may therefore be submitted for consideration as having a good claim for acceptance as a philosophical theory of value.

CHAPTER IV

CHARACTERISTICS OF VALUE

EMERGENCE, OBJECTIVITY AND EXISTENCE.

1. The definition of value formulated in the last chapter, together with the explanations subjoined therein, makes it clear that the realm of value is included in, is indeed a part of, the causal realm. Such a statement is, however, liable to misinterpretation. It does not mean that the natural order and the order of values, even in that region where they touch each other, are identical with each other in every respect. It does not mean that a thing is valuable simply because it is caused or has causal connections, much less of course that everything that is caused has value. Nor is the statement intended to emphasise, what may indeed be regarded as an obvious commonplace, that everything that is valuable is *caused*. What is really the purport of the statement is that value *as such* is engendered out of the interrelation of subject and object. Value does not exist in its own right as a self-caused or uncaused entity or essence. It exists¹ or *comes* into existence as the result of certain definite causes, it is an emergent. Value-propositions therefore are in a fundamental sense causal propositions also, for they tell us mainly how value or a particular value comes to be. Take, for instance, a proposition which at first sight seems to be the most remote from causal implications, a proposition like, Love is good. This proposition does not mean that love in itself and for itself, love *per se*, is good or that goodness is a quality which unconditionally attaches to love. The proposition is indeed a synthetic proposition but in a far richer sense than that in which realists ordinarily understand it. It is intended to denote the circumstances under which alone love may be said to be good or the conditions or connection of phenomena with reference to which goodness as a value comes to exist in this particular case. Out of relation to this catenation of circumstances, the goodness of

1. A modification of this terminology will be suggested, and the whole question of the relation of value to existence discussed, in a subsequent section of this chapter.

love would not exist (*i.e.*, love would not be good), and the proposition therefore taken by itself is incomplete if not radically false. And to specify these concrete circumstances which are responsible for the generation of the goodness of love is to specify its cause or condition.

2. It is therefore not a little difficult to understand the statement made by W. R. Sorley that "Ethics is distinguished from the natural sciences by the fact that its propositions are value-propositions and not causal propositions: it predicates value, not causation."¹ The exact significance of this sentence eludes one's grasp especially as the reason alleged for this distinction is that ethics and value-sciences in general predicate value upon the assumption or under the hypothesis of existence. Now without raising at this stage the wider question whether the postulate of existence "expressed or implied, actual or hypothetical," is indispensable for the predication of value, one would have thought that the reason alleged for the distinction, granting it to be true, would in fact *pro tanto* obliterate the distinction between ethics and the positive sciences, like physics and chemistry. For the natural sciences, unlike the abstract sciences² like mathematics, notoriously deal with existents and not with subsistents and it is because of this pre-eminently existential character of the entities dealt with by them that their experimental procedure stands justified or at all becomes applicable. And if the value-sciences also proceed on the hypothesis of existence, if a thing is held to be good only as existing or if it exists, then they must equally submit to the implications involved in the application of the causal law, for whatever exists or is capable of existence, or is connected with existence, is certainly caused or capable of being caused, or is connected with the causal laws which determine existence. If so in what sense then are we to believe that "the laws which determine value are not of the same order as the laws which determine the causal or other connexions of things and persons?"³ An existent thing may be without value altogether but all existent things are caused

1. *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 85.

2. It is these abstract sciences which Prof. Sorley takes to illustrate the distinction in question, but nevertheless the distinction is made primarily with reference to ethics and the natural sciences, which, however, remains unillustrated and therefore unjustified.

3. *Ibid*, p. 507 (*Italics mine*).

and whatever values are connected with existence must equally be connected with causation. This is why it was said at the beginning of the present chapter that the realm of value is *included in, or is a part of*, the causal realm. And whatever the legitimacy of the distinction¹ between intrinsic and instrumental value, it is clear that the notion of value in the generic sense is the same in both cases.

But, it may be asked, how is this conclusion consistent with the fundamental distinction laid down in the second chapter between the *normative* and the *positive* sciences and with the implications of the normative standpoint generally? It was to guard against such a premature conclusion of inconsistency in the present doctrine that it was observed² that the value-realm and the causal realm even in that region where they touch each other are not identical with each other in every respect. For a value-situation or experience includes more than a mere causal situation. Values are certainly caused and in so far lend themselves to treatment in more or less the same terms as are applicable to other kinds of natural phenomena; but at the same time the *experience* of value is an experience of *appreciation* while the standpoint of scientific procedure is one of *description of fact*. There is a kind of attachment of the subject to the object in the former, a sort of personal equation or identification in the relation, which is entirely absent in the latter. In other words, the *attitude* of the subject to the object is different in both the cases, and this difference is vital in characterising the nature and standpoint of the normative and the positive sciences respectively. Or in the language of those who believe that value is a unique quality inherent in the object, it may be said that in order that a thing be valuable, it must not only *exist* (be capable of causal treatment), but must possess some other quality or relation which is not given in mere existence. In the words of Prof. Sorley, "The moral order cuts across the actual order of existence as presented in sense-perception and described by science.....The predicate good therefore divides existence (real or possible) into two classes: the things to which this predicate applies and the things to which it does not apply."³ And secondly, in the value-realm generally, there is always the assumption that values can be *produced*, created, brought

1. *Ibid*, p. 507.

2. *Vide* p. 85 *ante*.

3. *Op. Cit.* p. 86.

into being where they did not exist before. The practical attitude towards the universe assumes—and it is largely justified in the assumption—that goodness and beauty—to take only two cases of value—can be increased in the world and vice and ugliness lessened continuously. This implication of addition to and subtraction from the sum of value and of disvalue respectively is not present in the scientific attitude towards the world which is one of strict ethical neutrality. The scientist has no ambition of adding to or subtracting from the "*ens realassimum*" or the sum of reality in the world. He does not create or destroy. He just studies reality as he finds it with the primary object of gaining a clearer insight into the workings of nature. Of course, so far as the work of the scientist results in concrete gain to humanity in the way of increasing our knowledge and control of nature, to that extent we may say that science creates values and here we said positive sciences touch the science of value. But such creation of logical and practical values is secondary for the scientist who in the first instance desires to deal with reality only in the capacity of a student or learner eager for knowledge. And lastly, and above all, the normative standpoint implies, as has already been made abundantly clear in the first two chapters of this work, the dominance of purpose or the acceptance of teleological causation in addition to natural causation. Values are indeed caused, but their occurrence or emergence cannot be adequately interpreted in terms of physical and mental relatedness, but requires also the help of dramatic explanation.

3. The gist of the discussion then is that the definition of value should be given (as has been attempted in these pages) in purely genetic terms. It does have a nature of its own, of course, but this nature is so inevitably mixed up with or dependent upon the effective relatedness of subject and object which produces it, *i.e.*, natural causation, involving also as it does teleological causation (as already admitted), that apart from such causal factors, or causability (if the expression be allowed), it has no reality, and in fact, no meaning. Dewey in an article in the *Journal of Philosophy*¹ distinguishes between value as a quality or essence and value as an embodiment of this eternal quality or an existence having value. And the only question worth discussing about value is, he holds, the exis-

1. Vol. XXII, pp. 126—128.

tential question of how things come to possess value-quality. It has already been shown in the previous chapter that we can speak only metaphorically of the causal occurrence of *things* possessed of value, for value according to the present theory does not belong to the object as such, but is imputed to it or superimposed upon it, being in its own nature an emergent from the interrelation of subject and object. And with this explanation, we may perfectly agree with Dewey that even the definition of Prof. Perry that interest or liking is constitutive of value is only a definition of the causal occurrence of things possessed of value, so that liking or interest is a *condition* of the existential occurrence of value. We may also agree with him that thought—by which he understands the recognition of meaning, the reference to something beyond the immediate present—is also equally an essential condition of the presence of a thing having value. But what is surprising in Dewey is that he should talk of the concrete embodiment of eternal value-essence or quality implying thereby that value in its generic nature is a quality or an essence in the Platonic-Leibnizian sense. The present view differs from Dewey's in two important respects; (1) there is no such thing as a value-quality or essence which is embodied or actualised in concrete objects; (2) when we talk of the causal occurrence of things possessed of value, what causally occurs is not the thing or object as such (as Dewey seems to believe) but *value* itself. It is always value in the specific sense, as this or that value, as economic value, as moral value *etc.*, that occurs. The object that is said "to possess" value does not occur but is given in experience as one term of the value-relation. Hence it is misleading to speak of the causal occurrence of *things* possessed of value. Value is superimposed upon objects on account of their capacity to fulfil certain interests; if we must speak of the value of an object we should do so under "acknowledgment" in the language of Morgan and remember that in this sense it is to be regarded as a "property" and not a "quality" of the object.

4. That this is the correct analysis of the value-situation is admitted by Prof. Dewey himself in an article in the *Philosophical Review*.¹ Value, it has in effect been maintained in these pages, is created in the process of appreciation, and does not exist apart from it. And this process of appreciation which is

1. Vol. XXXI, "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge" pp. 344—46.

only a technical name for the joint operation of natural and teleological causation, includes, it was admitted, the element of thought as well as of feeling. Liking, bias, interest or *attachment*, as we have called it, is one essential condition of value-production and herein Messrs. Perry, Prall, Dewey *etc.*, all agree. But Dewey further holds, and in this the view set forth in these pages is in substantial agreement with his, that thought also is an equally essential ingredient in any situation having value-quality.¹ All this has been discussed before at some length² and will be adverted to in a subsequent connection. But in the article in the *Philosophical Review* above referred to, Dewey discusses the role of judgment as a *causal* factor in bringing about the existence of value—an interesting and highly important theory as to the logical character of our valuation judgments. He maintains in effect that judgment constitutes value (in the sense of being the efficient³ cause thereof) because where there happens to be a doubt concerning the reality of a value, judgment, by deciding in favour of one alternative rather than another, and by issuing in action in consonance with that decision, may bring into existence a value which otherwise would not have existed. For instance, a patient who is in doubt concerning the advisability of consulting a particular physician, decides, let us say, that he ought to do so and in consequence is cured. Regarding this theory of judgment-caused values (which, be it noted, applies only to cases of genuinely doubtful value, although every recognised value must once have been produced likewise), Dr. Costello raises the objection⁴ that it involves the absurdity of saying that the judgment produces the *thing possessed of value* or causes the thing to possess a value *which otherwise it would not*.⁵ And in reply Dewey points out

1. "The Meaning of Value:" *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXII, pp. 129-30. Also Vol. XX, p. 618.

2. *Vide*, especially pp. 43-45, *ante*.

3. Not the *material* cause, as supposed by Messrs. Perry and Prall in the case of liking.

4. *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVII, p. 449.

5. Dr. Costello takes the case of a cook who believes she can make a delicious dish by mixing ingredients in a novel fashion, and he interprets the role of judgment (according to Dewey) in this case to be that it must cause cakes made in this proportion to taste good when otherwise they would not. Or in the judgment that copper and sulphuric acid would under certain conditions make copper sulphate, the judgment should unite them both into copper sulphate when otherwise they would have made something else!

that this is a caricature of his doctrine whose real import is, not that the judgment "produces the relation between the proportions and the taste" nor that "because of an act following from a judgment copper and sulphuric acid will make something which they would not make without a judgment," but that without such a judgment in either case, "the taste, the good, would not exist" nor would "knowledge" (a value) be brought into existence.¹

5. We have so far been discussing one great characteristic of value — that which expresses its inmost nature, *viz.*, that it comes into existence, is produced, is an emergent from the subject-object relation, is given off like a spark, so to say, from the clash of the hammer and the iron on the anvil. But what is its status in reality, what is its ontological significance? This raises at once the vexed question of the objectivity of value, which must now courageously be faced and grappled with even though one may not be able to settle it. Long-rooted prejudices die hard; and it is a wise saying that you can no more eradicate a habit of thought than you can eradicate a habit of action. Still without claiming to decide this question one way or the other, and without pretending to deal with it in a manner so as to render full justice to it, we shall attempt to urge some considerations in favour of a view which must already have become more or less explicit in the course of the preceding discussions.

It would be well to begin the attempt by drawing the reader's attention to the confusion that may possibly arise between the *objectivity* of value as such, and its *objective reference*. From the conception of value that has been adumbrated in these pages as an emergent of the subject-object relation, it would unmistakably appear that the present theory not only *admits* objective reference for value, but necessitates it. Even while insisting upon the primacy of the subject's need or affective-volitional life in the production of value, care has been taken to point out that desire does not by itself create value, but creates it out of the *object*.² And the definition of value is itself so framed as to bring out the importance of the object for value, in so far as the object is taken to be capable of helping the realisation by the subject of a universe of desire to which he

1. *Op. Cit.* p. 345.

2. *Vide* p. 70, *ante*.

is attached.¹ Objective reference, then, is not denied by the present theory of value—it only contends that such reference, however, does not constitute value, nor does value primarily depend upon it. So far, therefore, the present theory is at variance with those views which explicitly or implicitly hold that value is constituted by bare liking, interest or bias, in short, a *feeling*. As Prof. Dewey points out, unless the ideational factor is admitted in the experience of value, or at least it is made clear that preference means, not bare feeling, or a state of contentment, but an active reaching out after *specific* objects, such theories cannot be credited with the implication of objective reference in value.²

Now as regards the problem of objectivity. In discussing the relation between normative and factual objectivity, Prof. Urban distinguishes three meanings of the term "objectivity": (1) presupposition of the *physical* existence of the object of value. While some values really do require such physical existence of their objects, this cannot be made a necessary presupposition of the existence of *all* values; (2) assumption of the existence of value in the sense that the individual desire "is continuous with, or convertible into," the desire or demand of others, individuals or special groups. Here again value as such need not be objective in *this* sense for the simple reason that an ideal or an object which has immense value for an individual may not possess any value to others, or to the bulk of the given society in which he lives; (3) inner reality of the value in that it represents "organised and permanent dispositions as over against temporary desires and feelings."³ In this sense, of course, value may unhesitatingly be admitted to be objective, though it does not follow from this admission that temporary desires and feelings engender no value at all in the generic sense.

The whole question turns upon the relation of value to existence and this is a matter on which diverse opinions are held. Prof. Sorley, for instance, believes that the hypothesis of existence is indispensable for the predication of goodness or other value. "Without the postulate of existence, expressed or implied,

1. *Vide*, p. 65, *ante*.

2. "Value, Objective Reference and Criticism": *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXIV. pp. 316—317.

3. *Valuation; Its Nature and Laws*: pp. 387—389.

actual or hypothetical, the attribution of goodness or of any value would be out of place." It is not necessary to assert existence, but at any rate there must be an assumption of it in our judgments of value. "Apart from its claim upon existence in some such way, nothing is either good or evil."¹ William James is of the same opinion that "it is only as being that one thing is better than another."² Dean Inge has vehemently asserted that "A value judgment which is not also a judgment of existence is in the air.....that which has no existence has no value."³ And James Lindsay is convinced that "Reality is the support of value.....Value does not hang in the air."⁴ So is Herbert W. Schneider.⁵ Prof. Perry, though he generally declares for the objective reference of value, is still doubtful about its existence. Somethings like universal peace and immortality, he says, "are valuable despite their non-existence. We do not wait to be assured of the existence of a thing before we deem it valuable." This is "the whole tragedy of life" and he would meet this difficulty by reducing the object of value to the subject of value and by generally providing a realm of subsistence for non-existing objects.⁶ This is all the more necessary for, he believes, existence is a variable factor which distinguishes some values from others. The object of value may have existed in the past, may exist in the present, or may come into existence in the future, and it may be non-existent in all these temporal aspects. Peace may be valuable both in times of peace (when it exists) as well as in times of war (when it is non-existent). Sometimes value itself may come into existence when the object ceases to exist. Thus the value of peace comes to exist in times of war.⁷ Further, according to Prof. Perry interest itself always implies reference to future existence, which means that "interest has the effect, so far as the interest judgment is true, of transforming the object of that judgment from a problematic into an existent object."⁸ This does not imply, however, that "existence or creation is an in-

1. *Moral Values and the Idea of God*: pp. 82- 85.

2. *The Letters of William James*., V. 2, pp. 122-4.

3. *Outspoken Essays*, p. 271.

4. *Great Philosophical Problems*, p. 35.

5. "The Values of Pragmatic Theory": *Jnl. of Philosophy* (1917), p. 711.

6. *General Theory of Value*: p. 24.

7. *Ibid*, pp. 248-249.

8. *Ibid*, pp. 249, 347.

variable constituent of the object of interest." And since for Prof. Perry, interest is identical with value, we may say that for him value is prior to existence and the parent of existence.

There are others, however, who definitely reject the view that value has anything to do with existence. Durkheim, it is said, held that the "world of values" is independent of the world of existence, for value is after all made by valuing. Santayana has said that "existence is irrelevant to an ideal."¹ And in this L. J. Russell, Münsterberg, Hoernle and Bertrand Russell agree. The lyrical protest of Russell against a universe of unconscious but irresistible forces that trample upon the world which man's own ideals have fashioned, recorded in that masterpiece of English Literature, "The Freeman's Worship," has justly become famous.

6. But it is Prof. Urban's view that merits close attention in this connection. In a rather lengthy passage in his earlier work,² he had contended as against Meinong that value does not presuppose the existing object and that the feeling of value does not follow the judgment of existence. The predicates of existence and truth may *add* value or reality to an impression or idea but such addition is neither a condition of appreciation nor a consequence of acknowledging the presupposition of reality which already involves an explicit definition of existence or truth.³ And the ultimate meaning of the presupposition of reality (in addition to the three meanings already noted) he had found in the "inner identity and continuity of the will with its objects or with itself through successive empirical moments of realisation," or "the identity of a subjective will with a met-empirical will" which realises itself in specific forms of empirical continuity. This is what gives objective value.⁴ In his latest work, however, he states in simple language that we cannot speak of value as existing or subsisting. "Value itself is merely valid. That is its objectivity."⁵ And yet value (or validity which is for Prof. Urban identical with value) is *real* enough. "Difference from being does not mean absolute nothing." "To

1. *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 72.

2. *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*: pp. 38—48.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 427. 4. *Ibid.*, pp. 401—402. 5. "The Intelligible World: Metaphysics and Value," pp. 150—161. Also vide "Ontological Problems of Value," *Journal of Phil., Psych., etc.*, Vol. XIX, No. 12.

distinguish validity from being, to set it in contrast to being, means merely to disclose a sphere the peculiar character of which is not completely characterised by its determination as being."¹ Owing to the lack of finality in such a state of affairs, some people may be tempted to turn value and validity themselves into existence, in which case either we shall have to lean upon the psychological account of values or invoke the aid of "a transcendental psychology with its concept of an over-individual subject"—alternatives both of which are undesirable and unnecessary to Prof. Urban.² (Here it may be noted, by the way, that the doctrine of the met-empirical will of the earlier work is practically given up).

What then is Prof. Urban's final solution of the relation of value to being? It is that value and truth have never been strangers to being and that it is by a process of vicious abstraction that we come to separate them. Value is of the very essence of reality. Anything that is, that exists at all, has also value—has it not as an incidental feature of its existence, but as the very essence of its existence.³ Divorced from its value, the question, what is the real? is meaningless. In the same sense in which it is alleged that value is subjective, it is also possible to hold that the reality or unreality of objects is also subjective, and if the latter is absurd, the former is no less so. In fact, the very distinction between the real and the unreal, the existent and the non-existent, between being and non-being, presupposes mutual acknowledgment of values, for the only test in such cases is that we acknowledge the validity of the distinction.⁴ Negation, it will be admitted, is sometimes significant, but it is only in a limited universe, the boundaries of which can be determined only by purpose and the acknowledgment of the values which the purpose presupposes (universe of discourse), that negation becomes significant. It is therefore "but a special case under the general principle that existence abstracted from value is meaningless." And grades of being—matter, life, mind, spirit etc.,—presuppose grades of value.⁵ And yet although value and being are no strangers to each other, for thought and knowledge they remain distinct. "If fact and value were identical

1. *The Intelligible World*, p. 151.

2. *Ibid*, pp. 154, 155.

3. *Ibid*, p. 157.

4. *Ibid*, p. 159.

5. *Ibid*, pp. 450—452.

there would be no will and no event."¹ Value therefore is what-ought-to-be,² as opposed to what *is*. "The innermost meaning of time is the inalienable difference between what is and what ought to be." It is only in mystic experience that the two fuse together. *Sollen* is prior to *Sein*. It is the presupposition of the latter. Existence and truth may be reduced to value terms, but not conversely.⁴ Prof. Urban heartily endorses Lotze's memorable words in the concluding part of his *Metaphysik*: "The true beginning of Metaphysics lies in Ethics," though he recognises the inadequacy of such a statement.⁵ To him as for Lotze, "Everything depends upon the fact that an *ought* is there that sets the play of thoughts, of ground, cause, purpose etc., in movement." Value is primary and substantial. Metaphysics is conceived therefore as value-theory. An intelligible world is always a world of values.⁶

Values are real. But they do not exist or subsist. They are prior to and presupposed in existence. They are in fact of the very essence and substance of existences. Anything that is has value as the innermost core of its being—its meaning and intelligibility is itself value. And yet sometimes, it seems, values do come to exist. This is when will and the element of time enter into the situation. Then values immediately become ends, purposes, final causes, and degrees of value relate themselves as means to ends. At once a certain relation of value to existence is established. What this relation is we are not told, but we may gather that values—by themselves eternal, constituting as they do, the very stuff and being of reality—acquire a temporal form and require to be realised in time. They become in short existents.⁷

7. To criticise such a theory were an impertinence, especially as it represents, according to Urban, the Great Tradition in philosophy. The names of Plato, Aristotle, St. Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Hegel, Lotze etc., are associated with it. We may, however, try to appraise it. The essence of Urban's contention may be stated in the following two propositions. (1) Value is of the very essence of reality. The real is the intelligible and

1. *Ibid*, p. 159.

2. "Value and Existence": *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, p. 464.

3. *The Intelligible World*. pp. 159, 342.

5. *Ibid*, p. 162.

4. *Ibid*, pp. 165–166.

6. *Ibid*, pp. 163, 167.

7. *Ibid*, pp. 341–343.

the intelligible is the valuable. Value is substantival not adjectival. (2) Though real, value cannot be said to "exist." It is simply *valid* and its validity is its sufficient objectivity. Fact and value do not coincide. It seems to me that Prof. Urban is guilty of ambiguity, if not of equivocation, in the use of the term "value" in the two propositions. Throughout the major part of the work under consideration, as in the earlier work¹ referred to, he employs the term "value" in (1) the sense of the *meaning*, the *significance*, the *intelligible essence* of a thing. (In connection with this criticism, it should be noted, Prof. Urban's distinction between "verbal" or "instrumental" and "real" or "intrinsic" intelligibility is immaterial, since the term is considered mainly in the latter sense here). If anything is at all intelligible or has some intrinsic meaning, its intelligibility so far constitutes its value. This, it will be seen, is a very broad use of the term "value." It is in this sense that value is said to constitute the essence of a thing, to be inseparable from the real. If value is divorced from being, we are told, the question, what is the real, becomes unintelligible,² which means that a thing ceases to be real—to be itself—if it is deprived of its *meaning*, its intelligible nature, its *raison d'être*. This sense of the term "value" comes out specially lucidly when it is applied to the *universe as a whole* or to the acts of moral agents. Has the world necessarily a meaning or not? is equivalent to the question, Has it value³ or not? What can be the *meaning* of A's conduct? implies that the purpose, the value-reference of his action, is not known to the observer. Writes Prof. Urban: "Back of the concept of meaning lies the concept of value and the two concepts cannot be separated."⁴ A thinker is of course at liberty to use a term in his own special signification, but in such a case strict adherence to his chosen meaning is the first demand made upon him. The plausibility of Prof. Urban's argument depends, however, upon his constantly mixing up the above sense of value as the intelligible essence or the *raison d'être* of an object

1. *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*. It may be noted that in this work the author attempted a definition of value which has now become famous, as the *funded* meaning of the object for the subject, or the affective-volitional meaning. In the latest work, however not only has this subjective point of view been repudiated, but value itself—now supposed to be entirely objective—is declared to be thoroughly indefinable; *vide* pp. 139–140.

2. *The Intelligible World*, p. 158.

3. *Ibid*, Ch. II. Also pp. 263, 266, 189.

4. *Ibid*, p. 61.

with (2) the more special, technical and nevertheless common sense of worth or *worthiness* to be, "oughtness" in general, and even value as the product of appreciation or interest. Not mere meaning, but meaning as envisaged by *interested* contemplation, meaning as positively desired, is that which is the source of value. It is in this sense that value is contrasted with fact, in this sense that "what is" is distinguished from "what-ought-to-be," in this sense that value is denied to "exist." Else, if value meant only the *meaning* of an object, this meaning is as it is or even as it should be, and it is an absurdity to suggest that the intelligible essence of an object "ought" to be something other than what it "is." Every object, every action or event, has its own 'intelligibility'—its own reason for existence, for being what it is, and it is irrelevant and futile to demand that it should have been otherwise. Further, value in the sense of "meaning" cannot become the "end" or "purpose" of action—the object of volition, requiring to be realised in time. And it would be absurd to talk of "intelligible evolution" or "intelligible progress" if evolution and progress in these phrases referred to meanings.

It may be pointed out that in some at least of the passages referred to, values are said to be implicated in or coupled with meanings, but not identified with them. But then does every object which has any meaning whatsoever also thereby possess positive value or disvalue? To prove Prof. Urban's contention, be it noted, every object should be proved to have *positive value or disvalue*: it is not enough if it has a mere value *reference*, for such reference may be purely subjective or personal, the thing itself being neutral as regards value. This is, to say the least of it, a doubtful issue. Hobgoblins and centaurs have clear, intelligible meaning, but their value to the world has yet to be acknowledged. "Things do not, indeed," writes Prof. Urban, "have to be beautiful and good in order to 'exist' But things do have to be in *relations* of value as well as in other types of relations, to be things in the full sense of our experiencing them as things."¹ Now this is an excellent illustration of the attempt of a thinker (who in his earlier years held the view that values are subjective or nearly so) both to eat his cake and have it. Things in the first place can only be in

1. *Ibid.*, p. 157 (Italics mine).

particular, specific kinds of value-relations to one another, they cannot have a relation of *value-in-general*. And it is clear that such specific relations can only arise in specific situations confronting particular individuals. And secondly, do things have value *apart* from our experiencing them or only as we experience them? If the former, Urban would be realist, new or old, and he is neither.¹ If the latter, then value would be partly at least subjective and would not belong to an object as the very essence and substance of its being. And mere *value-reference*, it was said, is not enough since such reference may be purely *imposed* upon an object by a person, the object itself having neither positive nor negative value. The sand on the sea-shore may be said to be *valueless*, but such a judgment has no intrinsic intelligibility, for the sand by itself has neither value nor disvalue.

The proposition "The real is the valuable" is true only if the valuable be the intelligible—if value is identical with meaning. In no other sense can it be held that communication "the ultimate presupposition of philosophy"—involves the inseparability of value and reality.² But this meaning is irrelevant to a consideration of value in the technical sense—in the generic sense of what is measured by the norm. In *this* sense, it is palpably false to say that everything as such *has* value, much more so to say that everything *is* value. The value conception is certainly ultimate for *human* knowledge: it is in this sense that we have said that normatics is the science of all sciences, human science *par excellence*. But this argument by itself gives no warrant for concluding that therefore value as primary, substantial, is ultimate *in the universe*, or that the *real* is as such value. Human conceptions or presuppositions may not be the measure of the possibilities of things. It may be that in the final analysis the universe may be found to contain value in some form, but this is a matter for independent investigation which must be prepared to take whatever results are to be

1. He repudiates the view that value is a quality, *ibid*, p. 143. It is not a quality, it is not a meaning (according to the present argument) and it does not exist or subsist. It is not objective (according to the first part of the quotation given above), it is certainly not subjective, nor both. What then value really is, Prof. Urban alone should explain and he holds it to be indefinable.

2. *Ibid*, 158.

found—it cannot be taken to be established *a priori* (the method of self-refutation of which Urban makes so much)¹ by the simple fact that we are all along guided by the value-category, that the distinction between the real and the unreal, being and non-being etc., itself involves the acknowledgment of the conception of value or validity. This is indeed a value-centric predicament. It is like saying that because the scientist is investigating a group of facts in order to test the truth or falsity of a certain hypothesis he has formed for himself, *therefore* the truth of that hypothesis must be taken to have been established by or involved in the facts themselves. In both cases, on the contrary, the investigator is *experimenting*, and he must be prepared for disappointments and disillusionments. It was for this very reason that it was said in an earlier connection that to value is to *dare*, to undertake a *venture*, to *risk*. This fact must be remembered even in connection with the reduction of truth and existence to value. The true is better than the false, the real than the unreal. But surely the truth of a thing is not merely the aspect of its "being better than" or "more valuable than" something else? There is a more positive content in it by virtue of which it is true and is distinguished from the false. Else, if the relational aspect alone were constitutive of truth, we could not then distinguish, not indeed the true from the false, but one truth from another truth, for the true by definition would in every case be simply "that which is better than."

It is hard to believe, then, that the real as such *is* value though we may concede that much of reality *has* value, has it in the sense of "acquires" incidentally through certain relations to the experiencing subject. Hence the objectivity of value cannot be maintained in this sense. And Urban declares that values do not "exist" in any sense in which science and philosophy talk of existence.² Prof. Sorley, we saw, is of the opinion that without the postulate of existence, expressed or implied, nothing can be said to be good or evil. What he means is, as he himself explains, that "the notion of value always implies a *relation* to existence."³ The value—thing, person, act—*ought* to exist, and if it cannot exist, it cannot be valuable—or unvaluable,

1. *Ibid*, Ch. II.

2. *Ibid*, pp. 151, 157.

3. *Moral Values and the Idea of God* p. 79 (Italics mine).

for that matter. That is, it is the *objects* which possess value that demand existence; value itself "is not reduced to an existential proposition." This, it should be seen, is a far more satisfactory view of the relation of value to existence than that of either Prof. Urban who holds the one extreme of making value the presupposition of all existence or of Prof. Perry who holds the other extreme of making value entirely independent of existence.

Hitherto we have been engaged in the rather venturesome task of estimating the views of eminent thinkers on the question of the relation of value to existence. Before taking up the thread of the argument regarding objectivity, it is perhaps desirable to state our own view concerning the first question.

7. This we can do by first of all inquiring into the nature of existence. Existence as an ultimate concept may be held to be indefinable;¹ but we can understand something of its nature by examining what aspects of reality involve existence. Urban, as we have seen, contends that the realm of reality is far wider than that of existence and others also have held that three classes of entities in particular—propositions, characteristics and possibilities—are real without being existent. Now Dr. McTaggart in his monumental work, *The Nature of Existence*, has examined these cases and arrived at the conclusion that "there is no reason to hold that there is anything real which is not existent."² This conclusion that the spheres of reality and existence coincide is one with which we thoroughly agree and accordingly we follow Dr. McTaggart in his enumeration of the several spheres of reality which involve existence. All real substances and real events—"a table, a battle or a sneeze"—are existent. And all the qualities and relations of such existent substances or events exist, and all the qualities and relations of such existent qualities and relations also exist. Any characteristic or relation, divorced from the object or the terms related and considered *in abstracto*

1. Bradley defines it "as a temporal series of events or facts." The series may not be directly perceived throughout, but there is immediacy of perception with regard to some at least of the contents experienced as particulars upon which we make an ideal construction. And "any part of a temporal series" or "any aspect of direct experience, or again of an event," is a *fact* (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 317). But here it is not the abstract concept of existence that is defined, but existence as partly at least directly perceived.

2. Ch. II. "Reality and Existence," pp. 9—33.

is not existent, but considered as actually qualifying such an object or relating such terms, it is existent.¹

In short, existence belongs to real substances, real events and their characteristics and relations. What about value then? In the first place we must give up Urban's contention that value is real and yet not existent. Reality in all cases involves existence². But whether value is real in the sense that reality implicates value has been doubted in these pages. In the second place, if value is to be interpreted as a quality, a characteristic or a relation, then so far as such a quality or relation characterises objects or really relates terms value would exist. But we have not accepted the view that value is a quality inherent in the object as such or even a relation. Another question may in this connection help us somewhat. It is certainly not possible to speak of value as a substance, but may it not be a *fact*—a fact of the universe? This question has already been discussed in connection with the problem of appreciation in the second chapter and the conclusion has been arrived at that in the sense in which we speak of the "facts" of nature or of life value is not a fact. Dr. McTaggart defines a fact as being "either the possession by anything of a quality, or the connection of anything with anything by a relation"³ ("anything" being used to denote both substances and characteristics). Now this definition is rather ambiguous. It is not clear from it whether it is the *possession* of a quality by a substance, let us say, or the *connection* of one characteristic with another by a relation, that is to be called a "fact," or whether it is the *quality* so possessed or the *relation* which thus connects that deserves that name. But from the examples that immediately follow⁴ it is clear that it is the quality or the relation ("squareness" or "belief") that constitutes a "fact." And value, we have argued, is neither a quality nor a relation. The occurrence or emergence of value is a fact in the sense in which this term is used in common parlance but in this sense "value"—what occurs—is not a fact.

1. *Ibid*, p. 5.

2. And "even if there is any such non-existent reality, its relation to existence is such that, in studying existence, we study the whole of reality." (*The Nature of Existence*, p. 9).

3. *Ibid*, p. 11. 4. "Thus the squareness of the table is a fact, in distinction from the belief about it, which is an event in my mind, and the proposition about it".....*Ibid*, p. 11. (See also foot-note 2 on this same page).

9. Value, then, as so far seen, being neither a substance nor a quality nor a characteristic nor a relation nor a fact,¹ would appear not to exist. But in another sense, value is a matter of concrete experience. Value, we said, is not real except in the act or process of appreciation, and in such living appreciation, value emerges as a certain *status* or significance of the object to the subject determined of course by the extent to which the object conforms or not to the norm or standard in the agent's mind. Further, this conformity or non-conformity is itself determined by the extent to which the object is believed to help the realisation by the individual of a given universe of desire (the stuff of which the norm is made) to which he is attached. There is then the subjective contemplation of the object determined by the universe of desire (to which the subject is attached) on the one hand; there is, on the other, the objective *approachment* (if I may use such a term) to the subject determined by the degree to which the object is believed to realise the subject's desire; subject and object are thus *en rapport*, and in this living experience, the value of the object is struck. Value in such an analysis is found to be the externalised form, the concrete blooming, of the affective-volitional life of the individual. As such we may say that it is a characteristic of the individual's life of desire—a characteristic of an existent phase of life and so is itself existent.

Such values then, representing as they do the blossoming stage of the life of desire, are both real and existent. That is, the values which are both real and existent are always specific, concrete values and are always values for some one. They are contributory values which possess the capacity of furthering some end beyond themselves, not intrinsic values. The so-called value in the abstract, value-in-itself, is certainly "in the air"—it is neither real nor existent. Values as existent facts or characteristics represent, we said, only the blooming or blossoming stage of the life of desire. But just as a blossom has generally no ultimate significance in itself, but is only a stage in the final fruition of a plant or a tree, likewise values are but a stage in the fructifying process of desire. The final stage of the fruition of desire is reached when the object is seized, possessed,

1. "A fact exists when the thing about which it is a fact is existent." *Ibid*, p. 11.

appropriated, enjoyed, or in some way dealt with or acted upon by the agent. Possession and enjoyment thus represent the appropriate termination of the contemplative stage of valuation. Desire is the starting point (*terminus a quo*) ; value is the half-way house; action of some sort is the destination (*terminus ad quem*). The whole process however, is one continuous form of the agent's activity which is partly psychical and partly physical.

10. Values, however, are a peculiar variety of existents. A value-existent differs from an ordinary existent such as a table or its colour in these respects: (1) the *esse* of a value-existent is entirely dependent upon the union of mind and its object ; (2) with the cessation of a mind's contemplation, the value which had emerged during the contemplation ceases to exist also; (3) with the resumption of contemplation, value reappears; (4) a positive value may subsequently become an evil or a disvalue and later on turn out to be a good once more. Is it the same value that reappears or a different value? If the same, what is its mode of existence in the interim? And what is the final destiny of these values? Such metaphysical questions, tantalising as they are, must be postponed to the second volume of this work. It may nevertheless be added that in view of the fact that values thus possess the features of emergence first, then submergence, and possible resurgence afterwards, they may be called, if such an expression be permissible, *transistents*. Transistents are not subsistents, but a peculiar variety of existents whose existence is subject to transition depending upon the motor-affective life of the valuing agent. Metaphysically speaking, they are not universal or eternal as subsistents are claimed to be. Rather are they particular-universal. But when once they have emerged, what is their *locus standi* ? Do they float into nowhere and float in again from nowhere? How are they grounded in reality ? To this question, it may be suggested tentatively that they are grounded in the motor-affective continuum of individual psychic life, and remain there as "pure potentials for the specific determination of matters of action."¹ They are appre-

1. To adapt the terminology of Prof. Whitehead for our purposes. Diotima's description of love in Plato's *Symposium* affords an excellent illustration of the nature of "transistents" as conceived above. Love "is by nature neither mortal nor immortal, but alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty, and dead at another moment, and again alive by reason of his father's nature. But that which is always flowing in is always flowing out; and so he is never in want and never in wealth...."

ciatively "prehended" or "envisaged" by the agent. Not all values, however, find such a *locus*. Some are completely disintegrated and finally destroyed. Their *esse* turns to non-being. Such cases are rare. Generally other values spring up on the ashes of those burnt up.

The nature of transistents may be explained a little further. We must believe that, transistents as they are, there is an order, regularity or uniformity in their emergence or submergence, else a science of value would not be possible. What explains this uniformity of their behaviour? If we remember that the birth of value is determined by the coming together of subjective desire and objective quality or capacity, we may say that the laws of value are not expressions of the relations among outside facts or objects, but rules fixed in the motor-affective continuum of the human mind whereby that mind determines itself to certain ways of appreciation on meeting an object appropriate enough to realise its (the mind's) universe of desire. The human will then constitutes the ground of the laws of value—the pattern of the motor-affective life creates the pattern of the existence of value. The will has its own ebb and flow, high tide and low, activity and passivity. Depending as they do on the vagaries of the will, values also have their rise and fall—that is why they are called transistents. But the vagaries still issue always in a uniform pattern of created objects. How is this possible, it may be asked. A spatial datum, for instance, may be uniform and dependable, and *yet not permanent*. If I run my head into a brick wall, I see stars. The stars are not permanently there; but they appear regularly whenever my head happens to knock against the wall. A liquid does not in itself contain any geometric shape, but when the solution of a solid in a liquid, saturated at a higher temperature (e.g., blue vitriol in water) is allowed to cool down, it is found that a quantity of the solid, held in solution, is deposited *spontaneously* in the form of particles having regular and definite geometric shape and known as crystals. Likewise a permanent disposition exists in the conative-affective life of mind for creating values of a particular type whenever certain given conditions are fulfilled on the objective side. Thus does the life of values attain uniformity and regularity, transistents though they be. Their *locus standi* is in the affective-volitional activity of mind which has its

own patterns of behaviour and engenders accordingly patterns of value. We need not, that is, suppose any realm of subsistence in which values might continue to exist even when no mind is actively related to them.

11. We can now broach the problem of the objectivity of value more easily. To begin with, it is necessary to remark that the term "objectivity" has been variously understood by different thinkers. We have already examined Prof. Urban's use of the term. Thinkers like Prof. Sorley and Prof. Moore interpret "objectivity" to mean the presence of an objective value in the situation, independently of the judging subject and his moods and desires.¹ To say that "A is good" (A standing for person, object, act or event) does not mean, according to them, that A gives me a pleasing sentiment and therefore I approve of it, or that I approve of it because I desire it. The value judgment is on all fours with the judgment of fact, and just as in the one case the aim of the judgment is to establish an objective connection of phenomena in nature, even so in the other the predicate "good" must be taken to characterise A as a matter of fact. Now in regard to this view, it may be pointed out that even if the reference in the value judgment is taken to be to the *feeling* of the judging subject, it is not clear how subjectivity in this sense is disastrous to the science of normatics; and it must be added that the view of the present work is entirely different from such a position. But independence of the *feeling* of the subject is not the same as independence of the subject's life of *desire*, and value, it has in effect been maintained in these pages, is certainly not independent of the subject in this sense.² It may be said that value cannot be defined in terms of desire for the same object may at one time be an object of desire; and at another time an object of aversion, and then the same object would at one time possess value and at another time disvalue. This, however, is not contradictory, for it is a patent fact of everyday experience that we do like somethings at one time (when they possess value for us) which we may dislike at another time (when they cease to possess value for us). The explanation of

1. *Moral Values and the Idea of God*: Ch. III: The Meaning of Value.

2. In fact, Prof. Sorley himself admits as much, perhaps in an unguarded moment; *vide Moral Values* etc., p. 122.

this possibility lies in the fact that, as was pointed out before, the *qualities* of an object are in themselves different from the *value* we ascribe to them which depends upon our *desire* for those qualities. But if instead of thus relating value to desire we ascribed an independent value to objects in themselves, *then* contradiction would certainly arise in that the same object would be considered by us at one time valuable and at another time unvaluable. It may be said again that if value be related to desire, then the fact of approval of one desire and disapproval of another—which is the essence of moral objectivity—cannot easily be explained. But this is a superficial criticism which is more popular than philosophic. For after all when we talk of moral good and evil, we are not referring to unique qualities possessed by things, but only to the organisation and integration of our desires in some particular direction—in the direction of comprehensiveness, for example whether in personal or social life—which we have found by experience to be conducive to a larger, fuller, more developed life. And whatever particular desire happens to promote this larger life would be good while whatever hinders it would be evil.

12. It may be replied that this view evidently presupposes the notion of "good" or "better" and as such does not really explain it. This is the commonest, and as it is believed by thinkers like G. E. Moore, Ross and Urban, the most effective criticism of the psychological theory of value—the charge that all such definitions are circular or question-begging.¹ Why should a more comprehensive life be good? Why should fulfilment of interest be good or better than non-fulfilment? "Whatever definition of good be proposed," writes Moore, "it is always possible to ask of the complex so formed whether it is itself good?"² Now in the first place, it needs to be pointed out that "good" is not equivalent to "value" in the generic sense, that it is only a particular aspect of value, and as such cannot be used to determine value in the generic sense. Value in the generic sense does not stand in need of a passport or certificate by one particular variety of it—the moral value. And in the second place, it must be noticed that Urban's question, "*why*

1. *The Intelligible World* etc., pp. 135–140. Also *vide Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, pp. 452–453.

2. *Op. Cit.* pp. 15–16.

should fulfilment of interest or desire be a good?" is different from Moore's "whether it is good?"¹ To dispose of the latter first. If after defining value in a particular relational way, it is still found possible to ask with significance of the complex so formed whether it is itself valuable, this only shows that the questioner is *still in doubt* as regards its valuableness and does not prove that the definition offered is not a proper definition of value. When once he is *convinced* about it, there would be no further significance in the question, whether it is itself valuable. This is the proper answer to Moore's question in cases where good is defined in terms of something else, say, pleasure. When a man is convinced that his good (in the sense of what is valuable to him) consists in pleasure and pleasure alone, the question, is pleasure itself good (meaning, is it valuable) becomes absolutely meaningless to him. Any significance that may still be attached to the question is derived from a surreptitious and uncalled-for substitution in the question of the notion of *moral* goodness for the general notion of value. Whether pleasure be *morally* good may still be doubted by a person who holds it to be a value, *i. e.*, to be precious, in some sense.

Whether an object, held to be valuable for certain purposes in life, is also valuable for a certain *other* purpose may legitimately be doubted, but there can be no legitimate doubt of its value regarding purposes in respect of which alone it is first declared to possess value. And even in the second case, where once a person is *convinced* about the moral goodness of pleasure, he can no more attach any significance to the question whether pleasure is good. The same argument must be advanced to justify the definition of value in terms of desire or satisfyingness. Is being-desired or satisfyingness good? is meaningless if good means value in general. Some may think that the exercise of one's vital faculties in accordance with and in obedience to reason is satisfying;² others may think that their exercise in accordance with and in obedience to feeling is satisfying. In any case, to ask whether satisfyingness itself is good is to ask a self-stultifying tautologous question like, is good good? If the question turns about the *moral* goodness of desir-

1. Urban does not seem to be clearly aware of the difference though he raises both questions in the passages referred to above.

2. Aristotle's definition of good (Nicomachean Ethics, I, 6).

ing an object, this is still open to discussion and settlement, but when an individual once settles it by saying yes, he can no more question it. It is to the person who does *not* believe that, for instance, good is pleasure, that the question "is pleasure good" (assuming that good is here used in a general, non-moral sense) still has a meaning, not to the person who has positively decided about it.

13. Now for Urban's question. Why should pleasure be a value at all? Why should fulfilment of desire be a good? In saying that fulfilment is better than non-fulfilment, that existence is better than non-existence, that a developed life is more valuable than an undeveloped life, is not the value-category implicitly presupposed, and how then can you *define* value in terms fulfilment of desire, increase of life etc.? This is our old question of reality presupposing value, and our answer to it is as follows: The value-category is indeed ultimate for human life¹ but that is because desire is still more ultimate. In the absence of all desire in the human breast, there would be no value of any sort in the universe. But before proceeding further the ambiguity lurking in the term "value-category" must be exposed. It must be pointed out that the category of value is itself *not* a value. It is not a category of the understanding like substance or causality which is unilateral or univocal in meaning. Value is always either positive or negative. "Value" itself is but a generalised conception for such pairs of opposites or dyads as "good and evil" "beautiful and ugly," "true and false" "utile and inutile," "pleasant and painful" "happy and miserable" etc., and must be distinguished from the positive extreme in every case which is also sometimes called "value" and contrasted with the negative extreme, "disvalue." Accordingly when it is said that man always seeks value (which is what is meant by the statement that the value-category is ultimate for him), the real import is that he seeks *positive* values and avoids *negative* values. And this appropriation of positive and avoidance of negative values cannot *themselves* be determined by the value-category (for this leads to an infinite regress) but by some other principle which is more ultimate than value—positive or negative—and which in fact determines value. This is the principle of desire or interest and accordingly it is desire that

1. In what sense it is so will be made clearer further on.

impels a person to seek positive values (which means that what he desires becomes for him a positive value) and to avoid the negative (in the sense that what he turns away from becomes negative for him). This is the only explanation that could be offered for cases in which an individual seeks what is apparently a negative value. Suppose that a person were to be faced with such miserable circumstances in life that he desires to commit suicide. Here what we would ordinarily call a disvalue—non-existence, death—is to him a positive value, for he is desiring what everyone would ordinarily avoid. Here the situation cannot be explained by invoking the aid of the value-category merely which, as we have seen, is only (according to Urban) the relation of "better than" and "worse than." To say that value is objective (that reality presupposes value) would then simply mean that there are relations of "better than" and "worse than" amongst things themselves. If this were so, then there should evidently be no room for differences of opinion in the matter. But this is notoriously not the case. We may admit that *man* has an innate sense of "better than" and "worse than" (as relative notions only) by which he is guided in life. So far the value-category is ultimate. But this by itself cannot supply any ground-principle of action: action of even the most elementary kind could not proceed out of mere "better than" and "worse than."¹ Faced with an alternative course of action, a person may repeat the value-category any number of times and he won't be helped in his choice even by a jot or a tittle. Such a person—the would-be suicide in our example—must first decide *which* is better than *which* and only when such a decision has been made does value emerge in the situation. And in arriving at this decision—in considering that *one* course of action is more valuable than *another*—it is desire, we maintain, or interest, that plays the most prominent part. One person—in the circumstances supposed—may desire to end his existence: death acquires a value for him. Another in the same circumstances may prefer to live: death acquires a disvalue for him. Things themselves do not have a value or disvalue of their own, and in the absence of positive values and disvalues the mere

1. Any more than it can proceed out of "to the right of" or "to the left of."

relation of "better than" or "worse than"—the value-category—has no value either and can explain nothing.¹

Value, then, is not objective in the sense that things or situations possess value or disvalue independently of the judging subject. Nor is it objective in the sense that the sense of "better than" or "worse than" is innate in human nature, for after all this sense is only the sense of a relation, and *what terms* it shall relate is to be determined entirely by the affective-volitional life of man. The value-relation (even if value be nothing else) neither exists objectively nor holds between existing objects independently of the relation of these objects to some one's consciousness.

14. Value exists, we said, but is not objective. This appears to be a contradictory result, but is really not so. Value exists as a characteristic phase of desire and as such its validity can only be subjective and psychological. Our conclusions regarding the values of things can never be wholly true of the things themselves—for they are largely expressions of our own likes and dislikes superimposed upon the objects. Do we not then land ourselves in a vicious relativism and scepticism? As for scepticism, it is a matter for grave doubt whether, even according to the objective theory of value, we do believe now more about the values of things than we would like to, at any rate. And as regards relativism, there are so many brands of it that we must explain what particular variety is ours before it is condemned. The present theory is not relative in the sense that it makes value relative to individual feeling alone, nor is it relative in the sense that it makes value depend upon individual thinking alone.² It is relative to the needs and desires of individuals but this by itself cannot make it "viciously" relativistic. For as we have already admitted in previous connexions, and as we shall show at greater length in a subsequent chapter, the process of valuation includes cognitive elements, desire is ideational, and needs are controlled by

1. It is necessary to remark here, at the end of this long discussion, that we do not subscribe to this reduction of the value-category to the relation of "better or worse than"—a reduction made by Prof. A. P. Brogan. And Prof. Urban also does not explicitly reduce it so, but his insistence that all our fundamental distinctions presuppose the validity of the value-category cannot, as we have already seen in a previous connection, mean anything else.

2. *Vide* pp. 67—70 *ante*.

thought. That such a position does not compromise the psychological explanation of value given in these pages is, we hope, sufficiently clear. At the same time it guarantees the legitimate demands for the objectivity of value. For where we are dealing with desire as involving thought, with the affective-volitional as implying the cognitive life of man, we are dealing with factors which make for the greatest common measure, for the widest possible universality, in the estimates of value. In the first place it is an unwarranted assumption that feeling by itself would introduce anarchy into life, individual and social; the sensible part of man is not so devoid of the elements of order and uniformity as rationalists in morality have often made out. In the second place, where feeling is controlled by thought, the logical processes of analysis and synthesis, discrimination, comparison and abstraction, as well as the practical considerations of prudence and forethought, subordination and superordination, control and regulation, are all effectively brought into play in the determination of the value of objects, and there is absolutely no ground for the suspicion that morality or any other value of life would be subject to the fluctuations produced by the gusts of individual whim and caprice. If there is still felt some difficulty in safeguarding the objectivity of value (for myself I cannot see what more we require in the matter), it is not so formidable as the difficulty that has existed for all value-realist systems in explaining how it happens that, value being taken as inherent in the objects themselves as their quality, or, even more, as the very essence of their existence, there still prevails so much diversity and conflict of opinion regarding the values of life.

Values are certainly relative, but they are relative not to the idiosyncrasies of individual likes and dislikes, but to the common and broadly universal desires of classes of humanity differentiated as they are by the differences of race, religion, culture, history etc.. They are also relative to different ages and epochs in the history of humanity, for with increasing experience by way of contact with different systems of culture and civilisation, with the increasing necessity for adaptation to fresher environment, the standards and ideals of men also vary in different ages. In short values are relative to humanity and its interests: values exist for the sake of man, not man for the sake of values. Man's ideals of life may expand or undergo modifications and values

must come round and correspond with such 'alterations. "Man is the measure of all things, not the will of the gods whose very existence is uncertain, nor yet a purely hypothetical state of nature." This is the significance of the statement made in an earlier connection that the value-standpoint is ultimately justified only by utilitarianism interpreted in a liberal sense as emphasising the effects upon human life and relation to human consciousness. Appreciation of value, we said, is always in terms of the interest-fulfilment of the subject, in terms of the utility or usefulness of the object in furthering some aspect of life.

This brings out another sense in which value is relative—a sense necessarily connected with the utilitarian standpoint. If an object is valuable only in relation to the interest-fulfilment of the subject, then value is relative to a definite end or purpose as realising which alone the object valued is said to possess value. There are no absolute *values*—eternal and immutable laws or principles which are the sustainers of the universe independently of an appreciating mind. There are, we admitted, values in the universe, but they are all instrumental, rarely intrinsic. If we may use the term good as equivalent to value, we would say that there is nothing good-in-itself or intrinsically good, but what is good is always good for something and in certain given circumstances. Goods are causal or instrumental: they are means to other goods which in their turn would be means only to yet other goods and so on. The relation of means and end is reciprocal and the distinction is only relative. What is a means to a certain end in certain circumstances may itself be an end in other circumstances, and the end realised by a certain means at one time may itself become a means for the realisation of something which, having formerly been a means only, has now assumed the character of an end. Wealth may to begin with be only a means for the acquirement of a good education, but after acquiring it, knowledge may become but a means for the acquisition of wealth and power. In short, the causal and the teleological categories are not incompatible with each other and G. E. Moore's rigid distinction between the relation of means and end as causal and the relation of part and whole as purposive or organic needs to be slackened.¹ Thus we find one more justification for

1. *Principia Ethica*, Ch. I. On this whole question of the relation between causal and teleological judgments in ethics and on the general

the statement made at the beginning of the present chapter that the value realm is included in, is part of, the causal realm.¹

15. Objectivity has been claimed for value in these pages on the ground of the common affective-volitional and cognitive nature of the empirical human constitution. But now may be suggested another kind of objectivity which touches the deeper roots of human nature. A norm, it was said, must stand for the highest interest of the subject in any given realm of value, defined as that degree of interest which while yielding the highest point of satisfaction that the object is capable of yielding, yet goes beyond that point in quality or quantity or both. And such a norm, by reference to which the value of an object is appreciated, must by its very nature be incapable of realisation or actualisation. Now, value in its specific forms is objective in so far as the norm or the highest interest in any given realm of value remains identical with itself and is continuous with its successive empirical manifestations which seek satisfaction in empirical moments of time. Particular interests are discontinuous, momentary, isolated; their satisfaction immediately appeases them and annihilates them, and the value that is thus obtained is likewise fragmentary, piecemeal, unsatisfactory. But running through them all, like a silken thread through discrete beads, there persists the inner feeling of a transcendental ideal, the norm, the highest, which is never completely realised in any or all of its successive empirical manifestations and yet which, while giving empirical continuity to them all, is itself continuous with them and retains its inner identity through them. What the actual content of this norm may be is, as we saw in a previous connexion, beyond our ken; for although we have a persistent feeling of the norm, we have no practical experience of it, as we have experience of its empirical manifestations. If it were possible to develop its contents, we could deduce from it a system of absolute values, for such values, drawn with logical necessity from what represents the highest and best interest, not of this or that particular individual, but of man as a type of being, of human nature as such, would undoubtedly be univer-

question of the relativity of value, see the present writer's article on "Values as Objective" in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, October 1933.

1. See below, Ch. XIV, for other and more important senses in which value is said to be relative. A more detailed discussion of the conception of means and end will also be found there.

sal and unconditioned. We no doubt possess a glimpse of this ideal interest in the empirical norms that we employ in practice; for the ideal, if absolutely unknown and unknowable, could have no influence over human volitions and would be entirely useless for value-theory. How much then of this transcendental norm is vouchsafed to man, how we are gradually led to a perception of this norm in the natural course of things, are topics that can be dealt with only in the concluding chapters of the present work. But it remains true to say that this norm is not *per se* applicable in our empirical valuations, but remaining in the background of all our affective-volitional life as a vague feeling of the highest and the best in all our practical interests, it influences and controls them and shapes them to a closer and yet closer approximation to itself. And thus by reason of its inner self-identity and continuity with all our empirical interests, the values arising from these interests obtain an objectivity adequate enough to stamp them with a certain degree of reality. All empirical values, it remains true to say, are instrumental in character, and they are both means and ends relatively to one another. But they are all grounded in a transcendental value—they are *phenomena bene fundata*. They certainly lead to their own self-transcendence, but they are not annihilated or distorted in such self-transcendence.¹

1. See Ch. XIV, Sections 34—35.

CHAPTER V

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUATION

1. The general nature of value as we know it in human experience has been outlined in the preceding chapters. It has been shown that value is a human-mental category which expresses a profound fact of human experience. It has been shown that value cannot be sought in any transcendental realm of essences or existences, that here as elsewhere there is no dualism of an ideal and an actual world the one existing independently of the other. Like Plato's ideas, values are *in* the things,—the things of human desire and aspiration and appreciation—and not apart from them. There is only one world here, the world of appreciation which, when looked at from the standpoint of the appreciating agents discloses the aspect of desire and interest, and when viewed from the standpoint of the objects appreciated, appears as a world of powers and potencies capable of satisfying the desire or interest of the agents.

Value is the offspring of the union of desire and the object of desire. It is in other words born out of the act of valuation which act expresses the coming together of desire and its object. If so, the psychology of valuation—especially as this phenomenon is essentially psychical—becomes peculiarly important for our theory of value.

Some purists might object that in a work professedly dealing with the *metaphysics* of value, psychological considerations should have no place. Such objectors may be reminded that metaphysics in general (as a science of being) stands only to gain from a study of the departmental sciences and that the metaphysics of value in particular should not refuse the aid of psychology or, indeed, of any other science for that matter, should help be forthcoming from such a quarter. Its questions are so far-reaching, comprehending as they do the entire sphere of human life and conduct, that it should only be too grateful for any light—large or small—that may be thrown upon them from any source. In short, adapting the words of Prof. Alexander,¹ one may say that the problems of value are

1. *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. I. p. 9.

anxious enough without allowing oneself to be disturbed by punctilios.

But, above all, there is a deeper, more fundamental reason why we should undertake the present psychological investigation. The account of value that has been rendered in these pages is essentially subjective and psychological; value emerges out of the subject-object relation which we have called contemplation; it shoots like a blossom out of the maturity of the subject's affective-volitional life attached to a given universe of desire; in short, value exists only in appreciation. If this necessary relation of value to interest is true, then indeed it is part of our duty to show (1) how exactly value emerges or comes to exist in the several spheres of the individual's affective-volitional life, (2) what are the psychological presuppositions as well as the processes involved in an act of valuation. The first question—partly logical and partly psychological—will be dealt with in the subsequent chapters. The present chapter will be devoted to a consideration of the second and more purely psychological problem.

2. (1) The science of valuation or normatics must, as a science, enunciate one fundamental postulate, *viz.*, the reality of the subject who values or estimates. If at any time behaviourism of the extreme form as represented by Dr. Watson were proved to be true, normatics would at that moment stand condemned and falsified as a science. For Watsonian behaviourism stands pledged to the denial of consciousness in a psychological sense. In one sense, behaviourism is incompatible with any science whatsoever, in fact, with the pursuit of knowledge as such. For if consciousness does not exist, being only "a plain assumption, just as unprovable and just as unapproachable as the old concept of the soul;"¹ if there is no *subject* of experience and experience itself is nothing but the movement of matter;² if in short human beings are mere recording instruments; who or what are they that enunciate scientific laws and principles? And for whom and why? This absurdity need not be dwelt upon. But a science of *value* for which the concepts of end, striving, purpose, goal-seeking etc., are fundamental becomes a peculiar fatuity and an inanity on the assumption of the truth of

1. Watson: *Behaviourism*, p. 3.

2. Weiss: *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behaviour*, p. 143.

behaviourism. Valuation implies not only that a certain object is cognitively apprehended but affectively felt in a certain manner and conatively striven after. In our account of appreciation we have found not only that subject and object come together *en rapport*, so to say, but that over and above such attraction—called interest or attachment—a certain conformity etc., of the object to a certain norm or standard accepted by the subject is perceived by the latter which is the basis of the value attributed to the object. Now the phenomenon of interested contemplation of the object by the subject may in a sense be capable of being explained behaviouristically by saying that the object forms the stimulus to which the organism (subject) responds in that particular way, just as a needle responds to the attraction of the magnet, though even here *contemplation*, as contradistinguished from blind attachment, would call for explanation. But what conceivable sense can we attach, according to this explanation, to the terms, *norm, standard, preception of the conformity, attribution of value to the object* etc? Who is it that lays down the norm, that perceives the conformity etc., and that attributes value? Does the needle—or any meter or recording instrument for that matter—do any of these things? No doubt the instrument measures, but does it *know that it measures*, or *what* it measures or whether it measures *correctly or incorrectly*, or whether the measurement “comes up to” a certain “expectation” (whose expectation, by the bye, shall we say?)? And *why* does the organism measure at all (supposing for a moment that it does measure), for what purpose? Such questions would become peculiarly unmeaning on the assumption of the truth of behaviourism.

Fortunately for us, however, behaviourism of the extreme form referred to above is no longer current coin in the psychological world¹ and one is at liberty to say a few words about the psychological presuppositions of valuation.

Valuing is a daily fact of human experience: we not only like or dislike things but we also *know* that we like some things and dislike others and *how much* we like or dislike them, we compare, contrast, choose between objects, determine their

1. This chapter, in its original draft, written about eight years ago, contained a fairly full criticism of behaviourism as it was then current. In the light of recent developments, it has been thought desirable to omit that portion altogether.

respective values, strike their average value etc.. But if such experience is real—then there must be *something* which exercises its activity in the way described as well as in the forms of bodily behaviour. In the words of McDougall, "There can be no question that we are bound to postulate this *something*; and that, if we are not content to regard it as merely the brain mechanically conceived, we must have some name for it and must recognise that it has a very complex nature.....I do not think that we can find a better word to denote this *something* than the old-fashioned word "mind."¹ The mind or the "subject," then, (as McDougall later on denotes it²) which is always "experiencing," i.e., "thinking about some object" is "an indispensable hypothesis" in value-science as much as in all sound psychology. Whether the experience be "noetic" or "anoetic," "any lived experience"—in the words of Spearman's first Principle of Cognition—tends to evoke immediately a knowing of its characters and experienter."³

It must be noted here that "mind" cannot be taken merely as another "popular" or "philosophical" expression for brain-processes. "To do so," says McDougall, "limits unduly our freedom of thought,—leads us to absurd consequences.....and, worst of all, is apt to blind us to facts of observation, and biases our interpretation of other facts."⁴ Mind must be conceived as something *other than* brain-process though what it is apart from the latter we cannot experimentally determine. It is essentially the subject of activity which no doubt "is embodied in and manifests itself to us only in and through the medium of a material organism,"⁵ but which is not, in its own nature, bound down to any such organism. Material organisation is only the *condition* of its manifestation on a physically observable plane, just as a rough or material surface is a condition of phosphorus bursting out into flame when rubbed on it. But as McDougall points out,⁶

1. *Outline of Psychology* (1931); p. 35.

2. *Ibid*, p. 39.

3. *The Nature of Intelligence and Principles of Cognition*, p. 48.

4. *Op. Cit.* p. 36.

5. *Ibid*, p. 36.

6. *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*; Ch. IV. On a review of the principal facts of organisation, McDougall concludes "that just as the actions of the living organism cannot be explained, nor even intelligently described in purely mechanistic terms, so also its organisation cannot be completely described in terms of material structure. The facts of both orders combine in pointing to non-spatial organisation that expresses itself with a causal efficacy that is teleological" (*Ibid*, p. 107).

all organisations are not necessarily spatial, and the facts of memory and psychical research go to show that the organisation of mind is partly at least non-spatial (*i.e.*, non-material).

Hence, *ex cathedra* statements to the effect that the psychologist finds no evidence for "mental existences" or "mental processes" of any kind, or that mental states are to be classified as physical states etc., must be taken as expressing, not scientific fact, but only individual whim and caprice.

3. (2) The admission of mind or the subject of experience, moreover, necessitates the admission of something else, *viz.*, purpose, which is like a red rag to the psychological mechanist. We cannot conclude that because some responses can be mechanically conditioned, therefore all can be so conditioned, which means that goal-seeking plays no part in forming a conditioned reflex. As a matter of fact, however, even white rats are credited with goal-seeking in maze-experiments! It is not too much to say then that the envisaging of clear goals or objectives or purposes and the conscious striving to realise such goals are the distinctive marks of behaviour as contradistinguished from reflex activity, simple or complex.¹

Prof. McDougall (it is needless to state that his lead in psychology is followed in these pages) in his *Outline of Psychology* enumerates and discusses about seven characteristic marks of behaviour which he finds are all lacking in reflex action.² One can do no better than enumerate them: (1) a certain spontaneity of movement, (2) the persistence of activity independently of the continuance of the impression which may have initiated it, (3) variation of direction of persistent movements, (4) cessation of the animal's movements as soon as a

1. In this connection, care must be taken to distinguish "purposeful" from "purposive" action. The mere existence of a certain purpose before an agent so that the agent naturally and necessarily realises it although the said purpose may not be present to, *i.e.*, foreseen by, the agent does not make the action "purposeful" (but only "purposive") nor the agent free. This is only a case of "adaptation," natural and even mechanistic. What characterises human behaviour uniquely is not such *adaptation* but *adaptability* which is "a capacity to form projects, deal with novel situations, overcome difficulties and *plan ahead*" (*General Theory of Value* by Perry: p. 182). The stomach may be *adapted* to digest food—this is its purpose—but the stomach *has* no purpose, is not *purposeful*. It is from this standpoint that McDougall criticises Prof. L. J. Henderson's otherwise remarkable work, *Fitness of the Environment*, and concludes that it is inadequate to establish teleological causation. See *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*: Note 14; pp. 274–281.

2. pp. 43–46; 53–57.

particular change in its situation has been brought about, (5) preparation for the new situation towards the production of which the action contributes, (6) improvement in the effectiveness of behaviour by repetition under similar circumstances. Now all these marks of behaviour indicate, in the opinion of McDougall, that the action is purposive (*i.e.*, purposeful according to our distinction) by which is meant that "they are made for the sake of attaining their natural end and that this end is more or less clearly anticipated or foreseen." "The attainment of the goal is said to be the purpose of our action or our striving."¹ Purpose thus implies foresight and "purposive² action is action that seems to be governed or directed in some degree by prevision of its effects, by prevision of that which still lies in the future, of events which have not yet happened, but which are likely to happen, and to the happening of which the action itself may contribute. *Purposiveness*³ in this sense seems to be of the essence of mental activity; and it is because all actions which have the marks of behaviour seem to be purposive, in however lowly and vague a degree, that we regard them as expressions of Mind."⁴

"Purpose," says R. S. Woodworth,⁵ is a real fact in human life, and if not purpose, at least striving toward a goal is a real fact of animal life as well.....Purpose is one of the phenomena which psychology must include in its story."

Thus eminent psychologists have admitted the reality of purposefulness in human action and thereby shown that science does not, here at least, flout common sense. It has already been shown⁶ that the science of normatics is dominated by the conception of purpose, some end in view, in the light of which an agent judges, criticises, values, appreciates. The value of an object, or to value it, apart from some purpose for which it is valuable, is a physical, psychological and metaphysical impossibility. And purpose becomes all the more significant for the interpretation of value adopted in these pages according to which value is always relative and contributory, not intrinsic. Value is always valuable *for*; if so, *for what* seems to become

1. *Outline of Psychology*: p. 47.

3. Or purposefulness.

5. *Psychologies* of 1925.

2. Or purposeful.

4. *Ibid*, p. 48

6. Ch. II *ante*.

an ineliminable question betraying the presence of purpose in all our value judgments.

The purposefulness of human behaviour is brought out by Rufus Jones in the following telling sentences: "The whirling dust-wreaths of the street do not have longings. The bits of earth-crust which we throw about with our shovel do not yearn for what is not and then forthwith construct it. Desires and strivings, visions and ideals, emotions and sentiments, are as much a genuine part of us as are the iron and lime and phosphorus in our bodies. We have insights of what ought to be, appreciations of beauty, convictions of truth, experiences of love, and these things are not part of the earth's crust.....They are not results of masses of matter in motion. They cannot be adequately explained mechanically. They are real for mind and only for mind."¹

Indeed, responding to stimuli is only one half—and that an unimportant half—of the story of human behaviour. The other and more important half is that we often *create* stimuli just to see how our response feels like, or how we enjoy them; that we *alter* them to suit our whim or need or occasion; that we sometimes respond unfavourably to the same stimulus to which we responded favourably a while ago; that at other times we respond in a manner contrary to what was expected from the nature of the case, as when a martyr cheerfully allows his body to be consumed by the flames at the stake or the ascetic centrifugally denies himself the pleasures and enjoyments to which the mere organism would be centripetally attracted; that, in short, we *seek* goals, objectives and ideals and do not allow ourselves to be blown about by the wind of stimulus whither it listeth. All this is clearly observable in the experience of any normal person unobsessed by the weight of a theory. And further, what is equally if not more important still, the organism not only responds to detached stimuli one at a time so that we could vary the stimulus each time and note what difference the variation causes in the response—an example of Mill's experimental method of difference—but the organism generally responds to the *whole situation as such*. The essence of behaviour is that it is a reaction to a *total situation*, creative of new values, new visions, new possibilities of achievement and satisfaction. We

1. *New Studies in Mystical Religion*, pp. 189—190.

have already said that value, as an emergent, springs out of the interrelatedness of subject and object, the subject contemplating the object from the point of view of a given universe of desire to which he is attached. It is as contributing to the realisation of such a universe of desire (whose realisation is felt to be imperative) that all other objects and ends are said to be valuable. The universe of desire, of course, expresses the nature or the character of the entire person so that every act of valuation, in so far as it relates the object valued (or the desire for it) to this dominant interest, may be said to have a direct reference to the entire personality of the agent. This is otherwise expressed by saying that the will expresses, not merely the strongest desire, but the whole self in action. The motive force of the action is to be found in the acting personality itself. It is not merely this desire, then, or that passion or some other tendency or habit that responds, wills, chooses and acts; it is the person, whole and entire, now seeking satisfaction, it may be, in this or that particular way but still always capable of transcending the urge of the moment, that acts or behaves.

This elementary truth about human behaviour appears to be confirmed by the Gestalt school of psychology in Germany whose watchword—"configuration" (*Gestalt*)—is intended to emphasise the idea of systems, unities, synthetic wholes, in both the physical and mental realms. Both the field of experience as well as the experient organism are such configurations. The former is not merely a mass of sensation-qualities juxtaposed in space and time; it is a total situation, a system of energies in which every part is intimately related to every other part and to the whole while the whole in its turn determines every part. The latter likewise is not merely an aggregation of independently working neuro-muscular units; but an *organism* from the very beginning—a self-organised unity of parts held in equilibrium which responds *as a whole* to total situations. They describe this fact by saying that each configuration has a tendency to "closure" by which they mean that the equilibrium of energies having been disturbed by the onset of external forces, the organism tends to regain its former position of equilibrium. Thus the behaviour of the organism is to be interpreted in terms of unified deeds of goal-seeking which is the same thing as saying that it shows a tendency to closure.

4. (3) Any explanation of human behaviour which at all pretends to do the slightest justice to it must recognise not merely the reality of purpose implicit in conduct but, what is more important, the effectiveness or causal efficacy of such purpose in determining conduct accordingly. This is what is known as teleological causation. It has been pointed out above that the emergence of value is not entirely a matter of natural causation but requires also for its adequate comprehension the aid of teleological causation or, as Lloyd Morgan would put it, dramatic explanation.¹ How actually value is engendered through the operation of both forms of causation is a question to be discussed in subsequent chapters but here we are concerned only with the validity of the concept of teleological causation. Till yesterday cause itself (natural causation) was a condemned concept in academic philosophy, it is small wonder therefore that *purposive* causation—the efficiency of mind in relation to external objects in general and the bodily processes in particular—should have been laughed at as a mystic relic of the medieval age of mythology and miracles. Nevertheless many of the “exploded superstitions” of the past centuries are fast becoming scientific, and teleological causation is one of them.

What exactly is one committed to when one proposes to accept “teleological causation”? This is a point on which some difference of opinion exists amongst those who accept teleology in general and McDougall has in his work *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*² exhaustively examined the views of those thinkers—psychologists and philosophers—who, while accepting the concept of teleology, still try to explain away teleological causation as but a disguised form of mechanistic causation. He comes to the conclusion that none of these attempts can lay claim to success and that the two kinds of causation belong to two entirely disparate orders altogether. All spatial organisations work mechanistically while non-spatial organisations—like the mind—work teleologically. There is no true emergence in the physical realm, because although mere physico-chemical changes may attain greater complexity of structure—for example, an atom developing into a molecule—they

1. Ch. IV. p. §8 *ante*.

2. Chapter III and note 6 (pp. 184–218)

do not imply memory and imagination. We have already noted the seven marks of behaviour which in McDougall's opinion distinguish the conscious action of animals from their reflex processes on the one hand and the mere physico-chemical changes in the inorganic realm on the other. Those seven characteristics may all be reduced to three fundamental features:¹ (1) the infinite adaptability of the purposive course of action, (2) its persistence ("under which comprehensive term we may include the spontaneous renewal of action after arrest and augmentation of action in face of obstruction"), (3) its cessation as soon as the goal is attained. Actions exhibiting these marks are as truly *intelligent* as they are purposive so that the mere fact that a certain action is the concrete expression of a certain impulse or instinct (or propensity as McDougall has termed it in his latest work) gives no ground to conclude that it is not guided by intelligence. The true relation between instinct and intelligence appears to be that the latter helps or subserves the ends of the former. Animal action is partly at least² prescribed by innate organisation; but since it is everywhere adapted to the particular circumstances of the moment, we must conclude that "instinct is shot through with intelligence."³

That animals are guided by intelligence in their behaviour is only another way of saying that they possess memory and imagination. Memory enables the organism to attain stability of organisation in spite of changes and to incorporate the effects of changes within itself in the interests of a future course of action (as when a man learns lessons from past failures in order to succeed in an undertaking in the future)—thus it directly subserves purpose. Imagination helps its possessor to think of a multitude of objects and events not within immediate physical reach and thus to "achieve real planning, the thinking out of a line of action before beginning to act"⁴—an ability which marks "the principal condition of the natural man's superiority to the animals." Both of course involve appreciation of relations—spatial, temporal and causal—which is of the very essence of

1. *Ibid*, pp. 66–68.

2. Largely, McDougall would say. We must remember that he still retains about eighteen innate propensities and an equal or larger number of native abilities in man.

3. *The Energies of Men*: p. 67.

4. McDougall: *Outline of Psychology*: p. 208.

intelligence. Prof. Spearman's attempt to explain the nature of intelligence in terms of the qualitative principles of relation-finding and correlate-finding aided by certain well-known principles of quantity has justly become famous.¹ Making allowances for the interests of a theory, there is no doubt that the ability to perceive the mutual relations of different elements—objects, events, beliefs, propositions etc., within a given universe of discourse—is what makes inference possible and it is at any rate the surest and the chiefmost *criterion* of intelligence. From the standpoint of valuation, the significance of such perception of relations involved in intelligence, memory and imagination, cannot by any means be over-estimated. It rationalises desire which otherwise would have remained a blind striving and thereby deepens it or destroys it according as the object sought is now intelligently perceived to favour or frustrate one's interest. It holds forth the end or purpose luminously before our view, and by deepening our desire for it—for that which is not yet existent, *viz.*, the realisation of the purpose—acts as a causative agent in bringing about such realisation. Desire armed with clear intellectual perception is then what causes the act, creates, alters or sustains value. The preference of enduring as against momentary satisfactions, of unalloyed as against mixed pleasures, of that which conduces to enrichment as against what leads to impoverishment of personality, of the social instead of the merely individual welfare, —such facts of valuational experience prove to the hilt that in order to live a *whole* life and a wholesome life, not only the insight of intelligence but the backsight of memory and the foresight of imagination as well are absolutely indispensable.

5. (4) The last psychological postulate that the science of valuation has to lay down is the reality of human freedom—the freedom of choice for the valuing subject. This question, especially in its metaphysical aspect will engage our close attention in the next chapter which discusses certain general problems arising out of the acceptance of the philosophy of emergence. But it may be stated even at this stage that unless freedom of choice were granted, valuation, like any moral choice, would be only a figure of speech. When we rule out

1. *The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition and Abilities of Man* (London, 1923 and 1926 respectively).

unbridled libertinism on the one hand, and unredeemed fatalism on the other, the problem of freedom centres round the two conceptions of determinism (otherwise known as necessitarianism) and self-determinism or the theory of freedom proper. Determinists hold that at the moment of affirming and accepting a certain motive out of several conflicting tendencies, the agent is constrained to act in the direction of the strongest desire or motive which determines his volition or course of action. The votaries of freedom believe on the contrary that the agent has power to act or choose in any direction he likes.

Only a few aspects of the problem, manly psychological, need be discussed in this connection. What is of significance to note in the determinist view is, firstly, that character determines volition and not volition character, and secondly, that no efficient agency is involved in the law of physical, and much less therefore in that of volitional, causation. The considerations usually advanced against such a view may be summarised as follows. It is true that character determines volition, but at the same time it is equally true that volition determines character. Innatists are wrong, if they maintain that the human mind comes into being with ready-made materials of knowledge, but empiricists would be worse if they should deny that the human mind has its directions, its tendencies, its propensities—its principles *a priori*. And in addition to this mental presupposition in point of the origin, there is the mental contribution in point of the working up of sense-multiplicity into the harmonious product called knowledge. The psychological implications of a voluntary act make it clear that deliberation or active comparison of the several competing impulses involves an exercise of attention. The mind directs its attention upon each competing impulse in turn, and fondly dwells on some, cursorily views others, lingers over some a little longer, and longs to run away from others at which it languidly looks. Hence when it is said that volition follows the line of the strongest motive, we must not forget that the strength of the motive is acquired by it from the mind itself, from the fact of attention which was exclusively bestowed upon it. That is, mind itself acts as an efficient agency and is no more bound by the mechanism of motives than it is determined by the processes of digestion and circulation of blood. Motives by themselves are merely states of consciousness and in order

that any one of them shall prevail and determine the will to a particular course of action, it must be acknowledged by the mind, affirmed by consciousness, and accepted by the will.

In regard to the contention that no efficient agency is involved in the law of causation both physical and mental, and that the causal agent in both realms may conceivably act as a catalytic agent and no more, it is said that this view rests on a wrong analysis of the notion of causality implying as it does that the chiefmost element in that notion is the uniformity of conjunction between the antecedent and the consequent. The truth appears to be that while uniformity has a value only as an *external condition* in the production of phenomena, it has none in the conception of causality itself in which the sole indispensable condition is efficiency or capacity to produce an effect. In a world where no uniformity reigned, causes would continue to act but not invariably, and effects could be produced but not predicted. "The idea of causation," as Dr. Ward observes, "in no way whatever depends on the uniformity of Nature."¹ Hence it follows that we ourselves are the *efficient* agents in the production of our volitions. Again it is contended on behalf of freedom that the reluctance, in the case of all unsophisticated minds, to rest content with mere constancy of conjunction (in external phenomena) and their insistence on believing in some more intimate connection, some peculiar tie or mysterious constraint exercised by the antecedent over the consequent, are to be explained only on the assumption that the constraint is a case of felt consciousness—felt in the fact of our own volitions—which we later on transfer to the relations of external phenomena which resemble processes of our own consciousness. "The power of which I am presentatively conscious in myself" writes Mansel in his *Metaphysics* "I transfer representatively to other agents whom I suppose to be similarly constituted to myself."

Again it is remarked by Kant that the law of causation is not an analytical but a synthetic judgment *a priori* in which the two ideas of commencement and cause are related together by personal experience of an effect—a determination being produced by a cause—or volition. The law of the conservation of energy is also brought in to support the contention of "Freewillers" in so far as it compels us to believe that, if the law

1. *Philosophy Theism*, Vol. I. p. 333.

holds at all in the regions of psychical experience (as positivists declare that it does), it is because we are directly aware, on the occasion of an act of choice, of the transformation of one form of mental energy into another. But the most cogent and compelling of all the arguments advanced in support of freedom is the one which maintains that the mechanical conception of causality, as advocated by the positivists, is inadequate not only to explain the occurrence of phenomena as such but, more, to co-ordinate nature as a whole. This mechanical must be supplemented, if not substituted for, by a teleological conception according to which nature would be conceived as a "reservoir of ideal ends" for the realisation of which the countless processes of the external world take place. If this is the truth even about external nature, how much more undoubtedly true should it not appear in respect of the volitions of a human being who may, regard being had to his entire personality, be described as "a conscious reservoir of ends" ?

We have by no means exhausted the weapons in the armoury of the champions of human autonomy but enough has been mentioned to indicate the trend of thought in the matter. The entire strength of the school of freedom rests on its conception of personality as something over and above character. It is a mistake to think that character is some external agency which has power over us and our volitions. It is an unpardonable error to forget that the informing light in character is personality which, though ordinarily exhibiting itself in a certain direction, is yet by its very nature free to expand out of the habitual groove, and to baffle all expectation by following a different line of conduct. And it is a sign of imperfect insight into human nature to imagine that personality is exhausted in character. For, over and above character, personality implies life—the for ever creating and evolving *elan vital* whose course is unforeseeable and therefore unpredictable, and life means friction, spontaneity, freedom, initiative. Uniformity may be the mode of life—it must be so, else we cannot live upon continual surprises—but it does not thereby lose its spontaneity which is its inborn characteristic.

The truth of determinism, however, cannot be ignored. Character and circumstances do envelope the individual and dictate the line of his choice. Character in particular has to be

reckoned with. Every act of the individual not only brings about an external result on the same plane of being as the action itself—it is idle to pretend that I shall swallow a dose of prussic acid and yet remain free from any physical consequences—but, more important still, its effect is nowhere more palpable or significant than on the mind and character of the individual himself; for his act was but conduct, and conduct is more often than not the expression of character. Thought preceded act and desire was the father of thought. Hence it is natural to expect that on this plane of thought and desire, likes and dislikes, loves and hates, the act—and the thought and desire behind it—should leave a more indelible impress which thus becomes part and parcel of the individual's character and moulds or modifies it accordingly. This influence of the whole act on the mind and character of the individual may be called a "tendency." In addition to such tendencies, we have also to reckon with the inherited tendencies or capabilities of the individual which do not call for any discussion in this place.

If then tendencies of both these kinds go to constitute a person's character, the force of such character—of these tendencies—to impel action on certain lines and to inhibit action on certain others, cannot be overestimated. Conduct is three-fourths character and the path of character is pretty well determined. And every time conduct is determined in the path of a given tendency, say towards stealing, the same gains strength and the individual grows weaker under its influence, and it impels, forces, inclines, him in future more and more towards stealing and less and less towards desisting from it. That the determination of volition in a given direction a number of times produces a proportionately greater tendency for it to be determined in the same path is a fact of everyday experience testified to by consciousness, which is sometimes sought to be explained by the psychology of retentivity and facilitation, and at other times by the physiology of habit. If conduct is three-fourths character, character is four-fifths habit and readers of William James's famous chapter on habit in his *Principles of Psychology* will have no difficulty in appreciating this truth. Of course it must be remembered that we are concerned here with cases of conflict between motives which alone are the proper instances for considering the problem of freewill. And

applying the theory of tendencies to such cases, we would find that the impressions inherited as well as cultivated in a given direction may have become so strong that on any particular occasion we may well-nigh anticipate in which direction the moral individual is going to act.

This then is the element of truth in determinism—the force of impressions inherited and acquired forming the character of a person. But tendencies are not the sole determiners of a man's destiny, for they remain only tendencies. That is, the character formed under their influence is not inflexible. For there is in every man the power of adaptation, of working out these tendencies to their fulfilment in relation to a given environment, and this necessarily implies a large element of freedom for the individual to adapt, adjust, modify, or alter his impressions according to the needs of the situation or the demands of the hour. At every fresh point in the history of the individual's moral life, the individual continues to retain his individuality, his freedom of choice, his capacity for spontaneous action. For adaptation is essentially a principle of freedom and modern thought has recognised that a hereditary character "does not work in a hard, mechanical way." "For example, it often happens that a man becomes strong on that side of his character on which by heredity he is weak," simply by force of voluntarily cultivating the tendency. Thus though character often determines volition, volition has still power over character, adaptation over heredity. The tendencies or capabilities generated in the past do not ordinarily mature to the degree that is necessary to transform them into kinetic causes—they are always capable of modification and control. And according as we go on controlling and modifying or yielding to these tendencies of the past in the present, we create our future which therefore obviously lies entirely in our hands. If we are what we are to-day by reason of what we were in our yesterdays, we shall be in our to-morrows what we have started into operation to-day.

What is it that underlies and explains adaptation? The demands of the spirit, of the evolution of mental and spiritual life. Thus it happens that there are two great principles at work affecting the conditions of existence. The first principle is that whereby the prevailing desires, aspirations, loves and hates, attractions and repulsions etc., press the soul into conditions in

which these characteristics may have a favourable and congenial soil for development (the principle of impressions). The second principle is that which may be spoken of as the urge of the unfolding spirit, which is always urging forward toward fuller self-expression and the breaking down of confining sheaths, and which therefore seeks higher environments and conditions than its desires and aspirations would seem to warrant (the principle of adaptation and modification). The two principles act and react upon each other and determine the conditions of existence. One's life is largely a conflict between these two forces, the one tending to hold the soul down to the present conditions resulting from past impressions, and the other ever at work seeking to uplift and elevate it to greater heights.

The present view then allows the individual the largest amount of freedom consistent with a well-established character. His character is doubtless made, but inasmuch as he himself is the author of his character, he still possesses the power of altering it for better or worse. His circumstances are assuredly given, but objective conditions are not half so invincible or inexorable as subjective ones, and when the latter themselves can be transcended, there is no need to be anxious about the former. But on every occasion of a conflict, the impressions must be faced and they are likely to determine him in their own way unless he asserts his power of free choice over them. It is these impressions that come to us in the form of our fate—tendencies of character to determine us in given directions, but always remaining tendencies merely with only a difference of degree in intensity or force.

Such is the solution to the problem of freedom of will. Man is neither a marionette pushed by springs from behind, nor a skipping will-o'-the-wisp pulled by seductive strings from without. Much less is he a one-idea'd obsessionist irretrievably borne along the current of his own conceptions and character. The individual always has freedom of choice, freedom at times to depart even from his usual character—in so far this theory would be different from the idealistic theory—but freedom can have a significance only when confronted with the factors of determinism, viz., the impressions inherited and acquired.

"Either the will is free or morality is a delusion:" so said an earnest thinker when the controversy on freewill was raging at

white heat. Since his days, however, sciences—both biological and mental—have rapidly advanced and to-day it almost seems as if heredity and psycho-analysis have secretly made an alliance to give the lie direct to man's supercilious claim for freedom. And yet, as I have attempted to show, the inheritance of certain tendencies towards certain lines of action need not be construed as annulling or abrogating man's freedom to act up to or against those tendencies, to *adapt* himself to new demands, new situations, both moral and physical. Else were it necessary to abandon one-half of the modern theory of evolution (including natural selection), and worse still, to pronounce a ban on all those human elements of artificial evolution, *viz.*, social amelioration, co-operation etc.. Psycho-analysis, again,—a theory which explains the present by the past, the conscious by the unconscious, the manifest by the latent, and the waking by the dream state—may seem to show that a man's acts are all the result of affective-conative forces working in the unconscious with their own surcharged energies—and working, be it remembered, uncognisedly—and that it is no more possible to escape their direction than it is possible for a thrown-up stone to escape the inevitableness of being drawn to the centre of the earth. Here, once more, to those who are willing to pass beyond the compass of the first look, it should become quite clear, firstly, that when certain acts were performed for the first time, the individual had for all practical purposes a clean sheet, so to say, and that he was perfectly at liberty to choose his course; secondly, that the *libido* in general and the various complexes in particular which subsequently come to possess his soul, so to speak, are nothing but powerful tendencies weaving their tangled web of fate around him; and thirdly, that their evitability, so to say, is attested to by the fact that the consequent diseases and their symptoms disappear as soon as their causes are clearly cognised in the conscious mind. It is doubtful however how far psycho-analysis can be relevantly considered in connexion with the problem of freewill which is essentially concerned with cases of conscious conflict of impulses.

The reality of the valuing subject, of purpose, of purposive causation, of freedom of choice—these we have called the psychological *postulates* of a value-theory. It is clear that as *postulates* they can neither be proved nor disproved, but must

simply be assumed in order to render the experience of valuation intelligible. Scientific psychology also (like McDougall's, for instance) can but assume them—at least some of them—if necessary. But in any case it cannot scorn them. Its wisest course would therefore be to suspend its judgment over them and allow the freedom to other sciences legitimately to assume them in order to achieve the proper explanation and appreciation of *their* phenomena.

6. Hitherto we have occupied ourselves with discussing the question (partly logical and partly psychological) of the pre-suppositions of the act of valuation. It is now necessary to deal with the more purely psychological question of the content of the valuing process. The problem resolves itself into the following minor issues:—

- (1) Is appreciation or valuation a process of feeling or knowing or striving exclusively or is it a compound of two or more of these elements?
- (2) The psychology of desire.
- (3) The psychology of attachment.
- (4) The place of pleasure and pain in valuation.

(1) The first question is theoretically by far the most important one and has been the subject of much heated discussion among philosophers. It has already been touched upon once or twice in the preceeding pages. There are two rival theories on the subject, one holding that the act of valuation consists simply in liking, desiring or being otherwise favourably disposed to the object, while the other believes that in addition to such liking or desiring the act also involves finding, deeming or judging the thing valuable, which is the proper significance of *interestedness*. The second view, in other words, is psychologically as well as logically more economical inasmuch as it postulates the possibility of a single mental act which both determines or conditions the existence of value (and in this sense generates value) and apprehends or knows it through valuation, or rather which through the very process of apprehension leads to the generation of value. This double act is indicated by the terms "appreciation" "enjoyment" "contemplation" "valuation." To some minds this sounds like sheer absurdity. If the apprehension referred to be a form of judgment, the judgment must presuppose its own object, *i.e.*,

the object judged must have an existence logically distinct from, and prior to, that of the judgment itself. That the judgment *discovers* value already existing is understandable; or that value should be created or conditioned as regards its existence by a certain activity of mind called interest or desire is also intelligible; but that this latter activity of mind should be identical with the former so that in one and the same process of mind we both confer value upon the object as well as consider that value, is what is wholly logically unintelligible and psychologically impossible. The error is due to the confusion between the judgment of value as such and a mere *interest-judgment* or the judgment which *mediates* the interest as a whole.

Such is the criticism of the present view—partially held, amongst others, by Dewey—by Prof. Perry who ably defends the rival doctrine that mere interest or liking constitutes value. In the first place it is noteworthy that he has consistently with his doctrine avoided the use of terms like "valuation" and "appreciation" which, he thinks, being "both cognitive and motor-affective" are "confused and equivocal" and maintain themselves only in "an intolerable obscurity."¹ Even the verb "to value" is for him ambiguous as it may mean "either the motor-affective act, which is qualified by judgment and which confers value, or the cognitive act which assigns value as a predicate."² It must be said, however, that it is precisely the repudiation of these terms which is responsible for Prof. Perry's palpable departure from normal usage and meaning in his account of value. (Still such departure is by itself no defect in a thinker if it enables him to analyse and expound better the concrete elements in a value-situation). The meeting-point for both theories is the necessity for the motor-affective attitude variously called desire, interest, or attachment as in these pages. Dewey recognises it as much as Prall or Perry or Picard. Says Dewey: "That liking is a factor in causing the thing to acquire value, a cause of the occurrence of the value-situation, I do not deny."³ Only he believes that "the relation of judgment or reflection to things having value is as direct and integral as that of liking,"⁴ while

1. Perry's article on "Value and Its Moving Appeal" in *The Philosophical Review*, July 1932 (XLI), p. 341.

2. *General Theory of Value*: p. 362.

3. "Value, Liking and Thought" in the *Journal of Philosophy* (Vol. XX), p. 620.

4. *Ibid*, p. 618.

Profs. Perry and Prall dispute this intimate relationship of judgment to value.

It is not the case, however, that Prof. Perry by any means underrates the importance of judgment or the knowledge of interest in relation to interest.¹ He admits that cognition may enter a value-situation in a two-fold manner. Firstly, cognition may be a *constituent* of interest "which is its accompanying expectation regarding the interest's object," and which may vary in its degrees of clearness according as the object of interest is immediate bodily appetite or impulse (when the cognition is minimal) or an ideal object involving deliberate choice (when the cognition is maximal). That is, whether the object of interest be immediately presented or mediately *represented*, cognition is essential to give us its *meaning* and here at least the truth of Dewey's contention—long ago urged against Prof. Prall²—seems to be fully recognised. Appreciation, enjoyed contemplation, he urges, always does include an element of reflective apprehension or discriminated meaning. Value cannot be wholly a matter of feeling but must be one of intent or meaning also embedded in feeling.³ The cognition or judgment involved in such apprehension Prof. Perry calls "the interest-judgment" or "the mediating judgment," because it mediates the interest as a whole, it is absolutely essential to represent any object, say *a*, to an agent as an object of interest, in short, to bring into existence the interest or value itself.⁴ Secondly, over and above such a mediating cognition, there may also be "a supervening cognition, in which the interest itself is known, whether to the subject himself at the time of his interest, or to a second subject."⁵ This is what Prof. Perry calls "the judgment of value" which is "the judgment about anything that interest is taken in it."⁶ To judge an object valuable is simply to judge it to be an object of interest, for value is construed by him in terms of interest, value *is* interest. It is the confusion between such a judgment of value and an interest-judgment that, as already

1. *General Theory of Value*, p. 359; also "A Theory of Value Defended" in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIII (1931), p. 450.

2. *Op. Cit.* 3. "The Meaning of Value" in the *Journal of Philosophy* (Vol. XXII) p. 129. 4. *General Theory of Value*, p. 362.

5. "A Theory of Value Defended," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIII, p. 450.

6. *General Theory of Value*, p. 366.

remarked, has engendered, in his opinion, the notion of a single mental act which creates value whilst it judges it.

But before we decide the question one way or another, it may help a clearer understanding of the issues to ask one or two questions. When Perry declares that cognition is a *constituent* of interest which it mediates, does he mean (1) that it *causes* the interest to be, conditions its existence, (2) or that it causes the act of interest, as distinguished from the mere affective disposition, (3) or finally, that it is simply one constituent portion of the attitude called interest, that attitude being complex, of which motor-affective dispositions are one constituent, while cognition is another?¹ In any case, what is meant by cognition mediating interest? Mediation implies that cognition or judgment reveals the rational grounds upon which a given object is taken to be an object of interest, that it weighs evidence *pro* and *con* before it finally and deliberately decides in favour of a particular interest. Even in the case of appetites and impulses where cognition is at its minimum, some amount of intellection or intellectualisation, be it even of the perceptive level, would necessarily be involved, if the interest is mediated. If now such a reflective or thoughtful procedure be a cause or condition of the existence of interest, if it is admitted, as Prof. Perry admits, that "there is in valuation a reflective process in the course of which the object is exhibited in this or that light and prized accordingly,"² then surely the judgment which formulates such a mediation *is* a judgment of value. For what is the object of such a judgment? "Not to state but to enstate a value;" to discover what is good for oneself or what to take as good; what to like or prize; in short, to create an interest or value, in Perry's terms. I am in doubt whether a certain person possesses the value of a friend I ascribe to him, whether a certain doctor will be

1. It must be noted here that the *act* of interest is not identical with interest as such. Interest involves only a state of incipient desire—a heightened form of wish—which may yet remain impotent and inactive because not yet *accepted* or *owned* by the subject. When on the other hand the desire is *chosen*, *accepted*, *willed* or *resolved upon* by the subject, it becomes active interest or an act of interest because action immediately follows upon such acceptance and choice. A may desire to poison B, but he may continue for some time in the mere indulgence of the desire; but the moment he *resolves* to poison his enemy, the passive interest becomes active.

2. *General Theory of Value* : p. 123.

able to cure my disease or not.¹ If through a series of intermediate judgments I am enabled to arrive at a final decision and to judge: Yes, he is my friend, the doctor can cure my disease, I am stating nothing but a judgment of value, a judgment that is, whose object is that X or Y *is* valuable, as a friend or as a doctor. "A college is a desideratum for this district;" "The enlargement of this tank is necessary"—what else other than the establishment of certain conveniences *as valuable* is the object of such judgments, provided that they are genuinely formed after collecting data, sifting of evidence, and purposive deliberation in face of real problems of life? And if they are judgments of value in the sense of establishing things as valuable, is it not the case that their value is discovered through judgment—or the series of judgments and acts² which led to the final conclusion—as well as established, *i.e.*, judged valuable, by judgment?

Prof. Perry would say: Such a judgment is an interest-judgment or a mediating judgment which simply defines and indicates value, but it is not a judgment of value in the sense of having value for its object. For it to become a judgment of value, there must be a further judgment to the effect that the things judged valuable *are really objects of one's impulsion*, there must arise a *supervening interest* in the objects, for value is nothing but the interest we take in objects.

This is the heart of the problem. And I feel that the plausibility of Perry's argument depends on a certain ambiguity in his use of the terms "value" "valuable" and "judgment of value." It seems to me that throughout this controversy Perry is employing the term "value" in the double sense of "interest" as such (his own sense) and "what is judged or thought capable of satisfying or realising the interest or desire." The two things are not equivalent. In common parlance, "valuable" signifies "what conduces to the realisation of some end or goal;" "to be valuable"

1. To take the illustrations used by Dewey: "Valuation and Experimental knowledge", in *Journal of Philosophy* Vol. XXXI.

2. 1. The reason why *acts* are included as part of the intermediate steps to the final judgment or establishment of value is that it is only when certain acts are performed as tentative or experimental measures does the final value get established. To have the value of restored health, for instance, the patient must *consult the doctor*, and the proximate object of the preparatory judgments is to enable the patient to decide to *do this act*. This is what Dewey calls a judgment of practice into the details of which, however, it is not now necessary to enter.

means "to have the capacity of satisfying, *i.e.*, effectively realising, some interest," apart from the question whether interest is taken or not in what is thus valuable. In this sense the examples given above—and others of a similar nature—are all judgments of value in so far as they deem, judge, estimate things to be valuable in the sense explained. But Perry holds otherwise because these things are not judged to be objects of one's impulsion—there has been no supervening cognition in which the object itself is judged to be object of interest. But why should the object be judged to be an object of one's interest? Only when a particular definition of value is admitted, only when value is equated with interest, would it appear necessary for an object to become an object of *interest* in order to be valuable. Realists like Moore, for instance, who believe that value is a simple indefinable ultimate quality possessed by objects having no necessary relation to desire or interest, would mean by a judgment of value simply a judgment which ascribes value, *i.e.*, such a quality, as a predicate to objects. Indeed, on Perry's premises, it should be impossible for all those who do not hold the interest-theory of value to talk of, or to make, judgments of value at all! And yet Perry makes no attempt to distinguish *his* use of the terms "value" and "valuable" from the ordinary usage but simply insists that the ordinary judgments of value are not properly so-called because they do not involve knowing the objects as objects of one's impulsion.

The same matter may be expressed otherwise by saying that what Perry calls the interest-judgment is really the judgment of value in the ordinary sense (*S* is valuable) while his so-called judgment of value is purely a judgment which expresses an object's relation to one's interest depending for its significance upon the acceptance of the theory that value is to be construed in terms of interest. Both kinds of judgment may be true or false according to Perry; but if the judgment of value is merely an expression of the object's relation to one's interest, how can any one ever be mistaken about the fact that he is interested? The judgment of value simply says: I am interested in such and such an object—in tennis, in Shakespeare, in polar exploration, in writing a work. The interest itself—*i.e.*, the concrete *object* in which I take interest—may be judged falsely: I might land in America thinking I was discovering India (as Columbus

did), or I might read a play of Ben Jonson under the illusion that it was Shakespeare's. But this is the fallibility of the interest-judgment (according to Perry). There can possibly be no mistake about *the fact that I am interested in something* (the supervening cognition of interest which is the judgment of value) if I am interested in anything at all. To think that there could be is again to confuse¹ the judgment of value in Perry's sense with the judgment of value in the ordinary sense. It may be replied that although a person may disinterestedly—like an impartial spectator—*judge* a thing to be valuable in general, he may not judge it valuable *to himself*, i.e., may not *desire* it, and that until he does so, no judgment of value arises. This is of course a very old story raised by Socrates's dictum that virtue is knowledge, and most of us are now agreed that cold reason by itself is powerless to incite us to action without the vital warmth of feeling and interest. The question is undoubtedly of great importance to practical morality but one sees no reason why it should tyrannise over a general theory of value so as to prevent us from recognising that a judgment which through a long process of analysis of data, sifting of evidence, and final decision or choice, is able to state that *X* possesses the value which was under investigation is as truly a judgment of value as one in which we affirm our *personal liking* for the object.

Thus both when cognition is a cause of the interest itself or of the act of interest which leads to practical action, value is apprehended through valuation at the same time that its existence is determined by it. Suppose that cognition is a constituent portion of the interest. Cognition here is, as Perry explains, "the accompanying expectation regarding the interest's object." That means, the motor-affective attitude which is the other constituent of interest is illuminated by—shot through with the light of—cognition so that, being transparent, it plainly reveals its own object. But in that case, it reveals not only its object *but itself* and the fact that it is being experienced as an attitude. No one has explained this better than Perry himself. "Motor-affective states" he says, "may on the one hand present or

1. Such a confusion does occur when Perry writes: "such a judgment (judgment of value referring to the *fact* of interest) is not infallible, in the sense that what is judged valuable is *ipso facto* valuable"—"Real and Apparent Value" in *Philosophy*, January 1932, p. 5.

represent their objects..... Or, on the other hand, they present themselves ; they acquaint me with the nature of feeling and willing and with the fact that I feel and will."¹ An act of interest then is one which acquaints the subject with the fact that he is interested; that is to say the interest is known as such and judged valuable.

In all the three cases then that have been supposed above, "the relation of judgment or reflection to things having value is as direct and integral as that of liking."

Valuation, then, as ordinarily understood, is the act of consciously assigning value to an object impelled, as well we might be, by our own feelings, interests, desires, sentiments and purposes on the one hand, and informed, well or ill as the case may be, as to the capacity of the object to satisfy, *i.e.*, effectively to fulfil, our needs, desires etc. on the other. This account, however, has slightly to be modified to make it consistent with the nature of value discussed in these pages. Value has been shown to be not an intrinsic character or quality of objects, but a *property* we ascribe to or superpose on them when we find them capable of fulfilling, partly or wholly, our expectations, *i.e.*, when we discover the measure of their conformity to our standard. What we really judge, then, in valuation, is not the value of the object as such—for value has not yet occurred in the situation—but the degree of the object's conformity to a standard. The moment this conformity or non-conformity is judged, (interest-judgment, as we may call it) the value of the object is struck, so to say, or occurs or emerges and is simultaneously judged also (judgment of value). This account of valuation escapes some of the difficulties ascribed to it by Perry and Moore, the difficulty especially, that if value consists in being thought (judged) to be valuable, there would then be nothing to think about except the absurd *ad infinitum* of thinking.

7. The interpretation offered here has the further merit of answering the question: what exactly is the relation of the motor-affective attitude to value? There are two classes of cases in this connection that at first sight appear to be distinct and to need different explanations while in reality they are identical and explicable by means of the same principle. I may experi-

1. "Value and Its Moving Appeal" in *The Philosophical Review*, (XLI), 1932, p. 340.

ence a quality or an object for the first time and may be moved by it. I may hear the music of the Red Indians which I had never heard before and experience strange thrills and emotions in my soul which lead me to attach a considerable value to that type of music. I may happen to read a novelist or a dramatist whom I had not read previously and come to like him immensely thereafter. Or I may seek to reawaken in myself an experience which I had known before and which I had already judged to be valuable. In the former cases the motor-affective state appears to be caused by the objects newly experienced while in the last case the experience itself seems to be due to my given conative-affective disposition. In judging the relation of value to one's affectional-volitional states, it may be said that in the first type of cases the motor-affective states are themselves modes of apprehension—faculties of perception—peculiarly adapted to the perception of value, as intellectual faculties are adapted to the perception of truth, through which or by means of which the peculiar quality of objects called value is perceived. Feeling, in other words, would on this showing act like an arc-light which would illumine and reveal an aspect of objects *viz.*, value, inaccessible to the ordinary intellect. This is indeed a plausible view of the matter. It may be observed that it is no argument against this view to say that psychologically it is false or inadequate because it fails to explain the fact that there is no accounting for tastes as there is for the unanimity in regard to the properties of objects, that literary and art judgments are as various as there are critics themselves. The variety of taste and discernment can easily be explained by saying that the music or the picture tends to arouse different feelings and emotions in different subjects according to their mood, temperament, circumstance and surroundings. There are two considerations, however, which are quite decisive against the view that feeling or conation is a mode of apprehension. It is a mistake to regard appreciation or valuation as a mode of cognition. Valuation is indeed dependent upon cognition, as has been sufficiently shown above, but nevertheless it is other than cognition. In cognition we stand apart; we withdraw our complex personality of love and hate, likes and dislikes, desires and impulses, from the vicinity of the object, we depersonalize ourselves, so to say, into pure knowing spirit, and enter and touch the heart of objects. In

appreciation on the other hand we thrust ourselves into objects; our loves and hates, our likes and dislikes, suffuse and saturate them and make them glow with iridescent colours and lights of azure and red; we touch the objects indeed but only to touch our own hearts. In cognition we disappear into the object, in appreciation the object disappears into ourselves. Secondly — what is necessarily involved in the above distinction — cognition is the act of knowing the intrinsic properties of the object; valuation is the process of feeling the capacity of the object to satisfy or fulfil our interest. The view that conative-affective states are a mode of apprehension would make value an intrinsic property of the object, out there, to be known or discovered like any other property, and this in itself is sufficient to discredit the hypothesis.

The type of cases in which our given interests themselves take the initiative in leading us to objects and determining what kinds of experience we shall have is the more usual type and in fact the other type is reducible to the present. For valuation presupposes that there are certain fundamental conative-affective dispositions in human nature which, fairly early in the perceptive stage of experience, are already attached to given universes of desire and strive to realise themselves in particular modes and forms. Even if the music of the Red Indians should be heard for the very first time, it would have no power to move the soul unless one already had some music in one's soul and was susceptible to its influence in general. Assuming then that this is the fundamental type of appreciatory experience, we may say that the relation of the conative-affective state to value is that of cause to effect. Motor-affectivity does not itself constitute¹ value in the sense of *being* it. True it is that sometimes certain sentiments and passions like love and devotion, certain dispositions and attitudes like sympathy and respectfulness, are called values, but this is in the same sense in which objects are called values. When such sentiments and dispositions are called values, they in turn become objects of contemplation by certain other motor-affective states in the original subject himself or in a second

1. This word "constitute" is a most ambiguous and misleading term in philosophy. When *a* is said to constitute *b*, it may mean that *a* is *b*, or that *a* causes *b*, or that *a* is a constituent of the complex *b* which has other elements in it.

subject and then the relation of these latter to the former requires to be determined. This relation, as I said before, is that of cause to effect. In this sense of course motor-affectivity is not the only cause of value. The cognition of the subject we have found to be also a cause or at least a condition of the emergence of value. It may be said that value belongs to the whole—the organic whole—whose elements or constituents are the subject and his cognitive-motor-affective states on the one hand and the object with its qualities on the other. But this is to revert to the belief that value is an intrinsic character of objects—complex or simple. The thesis of the present work on the contrary is that value never belongs to objects *qua* objects, that it is an emergent out of the effective relatedness of subject and object, and that apart from contemplation of the object by the subject—a mode of relatedness which brings out the cognitional and volitional-affective factors of the mind into effective operation—there is or can be no value at all.

8. (2) So far we have emphasised the cognitive element in the psychology of valuation. The emphasis is merely intended to draw the reader's attention to a fact which is likely to be missed; it by no means implies underestimation of the importance of volitional and affective factors in valuation. In fact the present theory is one with the value-theory of Profs. Perry, Prall and others in holding that value is determined more by the interests of the subject than by the inherent qualities of the object. Profitably to discuss the psychology of interest it may seem necessary to discuss instincts and impulses, propensities, and reflexes of diverse sorts which make up the content of motor-affective life. The psychological approach to interest may appear to lie through the pathway of animal and human *tendencies*. But our problem is simpler than this. For firstly we have held that value does not arise except when the agent *consciously judges* the conformity or non-conformity of an object to a norm of expectation. All behaviour then below the reflective level of self-awareness does not fall within the province of our inquiry, for no value is generated in such behaviour. It is for this same reason that non-rational factors are not taken into consideration in the genesis of value. It is not suggested, of course, that instinctive tendencies have no part or lot in determining reflective behaviour; but such

tendencies, *by themselves*, are unable to determine conduct amenable to the value-judgment. Only when they are raised to the status of "desire" do they appear to contain the promise of value. The fertile field of instincts or dispositions should be tilled by the ploughshare of consciousness and sown with the seeds of desire before one can expect the rich harvest of value. And secondly the classification and even the existence of instincts are still so much matters of controversy amongst psychologists that one hesitates to accept a doubtful entity such as an instinct as the immediate source of value.

Again, the psychology of value has always asked the question: Is feeling or desire primary to value? The question has often been answered in favour of feeling because desire presupposes feeling whereas feeling does not necessarily imply desire. "Feeling is genetically prior to desire and therefore suffices to make an object valuable (positively or negatively) for any subject that is affected by it."¹ But this would be directly contradictory of the thesis maintained in these pages, and Ward himself subsequently makes the modified statement: "Nevertheless conduct and indeed all behaviour is shaped throughout by reference to what is wanted—*i.e.*, by appetite and desire—rather than by what is attained and for the present sufficing."² One may even go to the extent of saying that sometimes feeling by itself paralyses the perception of value just as sometimes it arrests actions. At other times, being overpowered by feeling is a possibility which immediately leads to appropriation, action, possession, enjoyment, and such a process of feeling-enjoying-object may, we have seen, go on for any length of time without there arising value in the situation. Properly to influence action, as well as for value to occur, feeling must be joined to the *idea* of an end or purpose clearly or dimly perceived; that is, it must become "desire." Further, "feeling" includes such various things as joy, rage, melancholy, pain, hunger, fatigue, thirst, amorousness, irritation, pleasure, desire, even tickle, warmth, touch and so on that it is obviously inadvisable to adopt as the ground of value a concept standing for such a nondescript

1. James Ward's *Psychological Principles*: p. 387. 2. *Ibid*, p. 387. Ward continues: "Man and brute alike enjoy their food but man, less absorbed in its consumption, recognises it as food and regards it as good. Even when the perception is explicit, the appreciation need not be; but apart from the objective recognition, it can not be."

class of things.¹ Hence taking "desire" in particular as the conative basis of value, we shall discuss the psychology of desire touching upon instinct, feeling and emotion only in so far as they affect desire.

Psychologists are agreed in calling desire "an attitude with a large emotional content or correlate." "It is the recognition of an object, which is not possessed, as desirable, that is, as an object whose possession or imminence would give pleasure or satisfaction...Desire and aversion are conscious attitudes."² But what is an attitude? "An attitude is a condition of preparedness of the organism which in the last analysis reduces to preparedness for action. Action, however, is suspended, otherwise the process would be action instead of attitude...Attitudes are fundamentally suspended action with a recognitive element in the higher forms, which evaluates the relationship between the subject and the object in either affective or intellectual terms."³ Desire then as an attitude may be analysed into (1) cognitive (2) emotive, and (3) conative elements. To take the emotive element first.

It is often said that desire is a state of tension involving a certain amount of pain, and, what is more, that there can be no desire unless the pain due to a want is experienced. Desires are thus said to be doubly painful: their very birth in a feeling of want involves pain; and their continuance, as a state of tension, is also painful. This view, it seems to me, is an exaggeration. No doubt in certain cases, where one longs for or yearns after an object which one does not already possess, such longing or yearning may involve a kind of painful consciousness. But in all ordinary cases of desire, no such pain is experienced. On the contrary, the idea of something to be obtained or achieved causes distinctly a feeling of pleasure in one's mind which helps to reinforce, and even, in some cases, produce, that state of incipient mental activity called desire. This is the pleasure one already has—the pleasure caused by the idea or thought of the object—ideational or causal pleasure—as distinguished from motive pleasure on the one hand and resultant pleasure on the other. And as for the continuance of desire, this is not always a tension

1. We can distinguish at least five different senses of the term "feeling;" (1) organic sensations, (2) the sense of touch, (3) any purely subjective state, as feeling of certainty or activity, (4) an affective state, as feeling of pleasure or pain, (5) an emotion, as feeling of anger.

2. *Instinct* by L. L. Bernard, p. 502. 3. *Ibid*, p. 497

and a source of pain. Since the fulfilment of a desire gives rise to pleasure, and fulfilment is a gradual process, the continuance of the desire is simply the desire to continue this pleasurable process of fulfilment. When once a desire is completely fulfilled, there is a cessation of the whole process and its resulting pleasure. There may spring up a further desire for the same object, but that is again the beginning of a fresh process.

The emotive—or rather, affective—element, then, present in desire is pleasure more than pain. In fact if desiring really involved pain, the desire and the pursuit thereof would to that extent become less effective, though people probably would not cease to desire. When we further examine the relation between emotion and desire, we find that emotions are specific forms of desire—to perpetuate an agreeable or to terminate a disagreeable situation. The emphasis is upon a *specific situation*. The specific situation, however, requires that it should be cognised consciously. “The emotion (say, of anger) aroused by a specific stimulus-pattern, is integrated consciously with the object or event concomitant with that pattern. The emotion is experienced as a background for, or adjunct to, the object or event perceived, *the perception of which is the real cause* of the anger.”¹ Mere feeling, that is, without reference to specific objects which arouse it, does not constitute value. When however such recognition of objects is granted, the emotion, *qua* emotion, begins in a feeling of pleasure or pain and finally ends in a similar hedonic feeling. To take Dunlap’s example. When I get angry with a person who steps into the seat I have vacated for a moment in a tram-car, my state of mind may be described as an emotional state in which there is a strong feeling of pain and discomfort and possibly also hatred against the intruder and his act—all ebullient out of an underlying substratum of desire to regain my seat or to see that the intruder at any rate gives it up. The emotion springs out of the desire—is in fact desire in a particular form and intensity; at the same time it is a feeling of pain or pleasure. And when I do regain the seat, the emotion subsides when the object which aroused it disappears. But the subsidence of the emotion is in turn followed by a feeling of satisfaction or pleasure or peace, for the underlying desire—the ground and cause of the whole experience—has been fulfilled.

1. Dunlap : *Elements of Scientific Psychology* : p. 320 ; also p. 318:

Such an analysis makes it clear that feeling, affective experience, pleasure-unpleasure, is not an independent or ultimate aspect of psychical life, but only an indication of the "measure," "bulk" or "degree" of the self (however the self may be understood). Pleasure and pain stand respectively for the sense of expansion or moreness and the sense of contraction or lessness of the self. As such they pervade or permeate every aspect of mental life which may accordingly and more truly be analysed into cognition, desire and volition or willing or choice.

We shall now discuss the cognitive element in desire.

Desire expresses the innermost nature of the individual and this nature, being imperfect and finite, realises itself in a never-ending process of want and fulfilment. Consciousness of want, then, is the first cognitive element in desire. But interblended with it there is at the same time a more or less clear representation of the object calculated to remove the want. Says Dewey: "Desire implies a consciousness which can distinguish between its actual state and a possible future state, and is aware of the means by which this future state can be brought into existence."¹ The value of an object, as we have seen, depends both upon the intensity of the felt want and the capacity of the object to remove the want. Thirdly, cases of well-marked desire imply that the agent is conscious of some interval between the present feeling of want and its possible removal by the appropriation of the object in future, although this interval may in some cases be the barest minimum. If, however, the distance between the present want and its gratification be too long, there is properly no *desire* but only an *expectation*. Further the desire to do a thing or to seize an object implies the consciousness that it can be done; I cannot be said to "desire" what is clearly beyond the range of my reach in any matter whatsoever. Again, I desire an object only when I am impelled by the belief—rightly or wrongly held—that it is conducive to my own good. Consistently with our account of value, it must be held that desire as such generates no value but that it is the conscious identification of the desiring agent with the content of the represented object, or his estimation of the object in terms self-appropriation or self-enjoyment, that is the source of value. Not only so, there is also necessary the consciousness that the good chosen is not attended with any

1. *Psychology*: p. 363.

more powerful evil which would otherwise stifle desire or nullify action. This is the negative aspect of desire while the hope that it would be found conducive to one's own good is the positive aspect. Finally, the desiring agent should also be clearly aware of the difference between the presentation of the object and its representation in idea. If thought involved existence or thought and existence possessed the same value, desire as such would not arise, for a want would be satisfied as soon as felt.

The conative element, however, is by far the most important factor in desire, tending as it does to direct it always in the line of volition or action, for if desire is suspended action, volition may be considered to be equivalent to action itself, or at any rate as the mental equivalent of action. It is customary to interpret volition as mere *willing* or *resolving* or consciously *choosing* one alternative, it may be, among many others. But it is not in mere resolution *as such*, but in resolution *carried into act*, that volition is properly manifested, for a purpose once chosen may be postponed, and when the time for action comes, we may think better of our choice, our desire in the meantime having undergone revision. Volition is the energy of the whole personality thrown into action. However, volition need not always follow desire. Desire, to result in volition, needs to be transformed into a purpose consciously accepted by the agent as the object of endeavour. At the same time the tendency of every desire is to realise itself, for it is backed up by the impelling influence of instinct and disposition, the whole psychic and vital *elan* surging towards self-fulfilment. Any deficiency in the supply of this psycho-physical energy naturally weakens desire to that extent.

Such then is the nature of desire—an excellent illustration in itself of the psycho-synthesis which is a characteristic of all mental activities. It is this psycho-synthesis which is the subjective condition of valuation. In valuation the end or object is taken up by the feelings, coloured by the roseate hues of desire, and transformed by the light of understanding;—then and not till then does the value of the object emerge. The moving force of valuation is neither the cognitive depiction of the end merely, nor the impulsion of feeling or desire only, but the apprehension of the situation in terms of the total self or the personality. Valuation is thus different from motivation. It

expresses the character of the agent, and the success or failure of his life depends on the soundness of his valuations.

9. (3) We are thus naturally brought to consider systems of valuation or the organisation of our conative-affective life. Not single desires, but systems of desire, play the chiefmost part in valuation. It is systems of desire or *universes* of desire to which the agent is attached that determine particular desires for particular objects and the question is, how such attachment to a particular universe of desire comes to be formed.

Attachment is psychologically a much stronger term than interest, or sentiment, though the latter comes nearer to it in meaning. It is a permanent and conscious attraction towards an object or class of objects. The attraction of course is not a one-sided pull of the object upon the subject, as a magnet pulls a needle; it also depends upon the innate propensities of the subject as much as upon the capacity of the object to satisfy them. Such an innate propensity expresses some one of the fundamental instincts, drives, urges, or forms of impulsion such as the instinct of self-preservation or self-maintenance (involving organic needs like hunger and thirst), the instinct of self-expansion or self-realisation (involving ambition for wealth and honour, development of capacities etc.), or the instinct of self-multiplication or propagation of species.¹ Such a fundamental instinct, drive or propensity, expressing itself in a variety of minor or subsidiary desires, all of which subserve the former, has its own proper field of activity or range of objects to which it is related in such a manner that the desire is evoked on the thought or perception of any one of these objects; and the two together, the dominant desire as well as the appropriate system of objects which calls it forth, form what may be called a *universe of desire*. When therefore it is said that an agent is attached to a given universe of desire, it is intended to emphasise not merely a known system of objects, which attracts him, but also the dominant desire or propensity in virtue of which, or in relation to which alone, the system of objects has a hold

1. The question of classification of instincts is still such a moot point in psychology that no attempt is made here to define or classify them; in fact, "instinct" is used here in the broad sense of a "fundamental need" or "drive" of the individual. McDougall's classification of instincts and recently, of propensities, is well-known. On this topic, see two papers, contributed by T. Drever and Ernest Jones respectively to the VII International Congress of Psychology: *The Proceedings*, pp. 218-231.

upon him. Deny the dominant desire, no longer does the system of objects attract him, no longer are the subsidiary desires felt for specific objects. How is such a universe of desire built up?

To begin with, there is the dominant desire or propensity attuned to its own proper field of objects. A young boy, let us say, has the desire for knowledge and intellectual expansion. This desire is closely linked with one or more innate abilities, mainly cognitive, which serve to bring the desire into play, to express or realise it in definite outward forms. By chance he lights upon a play of Shakespeare and finds that it not only widens his intellectual horizon but also gives him positive pleasure. Thereupon he devours with avidity as many plays of Shakespeare as he can possibly lay his hands upon, and finds them all equally thrilling. He then probably turns to other poets and dramatists and is attracted by some and repelled by others. Thus in course of time his desire for knowledge specially directs itself upon some poets and dramatists or upon the literature of some particular period or school. He thus develops an "attachment" (or "sentiment" as McDougall calls it) for that particular kind or school of literature. The attachment is stronger than the original instinct or desire,¹ for while the instinct is but a general tendency to respond equally to all objects calculated to evoke it, the attachment entwines itself round some particular object or class of objects with the result that the experience of love or liking aroused by it is correspondingly more intense and more easily kindled because it is more specialised. The wider the range of objects over which an instinct or desire diffuses itself, the weaker the feeling towards them; the narrower the range, the stronger the feeling. Love for humanity is no longer properly called *love* in the psychological sense. It is largely an intellectual conception sustained by reason and logic.

The attachment as a whole, however, is not merely to the class of objects as such, but to the desire itself: primary interest in the objects becomes overlaid with interest in the interest

1. The alternative does not mean that an instinct is the same thing as a desire; it means—wherever it occurs—that the dominant factor which leads to attachment may be *either* an instinct or innate propensity or a conscious acquired desire; the result would be the same.

itself, and this personal identification with the interestor desire is what is here called attachment. It is this secondary stratification of desire that is most important for ethics and value theory in general. It is like the transference of a miser's affections from the comforts and luxuries of life to the means wherewith those comforts and luxuries could be bought or secured, viz., money. Desire in itself brings no appreciable satisfaction; it is the object or system of objects desired that does it. Yet it happens in the lives of most of us that the association between desire and the object that satisfies it becomes so strong and close that in course of time the two absolutely merge into one and present only a single countenance — the countenance of one's own with one's dominant desire writ large upon it. Thus it is that we come to value a person for the mere strength of his attachments — *i.e.*, the intensity of his desires — for his mere interest in sports, for example, though his hands may never have touched a bat, or his legs a ball, for his interest in music, gymnastics, or swimming etc., to all or any of which he may be attached in the sense that he manifests a strong liking for them. What happens in such secondary reinforcement of desire is that the object of desire fades into the back-ground and what is uppermost in the agent's consciousness is the desire, the pull, or the attraction as such. Such a state is to be explained on the ground that the agent has, during a long period of time, identified his whole spirit and personality — in short, *himself* — with the desire, so much so that, for the time being at least, it expresses his soul and character. Knowing a man's desires in this sense, *i.e.*, his attachments, we can confidently predict his course of conduct in a given situation, to a certain extent, of course.

Attachment, however, is not only a more intense form of affective experience than instinct or desire, it is also reinforced to a certain degree by intellectual elements like analysis, comparison, discrimination etc.. It is needless to point out that it is these elements which are responsible for the emergence of value. Attachment is cognitive as much as it is affective or conative. Enduring attachments, systems or universes of desire, thus come to be formed. The growth of experience may alter, modify, enlarge or limit further such universes, but at any given time, there will always be found certain well-defined attachments in every individual's mind which are the unambiguous

expressions of his valuations in life. They are the master-motives or forces of his personality, the strands which together constitute his "character." Every new object will henceforth be valued as in some measure contributory to the realisation of such cherished values. And these dominant desires, in their turn, seek to fulfil themselves in a variety of minor or subsidiary desires for specific objects which therefore possess only an instrumental value.

10. (4) It is clear from the foregoing that attachment involves (1) previous contact with an object resulting in pleasure; (2) memory of this fact; (3) expectation of a similar pleasure to be derived in future from the same or similar object; and, in consequence, (4) a desire for repeated contact with such proper objects, finally ending in (5) identification of oneself with the desire, or attachment. To value an object is thus partly at least to value it for the sake of the pleasure it gives. Hedonism is generally supposed to have died and been decently buried towards the close of the last century, if not much earlier still in the eighteenth during the time of Bishop Butler. The chiefmost, and, as is alleged, the most conclusive, argument against hedonism is the assertion that many a time we act, not for the sake of pleasure, but for the realisation of some concrete end, ideal, or object, some organic need, some kind of life-activity *different* from pleasure, though pleasure may accompany the successful termination of every such activity. It is surprising, however, that philosophers should have been so ready to treat of this resultant pleasure (as they call it, and said to be confused with *motive* pleasure by hedonism) as a mere inseparable accident of life-activity. The truth requires to be stated in this way. It is not merely that pleasure simply results from successful activity, but that the agent *knows* that it so results, even if he does not always expect it. Else he would not act. The patient knows that the operation of his wound by the doctor ultimately gives him pleasure and it is because he knows this that he submits himself to a good deal of present pain. It is possible, however, that his immediate objective is only the removal of some present pain or trouble. It is called the immediate objective because it is explicitly present in his mind and is insistent, but necessarily connected with this idea of removal of pain is the idea of the affected part (now operated on) healing up, resulting in the

restoration of his original health, which thought, implicitly present all along in the back-ground of his consciousness, is the impelling urge to present action. Otherwise, it is clear, nobody would welcome present pain for its own sake. To take another extreme case. The hero is prepared to become a martyr at the stake for the sake of his cause, religion or country, as we say. Not merely that, however; the hero knows or expects that by his martyrdom the cause he represents would gain tremendous momentum and propagate itself at least as extensively by his death as by his continued bodily existence. Such a thought surely gives him satisfaction enough (if he be a genuine martyr) to sustain him in his present calamity? To be convinced of the correctness of this analysis, one has but to ask oneself the following question: would the patient and the martyr submit themselves to so much of present pain were they assured that such a course of action as they now propose to adopt would, instead of resulting in restored health and larger success respectively, lead to greater ruination of the body and final collapse of the movement respectively? In other words, the proper method to adopt in deciding questions of whether or not an agent acts for pleasure in any given case, is to imagine that the course of action produced, not its usual or uniformly expected results or consequences, but just their opposites or contradictories, and then to ask oneself whether, even as thus metamorphosed in its productivity, the course of action would still be adopted by the agent. This is what I have elsewhere called the "Method of Opposite Effects,"¹ and I feel certain that by a conscientious employment of this method, every unsophisticated person would convince himself or herself that an action is undertaken, not merely for the sake of an immediate concrete end, object or activity but *also* for the sake of its ulterior pleasant or desirable consequences.

11. Such a hedonism, however, can be held only with one or two modifications. It is not for pleasure alone²—divorced from knowledge, memory, understanding etc.,—that an object is

1. "The Methods of Ethics," in the *Proceedings* of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1930; also "Values as Objective" in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, October, 1932.

2. Such an anaemic hedonism or anaemia of pleasure has been held by nobody in the history of philosophy though critics have never been wanting who set up such a man of straw, and by knocking him down, think and believe they have demolished hedonism.

valued; but for pleasure as realised in some concrete object, activity or end, which necessarily implies the presence of knowledge, memory etc.. That is, the so-called resultant pleasure must needs be identified with the motive pleasure, for the remote objective is, as shown above, as important for action as the present objective. Secondly pleasure must be interpreted liberally so as to connote not mere subjective discrete bits of sensation, but a more comprehensive and stable state of the experient which may be called "happiness."¹ Pleasure, however, is a chief and indispensable element of happiness. This fact is often ignored by philosophers—idealists and realists alike—who, while criticising hedonism for its insistence on sensibility, extol the superior authoritativeness of the "higher values" "the claims of the total self," "the development of personality," "self-realisation" etc., which alone, it is said, are calculated to bring about "abiding satisfaction" to the self. It is doubtful, however, how far these sublime ideals would remain authoritative without the pleasure element that accompanies them, and the attractiveness of the authoritativeness, the pleasure inherent in the ideal, is concealed cleverly enough by using the equivocal word "satisfaction" in such cases.

In short, pleasure and the avoidance of pain, interpreted broadly as equivalent to happiness, must remain the motive-springs of valuation. Utilitarianism—the relation of all action to human life and happiness—must remain the basis and bulwark of value-science.²

1. See, however, Ch. VII.

2. This topic will be treated of at greater length in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER VI

THE EMERGENCE OF VALUE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCE

1. In this chapter we shall address ourselves to a question which has become insistent with the development of our definition of the nature of value in the previous chapters. If it is true that value does not exist in its own nature but is always *caused*, it must be possible to account for its rise and development by means of the double skein of natural and teleological causation.

The special kind of causal concept which we believe should be employed in connection with the origin of value is the concept of "emergence." The exact significance of this concept which is with justice dominating contemporary thought is difficult to determine. But from the writings of thinkers like Alexander and Lloyd Morgan, R. W. Sellars and A. O. Lovejoy, G. P. Conger and H. P. Brown, we may gather the following features as constituting the essence of emergent evolution.

Emergents are said to be absolutely novel. "Under what I here call emergent evolution, stress is laid on the incoming of the new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of mind, and in the advent of reflective thought."¹

The new emerges as a result of new and effective ways of relatedness of the old. If a molecule (stage 3) has emerged from atoms (stage 2), then at stage 3, "atomic b's cluster together in a new mode of fellowship to constitute the community we call a molecule (c)."²

The new, however, is not merely a resultant, but an emergent; it involves new qualities and new forms of relatedness which do make a difference to the go of the events they have emerged from. There is more in the complex than in the constituents. "The 'more' of any given stage, even the highest, involves the 'less' of the stages which were precedent to it.....It (emergence) does not interpret the higher in terms of the lower only."³

It follows that "what will characterise stage 6 or any later stage is unpredictable from, or not deducible from, complete

1. Lloyd Morgan: *Emergent Evolution*: p. 1.

2. *Hibbert Journal* Vol. XXVII, p. 612.

3. *Ibid*, p. 611.

knowledge of all that happens at stage 5 or any earlier stage."¹ This is the very marrow and bone of emergent evolution according to Morgan, Alexander, Lovejoy etc..

Lastly, emergence is opposed to mechanism. "The odd thing here is that the whole doctrine of emergence is a continued protest against mechanical interpretation and the very antithesis to one that is mechanistic."² In especial, it is claimed for the doctrine that it accepts teleological causation in that it recognises mental guidance of events which counts for progress.

An "emergent" then at any given stage in the evolutionary process, is any new quality, entity or essence—for example, life, mind, reflective thought—which is not a mere summation of the old elements from which it has emerged but possesses new qualities and new forms of relatedness which do make a difference to the go of the events they have emerged from. It is itself the result of a new and effective mode of relatedness of the elements of the previous stage, of a new "fellowship" as Morgan puts it. And prior to such emergence, the quality, entity or essence is strictly unpredictable. The hierarchy of such emergents forms a progressive order of the universe which is susceptible both of a natural (causal) interpretation as well as of a moral or purposive explanation.

2. The theory of emergence has often been criticised and its philosophical value questioned. It is said, for instance, that the emergence of new characters from the formation of a complex is always accompanied by submergence of some of the characters of the elements entering into that complex and that such emergence and submergence result both from disintegration as well as from integration. The four processes—integrational emergence, disintegrational emergence, integrational submergence and disintegrational submergence—occurring, as they are alleged to do, in every case of change, render the concept, it is said, ubiquitous and in consequence philosophically useless.

This, I think, is overshooting the mark. It betrays a lack of appreciation of the true character of emergence. We may grant that with the emergence of new characters from the formation of a complex, some of the characters of the elements of the complex are lost or submerged, though even this is not

1. *Ibid.* p. 611.

2. *Emergent Evolution*, pp. 7-8.

true in the best instances of emergence, viz., in the organic and mental realms.¹ But does every case of change illustrate emergence and submergence? What then is the difference between emergents and resultants? Is every change, however trivial, to be considered evolutionary in the first place? But the more important question to consider is whether every case of disintegration yields emergents. The example often adduced, though it is not a good example of emergence, is that of H_2O . When H_2O is resolved to its original elements, it is said, H and O regain the property of each one of them being a gas, while the liquidity of water is now lost. But if the contention of emergentists be true — and unless its truth is granted, there can be no problem for discussion — viz., that there has been a *gradual* appearance in time of *new* qualities and modes of relatedness — the simpler elements must not only logically but even chronologically have existed prior to the formation of complex entities. To assume that all the things of the universe have existed from everlasting without distinctions of temporal priority and succession is to beg the very question at issue which has been discussed before. The emergence of the hydrosphere must have been preceded by the existence of lithosphere, the centrosphere of quasi-liquid core, and the "filaments" of incandescent gaseous materials. If then hydrogen and oxygen were known to have existed as gases before the appearance of water, the decomposition of water into hydrogen and oxygen would present no *fresh* case of emergence or no fresh problem for science. What *novel* entities can possibly by fresh modes of relatedness emerge from among the existing elements? is the proper question for emergence, and not, what elements are restored to their original state of simplicity by the disintegration of complexes?

Disintegration *per se* is thus not a process giving rise to fresh emergents. In the majority of cases, disintegration results either in the restoration of the original elements known to have existed as such or in the utter annihilation of both the complex and its elements. But the emphasis in emergent evolution being on the appearance of genuinely *new* characters, entities

1. As Lloyd Morgan puts it: "Emergent Evolution urges that the "more" of any given stage involves the "less" of the stages which were precedent to it *and continue to co-exist with it.*" (italics mine)

etc., which were not known to have existed before in any form, neither the submergence of some of the old characters in consequence of the emergence of a new complex, nor their restoration in consequence of its disintegration, can be said to affect the philosophical soundness or value of the theory. The one is irrelevant and the other superfluous in the appraisal of its value.

Another and apparently subtler criticism of emergence is that we can never be sure that a particular character of a complex is really an emergent out of the complex formation and not a property of the elements. Our knowledge of the properties of the elements may be limited, or there may enter into the complex other parts unknown to us which may manifest the property. The complex, that is, may be further analysable into other parts not now known to us which may possess the property alleged to be newly emergent. Before tannin was discovered to be an ingredient of tea, scientists might have thought that its peculiar properties were the emergent properties of tea leaves in hot water. Now of course these properties are definitely known to be connected with tannin. Likewise when compounds, which are analysed only into atomic constituents, are said to exhibit certain new properties, these properties may really be the properties of the electronic constitution of atoms. Thus, it is said, there is no necessary inference from emergence to evolution. Emergence may be necessary, but not sufficient, to evolution.

On the face of it, this argument appears to be forceful. But closer scrutiny will reveal the fact that it commits the radical fault of mistaking the nature of evolution itself. It presupposes the belief that all evolution is only development, *i.e.*, the unfolding of what was all along there, but enfolded—the Leibnizian theory of pre-formation, and that evolution produces nothing new. All that evolves must already have been involved either as a hitherto-undiscovered part of the complex or at least as a property of the electronic constitution of atoms. It is too late in the day, I think, to suggest this view of evolution—whatever might have been its plausibility in pre-Darwinian days. As against it, it is sufficient to quote the words of an eminent authority on the subject: "The original import of the word "evolution" — to unfold or to unroll, as a flower is unfolded —

is too restricted, because, as theoretically presented in Lloyd Morgan's doctrine of emergence and as practically proved by palaeontologists in both the invertebrate and the vertebrate world since the time of Waagen, evolution is far more than the unfolding of something that already exists.....; evolution is the incessant appearance of new qualities, new characters, new powers, new beauties, for which there is no antecedent in experience or no evident promise in the germ itself."¹ If this is true of the theory of evolution, it is true of the theory of emergence also, for emergent evolution is not a different theory of evolution, but the same theory with the emphasis on the incoming of the new—the "emergent" as distinguished from the "resultant" of the old theory.

This does not, one must hasten to add, mean, however, that there are no conditions whatever determining the incoming of the genuinely new. Whether the emergent is absolutely novel and unpredictable will be discussed shortly; but here and now we must recognise that the universe as a whole—meaning by this the totality of the Real which is the same as the Eternal—contains the conditions which make it possible for the emergent to arise. The factors which are perceived immediately to produce the new are certainly not perceived to contain the new in any form, but they are open to countless influences from the whole universe which must therefore be supposed to contribute to the making of that new. In other words, while the immediately precedent factors are the "part cause," the universe as a whole is the "total cause" of the emergent, but this is not the same thing as saying that the emergent *as such* was somewhere and somewhen in the universe, that everything that is now and will be in the future has all along been there from everlasting. To say therefore that an entity is "emergent" is to say truly that it is "created" in the sense already described.

Once more, it is urged that the establishment of a hierarchy of levels in emergent evolution is of no particular significance. An infinite number of levels could thus be worked out—why only these rather than those? In reply, it must be pointed out that the levels are supposed to mark "critical" or "turning"

1. H. F. Osborn in Foreword to *Creation by Evolution* (p. IX). *Vide also* Prof. A. E. Taylor's views in *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, pp. 456–459. "Development is entirely misconceived if we think of it as the mere re-shuffling of pre-existent materials."

points in the course of evolution, stages at which entities or properties wholly new emerge; hence their importance as milestones in evolution. It is not possible to fix the number of levels in any definite manner, of course; there may as a matter of fact be more levels—critical stages—in the history of evolution than are usually enumerated by emergentists. But the exact number apart, the criterion of a level is that it is a genuinely new event, entity or property. Between any such two emergents, we must suppose there occur, not emergents, but resultants only.

Lastly it is said that there is no necessary connection between emergence and *value*. The question may be regarded from two standpoints. If it is a question about the significance of the distinction between "higher" and "lower" levels in emergent evolution, this question will be discussed shortly. If on the other hand it is a general question about the *relevance* of the application of the concept of value to the evolutionary process, we must begin by admitting that neither the attainment of mere complexity and stability nor the fact that something is later evolved than something else is by itself a sure mark of progress. And secondly, evolutionary progress may mean advance *in any* specific direction and not necessarily progress in the *right* direction. It is difficult to accept Lloyd Morgan's statement that what is essential "to the idea of evolution is upward passage by progressive steps...along definite recognisable lines of advance, with continuity of progress from lower to higher."¹ The mere fact of passage is no sufficient guarantee that it is always upward, or along lines of advance forward. Progress may sometimes be achieved through "degeneration." And there are loops and zigzags and extinctions and atavisms to be reckoned with. If notwithstanding all these, we talk of the evolutionary march as progressive in the right sense, this is because it coincides on the whole with so much of our own ideas of progress and value excogitated no doubt *a priori* and independent of the march.² Further, evolution in mind also implies the emergence of many types of value as part of that

1. In *Creation by Evolution*, p. 343.

2. This of course refers to the norms or standards applicable to different types of value. It is the conformity or otherwise of given objects or entities to these norms that determines the evolutionary emergence of values.

process. Hence we cannot lightly brush aside the concept of value as irrelevant or inapplicable to the theory of evolution.

3. So far we have tried to defend the theory of emergence against criticisms often levelled against it. But when one contemplates such a doctrine of emergence, several interesting problems arise which need discussion and clarification. We shall briefly touch upon a few of them here in order to make clear the precise sense of emergence adopted in these pages.

•(1) Are emergents absolutely novel and strictly unpredictable?

Hans Driesch has contended¹ that there has been no emergence, in the Morganian sense of the term, in the inorganic realm, in fact, that there has been no evolution there at all. Electrons or electric fields or ether, as you like, are the ultimate elements here, and all future events are "predictable" if only you know the position and velocity of these elements at any given time. This is the view of McDougall also, but it is not necessary to discuss it here. What is to our purpose is Driesch's conclusions regarding emergence in the organic realm. In the organic kingdom, phylogeny—interpreted as including the sum of all ontogenies—may be the "consequence" of a superentelechy which necessarily realises its essence in matter (in which case there is no true emergence), or of a superentelechy without a fixed essence which makes its essence during the phylogenetic process (creative evolution). In the former case, the emergents may be said to be new and unpredictable only with regard to *us* who stand within the process, not with regard to one who stands without it. In the latter case, there is of course true emergence. But as things are, it is clearly beyond our reach to determine whether empirical phylogeny is the result of a reality which simply copies its essence into matter, or of a reality which makes its essence during the phylogenetic process. This "means nothing less than that the problem of.....*emergent evolution... cannot be solved.*" Cosmic freedom may be a fact; or it may be a fiction; or at best, only a point of view, while determinism may be the truth.

Generally speaking, Morgan and his followers interpret predictability in a strictly temporal or empirical sense, and not

¹. *Proceedings* of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, pp. 1—9.

in a logical or philosophical sense. It may be that at any given stage in the development of science, it may not be possible to foretell what new capacities a certain element is going to exhibit in connexion with certain other elements, but this is only a limitation of our human all-too-human capacities. A super-human mind which knew the position and velocity of these elements at a given time and the fundamental causal law of their acting, could certainly foretell. As far as us, I should hold that if an event, be it even after its occurrence, is rationally intelligible or accountable so that we could say, with complete knowledge of the determining conditions, why the determined should be what it shows itself to be, it is *in principle* predictable. It is not necessary that the intelligible or the rational should, by that very fact, be actually predictable. There may be ever so many irrelevant or incidental factors mixed up with it which render prediction difficult if not impossible. Still, the principle of rationality is such that in principle it admits of prediction. If, on the contrary, even after its occurrence, the event should be found to be irrational or unintelligible in its connection or causation—as, for example, a black cat crossing my path from left to right taken to cause ill-luck—then it is strictly unpredictable and so may be called “emergent” in Morgan’s usage.

This question of novelty and predictability requires to be dealt with in some detail as it raises important metaphysical issues regarding causality, free-will etc.. We may at once refer to the principle of *ex nihilo nihil fit* and ask how far the possibility of the absolute novelty of emergents affects or is affected by that principle. We may think of reality in two different senses. The real may be “all that is” *i.e.*, all that was, is or ever will be in the past, present and future, all stereoscoped into one eternal present. This would mean that every particular form, object, property, or event that ever in any universe under any causal laws and circumstances could exist in time at all already exists in some form in the eternal Real, and that the so-called change or development which we observe in the world is only a manifestation—a gradual revelation—under conditions of space and time known to us—of this All-Real. Surely this view is not unreasonable, for if we conceive of reality in this sense of the All-Real, how *can* it undergo change and development? Change implies an environment external to that which changes,

and a reason why it changes or a cause which produces the change. Even if we suppose that the All-Real causes itself to change, there can neither be an environment external to the All-Real with reference to which it could change nor yet a reason in the All-Sufficient-Real why it *should* change. Reality in this sense would be the eternal, the immutable, the undifferentiated, the self-sufficient and the all-perfect. So far the logic is irrefragable. And from this standpoint there is no true emergence, no real evolution at all, no cosmic freedom, and nothing that *seems* to happen or emerge is strictly unpredictable or novel. Novelty and unpredictability are only with regard to *us* who cannot comprehend in one view the eternal All-Real. There remains, however, one small question. Why the seeming at all? Why the manifestation or the revelation—for whom and to what end? The all-perfect all-sufficient Real would abhor even the seeming. To say that it is an illusion is not sufficient, for that raises the inconvenient question of why and for whom once more and leads to an infinite regress. To say that unreal it is but illusory it certainly is not, is certainly to take refuge in a camouflage. For if unreality is a certain degree or kind of reality, this reality is either different from the All-Real, in which case the latter would not be the All-Real, or one with it, in which case the Real would contain something unreal—a palpable self-contradiction in the heart of Reality. If the unreal or non-real is contained within the All-Real, and yet not for the Real, the question of for whom and why the unreal would again raise its ugly head. To say that it is for *us* is to beg the issue and move in a circle, for the "we" is part of the unreal and constituted by it. To say that it is beginningless may shut the doors of chronology but cannot bang the door of logic, for we are asking not for the temporal beginning but for the logical explanation of the element of seeming—the unreal—in connection with the Real. The circle is closed only with the simple denial of all seeming and appearance. But with its closure we close all our problems, all our philosophy, all our experience—the very things which first called for an explanation. This kind of short-circuiting may satisfy some people for all time and all people for some time but it will not satisfy all people for all time.

4. The difficulty of explaining the appearance is real enough for those who hold to the philosophy of the undiffer-

enced relationless one, but more important for our purpose is the realisation that such a philosophy is the negation of all freedom, cosmic or human. It is the fashion nowadays for Absolutists of a certain type to lay the flattering unction to their souls by the reflection that the indeterminacy principle of recent quantum physics has come to justify their condemnation of the concept of causality. Agreeing for the moment that the indeterminacy principle is true, what light does it throw on the question of freedom in the philosophy of the relationless Absolute?

The principle of uncertainty says that the measurement of an electron's velocity is inaccurate in proportion as the measurement of its position in space is accurate and *vice versa*. It must be noted in the first place that this uncertainty is a question of our inability to calculate, with the methods open to the experimenter, and predict the movements of the electron, be the detailed reasons whatever they may; it cannot be taken as an abjuration of the principle of cause and effect as such. That is to say, we must distinguish between causation and causality. Causation is an *a priori* principle which states that every event must have a cause, and it is difficult to see what can possibly make us give up this principle. Certainly not the indeterminacy of quantum physics, for that only seems to militate against causality—the principle of *uniformity of sequence* in the observed phenomena. Uniformity of sequence may be essential to coherent experience, but it is not a theoretically inseparable element in the *notion* of causation, just as the law of definite proportions in chemistry, though no doubt essential to the *uniform* operation of elements which combine with one another, is not as such inseparable from the *nature* of chemical combination. What is indispensable for the latter is the existence of a *chemical affinity* between the combining elements. There is nothing absurd or inconceivable in supposing that two elements showing chemical affinity to each other should combine to form a compound without observing the law of definite proportions, although, of course, in that case the effect could not be predicted. Likewise, there may be a unique feature in causation which being present in every observed case, makes possible the phenomenon called by that name. Uniformity of succession may at best be only a sign, an indication, of the

existence of the causal relation, but it does not constitute the meaning of the relation. Regularity of sequence, in fact, is to be explained by the causal relation, and not *vice versa*. In a world devoid of uniformity causes would continue to operate, and effects would certainly appear, but we could neither control the one nor foretell the other.

If this distinction between causality and causation is valid, it follows that everything that happens in the subatomic world—such as the jumping of its orbit by an electron—must necessarily have its own proper cause. It may not be possible for us to determine beforehand which particular electron is going to jump its orbit, but there must be some cause which determines why only a particular electron and not any other is going to do so. There is nothing in the developments of contemporary physics which compels us to give up this view, and this view is logically at any rate sounder than the view which ascribes microscopic happenings to "chance" if by "chance" is meant absence of all causes. Schrödinger, for instance, admits that "there is scarcely any possibility of deciding" by experiment between the alternatives of strict causation and statistical uniformity and that if we explain events by means of the first alternative, "we shall maintain that the behaviour of each atom is in every single event determined by rigid causality. And we shall even contend that strictly causal determinism of the elementary processes, although we cannot observe their details, must necessarily be admitted in order to allow the mass phenomena, which result from their co-operation, to be treated by the methods of statistics and the probability calculus. From this viewpoint causality would lie at the basis of statistical law."¹ Here Schrödinger is talking of causation. But he fails to distinguish this concept from the principle of uniformity of behaviour ordinarily called causality when he says in another connection: "If an initial state which may be called the cause, entails a subsequent state, which may be called its effect, the latter, according to the teaching of molecular physics, is always the more haphazard or less orderly one. It is moreover precisely the state which can be anticipated with overwhelming probability provided it is admitted that the behaviour of the single

1. *Science and the Human Temperament*, pp. 41—42.

molecule is absolutely haphazard. And so we have the paradox that, from the point of view of the physicist, chance lies at the root of causality."¹

Therefore the mere fact that science feels unable to guarantee uniformity of sequence (causality)² among phenomena cannot be taken as a repudiation by science of the validity of the notion of causation as such. And so, if absolutism believes that it has exploded the concept of cause by convicting it of various defects, absolutism cannot hope to derive any support for this from modern science at any rate. From the standpoint of the distinction we have drawn between causality and causation, even the alleged defect of plurality of causes (granting for argument's sake that plurality is true) cannot vitiate the notion of causation since in such a case there would still be the necessity for some cause to produce the given effect although the cause might be different in different cases. The only alternative for the denial of causation is the denial of *all change* in the universe. Does absolutism think that modern science is going to oblige it in this respect also? If modern science will not do it, if change is an inexpugnable fact, then change implies causation however inexplicable this latter might be. And an apparent change is a real contradiction in terms. But before a logician could admit the truth of plurality of causes, he would require evidence based on a more rigorous analysis than is exhibited in Prof. Davidson's example of the possibility of obtaining formic acid from various sources such as nettles, ants, carbon monoxide and caustic potash, and sulphuric acid.³

5. Apart from this, however, it is not true that scientists have despaired of causality even. Planck believes that since it is the presence of the apparatus used in the measurement that inevitably introduces an error into the measurement, causality and determinism could be maintained if the experimenter himself and his apparatus are both included in and taken account of as part of the physical system which is under observation and on which the measurement is made. But in this case, the measurement would not be independent of the

1. *Ibid*, pp. 35–36.

2. Orthodox scientists like Planck and Einstein are not prepared to give up even causality.

3. M. Davidson: *Free-will or Determinism*, p. 44.

observer and his measuring instrument. In order to overcome this difficulty, therefore, he conceives the hypothesis of an ideal all-knowing mind which has a full knowledge of the action of the natural forces as well as the intellectual life of man and whose knowledge is independent of measurement.¹ For such a mind events would be strictly predictable, but such a mind, it is necessary to notice, would distinguish itself from the objective world observed, for otherwise, if this mind takes itself also as part of the system observed, its observations would again not be independent of the observer. In other words, such a mind would have to be a self-conscious and self-distinguishing, and not an undifferentiated and relationless, Absolute. And lastly we have to remember the implications of "h," Planck's cosmic constant. If the root of things is itself vitiated by indeterminacy, how could it at any point give rise to certainty?

6. Looking now to the philosophical implications of absolutism, we must observe that absolutism means strict determinism because the Absolute is changeless, all-perfect, all-real. There is no room for novelty and surprise in the Absolute; everything is just what it is and free from the taint of chance, probability, etc. Hence the course of events can be predicted by one who knew the system thoroughly. Predictability becomes impossible when there is either chance or freedom of will. Chance is ruled out in the Absolute—its nature is not such that anything may lead to anything else. As for freedom of will, the Absolute does not will, for it has no purposes to realise. And being incapable of willing, it cannot be said to enjoy freedom of will. The Absolute may not be a term in the cause-effect series; but if it is a system at all, it must be a system of implications, of ground and consequence. It must have character, of course, its own character—though not what you and I ascribe to it as characteristics; well, then, if it has its own proper character, that character is such that everything else follows from it necessarily as the properties of a triangle follow from the nature of a triangle, as the existence of a valley follows from there being a mountain, as a conclusion follows from its logical premises. If the universe, then, follows with rigid necessity from the nature of the Absolute, that nature being unalterable, the Absolute is no more free than the Relative. As

1. *The Philosophy of Physics*: pp. 70—73.

for human freedom, it is the veriest mockery in such a system. Our freedom consists in the realisation of our necessity—our necessary connection with and dependence on the all-encompassing Absolute. "Men," says Spinoza, "think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire."¹ The falling stone would regard itself as free if it were conscious.

In short, if absolutism relies on the principle of indeterminacy to make good its escape from the determinism of cause and effect, it is escaping from the frying pan only to fall into the fire. For so long as the universe is believed to be governed by the law of causation, there is some hope for freedom by way of possibilities like plurality of causes, intermixture of effects, spontaneous generation, emergence of new characters etc.. As we have seen in the discussion of freedom of choice in valuation, it is only where the determinism of causation (in the form of inherited tendencies) rules, that there is scope for freedom of will. But for the absolutist who disdains to take the helping hand of causation, and who is certainly pre-empted from taking refuge in the caprice (as he thinks) exhibited by the dance of the electron, the only recourse left is a system of reciprocal implication such that we could say "For all x 's if x is c , x is c' , and if x is c' x is c " ("Explosion of gunpowder implies and is implied by such and such a state of the atmosphere"). Such a system of logical determinism is the most rigid kind of determinism conceivable, palpably incompatible with freedom in any sense—it is not a case of moral self-determinism, be it noted, for the Absolute is above morality and self-determinism becomes meaningless when there is no purpose—and it is amusing indeed to find jubilant statements made by absolutists to the effect that modern science has come to their rescue in upholding a doctrine which they would fain have others consider as a doctrine of freedom. The truth, however, is that causality might go, but determinism of a more rigorous kind remains.

7. But of course the absolutists under consideration would reply by saying that theirs is not a doctrine of freedom as such but of freedom *cum* unfreedom and that it is such a theory that is sought to be supported by the indeterminacy of microscopic

Ethics, Book I, Appendix p. 75 (Elwe's Translation)

phenomena combined with the statistical determinism of macroscopic bodies. And herein lies the heart of the whole problem, and the contention requires careful consideration. Science, naturally enough, is dealing with a single field of reality, *viz.*, the empirical field of sensible effects, and whatever conclusions it may adopt regarding determinism and indeterminism hold of this empirical field alone. Within this single realm, it says, it has been noticed that while it is impossible to predict both the velocity and the position of subatomic bodies, we can do so more or less accurately with regard to large bodies like the planets. Even here, it must be remembered, what appears to be the strict law of causality only illustrates extreme cases of statistical laws: the accurate predictions are cases where the probability of occurrence differs from one, *i.e.*, certainty, by a quantity which is vanishingly small. In any case, the scientific position, as thus stated, is quite intelligible. But what is not intelligible is how such a conclusion can be accommodated within the framework of a philosophy which swears by two planes of reality, the noumenal and the phenomenal. Protest however much they might, the upholders of such a philosophy cannot but admit some kind of difference between the two planes—call them aspects if you will—if there is no difference, why call one of them phenomenal or non-real at all? The infinite, it is said, expresses itself in finitude. If this expression is to have any meaning, it must mean manifestation, and what is thus expressed or manifested must be different from what expresses, appears, or manifests itself, just as a painting must be different from the original. Apart from all the dialectical difficulties involved in this conception of appearance or manifestation—difficulties which the absolutist himself is fond of pointing out in the notion of cause and effect—we must ask whether the indeterminacy that science has discovered in relation to the phenomenal can be taken to be true of the noumenal also? Suppose that science goes further and proclaims that electrons are really free in their behaviour; should the freedom or the freak of the electron be taken as establishing the freedom of the Divine and, by implication, of the human spirit? Is this the kind of freedom for which humanity has been yearning? Is the blind chance illustrated in the movement of the electron to be taken as an indication of moral freedom

and responsibility? Are we to believe that as soon as we enter the subatomic world, we suddenly leave the empirical behind, and are transported, as if by Aladdin's Wonderful Lamp, into the regions of the transcendental? If this is the kind of freedom we have been bartering for, then all our moral struggles and spiritual strivings, heart longings and soul searchings, were meaningless and vain indeed, and electrons and protons have already attained a deliverance which we fail to achieve through aeons!

8. The truth is, the indeterminacy or uncertainty of the empirical can tell us nothing about the nature of the transcendental, *unless we are prepared to affirm that the empirical is not merely one but identical with the transcendental*. Simply because the empirical is indeterminable as being either real or unreal, this indeterminability is not what the quantum physicists are concerned with as the indeterminacy of the electron. Indeterminability is a question of predication or characterisation; indeterminacy, a matter of calculation and prediction. There is no *uncertainty* in the absolutist's mind regarding the nature the empirical—he affirms that it is neither real nor unreal, that it is an appearance or a superimposition. Further, the absolutists in question take great pains to tell us that the finite is not a plane or sphere apart from the infinite, and that the imperfections of the finite are to be exposed not elsewhere or at another time or in a different order of experience, but here and now, in this very empirical life of ours. For does not the concept of cause show itself to be riddled with contradictions such as self-dependence, reciprocal dependence and so on? Hence it is not possible to regard indeterminism as holding of one plane, and system and causality and law, of another plane. Here we may admit the premise that the finite and the infinite are not apart, but does it follow from this that the finite is identical with the infinite? If it is not identical with, it must in some sense be different from, the infinite; and then whatever loops and lacuna we happen to discover in the finite we discover only in our finite experience as finite beings—such an experience cannot be said to be continuous with the infinite experience. And whatever virtues the infinite experience might possess—such as indeterminism or freedom—cannot bodily be taken over and automatically ascribed to finite experience. Is it not the fact

that so long as we continue to be subject to the empirical order of experience we have not perceived the truth, and that as soon as we have seen the light, we no longer *live* in the empirical though we might continue to exist therein? And is it not the belief of the Absolutist that the seeing of the light—the attainment of perfection—is a sudden transformation, not taking place within the time-order or within the limits of the historical process, but that it is a "victory over time, a triumphant passage from the historical to the superhistorical"? Does not all this show that the empirical and the transcendental—the one marked by progress, the other by perfection—are two different planes or aspects comprised within the same order of reality? If they are two different levels or orders of experience, how can the indeterminacy or the determinacy of the one give us a glimpse of the freedom or otherwise of the other or *vice versa*?

9. But the legerdmain of absolutist logic does not stop with this. The Real, the Absolute, is ever-free (in itself free, perhaps); but it can and does express itself as if bound (what makes it do so is not explained); therefore it is neither free nor not-free (rather a tragic fate for the Absolute!). But if the freedom is real, the bondage can be nowhere near perfect. (Why can we not say rather that even if the appearance of bondage is real, the freedom can be nowhere near perfect?) The appearance, however, is never free (what about indeterminacy, then?) And even the freedom of the self or the Absolute, being only another name for its fulness of character and independence of all external conditions, it is *determinate* (!) And because it is determinate, we can give successful analyses in regard to the past; and because the ever-free in its appearance can never appear as the merely determined or the merely indeterminable, our predictions for the future are only highly probable.

It is unnecessary to comment on the logic of the above argumentation. It is clear that it is prompted by the single desire of trying to appropriate the conclusions of science so as to make it appear that science justifies absolutism. If the freedom of the Absolute is determinate, and the Absolute and the Relative are not two different planes but only one plane, then this determinateness ought to appear throughout the whole field of reality and one can see no reason why if the past can be *read out*, the future also cannot be predicted equally success-

fully. If this one plane be the plane of the ever-free, *ex hypothesi* it is always free, and indeterminism and unpredictability should rule absolutely. If on the contrary the one plane be the plane of appearance, then according to absolutist philosophy, it is never free and determinism and predictability should have full sway. Or if the conclusion of science that indeterminism is the order of the universe is more welcome, then we must frankly and courageously admit that the universe which science investigates is the only real universe, and that it is not merely an appearance, for science knows nothing of appearances. To try to accommodate and hold all these contrary and contradictory conclusions within the scheme of one philosophy, to say that reality expresses itself in appearance, that still the two form one order of experience only, that in this one order alone reality appears as partly determined and partly indeterminable, that therefore we can predict and yet not predict, and that scientific indeterminism is of one piece with moral freedom, is like trying to fit the circle to the square, simply because the scientists happen to say now that the circle is the more perfect figure. It is like trying both to run with the hare and hunt with the hound.

If the Absolute and the Relative are not one but, as we have held, two different planes, then predictability need be confined only to the empirical and whatever conclusions science may reach on this point, those conclusions would be determined entirely by the limitation of human faculties and the methods open to finite creatures; they would tell us nothing about the possibilities in the nature of things themselves or for minds more penetrating than ours. A philosophy which distinguishes between the empirical and the real may entertain its own conclusions about the noumenal and say that it is a region of freedom—in the last resort we shall find that nothing is free except the willing self—but in any case this region is not suddenly disclosed to our view when atomic matter is battered into electrons.

10. Lastly, if the contention of the absolutist that the empirical and the transcendental form only one plane or order of experience be granted, it should follow from this that the determinism noticeable in the large scale phenomena of the empirical should also characterise the Absolute *considered as the whole of reality*. And then we should have a system both of

logical determinism (because the Absolute is a system of reciprocal implications) and of statistical determinism—a fate from which entry into the electronic world can alone perhaps save us!

These are the only two alternatives possible: either the finite and the infinite form one plane only, or they do not form one plane but two planes or aspects; it is not open to us to entertain a third alternative and say that they are not different but we treat them as if they were, for if they are not different, "we" are in the infinite itself, and there is none else to effect even an imaginary bifurcation in the unity of the infinite.

11. Such then is the bearing of the indeterminacy principle of quantum physics on the question of freedom in the philosophy of the undifferentiated One—one view of reality that might be entertained. Before we consider the other view and the possibility of freedom or predictability therein, a few words regarding the meaning and nature of causation in general would not only be in order here, but, it is hoped, would also conduce to a clearer understanding of the argument.

We need not mean by "cause" any activity, agency, force or power such as has been charged to the credit—or discredit?—of pre-Humean philosophers. We may mean by it just that kind of relatedness, both internal and external, of a cluster of events which determines any change in the manner of their go. There is an account of the scientific search for causes as the *device of amplifying disturbed or partial systems to undisturbed or complete systems*.¹ Philosophically speaking, however, we may say that the cause is a single change in the environment of a given object (the environment serving as the condition of the change) followed by a corresponding change—called the effect—in the object. That is, the emphasis here in the conception of cause is upon the single change in the immediate environment. Mill's method of single difference whereby the presence or absence of a single factor in two instances which are otherwise similar in all respects is taken to determine the presence or absence of the given effect, illustrates best the nature of the

1. Silberstein: *Causality, A Law of Nature or a Maxim of the Naturalist?*

causal relation. Further, causation is to be interpreted with reference to a single sequence and not in terms of a uniformity of sequences. Even if a change or the one like it had never occurred before and would never occur in future, it would still be the cause in so far as another observed change called the effect followed it. Is there a necessary connection between cause and effect? Inasmuch as we observe that the change in the environment was the only change that occurred immediately before the change in the object called the effect took place, we might say that there is a necessary connection between cause and effect, but the sense or direction of this connection is from the effect to the cause and not from the cause to the effect. That is, while a given cause is always necessary for a given effect, the given effect need not always follow from a given cause. This does not mean that it will follow from other causes; it only means that there are such things as counteraction of causes and intermixture of effects. That is, while plurality of causes is logically impossible, plurality of effects is quite possible. We may express this by saying that while the effect presupposes the cause, the cause does not presuppose or necessarily imply the effect: all that we can say is that it involves the effect. Presupposition, we shall see later on, is partly logical or necessary and partly factual or functional. Further, the idea of quantitative identity between cause and effect—the doctrine of conservation of energy—is true only of resultants but not of emergents, for in the latter there is always something more than can be accounted for on the basis purely of the terms which enter into relatedness.

12. We may bring out this same relationship between cause and effect in another way by saying that the effect is one in substance with the cause in the sense that it is potentially contained in the causal substance as a state which this substance is capable of assuming. The passing of the causal substance from one state of existence to another state is what we call the production of the effect. It needs to be pointed out, however, that when we talk of oneness of substance, we do not mean sameness of nature always; the effect may have characteristics or properties essentially different from those of the cause, as, for instance, water has in contrast with hydrogen and oxygen; nor need this difference mean that the effect is a thing altogether

different and separate from the cause. All that we can say is that while the effect is substantially non-different from the cause, it may differ from the cause in other important respects. The effect is potentially contained in the causal substance, we said; at the same time it must be recognised that the effect is a growth of the cause, its development into a different stage or state, and in this development into a different stage, new properties might appear in the effect which were not present in the old state of the cause. There need be no external agency acting upon the cause in order to make it develop into an effect, particularly in the vital and organic realms. The cause is self-energising and transforms itself into different states. And moreover both cause and effect are themselves parts of a wider process which is well-nigh interminable on either side, so that what we regard as an effect at one stage of the process may itself become a cause at another stage. But this need not preclude us from fixing our attention on certain parts of the process for practical purposes and distinguishing them into causes and effects on the ground of the method of single difference referred to above. A time-interval, however infinitesimal, would certainly be necessary for the cause to change itself into a *perceptible* effect, but the effect-change may be said to begin from the moment of the introduction of the cause-change. Without such a temporal factor, the concept of change itself would become meaningless.

Further, the terms "environment" and "substance" must be interpreted in a broad sense so as to suit the institution of causal relationships in different fields of enquiry. In the economic and the social spheres, for instance, we talk of the cause of a labour strike, the cause of immigration etc.. If the change of the causal substance from one state of existence to another state is what is called the production of an effect, then the environment or the substance in its first state in which the change takes place—which change is called the cause—is the existing social environment or the social substance as constituted by the common interests of employers and the employed, the government and its subjects etc.. If in such an environment or substance a single change takes place, say a reduction of the wage, this acts as a cause and produces another change in the environment, *viz.*, the strike. The strike, then, which is the

effect, is the same social substance as passing over from a first state of harmony or equilibrium into a second state of disturbance or discontent.

13. In any case, the relation between cause and effect may be described as the relation of unity-in-difference. Cause and effect are equally real and there is no logical reason why a particular cause should produce a particular effect and no other; but given the effect, it could have been produced by a particular cause and no other. Causal judgments, that is, are synthetic *a priori* judgments—synthetic inasmuch as the cause and the effect are two different and equally real events or processes and there is no reason why a given cause should give rise to a particular effect; *a priori* in so far as the effect necessarily presupposes or depends on the cause. The effect cannot be without the cause. The relation between them is one of functional inalienability, because the effect expresses a function of the cause. Wherever there is a centre for some energy to operate upon, or for a will to manifest itself in, that is the body of the energy or the will, *i.e.*, its effect. The two together form a unity-in-difference, and the dialectical difficulties that are sometimes pressed against the concept of identity-in-difference do not, for obvious reasons, arise in the case of unity-in-difference. This conception will become clearer in subsequent chapters; but if it be asked how non-difference can subsist along with difference, the reply can be made that the difference relates to the nature of the parts (cause and effect may possess different characteristics) while the non-difference relates to the inseparably united mode of existence of the parts. And since the objects of difference and of non-difference are themselves different, no inconsistency or self-contradiction arises between them. Difference is as real as unity, for if all difference be unreal, there would be no difference between truth and falsity, between true theories and false ones, and then there would be nothing to quarrel about!

14. It is clear from all the above that the effect is an emergent, *i.e.*, a true development of the cause. The effect is indeed potentially contained in the cause, *i.e.*, the previous stages which enter into effective relatedness with one another, but still it is not predictable, for we cannot know what new form and properties the previous elements are going to develop in contact with

the rest of the environment—what is going to emerge out of them—until the new character actually emerges out of the situation.

15. In the light of the above discussion of causation, let us now look at the second view of reality as contrasted with the first view. There are people who would say that the real is indeed "all that is" but that this "all" is not an undifferentiated plenum but a differentiated plurality. They start with the postulate that our finite experience of change, growth etc., is ultimately not invalidated by reality for otherwise there could be no justification for this whirligig of a manifestation etc., however seeming it be. If the experienced world shows variety, that variety cannot be squeezed out of a beginning which is a differenceless uniformity. The unity could only be a unity of a variety. It is possible therefore for some parts of such a reality to undergo change and development—real change and real development—without affecting thereby the other parts which might remain unchanging. What sort of a whole then is it that is formed out of such parts some of which are changing constantly in time and space while others remain unchangingly super-temporal and super-spatial, what is the nature of space and time and eternity that are involved in such a conception etc.,—these are questions into which I must not enter here.¹ My present purpose is to point out that if some parts of this whole can undergo real change, there can arise real emergents in the universe so that such a universe would in no sense be a "block universe" or a "closed system." In fact the contemporary relativistic theories of space and time are not at all incompatible with the view of evolution as being a real development,² and contemporary science, if anything, supports more the doctrine

1. See the third problem raised in this chapter as well as the tenth chapter, for a discussion of the nature of the whole-part conception herein involved. Also *vide* the writer's article on "The Notion of Dependence" in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 5, pp. 506–524, and a paper on "The Essence and the Existence of God" in the *Proceedings of the Ind. Phil. Cong.*, 1938.

2. *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge* p. 428.

of a self-differentiated self-evolving reality than a theory of an undifferentenced relationless Absolute. But if some parts of such a reality do undergo development, two conditions must be granted as pre-requisites. Firstly we should assume that for some parts to undergo change, the other parts that do not undergo change must serve as an environment or background with reference to which they undergo change. For there could be no other environment in the All-Real. Secondly the parts that do undergo change must already have some definite intelligible character of their own, for only so can they react in definite ways to the influences of the environment and undergo modification and development. And further the laws which initiate the influences in the environment and the laws which determine the nature of the reaction to those influences in the parts which are subject to such influences—in other words, the laws of interaction between the environment and the environed—must be of a like nature ultimately, for it is impossible to conceive of two disparate universes with entirely disparate laws to come into contact with each other.

Now transfer these abstract concepts and conditions to the world-drama. Suppose that the mutable parts comprise the world as we experience it—the world of the living and the non-living. The immutable part may be represented by some superentelechy (in Hans Driesch's words) which forms the background from which influences for change proceed. Of course the source from which influences for change proceed need not itself be subject to those influences. Is everything that is the product of change—new forms, new characteristics, new qualities, new powers, new beauties—here pre-determined and predictable? We must answer the question with reference to the living and the non-living separately. (The question has already been answered with regard to *us* finite observers). On the supposition that the non-living is the inconscient and obeys only mechanical laws of determination, the changes produced in it would strictly be predictable by a Supermind which knew the internal structure and constitution of matter, the position and velocity of the different elements, and the fundamental causal laws of their acting. They would only be predictable, I said; this does not mean that some products at least of the change could not be genuinely novel—novel in the sense that as emergent wholes

they did not exist before in reality, although in their constitutive parts and relations they did exist before in the "all that is." Molecules indeed consist of atoms but it is possible to conceive of a state of the universe in which molecules did not exist but only atoms and the laws of their combination. The "all that is" would in this case contain, at any given stage of the universe, the universe evolved up-to-date and, for the rest, only the conditions of future evolution. And the Supermind would possess a knowledge of all that is to come, but the actual coming—the consummation of the universe—would still be an event eagerly awaited. Predictability, that is, is not incompatible with novelty. *Ex nihilo nihil fit* would be consistent with evolution.

As regards the evolution of the living and the conscient, particularly of the finite spirits, the changes that take place in them are not even strictly predictable and they are entirely novel. Here also we must begin by admitting that the laws of action and interaction are known to the Supermind and the conditions of the occurrence of everything—of the "choice" on the part of the finites—pre-exist in the "all that is." Every act of the finite, every choice that it makes, would have two kinds of causes, the immediately preceding factors in the environment and in its own psychology which act as the part-causes, and the innumerable influences, tangible and intangible, in the rest of the whole universe which we must suppose act upon it and which therefore form its total cause. The act is in short the whole universe as expressed in that act and at that moment. In so far, the act is determined and just the outcome of pre-existing forces, and here also *ex nihilo nihil fit*.

16. But there is another aspect to the story. Let us consider the question with special reference to the problem of value. Value, we have said, emerges out of the interrelation of subjective desire and objective capacity and both are subject to laws and conditions which are definitely ascertainable and controllable. Anyone therefore who made a thorough study of human nature and its several springs of action on the one hand, and of objective nature and its diverse qualities and laws of combination on the other, would be in a position to predict the broad lines of conduct and the probable rise of certain fields of value. But the qualifications used here should at once suggest the danger of hastily inferring that the emergence of value is

thoroughly predictable. For it may be possible to make an exhaustive study both of the laws of human nature and of the laws of objective nature independently of each other; but the exact points of contact between the two, whether under given circumstances a known law of human nature will come into operation or not, it is difficult to determine prior to the actual choice of the individual, simply because of the spontaneity and the initiative that are the prerogative of the human mind. As Planck puts it: "From the point of view of an ideal and all-comprehensive spirit, human will, like every material and spiritual event, is completely determined causally. Looked at subjectively, however, the will, in so far as it looks to the future, is not causally determined, because any cognition of the subject's will itself acts causally upon the will, so that any definite cognition of a fixed causal nexus is out of question.....And those who fail to agree to this overlook or forget the fact that the subject's will is never completely subordinate to its cognition and *indeed has always the last word*."¹ The same objective situation—a beggar in rags, for instance—may evoke different feelings in different individuals, and where *ordinarily* we may predict the rise of sympathetic emotions in the beholder, disgust or contempt may be the actual response evoked. Of course the actual response of the individual cannot be independent of psychological laws; we must believe that there will present themselves before the beholder's mind a number of affective and intellectual contents each of which appear in a determined way; we may also know the past history and character of the individual; but which content he will at the moment affirm or deny and accordingly translate into action, is more than can be foretold even on the basis of the most perfect knowledge of human nature. The emergence of value,—that is, emergence in the realm of the conscient and the spiritual—is only partly predictable and the product entirely novel. The Supermind, we may believe, is aware of all the possibilities of choice on the part of the finite minds, as in William James's illustration the expert chess player is aware of all the possible moves of the novice on the board. But just because the novice has a mind and will of his own, his moves cannot be anticipated even by the Super-

1. *The Philosophy of Physics*, p. 32—33 (italics mine).

mind, as the motions of matter can. To this extent then the individual enjoys real freedom.

17. (2) The question of predictability and causation naturally brings us to the consideration of the double standpoint adopted by Lloyd Morgan in accounting for emergents and his attempt thereby to establish the reality of teleological causation. Every event, he says, can be accounted for in two ways: in scientific regard, as an event in accordance with the order of nature (interpretation); and in dramatic regard, as due to the act of some agent or agents motivated by some purpose (explanation).¹ In this way he attempts to reconcile the scientific hypothesis of emergence with the moral hypothesis of freedom. Elsewhere² I have pointed out at some length that freedom and purpose are not realities in Morgan's scientific philosophy but at best only *points of view* from which an outside observer may try to explain an occurrence. Morgan no doubt everywhere talks of effective relatedness of the field or system in question and an essential feature of causation is thus expressed: "Given a field of effective relatedness, that which observably happens under the existing go of events is an expression of the nature of the field and the nature of this or that which lies within it."³ Nowhere, however, are we told what modes of relatedness, in particular, are responsible for the appearance of the emergents at various levels of the pyramid of evolution.

The omission to discuss this aspect of the question very seriously vitiates Morgan's account of teleological causation as well as his attempt to reconcile freedom and emergence. He does not see that explanation in terms of agency or purpose is not on all fours with interpretation in terms of natural relatedness.⁴ He does not see that in human affairs at least, if not in the affairs of lower animals, the admission of agency is not merely a *dramatic* device, or a way of accounting for acts as only alternative or even supplementary to natural interpretation, but

1. *Mind at the Cross-ways*: Chs. I and XII.

2. "Teleological Causation in Lloyd Morgan"—Proceedings of the XIII Indian Philosophical Congress, 1937.

3. *Emergent Evolution*, p. 278.

4. "Freedom and emergence have at least this in common. They stand for indeterminism when and where they obtain. They stand for a denial of the dogma: *All that was, is, and shall be is rigidly determined.*" *Mind at the Cross-ways*: p. 260.

a fundamental necessity, a postulate, in fact, which has the effect of relegating natural relatedness to a subordinate position. Morgan talks of scientifically interpreting the act *after* it has emerged. But the question is: Has it been proven that the act was a case of true emergence, *i.e.*, that it was the effect of *merely* natural relatedness, psychical or mental? In other words, the more important question is to analyse the agent's mind *before* or *at* the moment of action, in order to determine what it was that precipitated action. Taking the imaginary case of a gentleman reduced to beggary through drinking and yet too proud to beg, let us suppose that one evening as he is sauntering along the road in a despondent mood, he espies a wayfarer whom he thereupon robs. Granting that this is the first act of robbery or theft he has committed up-to-date, and that therefore there is here a "subtle" and "evasive" nuance of mental attitude, born of "those inner modes of relatedness which constitute character and those modes of mental reference to the environment included under circumstances,"¹ how shall we analyse them? Shall we say that fierceness, unscrupulousness, a certain proneness to wickedness etc., integrated themselves in a new manner, that poverty, the miserable condition of his family, want of a drink for a long time before, the absence of any third person on the road, etc., etc., synthesised to produce a new mode of mental reference to the environment, and that these two—the new mode of relatedness of the elements of character, (as developed up-to-date) and the new mode of mental reference to the environment—coalesced and resulted in the formation of the fresh nuance of attitude, *viz.*, looking upon the traveller as a fit victim for robbing?

With change of attitude came also a change of desire—cupidity to rob the person ("the *de facto* pull of desire which leads to action"²).

This is, I believe, a fair analysis of the emergent situation in moral life. Now the question is, just at this critical turning-point in the person's career, what was it that precipitated action? Was it these modes of relatedness *by themselves*, the interaction of character and circumstances, the nuances of attitude and desire? Was there no awareness in the gentleman's mind of his

1. *Hibbert Journal*, p. 614: Morgan's article on Emergence and Freedom.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 614.

own ability to do one way or the other, to raise his hand to rob, or to lower it, as he liked? Was he simply swept off his feet by the rushing tide of the new modes of relatedness?

Now either the individual had, at the moment of acting, the power to choose his course of action or he had not. If he had not, then was his action determined indeed, and to talk of his freedom, of his efficient causality, is a mockery of terms. He was no better then an animal of a low grade, or an automaton. If on the other hand he had that power, and accordingly *deliberately chose* to rob, it was this choice, this will-decision, that ultimately told for action; without it, there might have been any number of fresh nuances of attitude and new desires springing up in the breast—none of them, singly or collectively would have resulted in the action, as the new mode of fellowship of atoms would result in the molecule. His choice having been the principal causative agency, the modes of relatedness were only partly responsible, were only contributory causes, for the decision. The decision itself was the result of the acceptance by the individual of a purpose or end, *viz.*, enriching himself through robbery. This purpose then, when deliberately chosen and accepted, was the real cause of the act. The modes of relatedness had their influence no doubt, but only in an auxiliary sense, just as a swimmer, while swimming down-stream, is helped by the down-current to go faster. The agent could have chosen not to rob, the modes of relatedness notwithstanding—he could have inhibited their influence. Even such a choice would probably have had modes of relatedness preceding it (but unable, be it noted, to determine it), just as a swimmer, while choosing to swim up-stream, may be helped in his endeavours by a strong wind in his favour.

In any case, it is the choice that fundamentally tells, and since nobody can definitely foresee the choice, the act is partly predictable and partly not.

That the event can *afterwards* be interpreted scientifically so as to make it possible for him to say—this had its due place in my emergent life-story—by relating it to some events that went before and some that came after, has no bearing on the question of freedom at the moment of acting—it would be only *ex post facto* explanation—it is not possible to reconcile freedom with emergence in this way. It illustrates the freedom to explain

the act, not the freedom to do the act itself. Our illustration has proved that if natural causation be sufficient to explain mental and moral phenomena, freedom is a myth; if purposive causation be a reality, natural relatedness is inadequate to account for them. It is always possible, especially as there are modes of relatedness on either side, to link on the act, *after* its performance, to modes of relatedness of the character revealed in the choice, and then to say, such the emergent modes of relatedness, such the act or result. Such an interpretation, however, ignores the true inwardness of the emergent situation—the controlling of the causal series by the finalistic decision. Causes are counteracted here, not by other causes, as in the natural world, but by ends, purposes, ideals. It is this teleological causation or counteraction that makes the prediction of the emergent difficult in the mental and moral world. Of this, however, more presently.

18. We may illustrate the respective functions of modes of relatedness and voluntary decision by having recourse to the distinction between "cause" and "ground" or "condition." C. J. Ducasse in an article in the *Journal of philosophy*,¹ distinguishes between sufficient and necessary factors in causation. The "sufficient to" is the cause, the "necessary to" is the ground or condition. The ground of the effect is generally the environment, the collocation of circumstances, without which the effect could not have taken place at all. The cause is a *change* in that environment and so is not identical with it. The ground or environment only prepares for that change, is a condition of that change. Adopting this distinction for our purpose, we may say that the modes of relatedness, in the case of a human action, are the condition, the ground, of the act. The nuances of mental attitude, and the modes of mental reference to the environment, are all preparatory to, and necessary factors for, the ensuing effect. But the will-decision is the cause proper, *i.e.*, that which was sufficient to the production of the effect. For it introduces a change in that environment, a change which is in the nature of a single difference in the antecedent factors. Given that difference, the effect follows; in its absence, the effect does not follow.

1. Vol. XXIII, p. 57: "On the Nature and Observability of the Causal Relation"

Morgan, on the contrary, considers that the distinction is between ground and condition.² The ground refers to the inner constitution of a system or given organism (immanent causation) while the condition refers to the external environment (transeunt causation). If, however, we should consider that the cause is a single *change* in the given environment (mental and physical), both the inner constitution and the outer circumstances need to be included in the condition or ground, while a change in a part of that ground (*viz.*, the mental part) is to be considered as the cause proper of the action.

Will-decision then is the direct and immediate cause of the action: that particular change which alone occurs first in the immediate environment and produces action. In thus effecting action, however, it shows itself either as co-operating with or counteracting the series of natural causes otherwise called modes of mental relatedness. Left to itself, the causal series would tend to bring about a certain result; in the case of many people who have forfeited their power of choice, it does directly bring about the result. But in the case of normal persons, the natural tendency is by *deliberate choice* either confirmed and strengthened or inhibited and weakened. Thus at one point at least the teleological nexus can break through, abrogate or overcome the causal series and show itself as superior to, and controller of, the latter. For will-decision is itself not subject to any kind of causal determination. It is, in the words of Hartmann, "an over-leaping of the time-process" by the subject who thereby asserts his inner freedom. It is a spiritual phenomenon, unique in nature; for one idea may cause another and that another and so on *ad infinitum*; and one feeling may produce another and that another and so on *ad infinitum*; but no series of ideas or feelings, however prolonged, can ever, by itself, generate an "I will." And yet, as observed before, it acts as a cause. It forces a breach, so to say, in the causal dam, diverts the flow, and then allows the stream to flow once more in causal fashion, smoothly no doubt, but this time to realise an end which is outside of itself and to which it is subservient. As soon, however, as the causal flow is thus diverted—and it may subsequently be diverted again and again—it reconciles itself to the change, and flows as a new stream,

2. *Emergent Evolution*: p. 285-87.

infused with the purpose of the subject, and controlled by it throughout the rest of its course. The causal series and the teleological series thus reconcile themselves in the end.

19. Thus mechanism and mentalism, causation and purpose, emergence and freedom, are finally harmonised. The reconciliation here is more real than in the double hypothesis of Morgan, where it is more apparent than real. For in the latter, scientific interpretation and dramatic explanation, emergence and freedom, have no real relation: they fall apart; and freedom, as shown elsewhere, is only a *point of view*. But the view set forth above establishes a vital connection between the two series and thereby makes a real reconciliation possible.

Doubtless certain metaphysical questions arise here in saying that the teleological determines, and even breaks through, the causal. The chiefmost of such questions is: Does the possibility of such intervention in the case of human action vouch for the possibility of a similar intervention in the case of Nature at large? If so, is not the causal series, in the case of the cosmos also, absorbed in the teleological? What is the presupposition of such intervention in the case of the cosmos? In the light of the recent developments in the physical notion of causation, which tend to emphasise the inadequacy, and, in certain cases, the inapplicability, of the notion of mechanical causation for the interpretation of natural phenomena, and which have been touched upon to some extent in the previous pages, such questions surely become pressing. But their place is not here, and their consideration must be postponed to a later occasion.

Teleological causation, then, is not merely a *possible way* of looking at human behaviour but a *fundamental fact* which is involved in that behaviour and which alone satisfactorily accounts for that behaviour. It must be observed here that what thus determines conduct is not value as such, but some motive or end. For value is not yet born and does not exist prior to the acceptance of some definite end or purpose. There is feeling no doubt pulling the agent in the direction of a particular universe of its own; but feeling by itself is not and does not contain value. For the occurrence or generation of value proper, feeling must be joined to the idea of an end or purpose, *i.e.*, it must be transformed into desire involving, as

the latter does, cognitive, affective and conative factors. As soon as blind feeling is transformed into conscious desire for some end, mind enters into effective relatedness with an imagined new environment and the corresponding value is born. In real life, of course, the three stages of feeling, desire and value are not ordinarily separated by any spatio-temporal interval, since they run into one unique and integral experience; but they are logically distinguishable psychical land-marks which should not be confused with one another.

Thus value and end are not identical. Not every end need have value *i.e.*, need generate value, positive or negative, for an end, tentatively chosen, may finally be given up. The end is the cause of value only at the time when the end is finally chosen by the agent; and both together, or the end-as-valuable, determine action.

20. (3) Morgan and Alexander speak of a hierarchy of emergents, of a "pyramind" of emergent evolution, in which every ascending step is of a "higher" order than the one below it which is said to be "lower." Naturally the question arises: In what sense are the emergents "higher" or "lower" relatively to one another? There are several senses of these terms, but the most usually accepted sense is that according to which an emergent which is higher is said to be "more inclusive" than the one which is lower. This is the sense in which Lloyd Morgan uses the terms,¹ though he puts it in his own way by saying that the higher "involves" the lower, while the lower "depends" on the higher for its "go" whenever it is co-existent with the higher. "Life" involves physical factors; "mind" involves life and physical factors and so on; while the "go" of the physical at the stage of life, and of life at the stage of mind, is noticeably different in virtue of the presence of the latter from what it would have been had they been absent. As Morgan interprets these terms,² involution and dependence, there does not appear to be much difference between them unless, as I said, we interpret "involving" as meaning "more inclusive."

But neither involution nor inclusiveness by itself carries with it any valuational connotation which, however, is implied in the whole of Morgan's and Alexander's treatment of emergence

1. *Emergent Evolution*, p. 15 ff.

2. *Ibid*, p. 17.

as tending towards a cosmic upward sweep. In a science professedly dealing with the problems of value, it is but just that this connotation should be explicitly incorporated in the terms that we make use of to express differences of value. Even so, what precisely is the connotation that we should attach to the terms "higher" or "lower" or any other equivalent terms? I suggest that we should retain the concept of inclusiveness but so interpret it as to bring out clearly the valuational connotation. Recently, Nicolai Hartmann also has employed the same concept in his treatment of the categorial law of height and strength as applied to the entire realm of values. A higher but weaker value, he tells us, "depends" for its being upon the corresponding lower but stronger value; but it is "free" within the limits set by the lower. But even here the exact significance of the concepts of dependence, higher and lower etc., is not clear. In what follows I shall try to elucidate the logical and philosophical import of these notions mainly no doubt from the standpoint of value-theory but with an underlying logic which appears to me to be full of promise.¹

I start with the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of an end, a purpose, or function, set before every object in the world whose realization is "according to nature" and constitutes the destiny of that object. But every object or system of objects is in some sense a complex entity, a whole composed of distinguishable parts. And in such a whole there will generally be found to exist some parts which alone are capable of expressing the distinctive purpose of that object, and others which are more or less accessory to such fulfilment of purpose by the former parts. Such accessory parts, however, have their own characteristic ends to realize; but in realizing their ends they at the same time subserve the object of the constitutive parts, and thus together both achieve the purpose of the whole. In a violin, for example the frame and the strings may be said to be the constitutive parts, the keyboard and the bow serving only as accessory parts to the production of good music, while each factor has its own distinctive function to fulfil. The primary purpose of a window, again, being to admit light and air into a room, an opening in

1. What follows, upto end of section 24 is a reproduction, with certain modifications, of a part of an article entitled "The Notion of Dependence" published in the *Philosophical Review*; XLVIII, 5.

the wall would appear to be the fundamental requisite; wooden frame, bars, panes, wiring etc., are only subordinate parts. It is, however, in organic wholes that this distinction is most perfectly illustrated. If we grant that the reflective rational capacity of man expresses his true function or *differentia* as a human being, then it is reasonable to hold, as Plato held, that mind alone is constitutive of human nature and its excellence; but for the realization of this excellence by mind a natural organism with the senses, etc., having its own immediate ends, is, I suppose, necessary. A mindless person *ipso facto* ceases to be a human being, but a person deprived of the power of sight or hearing is still a human in the real sense of the term. In every such case, it would be agreed, the constitutive parts are of primary value while the subordinate parts are only of secondary value.

21. What, however, is the exact relation between the constitutive and the subsidiary parts of an organism? This is the question upon the answer to which will turn our whole understanding of the concepts of dependence, higher, lower, etc..

The answer may be introduced by way of a discussion of the modern doctrine of inference.¹ In all demonstrative as distinguished from problematic inference, there are, as Johnson tells us, two fundamental principles involved, *viz.*, the applicative and the implicative. The applicative principle states that "from a predication about every, we may formally infer the same predication about 'any given'."² The implicative principle is employed to infer a conclusion from a premise which, like the hypothetical judgment, asserts a predication under some condition, or a "subject with some characterising adjective."³ The conclusion here springs from a situation which has certain possibilities inherent in it. Inference based upon these two principles is operative largely in what may be called deductive

1. The argument, it will be noticed, proceeds through two stages, the logical and the teleological or metaphysical. It would be awkward no doubt to apply the teleological analysis that follows later on to cases like colour and triangle discussed in the logical portion; but the writer believes that the logical is a genuine moment involved in the progress of the teleological. In any case, the validity of the logical analysis must be judged on its own merits without loading it with any philosophical meaning that may be developed out of it.

2. *Logic*, II, 11.

3. *Ibid*, pp. 11—12.

inference, understanding by that term not only inference ordinarily so-called—both subsumptive and functional—but also most forms of induction excepting the problematic.¹ To go deeper into the question, implication, as ordinarily understood, is a relation between two propositions, p and q , such that if p implies q , q can logically be deduced from p . The relation is otherwise called *entailing* by G. E. Moore. That which is entailed by a given proposition is seen to follow from, to be a consequence of, or deducible from, that which entails it. In this sense, it is said, "this is red" implies "this is coloured," and "this is a right angle" entails "this is an angle." Now I wish to suggest that "this is coloured" cannot in any intelligible sense be said to be a *consequence of*, or *deducible from*, "this is red," though of course it can be inferred from it. Colour is not the consequence but the *prius* of red; and we shall shortly see what this means. Meanwhile the objection can be appreciated better by contrasting such inferences with others in which the implicative or deductive nature of the inference is indisputable. "Every merchant will prosper if honest; this merchant is honest;" this conjunction of propositions implies "this merchant will prosper." Again, "the king can only act through his ministers" implies "the king can do no wrong." Here from the fact that honesty is made the condition of a merchant's prosperity, it legitimately follows that this merchant who is honest will prosper. And the king's inability to do wrong can logically be deduced from out of the fact of collective responsibility for action according to the British constitution. Now consider some examples of the applicative principle. From "Every proposition can be subject to logical criticism" we can infer "that 'matter exists' is subject to logical criticism;" again from "All crowds are excited" we can infer "this crowd is excited."

What is the difference between the inference about red and right angle on the one hand, and those illustrating the properly implicative and applicative principles on the other? To point out a superficial distinction, the inference in the first set is from the particular to the general,² from the species to the

1. *Ibid*, pp. 27, 132, 189.

2. In functional deduction this kind of inference is justifiable; but it makes use only of the applicative, and not of the implicative, principle: Johnson, *Logic* II 129, 131, 189.

genus,¹ whereas in the second it is from the general to the particular, from a condition to its consequence, from a law to a limitation involved in it. But the philosophical ground for this distinction appears to be that the second set illustrates the properly demonstrative or deductive nature of inference; in it the implicants and the "applicants" are more fundamental than the impicates and the "applicates." That is, the implicants supply the rational and necessary ground for the possibility of the impicates, while the "applicants" afford a universal scope within which the truth of the particular "applicates" holds. But the case is otherwise with the first set of inferences. Here also there is legitimate inference from "this is red" to "this is coloured;" but the impicate is evidently more fundamental than the implicants. That an object should be coloured first is the condition of its being coloured red or blue; but not *vice versa*. Otherwise stated, the impicate is logically prior to the implicants in the sense of being logically simpler. And logical simplicity may be explained by saying that *q* is logically simpler than *p* when we can conceive *q* without assuming *p*, but cannot conceive *p* without assuming *q*.² We can assume an angle without thinking of a right angle, but we cannot think of a right angle without assuming an angle. Or we may say that a simpler notion is that which requires fewer concepts or predicates to define it. If this is a correct analysis, then to say that red *implies* colour is not only inappropriate and misleading but false; for, firstly, the particular does not imply the general, and, secondly, according to the implicative relation, the falsity of the implied should follow from the falsity of the implier,³ and this is obviously not true in the present cases; and, lastly, implication is essentially constitutive,⁴ but this condition appears not to be fulfilled in the inference from red to coloured. We should therefore rather

1. The problem, it will be noticed, is not exactly about the relation of universals to particulars or of genus to species etc., as these terms have been understood in philosophical parlance, though in some instances adduced, such as red and colour, angle and right angle etc., it may appear to be so. In other instances, such as smoke and fire, which will be discussed further on, both the terms involved may be universals. And I do not know how to state the relation between them. It is a problem which, so far as I know, has not been discussed anywhere.

2. L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, 175 (footnote).

3. *Ibid*, 176.

4. Johnson, *Logic* III, XIV.

say that red *assumes* or *presupposes* colour, just as a right angle presupposes an angle.¹

In addition to the two principles of inference, then, the applicative and the implicative, we must now add a third, the assumptive or presuppositional. Both the constitutive and the epistemic conditions which are necessary for valid inference

1. "The falsity of the implied should follow from the falsity of the implied." "The generating relation of a deductive system," says Stebbing, "is implication." (op. cit. 196) And Johnson writes: "Deductive inference or implication " (*Logic* III, XIV; cf. also II, 132). It must be noted that I am using the term implication in its strict sense of logical implication. It is necessary to rescue this good word from its distortion in modern symbolic logic and to preserve it to denote that intrinsic connection of meanings or characters in a deductive system which is its primary, logical signification—a sense, e.g., which it retains in Idealistic logic. No doubt in modern symbolic logic, the ordinary interpretation of "*p* implies *q*" is that *p* false and *q* true does not occur. But this interpretation holds true only from the extensional point of view of logical relations giving rise to what Russell calls "material implication." This is concerned only with the literal truth or falsity of the propositions entering into the relation and so "*p* implies *q*" (i.e., *p* true and *q* false does not occur) would be true when both *p* and *q* are true, when both are false, and even when *p* is false and *q* true. Such an implication, however, does not necessitate or affirm the truth of its antecedent or that of its consequent, it does not take account of connections of meaning in propositions. The extensional interpretation of implication "is not the usual meaning of 'implies' though it is the widest possible interpretation of this relation." (Eaton: *General Logic*, 368).

According to the usual or intensional interpretation of implication, *p* implies *q* when there is a necessary logical connection of meaning between *p* and *q*—a connection which is not merely epistemic but also constitutive. And so if *p* implies, i.e., necessitates *q*, then, questions of existence being disregarded, to the extent that *p* is false, *q* also must be false. Plurality of causes is only an empirical observation; strictly speaking if *a* is the cause of *a'*, in the sense that it is the condition of *a'*, then that cause will not admit of any other cause in the same sense. Such necessary truths may be said to be analytic. (*Ibid*, 232) Our ordinary causal laws—of the type of Mill's inductive methods—are only "formal implications" and only when they are so regarded is a plurality of causes conceivable. (*Ibid*, 520) But a formal implication is not the only type of causal law: it states a sufficient, but not a necessary and sufficient, condition of an effect. Science searches for the necessary as well as the sufficient conditions of phenomena and so its generalisations take the form: "For all *x*'s, if *x* is *c*, *x* is *c'*, and if *x* is *c'*, *x* is *c*." That is, strictly scientific or logical implication is reciprocal. "Arsenic poisoning implies and is implied by (is equivalent to) such and such a state of the organism" (*Ibid*, 520-21). This is admitted by idealists also like Bosanquet. (*Logic*, I, 238 sq.; also, *Implication and Linear Inference*, 100).

All of which goes to confirm the view that according to logical implication, if red *implies* colour, the falsity of colour must follow from the falsity of red, which is absurd. Eaton, in fact, says in so many words that in logical implication, *A* is a necessary condition of *A'* if, when *A* is false, *A'* is also false (op. cit. 521). If *c* and not *c'* is true in some instance, then *c* cannot imply *c'*. And if not-*c* and *c'* is true in some instance, *c* cannot imply *c'* (*Ibid*, 522)

Lastly, I would submit that in general the view that true consequences

are present in presupposition.¹ For the sake of convenience, I shall call the proposition which presupposes another "the presupponens," and the proposition which is thus presupposed "the presuppositum."² If the presupponens is true, the presuppositum is true; if the former is false, the latter is doubtful. If the presuppositum is true, the presupponens is doubtful; if the former is false, the latter is also false. Given the truth of the proposition "here is smoke" (presupponens), we can infer the truth of the proposition, "here is fire" (presuppositum); but given its falsity, we can only say that the latter is doubtful. Again granted that "here is fire" is true, we can only say that "here is smoke" is doubtful; but granted that the former is false, we can confidently infer the falsity of the latter also. Likewise in the case of red and colour, right angle and angle, or any other pair of presuppositional propositions. We may, as further examples of presupposition, give the following: "I want food" presupposes "I have or somebody has a good appetite"; "I see a light in the room" assumes "I have the power of sight"; "I think" presupposes "I exist"; "The stars are visible" presupposes "the sun has set" etc..³

22. What is the bearing of this distinction between application, implication, and presupposition, upon our former question of the relation of the constitutive to the subsidiary parts in an organic whole?

All the three, it will be noticed, constitute wholes. All the may sometimes, be implied by false premises rests upon a confusion between the *factual* falsity of a premise which is for the nonce or conditionally asserted to be true and the *asserted* falsity of a premise irrespective of its truth or falsity in fact. Where you *assert* a premise to be false (as in *p false implies q false*) then to that extent logical connection of meaning forces you to assert the conclusion also to be false. But where you suppose an actually false premise to be true, i.e., assert it to be true, a true conclusion may sometimes follow. If so it follows not from the falsity, but from the conditionally asserted truth, of the premise. (Vide, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* by Cohen and Nagel, 10, for an excellent illustration of this confusion).

1. Provided, of course, we substitute "presupposition" for "implication" among those conditions.

2. These names have been kindly suggested by the editor, *The Philosophical Review*, as substitutes for some uncouth terms which I had originally employed. I gratefully accept them.

3. It is not necessary to suppose that presuppositional inference is some form of immediate inference made possible on the basis of only one premise. We can have any number of premises provided that the terms in them have some community of nature. See for some illustrations the writer's paper on "The Nature of Descartes' Method" in the *Proceedings* of the IX International Congress of Philosophy III, pp. 15-20,

three are possible only within a system of terms and relations mutually connected with one another so as to form a whole; in every one of them there is a common nature which runs continuously through all the terms and relations binding them together into a system. In the first two, however, the common nature appears to be so intrinsic to the several terms that they derive their entire significance from it. The whole not only determines the existence of the parts but affects their very nature—in short, the parts have no essential nature apart from the whole and they are in a true sense constituted by the whole. In such a case, that a part is a part of a whole is a predicate which enters into the definition of the part which has it. In inferring that "this crowd is excited" we are only asserting of a *specified* member of a class what was asserted of *every* member of the class. And the nature of the system of the British constitution is such that whoever is a part of that system can never be guilty of individual wrong. Application is mere specification of a truth generally known; implication is mere explication of a truth already latent in the implicans.

In presupposition, on the other hand, just the opposite is true. The presupponens (p) and the presuppositum (q) no doubt form a whole, but the whole thus formed is not constitutive of the parts as in implication or application; it is itself constituted by them. Further, as regards the relation of the parts themselves, p is said to presuppose q when the object denoted by it is in its nature or essence different from, but not opposed to, the object denoted by q ; but, in its mode of existence or behaviour, is determined by it. That is, the whole formed by their union is such that the mode of behaviour of one part is connected only by a causal¹ or existential necessity with the mode of behaviour of the other parts. True, p cannot be assumed without assuming q ; "here is smoke" cannot be assumed without assuming "here is fire;" but smoke *as* smoke is different in nature from, though not opposed to, fire; and the ground of the relationship by which fire has come to be united with smoke so as to form this existent whole "here" (this bush or

1. In the ordinary loose sense of the term causation as formal implication, not in the strict sense of logical implication as discussed above. This characterisation of the necessity within a presuppositional system as only causal, functional or factual—occurring elsewhere also in this section—will be modified in a later chapter (Ch. X, Intellectual Value).

haystack), is only a causal or existential necessity, as I said before, not an intrinsic necessity of nature. In its mode of existence smoke is so determined that you can never have smoke without having fire; you can never have red without presupposing colour. But the determination of smoke by fire, of red by colour, is not absolute; for fire and colour may conceivably manifest themselves in different forms. Presupposition thus emphasizes the difference in the being of the parts as well as the determination of the parts by one another in their mode of existence, *i.e.*, the maintained co-operation of the parts when they begin to function or express their nature. This determination, however, being only causal, functional or behaviouristic (under safeguard from psychological abuse!), the relation of co-operation between the parts thus brought about is only factual and not logical or *a priori*. In this respect we may with some plausibility liken presupposition to what Russell calls "material implication."

There is inclusiveness in all the three kinds of whole. The implicans, for example, includes the implicate just as the presuppositum included the presupponens. But the common nature of the whole, expressed by the implicans, enters into the parts and determines their nature so thoroughly that as we have seen, the implicans and the implicates tend to become reciprocal. This does not mean that the implicates have no significance of their own to reveal and that they are merely replicas—expressions in different forms—of the meaning of the implicans. In a true implication the implicans and the implicate are certainly different or distinct. But the contention is that not only the existence of the implicate but its very meaning—its nature as I call it—is so necessarily connected with the existence and meaning of the implicans that it can be said to be only a different *aspect* of that implicans. "If private property be legitimate, stealing is unlawful." The nature and meaning of stealing as something unlawful is so necessarily and logically bound up with the nature and meaning of private property that its unlawfulness, which is here inferred, is nothing more than a different aspect of that institution. "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space." The idea of two straight lines and the idea of their inability to enclose a space are certainly two different ideas; but the meaning of the latter is so logically connected with and follows from the meaning of the former that—this is

the crucial test to see whether presupposition is a different relation from implication or not, a test taken from Bosanquet himself—if you deny the latter, the former and ultimately the whole idea of space with it would have to be repudiated. Deny that stealing is unlawful, you *ipso facto* deny that private property is legitimate. Deny that the king can do no wrong, you necessarily deny that the British constitution is characterised by collective responsibility. In short, implication according to Bosanquet's own words requires us to say, "This or nothing."

Not so in presupposition. When I say that smoke presupposes fire, deny smoke, you do not necessarily deny fire; deny that this table is red, you don't logically deny that it is coloured; deny food, appetite need not be denied.¹ Here also there is a whole of parts, but the parts are such that the nature or meaning of the one is not derived from or determined by the nature or meaning of the other. There is a connection of course between the parts, but this connection is not so logically necessary—not so *a priori* or intrinsic to the terms—that you can say, "This or nothing." That is, the parts are not mere *aspects* of each other or of the whole as in implication, they are genuinely different natures not rooted in each other. Hence, while in implication you could tell from the nature of the implicans (*i.e.*, the determinable) what the nature of the implicate (*i.e.*, the determinate) is without any empirical or factual observation, in presupposition you cannot, without empirical observation, declare, given the presuppositum (*i.e.*, the determinable), what the presupponens (*i.e.*, the determinate) should be. Yet while in their nature the parts of a presuppositional whole are undetermined by each other, and the one cannot be derived or "deduced" from the other, the presuppositum determines the coming into being—the mode of existence, as I have called it, and in this sense may be said to cause the existence of—the presupponens. The presupponens having a nature of its own different from that of the presuppositum has likewise its own peculiar essence or uniqueness; but in what direction that nature is to be realized, how exactly that meaning is to be revealed, is determined by the

1. It must be noted here that it is the denial of the determinate that is in question both in implication and in presupposition. In the former, the denial of the determinate (implicate) leads to the denial of the determinable (implicans), but in the latter, the denial of the determinate (presupponens) does not necessitate the denial of the determinable (presuppositum).

presuppositum when the two enter into union. Such a unity therefore does not negate differences of the parts, but is thoroughly compatible with them. Smoke presupposes fire and combustible material, but while all the three are qualitatively different from one another, it is the latter two that determine the mode of appearance of the smoke, and the circumstances and conditions under which it shall exist, *viz.*, its colour, smell, duration, density etc.. Appetite determines what food and how much of it shall be taken. It is, however, in biological, aesthetic, and moral wholes that this teleological guidance of the presupponens by the presuppositum is best illustrated.¹ The human organism, for example, is a union of mind and body which are as different from each other as any two things possibly could be, and whose respective purposes are also different; but they are not contradictory of each other, and ordinarily it is the mind that determines the activity, the exercise of function, of the body. Mind rules, says Plato, because mind has the right to rule. For mind determines not only the activity of the body, it is mind also that alone can properly conceive and express the good of the organism as a whole as well; but my point is that the body—the accessory part—has also its characteristic function to fulfil in any case; and how this function is to be fulfilled, whether a man shall exercise his bodily powers as a carpenter, or as a soldier, or as a clerk, etc., is ordinarily determined by the qualities and capacities of mind. Both of course, co-operate to achieve that total good, *viz.*, the good of the organism. If a painting, again, is to bring out the soul and character of the original, it is this need of soul-expression that determines the choice of the materials and their proper utilization. In such a choice, however, the peculiar qualities and properties of the materials also come into play and prominence. Law presupposes liberty, and though the two may at first sight appear irreconcilable—because the purpose of law *qua* law is constraint while that of liberty as such is unlimited expansion—as Bentham, Mill, and Spencer thought, still both can and do exist together as factors of a unitary whole, *viz.*, moral life, in which, however, it is freedom that as the constitutive part, and as expressing the soul and heart of that whole, controls and directs the action,

1. This marks the transition of the argument from the logical to the teleological level. ...

the exercise, and the manner of functioning, of law, the subordinate part. Naturally therefore if in these cases you deny the presuppositum you deny the presupponens also just as if you deny the implicans you deny the implicate too. (And in so far both implication and presupposition agree). But this determination of the presupponens by the presuppositum is only so far as the existential occurrence of the former is concerned—not in respect of its nature or being. And so the fundamental difference between implication and presupposition should not be lost sight of. Implication is analytic, *a priori*, logical; presupposition is factual, functional, existential. Given the implicans, the implicates cannot help being what they are, for they follow necessarily from the nature of the implicans like the properties of a triangle from the conception of a triangle (which properties can be deduced logically from the conception without empirical observation). Given the presuppositum (fire or colour, e.g.) the presupponens (smoke or red) need not necessarily follow and its properties cannot be deduced without empirical observation. For it is not necessarily rooted in the nature of the former; its connection with it is only causal, existential. The distinction is here between the essence and the existence of an object. While the implicans determines both the essence as well as the existence of the implicate, the presuppositum determines only the existence of the presupponens, not its essence which the latter possesses and enjoys by its own proper right. Presupposition emphasises the underived significance of the parts. It is not the whole which gives them their significance though it is the whole which *enhances* their significance because it enables them to express their function or realise their being. It is a co-operative whole. There is a common consciousness (so to speak) in the parts of an implicatory whole by virtue of which they subsist as parts; in the presuppositional whole, on the contrary, there is a conscious commonness, as it were, in the parts which thus *make* the whole.¹

I think I can safely take Bosanquet's small work—*Implication and Linear Inference*—as on the whole a fair illustration of my point of view regarding implication. Bosanquet, of course, goes to the length of asserting that "even the acceptance of the blankest of brute facts which evidence compels us to believe depends on implication within a system" (16–17) "Every association of ideas, however casual and particular, does operate as a general connection of characters, such as must ultimately express itself in a system" (19; see particularly also 87). He

23. The presuppositional whole then is unlike a deductive whole though inference is possible within it from one part to another part. It is a peculiar kind of whole constituted of parts, let us say, *p* and *q*, when and only when *p* is dependent upon *q*. The relation of the parts to one another in such a whole has now been made clear; the presupponens *depends* upon the presuppositum and the presuppositum *involves* (as I shall say) the presupponens. But how shall we envisage the relation of the whole to the parts and of the parts to the whole as a whole in such a case? The whole, as I said, is made by the parts no doubt, but it is a whole nevertheless in some sense as it is different from the parts *qua* parts. It is emphatically not a mere aggregate or a numerical whole. The least misleading way of characterising it is to call it an organic whole, but if so we must remember that in it the parts do not mutually depend on one another as in the ordinary conception of an organic whole but that there is only a one-sided dependence of the presupponens upon the presuppositum. And it is a co-operative whole. But it must be pointed out once more that the whole *qua* whole is not very significant in this conception of co-operation. The life and soul of the whole is expressed by the presuppositum or the constitutive part; the subsidiary part (presupponens) only helps the constitutive in such expression. Not that the constitutive is in any manner obliged to form a whole and express its meaning, it is conceivable that logically it *could* exist by itself though thus seems to recognise no contingency, no factual association, no connection short of a logical, necessary connection through a universal, in the universe. This is of course a separate issue which must be discussed on its own merits. My thesis is a *prima facie* denial of this faith. I accept that there are connections which are not logical, brute facts simply intuited though the intuition has its own synthetic unity of apperception. That apart, however, Bosanquet's whole work bears out my contention that implication is for him through the supremacy of a whole which sustains the implicates as its own different facets. In their veins courses the life blood of that whole. The importance of the system, the true whole, the common nature which binds the terms into parts within a system (such that you can tell from one part of it what the other parts are), is emphasised on every page of the work; *vide*, 4, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 19, 27, 71, 77, 78, 93, 102, 118, 124, 126, 129, etc.). The sentences on pp. 77 and 93 are particularly noteworthy. "Implication within such a complex not merely establishes connexions of the terms having a relative necessity, but along with that both confirms their *existence* and establishes the true *character* in which they exist" (77, italics mine). "Therefore, again, in denying beauty, as in denying truth, you can deny the whole which alone gives assertion its basis" (93). It is not an accident, I think, that in characterising implication Bosanquet should have employed the very words which long reflection has led me to adopt as serving to differentiate this relationship from what I call presupposition.

factually it always exists on inseparable union with the subsidiary and thus forms a whole. In the circumstances it is difficult to express or formulate the relation of the whole to the parts or of the parts to the whole, in a presuppositional whole. We can only say that the whole *embodies* or "enforms" the parts or that it intrigues them to enter into a union. But these are only metaphors. If, however, we remember that the function of the whole is best expressed by the presuppositum, then the relation of the whole to the parts would virtually come to mean this relation of the presuppositum to the presupponens, for the whole is nothing but the unity of the parts. True, the unity is different from the parts which enter into a unity but to say that this unity stands in a relation to the parts is incorrect for the unity and the parts which make up the unity are not two separate facts. Similarly the relation of the parts to the whole would mean the relation of the presupponens to the presuppositum.

24. The relation then between the constitutive and the subsidiary parts of an organic whole is the relation of the presuppositum to the presupponens discussed above. And "dependence" expresses this relationship from the side of the presupponens—the subsidiary part. Dependence means presupposition. *p* depends on *q* (denoting by these terms now not propositions but entities) when *p* presupposes *q*. And summarizing the results of our discussion so far, we may say that the elements of this notion are: (1) the sense of this relation is from a less fundamental or logically simple to a more fundamental, or logically simpler, fact;¹ (2) both the presuppositum and the presupponens are equally real; (3) they are different from each other in nature and have different purposes and functions;² (4) but the presuppositum controls and helps the presupponens in the expression of its purposes through its characteristic function; and finally (5) the two together constitute a co-operative and unitary and richer whole—a unity-in-difference—in which the individuality of either is not jeopardized but enhanced. The whole is such that it indemnifies the individuality of the parts.

1. It must be observed that what is emphasized here is only logical and not *existential* or *factual* simplicity.

2. This does not however, preclude the possibility that the presuppositum and the presupponens may have *some* characteristics in common while there are other and more fundamental characteristics in which they differ. Nevertheless, even such partial agreement in nature is not always necessary.

Logically, the relation of presupposition or dependence is transitive and asymmetrical so that if it holds between, let us say, *a* and *b*, *b* will not have the same relation to *a* as *a* will have to *b*. It is the presupponens that depends upon the presuppositum and not *vice versa*. The presuppositum is the superior in the relation, it is of higher value and enhances also the value of the presupponens. Hence the relation is not exactly one of *co-ordination*, but of *co-operation*, as I have called it. In this sense then we may say that of two emergents in realist philosophies one is higher than the other not only if the one includes the other in some sense but also if it stands to that other in the relationship of presuppositum to presupponens. Any distinction of higher and lower, it was said in the beginning, must not only retain the notion of inclusiveness but must be so interpreted (in value science, especially) as to bring out clearly the valuational connotation. And the analysis of dependence given above, it is hoped, brings out this connotation sufficiently clearly. In this sense only may we admit the conception of degrees of reality, which would thus mean only degrees of perfection or excellence. On the teleological or metaphysical side, the relation between the presupponens and the presuppositum may be called *inalienability* or *inseparability*. The epistemological consideration of the whole question must be postponed to a later chapter.

25. (4) Does emergence involve temporal sequence with regard to the members of the hierarchy of emergents? If not, on what grounds shall we believe that something "new" or "novel" has emerged out of the old elements?

This question is vital for emergent evolution.¹ It may be suggested that taking the universe as a whole and with an infinity of time, what we observe is the co-existence of all the different levels of emergence yielding no proof for the temporal priority of any level. In this case the utmost that we should be warranted in affirming would be that, as between any two given levels, there was *difference* either in the content or the mode of relatedness, not *novelty* or *newness*. But the essence of the doctrine of emergent evolution is the incoming of the new.

1. What follows, upto the end of section 20, is a reproduction, with certain modifications, of an article entitled "Time and Succession in Relation to Emergence," which appeared in the *Journal of the Mysore University*, Vol. I (A), 1940 Part I.

There are about half-a-dozen senses or more of the word "new" recognised by the *Universal Dictionary of the English Language*,¹ but of them only three are pertinent to our inquiry. The new means "not previously existing, appearing, produced for the first time;" or "previously existing, but only recently discovered or known;" or finally, "beginning a fresh stage in a series, following that which has gone before, succeeding." Even of these three senses, the second, as we shall see, is not the meaning philosophically to be discussed. Hence the first and the third alone are relevant to our discussion. The question consequently reduces itself to this; can a mere logical difference of content between two levels or systems convey by itself, without recourse to the concept of temporal priority or subsequence, the idea of newness? The question may be looked at in this way. Take two systems A and B. A contains, let us say, factors p, q, r and B, u, x, y .² The mere difference in the contents of the two systems does not constitute newness or novelty. To say that u is different from p is not to say that u is newer than p . In order that the difference may constitute newness, what is said to be new in B should not have existed contemporaneously with the corresponding factor in A but should have come into being at a later moment or instant of sufficient span so as to form a distinguishable interval of time. If p, q, r and u, x, y came into being simultaneously, none of them in either system can be said to be newer than any other. If on the contrary, *after* u, x, y had existed for some time, let us say contemporaneously with p, q, r , B should later on develop z , this last factor would be new with regard to both u, x, y and p, q, r .

Taking the universe as a whole and with an infinity of time, such priorities and subsequences may not, it is true, exist for observation, for in an infinity of time all the changes and differences that we now observe may be supposed to have already come into being. This however, does not invalidate the possibility of such changes or differences having taken place in accordance with temporal priority and subsequence before observation began. It is not a question of *discovering* for the first time what might have been existing previously (the second sense of the word "new" noticed above) but the possibility of

1. p. 772.

2. Or these may be regarded as sets of factors in different stages of the same event or entity.

"all things existing together", or of some coming into existence *later* than others. The position according to emergent evolution is that some things must have come after others. And even now within our experience some sequences of this kind are plainly visible and bespeak the fact that "old" and "new" are intelligible only on the presupposition of such priorities and subsequences.

It may be said that the complex structure as such is not necessarily the later in time than the simple. Integration and disintegration of parts are processes that are going on simultaneously so that it is quite as possible for complex structures to appear first and then disintegrate into simpler elements as for simple parts to appear first and then integrate into complex wholes. In biology, for instance, the original complex pattern of the five-toed foot has been reduced to greater simplicity in the case of species such as the horse, the ox, birds etc., because the five-toed foot would be ill-adjusted to the creature's habitation. Again, it is the complex embryo as a whole that is given to begin with and the parts or organs develop only simultaneously with one other and as parts of an already existing whole. That is, the physical conception of parts as necessarily existing prior to the whole, is no longer a tenable conception in the light of facts revealed by the study of biological sciences.

The truth of this contention must to a large extent be granted. Indeed it is naive to assume that complexity is always the criterion of evolution or that evolution is everywhere in a linear direction from the simple to the complex. Spencer's formula of evolution—"from relative homogeneity to heterogeneity"—thus requires modification. If complexity involves variety, then we have seen that variety must be granted to have already existed in the supposedly simple beginning. And if evolution does at all illustrate and work by the principle of survival, then it is by no means certain that complexity—what Spencer called "length and breadth of life"—is conducive to survival. But all these admissions do not militate against our view that a finite interval of time is necessary between any two stages of a thing in order that one of them may be recognised to be "new" in relation to the other. Even supposing that the whole is given prior to the parts, it requires time for the parts to develop as parts from out of the inchoate whole and temporal

sequences would then be illustrated. In fact our thesis may be generalised and stated thus: Not only novelty, but *change* as such, of whatever character, presupposes the reality of temporal sequence of such a character that if A, B, C, are events, and if B succeeds A and C succeeds B, then in the dimension of time, there is no transition from A to C or from C to A except through B, and if a fourth event D succeeds C, then there is no transition from A to D except through B and C. Even if it be demonstrated that the universe has not shown any signs of change even by a jot or a tittle ever since its appearance, the general thesis nevertheless stands that *if* change is to take place, temporal sequence as above described is necessary.

26. In face of this conclusion one of two arguments may be urged. It may be maintained that the universe, as a whole, has shown no change at all ever since its appearance. There never was a time, it may be said, when the universe did not contain all that it does now, and, in consequence, there has been neither noticeable addition to nor subtraction from the sum of things. I think it would be difficult to maintain this position, at any rate in the light of our present knowledge of the formation of solar and stellar systems, of the earth's history, and of man's appearance on earth. It is not therefore necessary to pursue this argument further. A more serious consideration to be urged against temporal sequence would be to deny the traditional conception of time as a continuous flow and to insist upon the essentially discontinuous character of time. It is this age-old superstitious obsession of time as an independent flow quite apart from particular events, it will be said, that is responsible for the common belief in time length, its irreversibility, and its so-called relations of *before*, *simultaneous with*, and *after*. If, on the other hand, we adopt the new mathematical philosophy of Russell, Whitehead and others, we will be told, we shall discard these remnants of a rusticated philosophy and think only of discrete or epochal and not continuous, reversible and not irreversible, time. Then there will be no before or after *i.e.*, no temporal subsequence or priority. William James first gave expression to this new view in his *Some Problems of Philosophy*. According to him we have "to treat real processes of change no longer as being continuous, but as taking place by finite, not infinitesimal, steps, like the successive drops by

which a cask of water is filled, when whole drops fall into it or nothing."¹ Whitehead voices forth the same conviction. "Temporalisation is not another continuous process. It is an atomic succession."² Again, "Time is sheer succession of epochal durations. The epochal duration is not realised *via* its successive divisible parts, but is given *with* its parts."³

It is only this way of looking at time, it is held, that enables us to escape the antinomies of the completed infinite and of the infinite past time of which Zeno the Eleatic made such great capital as against the Heracliteans. The main point for our consideration here is that the steps, parts, the atomic wholes, the epochal durations, of which temporal process is said to consist, are supposed to be themselves divisible into proper parts. Whitehead, for instance, writes: "Thus time is the succession of elements in themselves divisible....."⁴ "Time is sheer succession of epochal durations.....the divisibility and extensiveness is within the given duration."⁵ And yet these proper parts are believed to be not mutually successive but mutually simultaneous. The epochal duration, for Whitehead, is realised, not *via* its successive divisible parts, but as given *with* its parts. This means probably that the parts of an epochal duration all occur simultaneously.

But how exactly does this new view bear upon our present discussion of temporal sequence? I said that a finite interval of time is necessary between any two observed stages in the growth of an object in order that one of them may be recognised to be not only different from the other, but *new* as compared with that other. And I said further that even to recognise change as such requires the recognition of an interval of time between the two stages, *viz.*, the stage before, and the stage after, the change. Now, however, according to the new view, time as *quanta continua* apart from the events that happen does not exist. If there be no such time, then there can be no finite interval between the two stages which according to our new terminology would be two events. Time is nothing apart from the events, and if between two observed events there are no other

1. *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 172.

2. *Science and the Modern World*: p. 179.

3. *Ibid.* pp. 177-178.

4. *Ibid.* p. 179.

5. *Ibid.* p. 177.

events, it follows there is no time between them. It may be that the object in question attained to stage α_1 at one moment or a finite slab of time, and then suddenly, by jerks, so to say, found itself at stage α_2 at another moment corresponding to another milestone in the temporal journey *without having gone through intermediate positions, i.e., without having traversed any empty moments of time*. And if there are no independent time intervals between events, we cannot attach any proper significance to the use of terms like before and after in connection with such events. For there being no independent standard of measurement, in the shape of a single all-embracing infinite time, but only a plurality of "duration slabs", it would be hard indeed to determine, say, in the case of two identical events which are mere repetitions of each other, which of them is the earlier and which the later; for aught we know every such repetition may probably be a case of going back to the past time. That is, time is quite reversible in either direction. When time loses its length, it loses its direction. When it loses its direction it loses its tense. This truth is further confirmed by the consideration that in the inorganic world there is a continual lapse of facts into non-being. A fact becomes present and real and then lapses into nothingness, another fact rises up but only soon to sink down beneath the surface of being, and so on. With the destruction of every fact, the relation between itself and the next also disappears; that is, the so-called interval between them has no being. With reference to what fact or entity, then, shall we say that the present fact is later or after, and when the present itself soon gets blotted out from existence, in what sense shall we describe it as being before another which turns up? In other words, does not this consideration lead to the conclusion that there are no relations of before and after in the proper senses of the terms and the only temporal relation left unresolved so far is that of simultaneity?

And simultaneity can be reduced to terms of existence. In fact all the three temporal relations under discussion can be reduced to terms of existence. Two facts are said to be *simultaneous* if both exist. One fact A is said to be *before* another B when B existing A does not exist, but has either directly by itself, or indirectly by means of another fact, A,—simultaneous with itself—left some trace of itself upon B. And

lastly, of two such events, A and B, if A is before B, B is *after* A.

Such, according to the new theory, is the significance of physical time — time in the physical world — for our question of emergence. As for mental time it is admitted that this has well-marked directions of past, present and future, for in the specious present we have not merely the most vivid illustration of durational experience, but we also have the past as continuing in the present and the present as anticipating the future. The past does not lapse into non-existence here as it does in the case of the inorganic world. But for this feature, however, mental time is supposed to be quite similar to physical time in all other respects : it too has no quantity, it too is quite reversible. Its distinguishing feature is that it can present some part at least of the panorama of existence as a whole together with its parts.

It is now time to examine briefly this all-too-brief exposition of time as epochal duration in its bearing upon the question of succession. First and foremost, let it be observed that the new theory does not *prima facie* affect the question of sequence among values, for it is admitted that mental time exhibits sequence, a determinate time-order of before and after, and values do not emerge unless we are conscious of them. It will be remembered that according to the present theory of value, the process of mind which discovers or apprehends value is identical with the process which creates it and such an experience, involving relation of oneself to an object and apprehension of this relation, is the best example that can be given of mental time and its characteristics. The new theory would apparently render all other value philosophies (which exclude consciousness as irrelevant to interest) powerless to explain how temporal subsequences and priorities obtain amongst values. But inasmuch as it lays the axe at the very roots of emergence — for emergence of different levels of existence requires sequence, and the emergence of value is but one specific case of general emergence, — it is necessary to examine how far the conception of sequence is abolished even in the case of physical time.

14. To begin with, it must be admitted that it would be more fruitful, from the point of view of an empirical analysis of facts, to regard time just as the process of things than to treat it either as a metaphysical form of the inner intuition of the mind,

or as an epistemological continuous medium necessitated by the continuity of successive duration blocks immediately experienced, or even as a natural absolute flow of pure time as the receptacle of all events and occurrences. Time is not a medium of any sort in which things are experienced. The temporal character of a thing is just its duration or persistence in being, the process of its self-fulfilment, and our measurement of time is just the measuring of this continuance of a thing or process in terms of the continuance of some other thing or process, say, the movement of the hands on a clock, or the motions of the heavenly bodies etc.. Let us agree then that time is nothing apart from the events that take place in the world. Time is adjectival to things and not substantival—an entity or an essence of any sort.

Further, although we have so far been using the terms before and after, earlier than and later than, past, present and future, rather indiscriminately, we must now distinguish the two orders or series in time, as McTaggart calls them, the A series of past, present and future, and the B series of earlier than and later than, or the before and after relation. Time is indeed a "flow" but this only means that the flow is the flow of some process—its motion relatively to the motion of some other process. Flow or flux, in other words, is change of motion. Of course flux or change presupposes the constant or persisting with reference to which alone change is intelligible, and this persistence is just the continuance in being of the existent. Such persistence, we shall find, serves as a basis for the distinction between past, present and future. That a thing is persisting means that it is present now. That it has persisted presupposes that it has had a past. That it will continue to persist implies that it will exist in future. Past, present and future are relatively independent blocks, as it were, of duration or persistence. A process might endure as a whole over a measurable period, but in this duration we can mark different epochs called past, present and future. The epochs are related among themselves, for duration is a continuity of process in which the present is the inheritor of the past and the legacy of the future. And in this sense the present may be said to be the successor of the past and the future the successor of the present. There is cumulative change from past to present and from present to future. Hence the independence of each of these blocks is only relative and not absolute.

As contrasted with the series of past, present and future—which McTaggart calls the A series (and there have been people who have questioned whether it can be called a series at all)—there is the B series of McTaggart in which events are distinguished into earlier and later. Just as it is the aspect of constancy or persistence of process which gives rise to the distinctions of the A series, it is the aspect of flux or flow which gives rise to the distinctions of the B series. It is often said that while the distinctions of the A series are intrinsic to the character of events, those of the B series are only the result of an extrinsic determination by virtue of which events in this series are related to one another in a serial order. Events, it is said, are past or present or future irrespective of their relations to other events in any temporal order. But no event can be said to be earlier or later except with reference to some other event in a temporal sequence. It is difficult to appreciate this differentiation of the two series. When I say, for example, that the dinner I attended yesterday is a past event, what exactly do I mean by its pastness? Not that it is done with and over and has left no trace of itself; the effects of the dinner still survive perhaps in the indigestion which it has caused and from which I am suffering to-day. *Qua* an occurrence it is past only with reference to another event which is present now. And this other event is present only in relation to the event which is gone by or to another which is yet to come. In order thus to be related to one another or to events in general, it is not necessary that past, present and future should form a series in the sense of a physical linear continuum. In this respect the items of the B series are in no better or worse position. Earlier, simultaneous with, and later, though not exactly identical with past, present and future, are still intelligible only when the same relationships that bind the latter are understood to bind also the former. If, for example, I should say that I came to this room earlier than my friend, my having come earlier is an event which is past and which is no longer available for comparison with the later coming of my friend. My presence now is doubtless a present event which is simultaneous with the presence of my friend but the event said to be earlier than my friend's coming is not that but my having come before which is now clearly a past event. The later, if simultaneity means compresence with a present event, is certainly

the future. It is true that the earlier and the later may both conceivably be in the past, but this does not affect the truth that as *between themselves*, the relation that holds is that of past to future. In other words, earlier, simultaneous with and later no more form a series than past, present and future in the mathematical sense of an ordered continuum of numbers. The constituent parts of a so-called temporal series are not all spatially juxtaposed, as it were, and thus available for comparison with one another. What is always so available is only duration as the specious present but this by itself can generate no idea of succession.

28. What then are we to understand by succession or temporal priorities and subsequences? In order to answer this question we must first interpret the idea of continuity. If we believe that time is nothing but the process, the peresistence in being, of an object or event, then the idea of continuity as the flow of an empty or pure time giving rise to an unbroken line with an instant as a point in it must indeed be given up. What we have in reality is not a linear continuum but a continuance of activity, of process, of change. And if such a process or activity is continuous, *i.e.*, uninterrupted, it follows that, however we distinguish the parts in it—whether as past, present and future, or earlier and later—, every part is in active, dynamic relation with every other part. Every part determines the conditions of the birth of every other part and is itself so determined by every other part. There is no part that may simply be disturbed from its proper position without thereby doing violence to the integrity of the process. It is not necessary that every part of the process that ever comes into being should be preserved intact. The loss of persistence of one part might mean the gain in persistence of another part. Continuity on this interpretation would be continuous concretion ever adding to the capital of persistence.

Succession in such a scheme of things may be said to characterise the events of the A series as well as those of the B series. Succession is always within a process and a process runs *from* a certain state *through* or *over* certain other states to certain still others. From, to, and through or over—these are the only signs by means of which we can be sure that a succession has taken place. An individual, for example, passes, in his

organic growth, from childhood through manhood to nonage. What conditions and circumstances actually describe such transitions is a matter for empirical investigation. On *a priori* or logical grounds all that we can say is that succession involves change and that change is always mediated or directed from and over and to certain states. So far as the A series is concerned, the direction is from the past through the present toward the future. But the determination of the past as past and of the future as future is only on the basis of the experienced present. The present is the confluence of states from which we can look backwards into the past and forwards into the future. Likewise in the B series, the earlier is that state from which a process passes on through certain states (which are simultaneous) to certain others which come later. While past, present and future are related among themselves and one is unintelligible apart from the other, earlier than, simultaneous with and later than, are related both among themselves as well as to other events. Only for this purpose we shall have to interpret simultaneity as compresence with an event now occurring. Here also, it will be noticed, the idea of presentness forms the junction point from which earlier and later diverge in different directions. What conception then we have to form of the presentness of an event which is basic to succession as well as to process, is a fundamental question for a philosophy of time which, however, it is unnecessary to discuss in this connection. What requires emphasis here is that succession, or sequence, is unintelligible apart from the idea of *change*. Change is the heart of succession. Without change, a mere series of numbers on the clock or on the calendar or of foot-prints on the sands will not by itself tell us that a process—and consequently a succession—has taken or is taking place. The order of the series is only an indication of the occurrence of a changeful process which generates the order. But the change must have a significance for an interpreting mind—or a history-possessing mind, so to say—in order that the order of succession may be determined. Change *qua* change tells us nothing about the order. Mere changes in an organism will not tell us about the direction of the change—whether it is *from* caterpillar *through* chrysalis *to* butterfly or in any different direction. It is only when intelligence reads into the changes the significance

of an experience gained by observation etc., that the changes disclose a direction or an order of succession.

It is sometimes suggested that the succession of past, present and future is different from the succession of before and after within a process, that in fact the terms process and succession are properly confined to the latter alone and are inapplicable to the former. Succession of before and after within a process, it is said, establishes the system of past, present and future, or the latter is a wider order within which the former falls. This latter contention may be granted but it is difficult to agree to the former. If past, present and future cannot be said to be parts of a process, no more do earlier and later form a process. A process is an activity and activity is always present activity, *i.e.*, experienced in the present. The nature of temporality as duration is disclosed only in the experience of the concrete present. The present alone is the temporal datum. Earlier and later do not any more than past and future lie alongside of the present to be compared with it. They are, like past and future, matters of construction on the basis of the present. There might be an earlier stage of a given activity, but that earlier, because it was earlier, is already past and no longer matter for present observation. And therefore there is absolutely no difference between saying, for example, that the bud is an earlier stage of the flower and saying that the bud is a past stage of the flower. The only processes of living are the processes now occurring, and the processes that occurred then are no longer processes in the strict sense. Or if they are also to be called parts of a whole process—on the basis of construction, as said above—it is indifferent whether we refer to them as earlier or past stages. Succession then is as much applicable to the system of past, present and future as to that of earlier and later, there is as much temporal process or lack of it in the one as in the other. If it is not difficult to conceive of an earlier and a later stage in the running of a dog when it follows a rabbit, neither is there any difficulty in thinking of a past and a present in his running. The whole difficulty in conceding a sequence to past, present and future consists in thinking of the past as over and done with instead of regarding it as veritably and vitally living in the present. Continuity in the sense of continuance of activity is as much illustrated in

the case of past, present and future as in that of earlier and later. The past is dynamically related to the present as the present is to the future and each to some extent determines the development of the others.¹ Whitehead then is not wrong in employing the term supersession for succession of before and after in process as well as for the system of past, present and future. The pattern on which the system of past, present and future is built is similar to the pattern on which the sequence of earlier and later is erected though the former may be laid on a larger canvas than the latter. Succession is the soul of both systems. Without succession, earlier and later are as meaningless as past and future. It is true that the present may be enjoyed as pure duration without analysing out its temporal structure. But no sooner do we attempt to analyse it than an order of succession breaks out within it. If time is just the process of things, then successiveness is the method of time—the method which Nature adopts in working out her processes.

29. We have so far given a general answer to the question of temporal priorities and subsequences. It is time, however, to consider the objections that were brought against the idea of sequence and such consideration would define more precisely the notions of earlier and later. The whole argument, it might be said, has so far rested upon the idea of time as continuous. Whether time be interpreted as an A or B series, the notion of continuity is implicitly assumed throughout, and that is what lends colour to the inherentness of successiveness in time. But what if time be not continuous but only epochal or atomic? This objection has already been stated at length and we need consider here only the possible answer to it.

The objection rests on the supposition that the new view of time is thoroughly incompatible with continuity in every sense. As a matter of fact, however, the theory that time is just the process of things and that this process is dynamic throughout establishes a new kind of continuity which may be called organic continuity. If the parts of a process determine each other in definite ways as regards the conditions of their birth and persistence, if they actively influence one another in such a manner that there are no unaccountable origins and uninher-

The exact system of determination that holds them together will be explained below.

ed endings, then the whole process may certainly be said to be continuous in a far richer sense than mere spatial juxtaposition or serial continuity bears. If time is the process of things, then as the process is continuous, *i.e.*, uninterrupted and unbroken (as above described), time is also continuous. And if it is continuous, then it properly admits of succession, so that we can legitimately speak of a later part of the process succeeding the earlier etc..

But, it may be argued, the epochal theory of time will not admit of such interpretation of what takes place *within* a process. Whitehead, (who has already been quoted in this connection), for instance, maintains that although time is succession of epochal durations, and the divisibility and extensiveness are within the given duration, the parts into which a duration is divisible are not mutually successive but mutually simultaneous. The epochal duration, for Whitehead, is realised, not *via* its successive divisible parts, but as given *with* its parts. This, as already indicated, means probably that the parts of an epochal duration all occur simultaneously.

It is hard to understand this position. For the duration is "not merely an instantaneous moment" but "one involving a definite lapse of time." How can there be a definite *lapse* of time in a step every part of which is simultaneous with every other part? In what sense can such a step be called a step of *duration*? If "time is the succession of elements in themselves divisible," every part into which the elements are thus divisible must itself be either a time or nothing. If it is not a time, then it is not clear how the compresence of the timeless can give rise to time. If it is a time, then it too must consist of parts occurring in succession, and so on *ad infinitum*. How are the antinomies of the completed infinite and the infinite past time overcome in this case? How can we ever get a genuinely first step of finite duration in which nothing is earlier or later?

Better light appears to be thrown upon the question by Whitehead in another connection.¹ The succession of before and after in a process is what Whitehead calls "potential supersession internal to each actual occasion." Such supersession does indeed involve time-quanta which may not all be equal.

1. "Time": *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* (1926).

Writes Whitehead, "But we could not even discuss the relative sizes of time-quanta unless these quanta were also divisible and were also comparable in respect to their parts thus elicited..... *Thus there is also a continuity in time, arising from infinite divisibility.....* But if we abstract from the realised self-enjoyment which is the individual residuum of each epochal occasion, that occasion, considered with the abstractions of physics, *might have been sub-divided into epochal occasions which together complete that one occasion... Thus there is no continuity of becoming but a becoming of continuity.*"²

It is clear from such a passage as this that Whitehead is not completely opposed to the idea of temporal continuity even within an epoch. The internal supersession is just the growth, development, the process of maturation, of an occasion from stage to stage. In such a process, there is no knowing where a particular stage ends and is superseded by another, *i.e.*, when an occasion leads to the future and in so doing turns its present into a past. The whole process is continuous, and, as Whitehead puts it, there is a becoming of continuity, although not a continuity of becoming, for according to Whitehead no concrete entity can change, but can only be superseded, for supersession is a part of its real essence. This is of course a separate issue which does not call for discussion in this connection. If therefore it is admitted that the possibility of continuity is not ruled out *within* an occasion, it is difficult to see how succession can be ruled out from its parts.

Equally legitimately does sequence hold between *different* occasions, for as between different occasions also, there is bound to be continuity of a profound sort. In the first place, Whitehead accepts extensiveness and continuity as characters of physical time, though he interprets them in his own peculiar manner. Extensiveness denotes the fact that no matter what two events may be taken, a third can be found which extends over both. It appears also in partial overlapping. Continuity is the reverse of extension. It is the quality of events in virtue of which we can always find an event included in any given event. It is true that according to Whitehead both extensiveness and continuity are matters of potentiality rather than of actuality—they belong to the realm of abstractions rather than

2. *Ibid*, p. 64 (italics mine)

to that of concrete events. But abstraction is involved in all physical measurement, and so we may believe that taken together these two characters establish continuity in an organic sense and thus make possible the notion of succession. In the second place the very fact that epochs are involved in creative advance in the organic world makes for an organic continuity. Owing to the multiplicity of organisms and their interrelations there takes place a pervasive overlapping of definite epochs of achievement. Further as the same organism may have more than one type of epoch, overlapping again comes about. This postulate of a complicated overlapping of epochs involves a concrete continuity which proves that creative advance proceeds in an ordered ceaseless succession.

To resume the thread of our original argument, successive-ness is inherent in the very notion of time, however conceived, for the basis of this notion is change and change is inexpugnable from a real view of the universe. It may be that the concept is really meaningless except for a mind; if so that would only show one more reason why physical time cannot be treated as being radically different from mental time. However, if change be applicable at all to objective nature in its own right, then with it the conception of temporal subsequence and priority is implicitly admitted.

30. The discussion of continuity and succession brings us to consider the question of irreversibility. Repetition in the present of a fact that occurred in the past is said to be, not mere repetition, but actual resuscitation of the past, a literal going back, in fact, to the past. And this is made to appear plausible by the further suggestion that in the inorganic world every fact, as soon as it becomes present and real, lapses into non-being and can thus establish no relation between itself and its immediate successor. Its successor is therefore said to be the dead fact itself veritably called back to life. This resurrection, it is alleged, is going on daily, nay, even hourly, in the cyclical processes of the natural world. Is this possible? I believe there is a confusion here between similarity and uniformity on the one hand, and identity on the other. Take the case of a clock which ordinarily would be considered to repeat its cycle of twelve hours in an identical manner. It is, to start with, wound up on a particular date and every cycle of

twelve hours that it completes exhausts the wind by a certain calculable quantity, so that no one cycle can be said to be identical in all respects with any of the previous cycles: it is a cycle which runs with so much less energy than its predecessors. Take any cyclical process in the inorganic world into consideration, you will find the same story: every cycle is similar indeed to its predecessors but not identical with them. A given quantity of water is heated in a retort vessel, converted into vapour and back again into water. The water that is obtained by the condensation of vapour is *not* identical with the fresh water used in the beginning, if only because it has been heated up once, and the next cycle of heating and condensation is not identical with the first if only on account of the fresh quantity of fuel used in the heating, or the vessel that had already been subjected to a first process of heating. In however mechanical a fashion the cycle may be conceived to run, there will always be some fact or facts, either in the internal constitution of the cycle itself, or in its relations to its surroundings, which do make a difference to the go of the events within the cycle. There are repetitions indeed, but the repetitions are not resuscitations. It is wrong to assume that a past fact has lapsed into non-being. The past certainly does not disappear *in toto*, it leaves its permanent trace or mark upon the present, it lives in the present in a vital sense. But just because of this, the present is enriched or modified by the past, and can never be identical with that past. The living past is different from the dead past. Time *is* irreversible. It does roll up bigger and bigger like a snowball. This is as much true of mental as of physical time. No doubt, we can re-live the past in contemplation and make the past living and present again. But the re-living *is* necessarily modified by what has come between. It must be a strange imagination indeed which can re-enjoy in memory in an *identical* manner the past life of opulence and luxury when squalour and misery have been one's lot for some years. If we could do so, we need not complain of our present poverty. In short, even in the case of a small slice of durational experience, the latter portion of the total duration, even when it is exactly like the earlier in other respects, must, if there be memory, differ from it by remembering the earlier state, and thus cannot be identical with it.

Repetition is not resuscitation or reversal, of the original process repeated. The distinction usually lost sight of in connection with this question is that between repeating a process a second, third or n th time, and making the first process itself re-occur in an exactly identical manner or making any process reverse itself. Repetition is possible, for this only means that another event *like* the first could take place. And it *could* take place for there is nothing in the first event to prevent a like event happening any number of times. But when once a process has occurred, this itself and *per se*, cannot occur again or be reversed. When old age has arrived, youth may come again (as in reported cases of rejuvenation), but this is neither the reversal of old age—the individual does not re-traverse the course of his past life point by point—nor the recapturing of the first youth as such. Granting that he could do so, the very fact that he is *re-traversing* or *re-capturing* or *re-turning* is sufficient to show that it is a different event which, if, as we must suppose, memory is present, makes a world of difference between itself and the former event. Thus on any interpretation, time is irreversible. If any event *a* occurs *before* another event *b*, it is never in that sequential relation *after b*. But this does not prevent any number of similar events from occurring after *b*.

No theory then if it is earnest about saving time, can get rid of the distinctions of before and after. These distinctions are genuinely given in our experience of time just as the distinctions of inside and outside are genuinely given in our experience of space. The attempted reduction of them to non-temporal terms is really not successful. Two events are said to be simultaneous if both exist. We cannot, however, say that the continent of Asia and the Republic of France have been simultaneous simply because both *now* exist. A is said to be before B when, B existing, A does not exist, but has only left some influence of itself upon B. The continent of Asia has not ceased to exist; is it not therefore permissible to say that Asia has been *before* the French Republic? Should the parents necessarily die before they can in any intelligible sense be said to have existed *before* their children? Do not the children exist only *after* the parents although the latter may continue in existence with the children? If such absurdities are to be avoided and

the meaning in each case helped out to completion, that can only be done by re-introducing, however surreptitiously, into the definitions the temporal relations which they were intended to define in non-temporal terms.

31. The temporal relations of *earlier* and *later* or *before* and *after* are indispensable for any philosophy of change. It is, however, necessary to add that there may be some difference in the way in which these distinctions are applied to physical and mental time respectively. In the inorganic realm, scientists tell us, the changes that occur are mostly in the direction of simplicity and stability, and therefore of greater probability. There is a gradual increase of entropy involving gradual dissolution of matter into energy and its radiation into space. In the organic kingdom, on the other hand, the evolution of forms has proceeded through the attainment of greater and greater complexity, structural as well as functional. However life may have originated, its first occurrence—if there ever was such a "first"—was, we may feel sure, itself an event of great improbability, and the further differentiation of complex and, in consequence, novel, forms must also have been increasingly improbable. For according to the second law of thermodynamics, the natural, and therefore the probable, state of a body is that in which its entropy—the measure of the unavailability of its thermal energy for mechanical work—has increased to its maximal value when it can increase no further. Any state of the body, therefore, in which its entropy is on the decrease—and all states in which the body attains complexity, richness and novelty are such states—is less stable and therefore less probable.

If these scientific conceptions are admitted as valid, it should also be admitted that they provide a scientific standard for the measurement of the temporal distinctions under discussion and a definite meaning of irreversibility. Of two events, *a* and *b*, *b* is said to be later than *a* if the entropy of the system represented by *b* be greater than that of the system represented by *a*. Time, that is, flows in the direction of increasing entropy or increasing probability and in this sense its direction is irreversible. Where entropy has reached its maximal value in a given system, large or small, no one event in that system can be said to be earlier or later than any other event and in *such* a system, considered by itself, I admit we may with some justice

speak of a resuscitation of the past and the reversibility of time, though even here relation to other systems would render a literal resuscitation or reversal impossible. But where entropy has not been complete, dissipation of energy shows the sense or direction of the flow of time, and the greater dissipation observed in any one phase of a system indicates that it is "later" than another phase wherein dissipation was less.

Consider now different phases in two different systems, such as the organic and inorganic. Of three phases, say, *a*, *b* and *c*, of a given inorganic system, the entropy of *b* is greater than that of *a*, and the entropy of *c* greater than that of *b*, and since time flows in the direction of increasing probability, *b* is later than *a*, *c* later than *b*, and so on. Of three phases, *a*, *b* and *c* of a given organic system, however, the reverse appears to hold good. For here every succeeding phase is one of greater complexity, richness and novelty, both in morphology and function, and so, of decreasing entropy or probability. It is true that in every individual case, the final processes of somatic death increase the entropy of the system and thus establish conditions of the greatest physical probability. But considering life as a whole in the species or the race, it must be said that its evolution into different phases exhibits decreasing entropy or probability. And since time flows in the direction of increasing entropy or probability, it follows that in some manner, *c* is "earlier" than *b*, *b* "earlier" than *a* and so on. If, for instance, we should consider the series of fish, serpent, animal and man as representing four broad phases in the evolution of life-forms, we should be compelled to believe that in some sense man is "earlier" than animal, animal "earlier" than serpent, and so on. How can we justify this curious, but incontrovertible, result?

32. The only way, it seems to me, of making this result intelligible is to interpret organic evolution in teleological terms. Conscious experience, it need hardly be said, is always guided by purpose or an end in view. It is the presence of purpose which gives significance to conscious experience. But, what is more important, it is the presence of purpose which gives unity to conscious life. The past, it was said, does not disappear *in toto* but lives in the present. But not all the past does so live in the present. The past that survives in the conscious present is the past whose soul yet awaits

fulfilment, whose soul perhaps is yet unborn. It is past only as event or phenomenon, it is not past as spirit or informing presence. Where the past has no such purpose left to fulfil, it disappears into total oblivion whatever influence it may continue to exert upon one's inner life in an indirect Freudian fashion. The past then, as living in the conscious present, is virtually governed by purpose, and is united to the present only as so governed by purpose. And it is beyond doubt that the present is veritably governed by ends in view to be realised in future.

If all this is true, we may attempt to understand the exact system of determination which obtains among past, present and future in the inorganic as well as in the organic kingdoms. It was remarked on a previous occasion that each to some extent determines the others. Now in the light of the preceding discussion of entropy, it may be said with justice that while in the inorganic kingdom the past determines the present and the present the future, completely, in the organic kingdom the present determines the past, and the future the present, more significantly than the determination of the present by the past or of the future by the present. That is, the past "depends" on the present, and the present "depends" on the future. The past depends on the present, for it is only in the present that the soul of the past is to be fulfilled, and the present depends on the future for it is only in the future that the reality of the present is to be made still more actual. Such dependence of the past on the present and of the present on the future does not, however, completely negate the dependence, in the ordinary sense, of the present on the past and of the future on the present. The dependence, in short, is to some extent mutual.

What, however, is implied in saying that purposes are the dominating and unifying factors in conscious life? Purposes are forward-looking, they have their eyes turned towards the future. A purpose that is realised in the present is no longer a purpose, it is an achievement. Purposes are not yet; and yet this not-yet, this future, the system of purposes, controls and directs the activities of the conscious present. This is what has been characterised in these pages as teleological causation.

If the future, then, can act upon and mould the present, the future is in some sense real, *i.e.*, already present. And so

we have reached the apparently paradoxical conclusion that what is not yet or future is in some sense already present. If the future is already real,¹ we seem to catch some glimpse of explanation of the strange possibility we were confronted with a while ago, viz., that what in point of scientific *description* comes *later*, is still in point of scientific *interpretation* to be considered *earlier*. I have tried to show that this paradox before which scientific interpretation stands speechless is to be resolved by resorting to the standpoint of *dramatic explanation*. We have only to believe that conscious experience is a privileged case in which we are directly aware of the essential characteristics of reality in general, and then the purposive explanation of individual existence, according to which the future and the past are telescoped into one, viz., the conscious present, and the future pre-lives in the present just as the past survives in it, can be extended to the universe at large and we can see how it happens that the later is still the earlier. It is earlier as having been envisaged or *involved* in the purposeful experience of some Mind other than of course the finite minds of finite experients. Having been envisaged in that experience as soul or meaning yet to be, it is gradually being realised, i.e., actualised, in successive stages, which to us appear present now and past a moment hence. Both past and present and future, however, are spiritually one as being big with the soul that is yet unborn—the past and the present represent only different degrees of its self-realisation. Into the cosmic and metaphysical problem here suggested, it is not possible to enter now. It is mentioned here just to show in what direction the final solution of the present problem is to be sought. It forcibly illustrates the ancient truth that the evolution of forms—of the lower into the higher, of the fish into the raptile, of the reptile into the animal, of the animal into man etc.,—was preceded by an *involution* of the higher in the lower—of spirit in mind, of mind in matter etc., that, in short, evolution is only a process of *realising* or *actualising* in a given medium or matter the essences or essential forms already *involved* in that medium or matter. This prior involution of forms does not, however,

1. Of course, the reality of the future is not on a par with the reality of the past, or with future space being actually real. "There" for A may be "here" for B, but "then" for A cannot be "now" for B.

millitate against the essential newness of forms as these are actualised in the process of *evolution*.¹ Nicolai Hartmann tells us that the peculiar characteristic of the finalistic nexus is that, unlike the causal nexus, the earlier in it is completely determined by the later, the dependence flows counter to the flow of time, and the final end determines all the earlier stages. To much the same effect speaks Hegel in the following passage: "The organic is, in its formal aspect, and by its very nature, something which exists in accordance with the end . . . It is an end which returns back into itself; and even regarded as something dependent on what is outside of it, it has the character of an end, and consequently represents what is truly first in comparison with what has been termed the immediate, in comparison, that is, with Nature Man (i.e., the intelligence which is in man) is not an accident added on to what is first; but, on the contrary, the organic is itself what is first."²

33. From the standpoint of values, the question of temporal priority and subsequence has a peculiar significance. It is not merely that purposes, which play an important part in life, can be realised only in the future—a future which already in some sense contains the present, as the present contains the past. Far more important than this is the fact that the later, or the future experience (I am not now referring to the inverted time order above discussed) is the most significant. It is not what we have achieved, but what we want to achieve, it is not what we are, but what we hope to be or aspire to be, that unfolds the stature of our being, determines the measure of our reality. From this point of view, self-unfulfilment is more significant than self-realisation, an incomplete self more richly real than a completed self. This same truth may be otherwise expressed by saying that the past is only a part of the present, and the present but a part of the future.

The upshot, then, of this rather long discussion of time is that emergence does involve temporal sequence with regard to the members of the hierarchy of emergents. After our discussion of the inverted time order in the evolution of the organic forms,

1. See pp. 176-179, *ante*, for an explanation of this possibility.

2. *Lectures on the Proofs of God's Existence*: Eng. Tr. by Messrs. Spiers and Sanderson, p. 341.

it may seem as if we are compelled to introduce the same conception of time order in the emergence of values. In a sense, of course, this is both true and necessary, for I have all along held that in axiology the lower depends upon the higher and not *vice versa*. That is, dependence flows counter to the flow of time, in the direction of decreasing entropy. In any case the distinctions of earlier and later do still remain, for otherwise no precise sense could be attached to the term "novelty" which is one of the characteristic features of the emergent process.

34. (5) One last general question remains about emergence. It has already been observed that the contemporary doctrine of emergence makes no attempt to determine the modes of relatedness into which the elements of a given stage enter before an entity emerges at a higher stage. We are only told that there are "higher modes of relatedness" at each higher stage, but what are these modes, higher or lower, and in what they differ from one another at different stages, we are not told. The present theory of value aims at filling this gap so far at least as the emergence of value is concerned. Another question which it seems to me requires some discussion at the hands of evolutionists — particularly emergentists — and which may be said to arise out of the previous one, is the question of the disintegration of emergents. Emergentists talk of modes of relatedness, nuances of situation etc., and of course these are peculiarly adapted for the emergence of novelty. But what about cases where the elements which had once integrated themselves in a novel manner unrelate themselves and fall apart? Have they any integral part to play in the onward march of evolution? Or are they merely waste-products of Nature's great factory of evolution, unadaptable and therefore unstable elements which are best left behind as evidences of Nature's groping method of progress? Had such cases of disintegration been few and far between, one might rest content with such a conclusion. Unfortunately, however, disintegration of complex appears to be as common a phenomenon as integration of simple entities. For this reason the question cannot be brushed aside lightly.

There are those who believe that this very fact of disintegration is decisive proof against ascribing an evolutionary

character to inorganic processes. McDougall, for instance, anxious to draw a clear line of cleavage between the organic and the inorganic, quotes passages from Sir James Jeans's writings describing the, as he believes, probable fate of the whole material universe as utter annihilation. The doctrine that all matter is bound ultimately to disappear by dissipation in the form of radiation and that all sidereal masses are now suffering such dissipation, is fairly common among astronomical physicists. This is the doctrine of entropy (discussed above) as applied to the sun-earth-moon system. And McDougall asks; "Can we fairly call a process that consists in continual approximation to annihilation one of evolution? Can we properly call a continuing process of annihilation one of evolution? I cannot see the propriety of such usage of the word."¹ And even in regard to the disintegration of radio-active substances such as uranium, thorium and radium which are gradually reduced by well-marked steps to less complex and more stable elements, he questions the appropriateness of describing the process as one of evolution.

Disintegration of complex entities may result either in the consolidation of matter into one lump at zero temperature, or in the further process of dissipation of matter by radiation into infinite space, according to the laws of entropy. In either case McDougall is unwilling to believe that a process of evolution occurs. Or it may so happen that dissolution of matter into energy may be followed by the reverse process of conversion of radiation into matter, the elements of a complex whole obtained by a process of disintegration of that whole may re-integrate to form a fresh complex. Such a process of dissolution and rebuilding, of integration and disintegration, may go on alternating in a rhythm, and it has even less title to be called evolution.² We may at best call them changes merely.

In regard to this whole question, it may be remarked that it is purely a matter of convenience whether or not we bestow the name of evolution on processes such as those described above. At the most we can say that the bestowal of the name upon a process of change is relative to the immediate product of that process. If as the result of a series of gradual changes in any

1. *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*: pp 226; 129-133.

2. *Modern Materialism* etc., pp. 226, 228-229.

department of nature, certain fairly definite and stable forms arise, forms which differ in their properties from those belonging to the generative system, we call it a process of evolution. If, on the contrary, these changes result in the destruction of the existing form without immediately giving rise to any fresh form, we call it a process of dissolution. The question always to be asked in this connection is: Is there going to be a relation or an unrelation of elements in a given case? If relation, it is a process of evolution; if merely unrelation without immediately giving rise to a fresh relation, it is dissolution. But even these processes are, as I said, purely relative. McDougall thinks that only in the organic realm is there evolution in the proper sense of the word, because the processes of change in any given species or individual result in greater complexity together with stability and efficiency. Yes, but what about the processes of disorganisation of the individual organism in declining years accompanied by gradual disappearance of efficiency and the final processes of somatic death? Are they not also part of the same process which commenced with the development of the embryo as soon as the ovum was fecundated? If so, with what philosophic or scientific justification shall we designate part of the process *evolution*, and part, *dissolution*? The truth is that these terms, and the processes denoted by them, are purely relative to each other. If an alternating system of construction, destruction, re-construction etc., cannot be called evolution, there is no true evolution of organic forms at all, for one of the most obvious features of organic existence is this same cycle of construction, destruction, etc., exhibited in cell-life. Further the same types of situation occur again and again, during the course of that existence such as secretion, nerve-conduction, circulation, digestion etc., thus completing the cyclical character of life.

Recognising, then, that disintegration as such does not take away the right of a process to be called evolution, our immediate concern is to determine the place of such disintegration in the scheme of emergent evolution. Does this process ever give rise to fresh emergents? Otherwise, in what sense shall we say that the process has been one of pure annihilation or destruction?

35. The question, be it noted, concerns the annihilation of the emergent product owing to the disintegration of the

complex generating it. I do not know if this occurs anywhere else than in the mental realm. To make my meaning clear, I shall point out one fundamental distinction between emergence in the physical and emergence in the mental realm.¹ The elements that enter into a physical whole exist separately as such before their synthesis, and their very synthesis *is* the emergent product. The synthesis of H₂ and O *is* the emergent, water. And the resolution of water yields back the two original elements. No doubt water exhibits certain new qualities or "properties", such as being a solvent, quenching thirst etc., which could not exist but for the synthesis, but no more could water exist without them, they are part of the product of the synthesis itself. But in the perception of beauty, for example, and the deriving of aesthetic pleasure therefrom, the relatedness of the contemplating mind and the contemplated object—their synthesis—is *not* the emergent product. It is conceivable that mind and object may be related without the perception of beauty or the enjoyment of pleasure necessarily emerging therefrom. For unless those elusive factors, desire and purpose, intervene and mediate between mind and object, the natural modes of relatedness, however novel and complex they be, are not by themselves efficacious enough to generate the perception of beauty or pleasure. Beauty or pleasure is further emergent *upon* the synthesis brought about by natural and teleological causation—the synthesis is distanced from the emergent by an appreciable period of incubation or maturation. The spirit must brood over the waters of moral life before forms of value could be created. It is for this reason that the synthesis of sense qualities—as in a clang or chord—does not afford as good an instance of mental emergence as the purposive *rapprochement* of mind and object.

When this uniqueness of mental emergence is appreciated, it will be seen that the emergent in such cases is dependent upon the moral synthesis in a sense in which the physical emergent cannot be said to depend on the physical synthesis.

1. F. H. Osborn thinks that biological evolution itself differs from physical in that the former presents us with not only new forms and characteristics but with new *powers* and *forces* not to be met with in the latter. *Vide*, Foreword to *Creation by Evolution*, p. X.

Because the synthesis in the latter case is itself the emergent product, the emergent continues its existence practically indefinitely in all normal cases unaffected any more by the conditions of synthesis. When once sodium chloride or carbon bisulphide has emerged, it continues its existence indefinitely without further changes. The case is slightly different with emergents like life and mind. For these are liable to be affected now and then by changes in the physico-chemical and vital processes respectively whose relatedness in particular ways was responsible for their genesis. But the case is absolutely different with moral emergents. Beauty and aesthetic satisfaction appear only so long as that particular mode of contemplation which alone can engender them lasts; the moment contemplation ceases, the emergents also disappear. For the mediating factors like desire and purpose which are largely subjective cease to operate in such a case, and naturally the perception of beauty etc. (which on the present theory is equivalent to its creation) also ceases.

36. This is the normal result of the disintegration of a mental or moral complex. But, as has already been pointed out in a previous connection, the emergent is not annihilated in its essence in such a case. It continues its existence as a *transistent* grounded in the motor-affective continuum of the individual's psychic life, appreciatively prehended or envisaged by him, and remaining a pure potential for the specific determination of matters of thought or action. There are, however, cases in which the disintegration of a moral complex effectively and totally annihilates the emergent root and branch, in short, reduces it to pure nothingness. This happens when, owing to conditions which can easily be imagined, a positive value turns to its opposite or disvalue, or is allowed to lapse into non-being owing to sheer indifference or apathy of the valuing agent. The love of A for B, for instance, is a positive value to start with generated by that particular and delicate *nuance* of mental attitude of A towards B (which all lovers are familiar with), influenced, let us say, by modes of mental reference to the environment including such things as the youthfulness and beauty of B, community of interests and tastes etc.. Suppose that, after some time, owing to radical changes in the character or circumstances (or both) of either party, A finds the original

ardour of his love for B gradually cooling down till it reaches the freezing point of absolute coldness—so much so that nothing in the world can possibly rekindle the dead divine spark in A's breast; and his whole affective-volitional apperceptive mass, so far as B is concerned, is totally devoid of all potentiality for pleasant colouration. In such a case, not only has the moral complex generated of A and B been disintegrated, but the emergent product of the synthesis, *viz.*, love, originally binding A and B together, has been utterly destroyed. Nothing of it remains in any shape or form. It does not exist even as a transistent because it finds no grounding in the conative-affective continuum of A, and what finds no metaphysical justification for existence certainly does not exist in any sense. This is a case of absolute destruction in the mental realm to which, nothing, so far as I know, corresponds in the physical realm. Even the so-called annihilation of matter through dissipation into energy still leaves, as the problem is at present envisaged by scientists, radiation travelling endlessly through space. The same fate of absolute annihilation again overtakes love when it is turned into hate, for instance, and for the same reason. Though in common parlance we speak of love turning to hate, reflection will show that the psychological and objective conditions determining the genesis of hate are entirely different from those determining the birth of love, so that hate cannot be said to be born out of the embers of love. Hate may in itself be considered a thing of value in certain cases, but that does not alter the fact that a previous and different value has been now negated out of existence in any form.

It is this fact which, as I see it, constitutes one of the distinguishing features of the theory of emergence adumbrated in these pages, and differentiates it from the theory usually to be found in realistic philosophies.¹

37. On the other hand, in rare cases of disintegration, the process can and may yield fresh emergents, alongside of the destruction of the old. The disintegration of the atoms of radium and of other radio-active substances, for example, results in

1. Lloyd Morgan no doubt speaks of "the dissolution of fellowship" and believes that "disintegration or devolution, no less than integration with emergent evolution, has to be reckoned with in the history of natural systems" (*Emergent Evolution*, p. 13), but he does not seem to see the further implications of this possibility.

the production of fresh elements like lead and helium which are characterised by less complexity and greater stability. Does anything correspond to such a process among mental and moral phenomena? It has sometimes struck me that the increased capacity for original thinking which shows itself in a person as he loses the power of oral eloquence—which is often nothing but a "miserable fluency of words"—may be an instance of this character in the intellectual field. A man of religion may begin his philosophical studies with implicit faith in the dogmas of his religion but the liberalised attitude of mind, the love of free-thinking and of fearless self-expression, which he would gain from his studies, may be accompanied or preceded by a corresponding loss of conviction in the truth of the dogmas. But by far the most patent instances of the emergence of fresh entities upon the destruction of the old are afforded by examples of moral phenomena. The case is on record of how Rousseau began by looking upon Madame—as his mother and venerating her as such, and ended by making a mistress of her. While reflecting upon this change in later years, Rousseau expresses surprise at the fact that while the old feeling of reverence, of filial devotion etc., continued to haunt his mind, though with lessened intensity, even after the first or second liaison, they disappeared completely as the new passion came to dominate his soul. The phenomena of moral or religious conversion also belong to this class. The zeal which a new convert displays for the religion of his adoption is proportionate to the loss of his love for the religion of his birth. The exalted passion for non-injury and peace to all creatures which the emperor Ashoka felt consuming his soul after the war upon the Kalingas, could arise in his breast only after the lust for power and glory had been dissipated in entirety by the sight of the blood shed in that war.

It is unnecessary to multiply examples. It may be remarked in passing that such emergence, when consciously brought about, constitutes one of the foundation-stones for the reconstruction of character and conduct. The reason why I describe the emergents in such cases as emerging *upon* the embers of the old entities is that the old and the new happen to have much in common regarding their essence and characteristics.

Such, it seems to me, is the significance of disintegration in the scheme of emergent evolution. Disintegration, however, is only one process by means of which emergents are sometimes born; the emergence of values in general depends more upon positive and constructive processes—both subjective and objective—and to the task of their determination and description we must now address ourselves in the following chapters.

PART II

THE KINGDOM OF VALUES

CHAPTER VII

THE EMERGENCE OF VALUE—SPECIFIC TYPES OF EMERGENCE :

(1) Organic, (2) Hedonic and (3) Recreative Values.

1. Having, in the previous chapter, discussed some general questions arising out of the theory of emergence in its special application to the problem of value, it now remains to answer the first question raised at the beginning of Chapter VI, to show, that is, how exactly value emerges at the various levels of the affective-volitional experience of the individual and the race. Two possible misunderstandings of the task here undertaken need to be guarded against at its very commencement.

In the first place, although I have insisted at elaborate length that the very conception of the emergence of novelty presupposes distinctions of temporal sequence and priority, I am far from implying that the emergence of values has followed any definite chronological or historical order that could be traced either by the historian of morals or the student of sociology. It is no doubt certain that all the values that exist in present-day society could not have existed from everlasting—there must have been additions to, and subtractions from, the list during the course of historical experience. The value of feminine suffrage, for instance, or of education for all classes of society, is one which everybody would feel sure did not exist in ancient societies either of the east or of the west. It has emerged only during the course of recent centuries. But this broad generalisation granted, it is futile to try to discover and establish any definite relations of before and after amongst the major values of mankind. That is not my undertaking in the present part. We can only discuss the logical, the psychological, and if you like, the natural conditions and processes of the genesis of the different values, and their interrelations; we cannot presume to decide which came first and which last.

2. In the second place, the inquiry into the emergence of value should not be construed as implying all the dogmas for which evolutionary ethics has stood in the past. Doubtless

emergent evolution is still evolution of a specific sort; but this evolution has no necessary connection with the slogans of biological evolution like struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, natural or artificial selection, adaptation to environment etc.¹ Above all, it is not committed to the view, so damaging to the success of evolutionary ethics, that the later-evolved is therefore the higher in the scale of value. To establish a hierarchy of values and to formulate the principles by means of which the relative rank of the various values can be determined, is one of the primary aims of the emergent theory of value; but I may as well begin by saying that whatever those principles of preference or criteria of grade may turn out to be, at any rate the evolutionary magic-formula of the later-evolved is certainly not one of them.

To make a long story short, the vexed question of origins vs. value has no place in this or any other connection in this volume. It is not so much origins as logical and psychological conditions of emergence that we are concerned with here; even if perchance we should happen at some point to make use of the concept of origin, it is not in the sense of historical beginnings that it will be used. The definition of value in general, and the accounts of various types of value in particular, offered in these pages are genetic in the same sense in which the definition of water as a fluid formed by adding one part of oxygen to two parts of hydrogen is genetic; they are not genetic in the sense in which the account of the development of a present moral or social custom through its primitive beginnings in a taboo etc., is said to be genetic. Consequently the question of the significance of a particular value, say, moral value, is not at all prejudged by the account given of that value as having arisen through the complexification on the one hand of certain natural modes of relatedness of organic and individual, economic and social values, and the need for expression, on the other hand, of certain dominant desires in the individual's psychical life. However the logical and psychological conditions of the emergence of a value be explained, it always remains a distinct and different question as to what the

1. I wonder if even S. Alexander would now, after his *Space, Time and Duty* and *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, care to repeat the attempt he once made in *Moral Order and Progress* of tracing moral evolution as on all fours with biological evolution.

nature and significance of that value, and its place and function in the economy of individuo-social life, are.

3. It may further be remarked that if evolution be accepted in the emergent sense, it not only does not conflict with, but positively countenances, the moralist's claim of the independence and self-evident validity of the moral ideas and ideals. For emergent evolution insists upon the genuine reality of the new or novel emerging at different stages of relatedness, which means that the emergent at any given stage cannot be explained in terms of the entities existing at any previous stage. Even with the fullest knowledge of the elements of a given stage, it is claimed, it would not be possible to predict what the next step in evolution would be. If these contentions be granted, it follows that when morality or values in general have emerged, they constitute essentially a new phase of the existence of reality exhibiting characteristics not to be found in any previous level, and therefore unaccountable on, and inderivable from, their basis. Doubtless the previous stages are necessary as forming the background for the emergence of the new; it is a new and peculiar mode of relatedness of the elements of those stages that gives rise to the new level. In so far, therefore, they form the necessary ground or the environment of the birth of that level. But they do not constitute its sufficient cause, nor do they contain even any part of the cause. The immediate cause is the new mode of relatedness, the fresh nuance of attitude dawning upon the mind, in relation to a given situation. But the sufficient reason for the new relation or attitude is not contained in the old elements themselves. Hence even when moral ideas are shown to emerge from or supervene upon the effective relatedness of non-moral factors, such factors cannot pretend to explain or account for the nature, the status, the significance or the obligatoriness of those ideals. They are entirely new creations, having their own independent nature and function, and serving as bases for developments along the same lines. Ultimately, of course, the universe or reality as a whole must be postulated as containing all the sufficient determining conditions for the emergence of all levels.

Moreover, it will presently appear that the subjective or psycho-centric explanation of value adopted in these pages, when coupled with the doctrine of emergence, is peculiarly

fitted to explain and justify the intuitionistic theory of morality, so long believed to be in mortal jeopardy from the alleged success of a naturalistic interpretation of ethics.

It will be recalled that in the discussion of the psychology of valuation, it was pointed out that there are certain dominant interests or universes of desire in individual life to which the individual gets attached early or late in life. Valuation proceeds on the basis of such systems of desire; an object, that is, is desired and valued in so far as it is judged to promote a certain dominant interest of life, or contribute to the satisfaction and fulfilment of a certain universe of desire to which the individual is attached. And in such a process of valuation, norms or standards are employed which represent objects or goals of the highest interest in different realms of experience—in the economic, the intellectual, the aesthetic etc.. Accordingly, in describing the emergence of the different levels of value, two facts need to be constantly borne in mind: firstly, the universe of desire to which a given value corresponds; secondly, the norm or standard that can be employed in that universe and with reference to which the value of a particular object is appreciated in contemplation.

4. There is another interesting fact which needs mention in this connection. The evolution of values is basically teleological; it depends upon the dawn of new interests and systems of desire upon the developing mind of humanity. Such an evolution may therefore be regarded as marking the several steps in the evolution of mind itself. The question whether mind evolved in the first instance from original non-mental stuff is not the question at issue now; starting with the empirically observed fact of mind in action, we want to know what different levels of evolution may be observed *in* this mind. And I believe that the evolution of values supplies the key to this problem. The stages that may thus be traced constitute the logical and psychological bases in human personality for the evolution of the respective values: they are the presuppositions or conditions of the possibility of such evolution. In the terminology of the ancients, they may be called progressive "sheaths" or "envelopes" of the evolving personality. There are seven such sheaths or psychological bases or orders of psychical organisation that we can formulate: (1) the pure bodily and vital sheath. This is

of course not a step in mental evolution, but as it forms the basis for the emergence of one dominant type of value, *viz.*, the organic, the psychical factor cannot be completely absent from it; (2) the passional, animal or sensual mind, where mind is still largely under the thralldom of the body and the senses; (3) the practical or sensuous mind where mind attains greater freedom from the determination of the body; (4) the social or cohesive mind—mind in its aspect of comprehensiveness and expansiveness, the connecting link between body and pure mind where the bodily determination of mind decreases still further; (5) pure mind, essentially discursive or reflective in character, where the freedom of mind is increasing, and mind begins to control the body; (6) contemplative or intuitive mind—mind as passing into spirit where mind's control of the body is on the increase, and its freedom also expands; (7) spirit pure and simple where mind has completely passed into spirit and its control of the body reaches culmination.¹

It will thus be seen that the story of the development of mind is at the same time the story of its struggle to attain greater and greater freedom of self-expression and ability to direct the material organism to serve its own purposes. Every subsequent level of value, in the classification of values presented below, is attended with a larger amount of such freedom. How exactly such freedom becomes possible and what its significance is for the theory of value, are questions that can more conveniently be discussed along with the consideration of each particular type of value.

5. The classification of values will naturally depend upon our classification of the dominant universes of desire in man. After much reflection upon the question, I have been convinced that there are about ten or eleven such dominant universes in human life. This conclusion has been arrived at, not on any *a priori* grounds, not upon the basis of any classification of instincts or sentiments by any psychologist, but purely by the empirical method of the analysis of experience itself. The list includes the following: (1) the organic interest; (2) the desire for recreation; (3) the economic interest; (4) the hedonic or

1. It need hardly be said that these differentiations are more philosophical than psychological. It is not, however, the fault of philosophy or experience that psychology has not yet been able to trace them.

pleasure-unpleasure universe; (5) the desire for individual or personal eminence; (6) the social universe; (7) the intellectual interest; (8) the aesthetic interest; (9) the moral interest; (10) the religious or spiritual interest.

6. The list needs some words of explanation. It is unnecessary to repeat that every interest in the list represents, not a single interest or desire as such, but a *system* comprehending many and various subordinate species of desire for different objects, no doubt, but all tending, in different ways, to the realisation of the same dominant universe of desires. Thus the desire for personal eminence may include subordinate desires like the desire for honour, for fame, for wealth, for a good position in society—in short, the desire for a hundred and odd things through which the personal ambition of an individual may be realised. The social universe may manifest itself in the desire for family and children, for friendship, the desire to work for the uplift of one's society, one's country or nation, and even humanity at large. And so on. Secondly, the list may be criticised for what it includes as much as for what it excludes. Is there an organic interest? it may be asked. Yes, and it includes not merely the desire for health, strength and bodily well-being in general, but the desire for the elementary organic needs of life such as food, drink, clothing, shelter etc.. To deny that there is an innate interest for food, drink etc., as for instance Dewitt Parker has done in his *Human Values*,¹ is to deny the most primary form in which the principle of self-preservation is active. It may be difficult indeed to discern a food-outlook upon life, or food-morality, in America or Europe where poverty is only relative in the sense that a man who owns a cheap Ford is considered to be poorer than one who stretches himself in a luxurious Buick. But in India, where more people die of hunger than of disease, where in the terrible years of 1876-1877,² people are said to have lived upon roots and seeds not even fit for animal consumption and parents are said to have fought with their own children, wives with their own husbands, for a share of such food, poverty is absolute, and there *is* a food-morality not in the sense that good and nutritious food is

1. pp. 46—47.

2. The memorable famine years of Dhātu and Iswara, in South India particularly, still vivid in the memory of many men living.

preferable to bad, but in the sense that any food is better than no food. Food first and health next. The problem of food is more imperative than the problem of good.

For a similar reason the economic and the moral interests have been assigned separate places in the list. The reasons for their exclusion in Prof. Parker's list are that in the one case, all dominant systems of interest are "moral" in the large sense, and in the other, economic goods are valuable only in an attributive, *i. e.*, instrumental, sense. Since, however, this work holds that all values are in their essential nature relative and contributory and none intrinsic absolutely, this is no reason for refusing to place a value upon the economic interest. As regards moral value, it is surprising that Prof. Parker should have failed to distinguish between normativity in general and moral normativity. It is true that every system of value generates its own standard or norm which is the criterion of judgment of value in that particular sphere of life. But surely such standards,—the standard of beauty, for instance, or of knowledge, or of power, or of pleasure—are "moral" only in a figurative sense? There are here four applications of the term "moral" which must carefully be distinguished. As pointed above, all values are moral in the "large" sense that they "create standards of conduct and release imperatives" in their several fields, and this sense, I contend, is merely figurative. In the second place, all values are moral in the sense that *there is a moral point of view present in the pursuit of all values*. In this sense the moral interest is, so to say, all-encompassing and supreme,—no aspect or value of life escapes morality's searching eye. Wealth as a value should be secured—but only in legitimate, *i. e.*, moral ways. Recreation is necessary, but only to the extent that it does not interfere with the discharge of life's duties but on the other hand recuperates the organism and enables the individual to discharge those duties more adequately. And so on. In the third place, all values are moral in the sense that *there is a moral duty incumbent on the individual to realise them all as far as it in him lies*—the point of view of self-realisation or perfectionism. It is morally binding upon me, for instance, to provide for my family, to educate my children, to realise my aesthetic and scientific potentialities etc.. In addition to these three applications of the term "moral" to values in general, there is of

course the special sense of "moral" values denoting character values or the virtues (such as justice, benevolence, etc.) in particular.

Of these four senses of the much-abused term "moral,"¹ I shall contend that the second and the fourth are the legitimate or properly moral senses while the first is a figure of speech and the third a fallacy. Even so, the field of application of morality is large and distinct enough to constitute of it a distinctive interest. Because the moral point of view is applicable (in the third sense) to all values in common, it does not follow that moral value is only an otiose appendage to the other values. It is, as I have said, (barring the claims of spiritual life) the most imperious of all the values whose claims can only be denied at the cost of shattering the very foundations of the life of values.

Prof. Parker's argument that there is no special moral value because all values are in their nature "normative" and therefore moral, is only one instance of the general confusion prevalent in contemporary thought between the general science of value and the science of morals. There may certainly be a standard way of eating, of dressing, of speaking a language, of conducting a business, of greeting a friend, of worshipping God, of tying a shoe.² But if we are not to do violence to the usages of language, in what conceivable sense can we speak of the moral obligation of tying a shoe in a standard manner or of dressing in a standard manner? While there is certainly a value in conforming to the standard modes in each case, no science of ethics or morals can take upon itself the task of judging that value. The proper science that alone can concern itself with such a task is the general Science of Value or "Normatics" (as I have called it) in one of its aspects, *viz.*, social value. Neither can ethics do duty for normatics nor can normatics be treated purely from an ethical point of view.

The economic interest is taken in a wide sense so as to include the desire for efficient workmanship, invention or creation of tools etc., for the practical attitude, where it is not

1. There are, of course, other senses of the term as used in literature and ethics itself, but with them we are not concerned in the present connection.

2. *Human Values*, p. 10.

3. For a fuller discussion of this question, *vide*, Chs. I and XII

concerned with the creation of moral values, generally subserves, directly or indirectly, economic values.

The hedonic universe represents the interest in securing comfort or pleasurable feeling in general but directly. The pleasure that accompanies the fulfilment of other ends or activities—what is called resultant pleasure—is not the object of this universe. Only motive pleasure is its proper goal.

Lastly, the religious or spiritual interest, while it is doubtless the supreme interest of life, will still not be treated of in this volume. The present writer believes, rightly or wrongly, that the concern of the spirit is of an order of significance which cannot properly be classed among "values." It transcends all value conceptions and belongs to a different realm altogether—what I have called the Empire of Worth. A tentative description of the nature and significance of worth will be given in the last chapter of this volume, but the interest to which it is related, *viz.*, the life of the spirit, does not generate any value as such but is itself worth. Spirit is worth or worthiness. Hence the philosophical treatment of spiritual life—which is another name for religious life in the best sense of the term—a treatment of the same character as that accorded to the discussion of concrete values in this volume—properly belongs to the second volume of the present work. The approach to the concept of worth in the last chapter of this volume is made only by way of suggesting its contrast from the concept of value. And the religious interest to which it is related is included in the present list of dominant interests just for the sake of completeness.

There are then as many types of value as there are universes of desire. It is now our task to investigate the two-fold nature of causation involved in the emergence of specific types of value and to inquire into the essential character of such values *i. e.*, the character of that conformity to the standard in each case the perception of which gives birth to the corresponding value. The upward tendency manifest in the scheme of classification of values will justify itself in the sequel, for it is believed that the classification reflects more or less the order of importance attached to the different values in the experience of mankind. The priorities thus involved in the scheme, it need hardly be repeated, are only logical and not chronological.

7. (1) Organic Values.

These are values primarily attached to food, drink, clothing, shelter, and, in adult years, the satisfaction of the sex-impulse etc.. By a natural extension of meaning, they also come to comprehend the values of health, strength and organic well-being in general. "A sound mind in a sound body"—whether the maxim be true or false—indicates at any rate clearly the region of values under consideration.

In order that the emergence of these values be possible, there is to be presupposed in the individual a clear desire for self-preservation, self-sustenance etc.. When this desire expresses itself in particular forms, such as the desire for food, drink etc., and when particular objects are sought after in the expectation that they would satisfy such desires, the loving contemplation of such objects by the desiring mind gives rise to organic values. The qualities, the possession of which makes the objects valuable in this case, are of course the qualities of appeasing hunger, slaking thirst and nutritive properties in general. A stage arrives when the mere desire for food and drink is refined into a desire for the delicacies of the table, with the development of luxurious tastes. Even such values, however, belong to the group of organic values, for they are ultimately grounded in these.

8. Health is a value distinguished as such from the values of food, drink etc., although inseparable from them. That the values of food etc., are more primary than the value of health is proved by the fact that a starving man will devour any kind of food however unhealthy it may be provided it can appease his hunger for the time being. But granting that the solicitations of hunger are easily satisfied, the requirements of health demand nutritious food, pure drink, clean clothing and so on. But health is more than pure air, good food and drink and clean clothing. It is the state of the organism in which both body and mind are in a condition efficient enough to discharge the ordinary duties of life. Is the healthy man one who is absolutely free from disease or bodily infirmity of any kind, and who conforms to the physician's table of measurements regarding height, weight, chest expansion etc.? I am afraid 99.9 per cent of the world's population would, on this view, have to be

pronounced unhealthy. The safest criterion of health is, it seems to me, (with apologies to doctors!), the one I have laid down, *viz.*, that that state of the organism is healthy which enables its possessor to discharge his duties adequately and with the normal amount of effort, and to keep his internal mechanism free from pain or discomfort.

9. Certain views regarding the conditions of health may be examined from the standpoint of their implications for moral philosophy or value science in general. It is sometimes said that "a sound mind in a sound body" is the best embodiment of the principle of health. While this adage is true enough as far as it goes, it must be pointed out that a sound mind is not always conditioned by a sound body and a sound body does not always depend on a sound mind, while the conjunction of both often leads their fortunate possessor only to vegetate in life. A certain amount of bodily inefficiency or ill-health appears in many cases to be a condition of the highest intellectual effort and achievement while idiots and mediocres are often found to be in the best of physical health. To a certain extent at least the body does act as a prison-house of the soul and the latter feels freer as the bars are loosened. At the level of organic values the influence of the body over mind is predominating, for the primary material needs of the organism have an imperious claim over everything else.

Again health is said to result from the equilibrium of functions in the organism. No doubt a certain amount of proper adjustment among the activities of the organism is necessary to the maintenance of good health, yet if equilibrium of functions should connote that every impulse or instinctive demand of the body should be given equal chance of satisfaction as every other, this would often lead, not to health, but to the destruction, or at least the depletion, of health. In the interests of the total efficiency of the organism, it would sometimes be necessary to deny an impulse, to refuse to satisfy it, to suppress it altogether, perhaps. For it may so happen that the impulse is so overpowering in the case of a given individual that to yield to it even in the slightest measure is to lose himself completely in it to the detriment of his bodily and mental health. In such a case the only means left to maintain perfect health is the total suppression of the impulse in question. Equilibrium or harmony may

sometimes have to be secured by the suppression or eradication of an impulse rather than by the due cultivation and strengthening of it. This is the *rationalē* of the ascetic principle in morality.

10. This means further that in all normal cases health is inseparable from happiness. There can be no harmony at the vital level unless there be harmony in the organism *as a whole including mind and spirit*. If a man is constantly worrying himself about something or other in life, it is difficult for him to secure perfect harmony even at the vital level, for freedom from anxiety and weakness of spirit is one of the first conditions of bodily health. Health and unhappiness ill go together. But, of course, the ultimate harmony can only be conceived in terms of individual ideal and aspiration, individual appreciation of what constitutes happiness.

The control and direction of the bodily mechanism by mind and spirit is thus the most essential condition of health—a condition, alas, rarely fulfilled, for ordinarily the control here is of the mind by the body—and this is what Plato meant when he spoke of justice in the individual. Justice for him consisted not merely in the fact that the appetitive, spirited and rational parts of the soul were every one of them concerned with their own proper duties without encroaching upon the spheres of the others—this was merely an outward expression of the inner principle of justice,—but it lay essentially in the spirit of subordination of the lower to the higher elements, and in the agreement of the two lower elements that the highest among them, *viz.*, mind or reason, should rule over the rest of the organism. This would be the truest health, not merely of the soul, as Plato called it, but also of the body.

Vital health then can never be an end in itself. We pay so much attention to it—we are obsessed, I may say, to such an extent by it—only because we hope to secure thereby an instrument as fit as possible to serve the higher ends of mind and spirit, however we may conceive of them. The realisation of our ideals, ambitions, and aspirations—whether in the direction of individual or social perfection—requires, as a *sine qua non*, the enjoyment of health at the vital level, though even here, as I have said, the correlation between good health and the flowering of genius has its own limits. But animal health by itself

can be coveted as an end only by a civilization which is blind to all else in life. Its value lies in this—that it serves as a base-meat for the rearing of a clean temple for the spirit, but this value, foundational as it is, loses its significance, in fact, its very life, should the temple be occupied by an unclean spirit. Hence though mind and spirit depend upon a sound body in a physical sense, the body depends upon mind and spirit both in a physical and an axiological or moral sense.

11. In the light of the foregoing discussion of the significance of health, the determining conditions for the emergence of the health-value may be laid down as follows: The universe of desire of this value may be said to consist of the desire for self-preservation, the desire to maintain fitness of body and mind, the desire to possess "hundred per cent efficiency" for one's work in life. Sometimes, as when health is to be achieved at the cost of some insistent demand of natural impulse, the dominating desire is to feel oneself as the master and controller of the body, to organise the scattered elements of natural life in the unity of an over-natural, yet human, system. In all cases, overspreading and invigorating the physical and vital levels of satisfaction, there would be the desire to achieve unison of these levels with the ultimate level of life-harmony as a whole, that is, of health with happiness, of pleasure with peace.

Be it noticed that these subjective elements are spoken of as "desires"—advisedly so, because of the presumption that the individual is prepared deliberately to choose lines of conduct in accordance with these desires to improve or regain his health. In addition to these conscious desires possibly resulting in deliberate action, there may be inner modes of relatedness among the mental processes of the agent—they but help the effective functioning of conscious desire. When desire is focused upon an environment capable of promoting the agent's health, when, that is, the agent contemplates things like sports, games, mountain climbing, gymnastics, quiet resting etc., as contributing in some measure—in what measure precisely can be determined only with reference to the kind¹ of health-norm applied by him—to the realisation of his cherished goal, the

1. The norms of health differ according as we desire the health-strength of a boxer, or of a gymnast, or of an intellectual worker and so on.

value of health, in the degree determined as above, emerges.

The natural processes of relatedness among values which serve as accessory causes of the emergence of health-value may now be briefly mentioned. Integration of recreative values is the chief mode of relatedness concerned here. For it is through the indulgence in recreation, in the large sense of the term, more than through anything else, that health is secured. At the same time there is also an interaction between organic and recreative values, each deepening and strengthening the other, and each depending to a certain extent upon the other. Recreative values, moreover, act in quite another way. The dynamogenesis¹ of these values results in their substitution by the health values, and sometimes in their transformation into the latter. This is what is called the principle of the heterogeneity of ends according to which a conative tendency directed towards an object (which possesses primary condition worth) develops new ends and values not contemplated before.

The peaceful contact of hedonic with social values also creates a favourable atmosphere for the birth of health-values, for our health depends to a large extent upon pleasurable activities and the maintenance of harmonious relations with our friends, neighbours etc., while the clash of moral with hedonic values often, by an opposite process, forces the value of health to the forefront.

12. (2) Hedonic Values.

By hedonic values we are to understand primarily the values of pleasure and unpleasure or emotional satisfactions and their opposites. The doctrine of hedonism has been the battleground for opposing forces for such a long time in the history of thought that one would naturally expect to find all aspects of the problem adequately recognised both by its upholders and opponents. And in this matter one's expectations are not unfulfilled. But one is not quite so sure that the right solution has been arrived at on all the main problems connected with this doctrine.

1. The tendency according to which a response to a stimulus induces a further stimulus for the same demanding a fresh response and so on.

It may perhaps be desirable to recall to our minds one or two psychological aspects of pleasure dealt with in a previous connection. The fact of pleasure must be distinguished from the fact of desire. It may in the end turn out that all desire is for pleasure or has a pleasure aspect about it, but it is at any rate certain that the two phenomena are distinct and different. Hence Mill's statement that "to desire an object and to find it pleasant are *one and the same thing*" is essentially misleading. Pleasure, secondly, is the emotive element present in all desire; emotions are specific forms of desire, to perpetuate an agreeable or to terminate a disagreeable situation cognised consciously. The emotion in fact springs out of the desire, and it is a feeling of pain or pleasure. And when the emotion subsides it is a sign that the underlying desire, the ground and cause of the whole experience, is fulfilled and it is in turn followed by a feeling of satisfaction or pleasure.

It is thus evident that the experience of pleasure-unpleasure is not an independent or ultimate aspect of psychical life, but that it always depends on and presupposes the existence of desire. Desire, as was made clear in a previous chapter, is the root element of affective experience; emotions are intensified forms of desire with reference to a given environment or an immediate specific situation; and pleasure or pain is the *super-vening* state of the self consequent upon the prospective fulfilment or defeat of the desire. In concrete experience these several elements are not usually distinguished; and pleasure or pain may be detected both in the beginning and the duration of the emotion as well as at its termination.

Such facts force us to conclude that pleasure and pain are respectively the feelings of expansion, growth or *moreness* and contraction, decrease or *lessness*, of the self. They are measures, so to say, of the bulk of the individual personality.¹ In the one the individual feels himself superior, enlarged, exalted, free; in the other, he feels himself inferior, contracted, depressed, bound. This is as near an approach as one can possibly get for the present to an understanding of the *nature* of pleasure. Such expansion or contraction, is of course accompanied by

1. I take this suggestion from the interesting work of Bhagavan Das, *The Science of Emotions*, though the use I make of it in this as well as in a subsequent chapter (xii) is my own.

bodily signs as well,¹ and will help us to resolve some of the difficulties usually urged against hedonism.

13. It is usual to distinguish between pleasure and happiness or "well-being", between hedonism and eudaemonism. The main difference seems to be that while pleasure is usually a momentary enjoyment arising from the satisfaction of a passing desire or impulse, happiness is the permanently cheerful mood of peace and contentment, an "abiding satisfaction", arising out of a proper regulation or systematisation and realisation of desires according to the demands of our rational nature. The essential note of happiness is harmony among desires accruing from their rational regulation and satisfaction. When, however, one comes to think of this question without any prejudice or prepossession, one is forced to admit that happiness, so-called, is nothing but one of three things: (1) it is either a lively sense, a pleasant recollection, of the preponderance of actual and direct pleasures enjoyed in the past over pains suffered, or (2) of satisfactions obtained by the successful fulfilment of life's ambitions and aspirations over dissatisfactions due to failures; or finally (3) it is a neutral state of mind—neither positively pleasant nor painful—arising out of the absence of all kinds of pain during a fairly long period of life. That happiness in many cases consists in the removal of some present pain, conflict, or obstacle to one's activity, needs no proof. "Until the enemy is overcome" we say, "I cannot be happy." It is only the first two statements that call for some defence.

It must at the outset be pointed out that happiness as such does not connote any of the known or felt states of the mind or the organism. It is not organic fitness, it is not intellectual vigour, it is not emotional exaltation. Like "pleasure in general" as contrasted with *a* pleasure or *pleasures* in the plural, happiness is an abstract idea and has no contents in itself. It stands for no object in particular. To give it any meaning at all, we must think of it as "a sum of pleasures" or at least as "a sum of different kinds of satisfactions"—satisfactions felt in the possession

1. Cf. Titchener, *An Outline of Psychology*, Ch. V. "We find that pleasantness is attended (i) by increase of bodily volume due to the expansion of arteries running just beneath the skin; (ii) by deepened breathing; (iii) by heightened impulse; and (iv) by increase of muscular power. Unpleasantness is accompanied by the reverse phenomena." Vide also Stoddart, *The Mind and its Disorders*, p. 58.

of good health, good companions, a tolerable competency for life able to procure comforts and, if necessary, luxuries also, and satisfactions connected with the realisation of numerous other objects and activities in life. When therefore a person declares that he is happy, we must suppose that he has felt, and is still capable of feeling, a large number of such pleasures or satisfactions, or in the alternative, as I said before, that he has comparatively few wants whose non-realisation would give him pain, or, shortly, that he has few pains. If there is any positive content in his mind at all apart from these possibilities, it is simply that for one reason or another, he normally finds himself in a cheerful, peaceful and contented mood or frame of mind, the very thought of his life is something exhilarating. But this is again an agreeable *feeling* whose possession has become the normal habit of the man's life owing to long cultivation and practice. As such it is a pleasure.

The integration or rational systematisation of desires involved in happiness is not denied; only it is difficult to see what significant difference this makes to the hedonist's life except that he now enjoys *ordered* pleasures instead of random ones as before (as alleged), and that this order or systematisation in desires removes possible occasions of conflict, friction and consequent pain from his life. It may convince him of the necessity of cultivating "higher pleasures" like those of intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual pursuits, yet this does not militate against his philosophy of pleasure. And lastly, the abiding nature of the satisfaction does not make it less a satisfaction, or a (by itself) different kind of satisfaction from the satisfaction of the ordinary pleasure-seeker. "Satisfaction" is itself an equivocal term which, whatever else it may denote, certainly connotes a substratum of agreeable feeling which need not of course be called pleasure.

For these reasons, it is hard to believe that there is any ultimate difference between pleasure and happiness.

14. Throughout the above argument the assumption has been made that the satisfactions obtained through the realisation of concrete activities and abstract ideals and aspirations of life are also hedonistic in character. The denial of this assumption is supposed to constitute the strongest and the most conclusive argument against hedonism ever since the days of Bishop Butler

Most often, so the argument runs, the object of the desire is not the pleasure of the individual, but activity of some kind, directed towards specific objects, some external goal, abstract idea and so on. Pleasure may *result* from the realisation of such objectives, but this is purely incidental and secondary. And there may also be some pleasure in the anticipation of fulfilment, but even this does not enter into the constitution of the goal of desire though it may probably reinforce it to some extent. Shortly, hedonism, it is said, confounds either resultant or anticipatory pleasure or both with motive pleasure proper.

In a former discussion of this same question, it was pointed out that the pleasure called resultant is miscalled so, because in most cases the pleasure that results from the successful termination of activity is *known* so to result by the acting agent and thus becomes an important element of the motive or the goal. The method of opposite effects, as explained there, proves this. What is untrue to fact, therefore, is not that pleasure is always a *constituent* element of the object of desire, but that it is the *only* element in it. Activity, achievement, objective goals are often desired no doubt, but along with them all pleasure of some degree is also expected and desired. If it were not so expected and desired, let the agent come to know that the successful realisation of an object is going to end in pain and evil consequences to himself or to those near and dear to him, it would be a question whether he would ever undertake the activity concerned. The so-called resultant pleasure, that is, must really be reckoned as a motive pleasure.

15. Thus even in cases where we are obviously desiring some trans-subjective object or activity of life we are equally desiring pleasure. And of course there are cases where we are confessedly desiring pleasure and pleasure alone—so it would seem—where the goal of desire is "motive pleasure," as it is called. ("A pleasure" as contrasted with mere "pleasure," does not mean the *object* giving us pleasure, but the object *and* the pleasure it is expected to yield; mere "pleasure" is an abstract idea, pleasantness in general, which nobody can and does desire and which, as such, is unrealisable. It is only in concrete objects that pleasure can be realised. It is always some concrete feeling, a concretely agreeable state of mind, that is desired. This distinction is important and will be considered more fully later on).

This possibility is also sometimes denied. There is a view which considers that pleasure is not a natural object of desire at all. Mr. John Wild, replying to Mr. R. M. Blake's attempt at resurrecting hedonism,¹ declares that any one familiar with the Butlerian analysis of desire would not consider the desire for pleasure to be naturally possible at all since it would violate the fundamental psychological principle of human nature, *viz.*, that desire is always for action directed outwards toward specific objects. The desire for pleasure is accordingly considered by him to be "unnatural and unhuman, occurring only in a rare epicurean or neurotic mood." It is "essentially psychopathic," a "secondary inversion of desire," based on "a Humian or Titchenerian psychology of mental states."

Such a view is surprisingly sophisticated. We have admitted that man often acts for external, transcendental objects or goals in which, however, the pleasure motive is not completely absent. But surely men often desire pleasure for its own sake without reducing themselves to neurotics or psychopaths. When, after returning from the hot sun on a summer day, I seek my couch and throw open the windows of my room to admit the soft north-easter, or when, after sitting at my desk for long hours, I get into my car for a drive on the high plains in the evening, what is it that I am normally and naturally seeking but to feel the pleasures of resting or the exhilarating sensations of a whirlwind motion? And what fundamental principle of dynamic psychology am I violating in so doing? Mr. Wild observes that it is quite abnormal for people to become interested in their own psychic states. Possibly, but there appears to be a slight confusion of issues here. If "being interested in one's own psychic states" means to indulge in the introverted contemplation of a present feeling of pleasantness, we may admit that this is a sign of a diseased mind, but fortunately such a contemplation is psychologically impossible, for a present feeling, as soon as it comes to be contemplated upon, has already fled and only its impression or memory survives. If on the other hand it means trying to act in such a manner as will bring about a continuum of agreeable feeling with which as a whole consciousness is co-extensive (without concentrating upon

1. "The Resurrection of Hedonism," *I.J.E.* Vol. XXXVIII, 1., a reply to Mr. Blake's "Why not Hedonism? A Protest," *ibid.*, Vol. XXXVII, 1-18.

any or every particular portion of it),¹ this is precisely what we do in the cases cited above and innumerable like cases, and there is nothing abnormal or unhealthy about it. Man is certainly a centre of energy directed toward particular ends, but need the ends always be external to mind or the organism? When I prefer warm or tepid water to cold water for bathing, is the object of my desire—*viz.*, to feel pleasantly warm about my body—something external or transcendental to myself?

16. And, after all, coming closer to the question, what is the basis in philosophy or psychology for this facile distinction between the internal and the external? Is not every activity or experience or object, in so far as the object relates itself to one's activity or experience, both internal and external? How is feeling peculiarly internal and subjective and what makes thought uniquely external and transcendental? Is there such an impassable gulf between thought and sensation? Has not this dualism been outgrown in metaphysics since the days of the Hegelian criticism of the *Critique of Pure Reason*? Why should it still hold sway in psychology and ethics? Does not sense-perception involve the perception of relations, analysis and synthesis, discrimination, comparison etc.? Is not thought merely the explication, the elaboration, the imaginative reconstruction, of such intellectual elements implicit in sensation? If these contentions be granted, then we may once for all bid farewell to both Humian or Titchenerian psychology of *merely private* mental states as well as to Butlerian or other "dynamic" psychology of external or transcendental objects negative of mental states. Feeling is, equally with reason, trans-subjective and intra-objective. The merest physical enjoyment involves sympathetic sharing of the feelings of others, and such enjoyment yields its best results when it is most successful, through a sense of love, in penetrating into and fusing with the heart-vibrations of others. The contagious nature of feeling—of pleasure, pain, sympathy etc.,—is too well-known to need description here. Probably Prof. Whitehead's suggestion that feeling is always

1. This means that in order to explain consciousness of pleasure we need not regard pleasure as an attribute of consciousness and assume the existence of a first pleasant consciousness and then a second consciousness of the first. Pleasure is a feeling; is feeling, or thinking for that matter, only an attribute of consciousness? For this view, vide "A Defence of Hedonism," I.J.E. Vol. XV, No. 1

feeling *of* feeling, supported by his doctrine of prehensive unities, may prove helpful in establishing the universally comprehensive and transcendental character of feeling. We may then appreciate better the truth of the unity of all life sung by mystics and poets alike in all climes and ages. Our feelings, dependent as they are upon our bodies, may be said to participate in and react to the feelings of others, for our bodies depend upon the environment which contains other bodies conditioning the birth of effective processes in them. Our reason too has an undercurrent of feeling about it and all understanding of the higher sort requires some basis in affective experience of some kind, of artistic sympathy, otherwise called "empathy" or "intuition." And if our feelings can be influenced and reinforced by rational processes in our own minds, and react to them, we can see how it becomes possible that they should so influence, and be influenced by, the rational processes in other people's minds as well. In short the barrier between our own sentient and rational experience on the one hand, and the sentient and rational experience of others on the other, becomes easily penetrable and mutual sharing of one another's experiences humanly possible.

Two things thus stand out from this discussion: reason and sensibility are only relatively to be distinguished, and both partake of the essence of objectivity and sociality as much as of subjectivity and individuality. It follows that when it is said that the natural object of desire is some activity directed toward specific objects, some external goal, abstract idea, etc., such objects or ideals are not devoid of the soft allurements and the roseate hues of agreeable feeling. In such cases it is difficult to distinguish the object, or ideal element, from the feeling-element. The act or idea is the feeling, keenly and consciously felt; the feeling is the idea, clearly and distinctly discerned. It is not that a "pleasant thought" is mistaken here for a "thought of pleasure,"¹ the thought is the winning of a goal which is as much subjective and private as it is objective and public, for it is mine as realised in outward action, and both aspects of the problem need to be equally stressed, for at

1. The divorce between thought and feeling, object and pleasure, is, as shown above, untrue to the logic of experience, and they can be distinguished only relatively.

every stage they fuse into one concrete desire, and action, conscious reflective action, is nothing apart from the ideal and affective elements involved in it.

It is obvious now not only that pleasure can normally and naturally be desired, but that it is always the obverse of desire whose reverse is some object or activity—now the one aspect, now the other, will be uppermost in the agent's consciousness.

17. It should also be equally clear, from the foregoing analysis of the relation of reason to feeling, that pleasure cannot be interpreted as bare feeling, devoid of knowledge, memory, reason, aesthetic susceptibility etc¹. Just as by the self one has to understand, not the discontinuous, ever-shifting aspect of particularity, unrelated to anything else, but a concrete human self, continuous, relatively self-identical, and essentially subsisting through its relations to other things and persons in the environment, likewise, if the ethical ideal is to be naturally possible without violating any fundamental law of human psychological nature, one must understand by "pleasure," not bare feeling, which is psychologically impossible, but concrete pleasure as it occurs in you and in me, with our particular tastes, temperaments, likes, dislikes, and enlightened, as every human being is in different degrees, with knowledge, memory, reason etc.. Experience is always of total situations, configurations, *gestalts*, and to say that a pleasurable whole alone has value is not to say that pleasure alone has value. And from the standpoint of value philosophy in particular, knowledge, reason, etc., are absolutely indispensable for the emergence of pleasure value, since it is only in beings capable of reflective thought that the sense of value (of any kind) can possibly arise. "A pleasure" should mean the object and the pleasure it yields, or rather pleasure as derived from a particular object, a concrete experience, as distinguished from abstract pleasantness.

18. Several questions arise in consequence of the present interpretation of hedonism. If all transcendental objects also involve pleasures, what does the doctrine of hedonism come to? And how is the felt preference of one pleasure to another—of the pleasure of poetry to that of puddings—to be explained?

1. So to interpret it has been the fashion of critics since the *Philebus* of Plato. But it is another question whether any hedonist or utilitarian has ever held such a doctrine.

On the basis of the old doctrine, it was said that the recognition of qualitative differences amongst pleasures (where such differences cannot be reduced merely to those of quantity), involves the recognition of the value of objects other than pleasure and that this cuts at the very roots of hedonism. (Even this criticism, however, was not just, for according to G. E. Moore's own principle of organic wholes,—based as it is upon his law of the incommensurability of the values of the parts and of the whole,—even if one common part in a number of wholes, *viz.*, pleasure, possesses a slight or uniform value the ascription of a higher value to one whole rather than another need not be due to the *objects* which also enter as parts of the several wholes, since according to the above principle even such objects may have no value at all or only a slight value.¹) But the present view needs a different formulation both of the principle of hedonism and of the principle of preference amongst pleasures. Hedonism is the doctrine that the object of desire is, and ought to be, the realisation of a pleasurable whole. There is no inconsequence involved here in the connection between the psychological and the ethical forms; for, although it is true that every object or activity does as a matter of fact involve pleasure also,² the question of relative emphasis becomes significant, and sometimes we may stress the activity-side alone, and sometimes the pleasure-side alone, of our goal. And the significance of the ethical form consists in the suggestion that the pleasure aspect of the goal should predominate in our consciousness in and through the process of activity, objective endeavour, adventure, of course, or at least that it should be co-ordinate with the latter. The so-called "paradox of hedonism" is so restricted in its application (in order to contain some sense) and, when extended over the whole field of human desire, appears so silly that I shall not discuss it in this connection. And now for the principle of preference. There is no preferability of pleasure to other things, for all acts and objects involve pleasure. Hence preference is in the first place of pleasurable to painful wholes,

1. See on this whole subject the present writer's article on "Values As Objective" in *The Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, October, 1932.

2. I am not, of course, denying that there are objects or activities which involve *pain* instead.

and secondly, of wholes containing greater or higher pleasure to those containing lesser or lower pleasure. This applies to all wholes equally, physical, intellectual, moral, aesthetic etc., and in every case, the two criteria of quantity and quality should be distinguished from each other. The criterion of quantity is easily intelligible. How is that of quality to be understood?

Let it be observed at the outset that the distinctions of quality among pleasures may run much deeper and embrace many more aspects of their nature than what we now seem to sense in the distinction between higher and lower. And such differences may, for aught we know, render pleasures of one class entirely different in *kind* from pleasures of any other class. Unfortunately so little attention has been given to this matter in the history of thought or experience that beyond the vague perception of differences of higher and lower, we do not seem to notice any other qualitative differences amongst pleasures. At any rate we don't possess distinctive names to differentiate between different kinds of pleasure, even should we feel them. And in the second place it must also be noted that "higher" and "lower" suggest not so much differences of *quality* as differences of our estimate of pleasures from a purely or largely *moral* point of view. And thirdly, we must not commit the mistake of ascribing to the pleasure felt the quality of higher and lower ethically or sentimentally associated with objects. And even with these qualifications, my belief is that there are as many natural and qualitative differences of pleasure as there are well-marked levels of experience. This, it seems to me, must be the result of the operation of the principle of emergence whereby value is generated. The organic union of mind at various levels with the objects appropriate to the different universes of desire, may be the cause of generating the differences in pleasure-quality. Poetry and puddings by themselves may each have a value which so far as quantity is concerned is identical with the value of the other; but each is characteristically unique so that poetry in consciousness may generate a pleasure value which may be qualitatively different from the pleasure value produced by puddings on the palate. This possibility of course presupposes, firstly, that the difference is partly accountable by the nature of consciousness which

reacts to the touch of external things, and secondly, that the relationship of parts with the whole is organic in the sense that it enables them to realise their nature more effectively without mutilating that nature.

19. One more consequence (for hedonism) of the position we have adopted must be pointed out. If one's feeling is not absolutely private, but can to some extent be shared by others also, and if further there is no radical disparity of nature between feeling and reason, pleasure and ideal object, sensation and idea, but the one is only the imaginative explication, the elaboration, of the other, then hedonism no longer stands committed to egoism, as we ordinarily understand the term. The antithesis between a Humian and a Butlerian psychology is not, as we said before, ultimate. One's own mental states are self-transcendent, and rational transcendent objects, such as other people's mental states, can, through their basis in feeling, participate in and become part of *my* mental states. So the desire for such transcendent things is not at all unnatural, for the transcendent is at the same time and in a very real sense immanent in me also. In short, altruism and utilitarianism have a firmer logical basis in hedonism than egoism. And no transcendental metaphysics of a universal cosmic self of which individual selves are relative manifestations, is necessary to justify this unity of the ego and the alter, of the subjective and the objective; the philosophy of "dependence," of organism and prehensive unities as ably portrayed by Prof. Whitehead, is quite sufficient to provide a metaphysical justification for the inalienably united mode of existence of parts qualitatively different from one another.

20. The emergence of hedonic values is particularly instructive for the reason that taking its birth as it does in almost every other value it shows how life as such is naturally constructed on an inherently hedonistic or utilitarian basis. Pleasure experience is ubiquitous, it is co-extensive with life's experience as a whole. The universe of desire represented by it consists of the desire to feel oneself exhilarated, exalted, enlarged, to feel oneself more full of life, more full of spirit, in short, to experience the *moreness* of the self in every respect. Every kind of superiority or exaltation, or achievement, physical, intellectual, aesthetic etc., makes us feel bigger or more in that direction,

and this feeling of moreness is pleasure. The exercise of every kind of faculty or capacity of the self involves pleasure during the process. Secondly, in some cases, as I said, the desire for pleasure may consist in the desire to get relief from some organic or vital trouble, pain, conflict or tension. Nature has so contrived matters relating to individual self-preservation that the insistence of organic needs whose fulfilment is a condition of such preservation may be matched by enjoyment of a corresponding amount of pleasure in the process of their fulfilment. Thirdly, the desire for novelty, freshness or variety of experience is essentially an aspect of the desire for pleasure. Fourthly, the quest after measure, harmony, proportion etc., in things and experiences is an expression of the desire for pleasure. And lastly—this is the most significant of the subjective factors—the desire for pleasure is the desire to obtain freedom for the spirit. This may sound paradoxical, but nevertheless it is the truth. The essence of the nature of spirit is, it will be admitted, freedom, unrestricted, unhampered freedom, but this freedom is at present curtailed, "crabbed, cribbed and confined" in numerous ways by its union with matter, by the fact that it has to work through the limitations and impediments of a material organism. Every level in the evolution of values, it was said, points to the attainment of freedom, greater or smaller, by the spirit through its struggle with the material environment. Now freedom denotes the same fact which we have tried to indicate by the idea of *moreness* of the self. The self at present is small, little, petty,¹ on account of the limitations imposed upon it by association with matter. The attainment of complete freedom would mean that the self would then be fully itself, manifesting its own nature, shining in its own light. And thus fully to realise oneself, to regain one's nature completely, is to attain bliss absolute, unalloyed happiness, which as we have already shown, is of the same nature as pleasure.² It follows then that every attempt to obtain pleasure is an attempt, on the part of the self, to realise its freedom. Yes, even the sensualist's craving for the crass sensation to be derived from material

1. I hope it is not necessary to say that these expressions, like that of *moreness* or *bigness*, are used only metaphorically. The idea in both cases is fairly clear.

2. The difference between bliss and pleasure will be discussed in a later chapter.

contact is ultimately to be regarded as the reflection, albeit a sorry reflection, of the desire to realise that unadulterated bliss,—freedom which is of the essence of the spirit. According, therefore, as pleasure is sought in the higher things of the spirit, a higher degree of freedom would be realised. But to seek pleasure—whether higher or lower—and to avoid pain is of the very texture of the self's being, and pleasure thus stands as the basic value of all other values.

Of the qualities in the objects fitted to give us pleasure little need be said in this connexion. The objects may range over the whole field of experience, covering the regions of all other values, from asafetida and chewing gum to jam and nectar, from beating one's wife and bullying children to the most rapt contemplation of God and the good, from slavish doglike attachment to one's master or mistress to rulership of a state. And competent students of human experience assure us that there is a kind of sweetness in pain itself, not of course of the sadistic type.¹ From objects so varied in quality and kind, it would not be a profitable task to try to educe any common characteristics which can be set down as peculiarly adapted to excite the feeling of pleasure in us. All that one can say is that, be the object whatever it may, it must be capable of imparting satisfaction to the experiencing mind at its particular level of desire or development. This alternative is noteworthy because even a saint who has realised full freedom of spirit may sometimes discover in his bosom a longing to play with children and derive satisfaction therefrom. When a mind, attached to the universe of bodily appetites, hardly perceiving its difference from the body and believing that its freedom lies in living its bodily life to the fullest extent, contemplates² any object of the material world as contributing to such a life, hedonic value appropriate to the sensual mind emerges. The same experiences of bodily life may be enjoyed by a mind attached, not to the bodily life, but to the intellectual or the aesthetic life, and then there would emerge hedonic value appropriate, not to the sensual, but to the pure mind of the reflective or discursive and

1. E. g. Shelly : Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought."

2. It is hardly necessary to point out that in this connection, as in so many others where contemplation is credited with generating value, it is not contemplation *per se*, but contemplation preceded or followed by, or in some way connected with, action or enjoyment, that generates value.

of the intuitive type respectively in which mind is no longer controlled by, but controls, body. Thus it is clear that the felt difference in the quality of pleasure value is attributable, not to the object of experience as such (which may be common to all experiencers) but to the type of mind that contemplates the object or enjoys the experience and the kind of desire-universe it brings to bear upon such experience. A sensual mind contemplating a figure of the eternal feminine generates only hedonic value of the sensual type, whereas a spiritual mind contemplating the same beauty would give birth, to the bliss-value of the "idea" of beauty. When a person takes to sports in the belief that he will thereby gain vim and vigour and vitality; when his mind is bent upon discovering ways and means of becoming a dollar-king; when he seeks honour and glory, social position and power; hedonic value, appropriate to the level of the sensuous mind in which mind is trying to free itself from the shackles of the body, emerges. And when he seeks the company of friends, family and fellow-workers just to while away an idle hour, hedonic value suitable to the level of the social or cohesive mind—mind in its growing and expansive state—emerges.

What is there common to values so diverse in character? No doubt they are all values of *pleasure*, but just as red and blue and yellow etc., though all colours, are still taken to be qualitatively different, likewise the different kinds of hedonic values, though all pleasures, may still have qualitative differences amongst themselves born of the peculiar modes of relatedness into which consciousness at its different levels enters with objects capable of yielding pleasure. We need not deny completely all power to the objects in bringing about these differences; the point is, *the type of mind* that contemplates, and the peculiar *tone or force of attachment* that it exhibits in such contemplation, are more nearly responsible for such differences. The different levels in the evolution of mind (with their characteristic features), and the different degrees of freedom accompanying each, have already been discussed in a previous connection. Since every successive stage in the list expresses a higher degree of freedom for the spirit, the pleasure expressive of this freedom may be taken as of a higher kind.

21. It now remains to mention the objective processes among values which may also act as accessory causes for the emergence

of hedonic values. Every type of value, it need not be repeated, involves a particular type of pleasure. The principle of the heterogeneity of ends—according to which conative tendency directed towards an object of primary condition worth develops new ends and values—applies to organic values which accordingly generate pleasure values. It is evident again that interaction between organic and recreative values, as much as between economic and personal values, is capable of producing pleasure value. The integration of social values, based as they are on the principle of attraction of like to like; the interaction between social and intellectual values which fuse together in such phenomena as sympathy, benevolence, reverence, etc.; and the imaginative reconstruction of social and intellectual values, are factors rich in the possibility of producing values of pleasure. And it is well-known that active and effective realisation of moral and intellectual values and the pervasion of aesthetic values over intellectual, as witnessed to in the perception of elegance in the formal deductions of mathematics and logic, also condition the birth of pleasure values.

There are one or two other processes which are interesting to note as also possible causes determining the emergence of pleasure value. Repeated contact with the same type of value, especially if there be a recurrent rhythm in the activity involved, by deepening the attachment to that universe of desire, may also heighten or intensify the feeling for pleasure value; but sometimes continued pre-occupation with the same field of value may produce a reaction or an aversion to it of such a character that the mere abandonment of or cessation from that kind of activity would naturally produce pleasure. The best instance of this class of conditions is what, adapting Aristotle's phraseology, we may call the *catharsis* of values. This theory has been developed in the present work particularly with reference to moral values; but we may here note its role as a conditioning factor for the emergence of higher values, and along with these, of higher kinds of pleasure value. The catharsis of a lower value (as explained in that chapter), for instance, of exclusive family attachment, or of narrow, parochial patriotism, may produce the pleasure value of social values or of cosmopolitan ideals. The catharsis of any value, in fact, by loosening the bonds of exclusive attachment to that value in particular,

has a tendency to generate the pleasure value of its opposite which may be either a higher or a lower value, relatively to the value catharsised.

22. (3) Recreative Values.

The values of play are so well known and appreciated in every age and country that to devote a separate section to it in a philosophical work would seem to many a strange phenomenon. Yet such is the sophistication of the age that we need to remind ourselves every now and then that there are high values—both of individual and of social efficiency—involved in play. It is not only children and boys that play, grown-ups also play in their own way—I am not referring to cricket, foot-ball or tennis—by building castles in the air, by constructing Utopias, by dreaming of the Holy Grail. And this suggests the thought that tennis, foot-ball etc.,—the olympic games or field-sports with their big trophies of silver and gold—may not with complete propriety be characterised as forms of "play." They have too great a tendency to breed a sense of seriousness and earnestness, to engender the passions of victory and defeat, to be called "play." They are too real to be make-believe. They are too professional to be spontaneous. But it is possible that I may be completely mistaken in this matter.

What then are the characteristics which differentiate play from real life? It is commonly said that play is an imaginative form of activity where we are concerned with *creation* while life is concerned with real activities in which *adjustment* or *adaptation* to the given environment is the heart of the problem. But this distinction is more plausible than real. In life as well as in play, adjustment and creation go hand in hand. And environment, in the shape of persons, things or situations, is given; we have to work upon and mould it adapting ourselves the while, if necessary, to its inward structure. We are not so wholly free in play or in art as to work with anything that comes to hand—if we could do so there is in no sense true creation in art. Statues can be carved only out of marbles, and only leaves or some such substances can represent plates. A round stone cannot represent a plate, though a flat one may stand for a table. Nor on the other hand are we so completely bound down in real life that we cannot choose, within certain limits,

our friends, our life's mates, our occupations, our beliefs. And in either case creation is our aim;—creation of fair homes, loving friends, good position, sound character, realised ideals, reformed societies in the one case; creation of artistic products, mock-homes, mock-dinners, mock-battles in the other. To say that we do not create in life is to start with a prejudiced theory about life and then to rail against it. It is like giving a dog a bad name and then hanging it. Persons and situations are given to us in life no doubt, and to a certain extent we have perforce to accommodate ourselves to them; but it is what we make of them, what we make of our fellow-workers, our club-companions, our bosses in office, our partners in life, our society, our opportunities, as well as what we make of ourselves in reference to all of them—it is this creation or re-creation of ourselves and our environment that really counts for life. Doubtless there be many who cannot thus create, they are failures in life, they cannot be said properly to live their lives. Life would not be worth living a moment, or even a moment's purchase, if we cannot mould it in some form or other in the light of our ideals, visions and goals. It is not merely a Socrates, a Buddha, a Christ that thus moulds society; every one of us, if we really live our lives, converts and creates in our humble measure. Nor is art entirely the creation of things unreal and merely imaginary. The question of art will be taken up for separate consideration in a different chapter, but we may here anticipate that discussion to the extent of saying that imaginary art certainly is, unreal it emphatically is not. To say that art products are unreal—that the painted landscape, the carved statue, the sung poetry are unreal—is to revert to Plato's fallacy that art is thrice removed from reality. As Aristotle truly pointed out, art is the idealisation of life itself, and the idealised picture need not always be non-existent.

Play is differentiated from art mainly by the fact that it is the expression in external activity of the same creative instinct which seeks an outlet in song, sculpture and painting. Further, it is art of a rudimentary type—that type which Plato confused with art even at its best and condemned as "imitation." Children's plays are for the most part nothing but "imitations" of scenes of the life they find around them. They are, however, none the less "real" for all that as objective embodiments of

meaning in children's minds. Lastly, while an art product need not necessarily appeal to any one beyond the artist himself, play necessarily presupposes reference to at least two persons—even when a single person is playing a game of chess for himself. Play is in this respect more conducive to social efficiency and solidarity than art which is essentially personal and even individual. This fact will become significant in the sequel although we shall have to notice exceptions to it so far at least as art is concerned.

23. If then play is not distinguished from life on the score of creativeness, what is the difference in standpoint between the two? It is a question of the adequacy of the created object to embody the meaning infused into it. In work as well as in play, the subject is interested in the development of meanings, the idealised desires, impulses and values which play upon his (or her) heart. And he seeks to body forth such ideal ends or meanings. In play, the embodiment is inadequate because the vehicle of expression is incommensurate with the meaning expressed—it will not allow itself to be manipulated in accordance with the development of meaning. So long as the child does not recognise this fact, however, but continues to play in earnest, we must believe that meaning is predominating over sensible representation of it. When, however, the child comes to recognise some time later on the inadequacy of the embodiment and feels the need for a more adequate representation of meaning through proper materials, play has changed into work. The child may be satisfied with leaves for plates for some time, but when it discovers that leaves change colour and wither unlike the plates used at home, the desire to obtain and use more durable embodiments of the plate-idea gets hold of her mind and then also her play attitude may be said to change for the work attitude. Lack of complete coincidence between idea and embodiment, then, is that which differentiates play from life and work.

24. There is, however, another aspect of this question which throws greater light upon the distinction between life and play. Adequate embodiment of meaning in concrete objects involves expenditure of a certain amount of labour and energy upon the material far in excess of what the subject in his play attitude is prepared to bestow on it. If the player himself does

not undertake the job, somebody else will have undertaken it for which the player will have to pay either in kind or coin. Thus the object—still used as an object of play, we shall suppose,—comes to be invested with a certain amount of economic value. And since no one is prepared to spend unnecessarily—whether in money or labour—upon the same kind of object, the sense of its economic value engenders in the player's mind the desire to preserve it intact for future use. And further since it is natural to think that no one will be so careful in preserving an object as he who has paid for it, a sense of *possession* and *exclusive ownership* of the article, and attachment to it, supervenes in the subject's mind upon the previous state of unconcerned expansive freedom. Leaves could be thrown about as one likes or taken by any one of a party. But plates cannot thus be appropriated by any one or left to their fate. The dawn of this sense of possession marks the change in the mind's attitude from one of play to one of work. Thus while play in its natural and genuine form involves a state of mind absolutely untrammelled by any consideration of *meum* and *tuum* and consequently expansive as the sky, work ordinarily implies a state of mind appreciably narrowed, contracted, by a sense of appropriation, possession or ownership. Play is creativeness pure and simple; work is creativeness *plus* possessiveness or attachment to the created object. It is the spirit of possessiveness which transforms children into selfish men and women, which transforms the bird-free life of the forest into the economically organised social life of the city and the state. This, I think, is the real explanation of the oft-repeated distinction that play is interest in activity for its own sake while work is interest in activity for the sake of an end or object. So put, the distinction is misleading, for there is an end or result in both play and work, *viz.*, the end of creation. Only while in play the created object is equally shared by all and no pang is felt by anybody, in work the object of creation is exclusively possessed by each individual for himself, and its sharing by others is not ordinarily contemplated with a free unconcerned mind. There is pleasure or enjoyment in both; but in play the pleasure is in freely creating and freely giving; in work, the enjoyment is in creating for the sake of possessing. In the one the pleasure is expansive and increases by

sharing; in the other, it is contractive and diminishes by sharing.

25. It is this spirit of possessiveness in work that accounts for the other differences generally noticed between work and play. The impulse to play, it is said, is the impulse to freedom and this freedom shows itself in various forms. While work is generally felt to be constraining—a kind of duty or discipline inhibiting inclination and externally imposed, or, even when self-imposed, undertaken for fear of punishment or hope of reward,—and has consequently to be carried on sometimes even beyond the point of fatigue, play has absolutely no atmosphere of compulsion or inhibition or imposition about it—there are no motives of reward or punishment in it—and it can be begun or ended whenever we like. Now, as I shall try to show in the sequel, work need not become drudgery for any one, and, except in the sense of the distinction pointed above (with reference to the adequacy or inadequacy of the embodiment of meanings), children do not feel this distinction between work and play. If, however, the distinction is commonly felt by most people, it is to be accounted for by the spirit of possessiveness which enters into work. In play meanings or ideas predominate, their physical embodiments are only of secondary consideration. Hence the child's mind is perfectly free to roam about and enjoy in the field of imagination unrestrained by any alien impulses. In work, on the other hand, the interest is in possible material returns for our labour, in the possible possession, appropriation and enjoyment of physical objects. Naturally the attitude of unconcernedness, of mental expansiveness, freedom, buoyancy, light-heartedness, which characterised play, have now flown away and concern for observance of rules, anxiety to please one's superiors, keen searchings of heart in the matter of proper discharge of duty, begin to weigh heavily upon the worker's mind—all generated by the sense of attachment to some universe of desire. It is the distinction between the honorary secretary and the paid secretary of an office. And above all, as a great poet and mystic has observed, "our very possessions are our limitations." If this piece of land is mine, that other plot is not mine, and whatever is not mine limits my freedom of activity. As for the constraint of rules, rules are not entirely absent in play either but it is the

fact that the rules of work are conditioned by my demand for possession of material goods, that gives them the character of inhibitions and prohibitions.

26. Another characteristic difference between play and work, namely that the regard for "consequences" present in work is absent in play, is to be explained on the same ground. What exactly is meant by saying that in play you cannot "go too far" and that you have got to stop at the point of "no consequences"? The suggestion is that consequences *matter* otherwise consequences would not matter! And consequences matter only when there is the question of profit or loss to somebody, or at least of possession, attachment and selfish enjoyment. Intentionally killing or hurting another person involves the spirit of possessiveness at some point, carnal love is for selfish enjoyment, benefaction implies readiness to part with a part at least of the contents of your purse, managing a business successfully is to see that it flourishes and does not fail. Life thus betrays a dreadful concern for consequences because the possessive interests are supreme in every walk of life. Since play is purely creative and not possessive also, *qua* play it cannot reach such consequences, it cannot "go too far", for if it did, it would import into it the spirit of seizure, appropriation, selfish enjoyment, mine and thine, and the consequent limitation alien to it. It is not merely that in play you cannot "go too far" (in making love, for instance,) while in fancy you can go as far as you please; so long as the true spirit of play lasts, you cannot, you ought not to, even in fancy, go too far with your partner. The moment you did so even in fancy, you have turned yourself into the sordid creature of every-day life. We shall notice in the sequel how it is possible to combine play even with consequences.

The key-note then of play as creativeness is freedom, spirit's freedom to create an imaginary world of objects which is yet felt to be rooted in the world of every-day life. This freedom is in one sense pure and unalloyed, because as yet it is not complicated, or contaminated, by the presence of other motives or desires—which hold such imperious sway in life—especially, the desire for exclusive possession and selfish enjoyment. Not that this motive is entirely absent in the life of the playing child or boy—but to the extent that it is operative, it destroys the

freedom, the pure joy, of creation. In this respect art is purer than play, for there at any rate the true artist gives himself away, and the essence of his excellence consists in his thus giving himself away, in obeying the impulse to self-expression, self-creation, unpolluted by any motive alien to creativeness. In so far as the impulse to creation is pure and unmixed in play, our petty failures, pettier triumphs, little sorrows, lesser joys, our anxious questionings, aching concerns, palpitating duties—all are for the time being at an end and there is a sweet joy in forgetfulness, a perfect relief in oblivion. Our minds are refreshed, our spirits renewed and our enthusiasms redoubled—in fact, our whole life literally re-created and strengthened. This is the "catharsis" effected in life—the purification of emotions in a broad sense. In another sense, however, the freedom achieved in play is of a poor sort because it is opposed to all the rich and varied impulses and desires that ordinarily make up the content of life. It is a freedom achieved in poverty of spirit, a purity attained in emaciation of life, a joy experienced in isolation and abstraction of living. The wholeness, the integration, of life thus effected in play is of an empty character—a wholeness without parts, an integration without inner differentiation, a harmony with no possible strife. It is an identity without diversity. Life on the other hand provides possibilities of a richer freedom, a truer wholeness, a more effective integration. Play is simple because it consists of a single strand, life may be simple in spite of complexity of impulses.

27. Thus far the values of play as compared with the values of life. But now the significance of play for life as a whole remains to be appreciated. From the foregoing discussion it may be gathered that creativeness which is the soul of play is all along overlaid with the experience of pure joy, pleasure, or bliss—joy in giving and sharing. In fact play and joy are the obverse and the reverse of the same process or activity. And this points to the truth that *playfulness* or the playful *attitude* of mind is more significant for life than play itself. And the elements of this attitude are: disinterestedness, spontaneity, freedom, flexibility, adaptability, sympathetic imaginativeness, joy in giving and sharing, absence of the spirit of possessiveness or appropriation, of dogmatism or narrow prejudice. None of these qualities is incompatible with an earnestness or seriousness of purpose—with

an interest in the end or outcome of one's activity—which is generally taken to be the characteristic mark of the work attitude. In other words, life as a whole *can* be lived in the *spirit* of playfulness, though it may not become *mere* play. This is not mere sentiment, it is sober truth and an expression of the only way in which life may most fruitfully and happily be lived, and ought to be lived. Doubtless in life, as in play, we cannot ask for complete freedom of choice, action or self-expression. But true freedom, we have learnt, is not the absence of all restraint, but the ability to obey a law imposed—by self or others—in the best interests of our own self-development.¹ If this fundamental idealistic contention is granted, there is little difficulty in perceiving how, even under the most repressive and hampering sort of circumstances, we can spread a spirit of play over all our actions, and so far at any rate as we—the acting agents—are concerned, remain impartial players or spectators of the game. Disinterestedness of spirit in all our action is the secret of the game of life and its significance and implications will be discussed in the chapter on moral values. Such disinterestedness is one with pure creativeness. The more we are creative in life, the less possessive, the better players we should be. And society requires above all else this spirit of us. The salvation of human society ultimately depends upon the number of people it can produce who can thus free themselves from the spirit of possessiveness and find joy in pure creativeness, who can, in shop, factory, school, church, court, and at home, in art, in industry, in politics, in social reform,—in every walk of life—think more of *creating* the goods of life than of appropriating or selfishly enjoying them. Ultimately, of course, the goods created will have to be possessed and enjoyed by some, or few, or all. But it makes all the difference in the world—even from the point of social distribution and justice—with what spirit we so take and enjoy them.

1. Who is to determine this with reference to a given law is a question with which realists like Laski are dreadfully concerned, but there is no satisfactory answer to this question either in realist or in idealist politics. The people who give their "consent" to a law may be as completely mistaken in regard to its tendency as the rulers who may impose it from above, consent or no consent. The problem of democracy vs. dictatorship cannot be finally solved on theoretical grounds. On the whole question, see the chapter on Social Value.

The spirit of detachment is the spirit of play. And provided we bring to bear upon life this supreme spirit of detachment and non-appropriation, we can engage ourselves in any kind of activity and be prepared for any kind of consequences. None of the impulses of life need be denied, and yet there is an art of satisfying them which will convert life into "play." None of the desires of life need be allowed to starve, and yet there is an art of feeding the flame which will burn up all "consequences." This is the art of non-attachment, the art of creativeness unmixed with the desire for appropriation. My profession in life need not be of my own choice; the conditions and circumstances of my living need not be of my own making; the rules and laws I obey may not have been legislated by my will. And yet I can feel completely "free" in them all provided I can ever live in a spirit of disinterestedness and non-ownership. It is possible to make inclination coincide completely with duty. It is possible to remove all sense of restraint from our own consciousness, though the environment may not completely cease to be recalcitrant. That is, life can be lived as play at least so far as we are concerned, we may not always count upon others co-operating to make it a success. But why should we regard success alone as the test of a good game played out and enjoyed? Success or failure, the joy of the game lies in *playing* it. And we can be most earnest and serious in playing it and need miss or shirk none of its "consequences." We can love, and get children; we can feel hunger, and appease it with food; we can be religious, and experience genuine faith. In none of these things, however, do mere "consequences" destroy the character of play that may attach to life, for the essence of that character we have found to lie in the spirit of creativeness, disinterestedness, non-ownership, non-attachment, spontaneity and freedom. And this spirit is not incompatible with "consequences," however serious. The full explanation of this faith must be deferred to a later chapter of the work.

Suffice it to say here that life, though in the ordinary sense less joyous than play, because less free, is yet on a higher plane than play because it exhibits the possible union of adequate embodiment of meanings in appropriate forms with the freedom and spontaneity characteristic of play. When this union is secured, life becomes a more perfect play.

The ideal of life should be to render it an increasingly perfect form of play. But in life, as life, the embodiment of meanings in appropriate forms, the idealisation of our environment or the realisation of our ideals in concrete persons or things, can never be perfect, and thus the human spirit is naturally forced to seek relief in still higher forms of play—in art and religion.

28. And now for the emergence of recreative values. The universe of desire to which the individual is attached in play is the universe of imagination, of meanings, of ideas, of ideals. It is the universe of freedom, of spontaneity, of self-imposed limitation. The subject seeks relief in play from the constraints and limitations of life felt to be externally imposed. But above all, he seeks creation of ideal forms, embodiment of meanings in flesh and blood, so to say, in play. Not less keen is his desire for the pure joy of creation, the joy felt in the consciousness of freely giving and sharing, the bliss realized in the forgetfulness of life's littlenesses and pettinesses, meannesses, selfishnesses, cruelties, anxieties, cares, as well as mixed joys and pleasures, diluted successes and failures. Nor should we omit to mention the yearning for social fellowship, for mixing with one's kind; there is no joy in singleness, and there can be no play without joy. And lastly may be mentioned also the eagerness for recuperation of exhausted nerves, renovation of mind and body; for break of the routine and monotony of life, for variety and change.

Such are the various motives to play. We need hardly remind the reader that these motives, and the recreative values gendered by them, come into existence only in persons capable of conscious thought and reflection. Such a reflective mind only, impelled by any one of the motives mentioned above, can realise the value of recreation by fondly dwelling in mind upon the virtues of various forms of play. In order that any form of play may thus be deemed capable of realising the universe of desire to which the individual is attached, it must possess some suitable qualities. It must in the first place be a form of activity: dreams, reveries, construction of Utopias etc., illustrate only the *spirit* of play and not play itself. The activity, in the second place, must involve the possibility of the expression of a real impulse of life—an expression, we say, not necessarily satisfaction. The impulse to worship, for

instance, or to fight, or to parental love—such real impulses of life must come into operation in play. Thirdly, the play, to retain the character of play, must afford a large scope for "make-believe" on the part of the players, for their imaginative exuberance, free construction of ideal objects. It must enthuse the players' minds more by the meanings and ideas suggested by it than by the adequacy of their embodiment in appropriate materials. Fourthly, in order that play may not pass into earnestness, it must not too deeply stir up the passions and the emotions, the impulses and desires of life involved in it. They should be roused to gentle action in such a manner that they can lightly be dismissed if necessary or easily brought under control. It is for this reason that "manly sports," organised matches etc., however valuable in other ways, are not so valuable as phantasy-plays for the purpose of sublimating the emotions. For the same reason, lastly, play should be of such a character that no consequences that "matter" should be involved in it; each act of play must in itself absorb all the players' interest and be self-sufficing while no definite outcome should hang upon it.

The norm applicable to recreative values is of a mixed kind. It is perfect freedom in the adequate embodiment of ideas with no liability to suffer consequences. It is clear that in play in the ordinary sense of the term, the three elements of this norm are severally incompatible with one another. Perfect freedom in construction is not generally enjoyed when adequacy of embodiment is insisted upon; and if we succeed in giving perfect form to our ideals, we cannot escape the consequences of our creation. Play is valuable in proportion as it succeeds in reconciling and balancing the different elements of this conception with one another. No play ordinarily does this, it is only when life becomes a perfected play that the ideal may be said to be realised.

A word in conclusion regarding the objective processes which help the realisation of recreative value. These processes, it should be remembered, only predispose the mind to the creation of the values of play. The sluicing of the natural instincts of man usually operative in organic, hedonic and personal values gives rise to recreative value. The human machine is loaded with interest power in these directions far in

excess of what can normally satisfy the instincts in question, and this excess power naturally discharges itself in outlets of play. Arrest of the primary values, again, whereby the interest in them is rendered impossible of realisation, the frustration of desire for any reason whatever, generates a tendency in the mind to seek their fulfilment in play. The interaction between hedonic and social values, the expansion of social values, and the adaptation of aesthetic to social values, are also fertile factors in the production of recreative values. Finally, mention may be made of the reaction that sets in when values like the economic, the intellectual etc., are pursued in a spirit of exclusive devotion for a long time.

CHAPTER VIII

EMERGENCE OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF VALUE :

(4) Economic Value

1. The treatment of economic value in a work purporting to be devoted to the *metaphysics* of value may, like the chapter on the Psychology of Valuation, be regarded by some as a piece of irrelevance. But here again I must plead that metaphysics has nothing to lose, but much to gain, from a study of concrete sciences. There is, however, another class of thinkers who believe that economic value is properly no value at all and that economic science strictly falls beyond the pale of value science. There are two attitudes discernible and distinguishable in this contention. First, it may mean that economics is a purely positive science—like physics and mathematics—and, as such, does not concern itself with any value concept, in the philosophical sense of the term. Value in economics is, on this view, merely like value in mathematics, the "value," or dependent variable, of two "arguments" or independent variables. This position has been advanced by many economists themselves—notably of the Veblenian School—and will be examined in due course. The second and more insidious suggestion is that economic goods are essentially instrumental in character and as such cannot claim a place among life's values. Before considering this view, I should like to say that the treatment of economic value is of peculiar significance to the theory of value advanced in these pages. For if it be true that economic values or "utilities" are essentially instrumental in character, then the theory accords well with the position taken up in this work that all values are in their nature contributory and none immediate or intrinsic. Economic value need not therefore suffer disparagement on this score.

2. In what sense is economics a study of means? Economics, it is said, deals only with the outward manifestation of the instruments of satisfaction, with the utilities of life, and in so far as the instrument is subordinate to the end, the science which is concerned with the husbanding of such resources must

be subordinate to the science which studies the nature and constituents of the end. It seems to me that this is not the proper way of stating the relation between economics and other sciences like ethics, politics, aesthetics and so on which are said to deal with "consumption values." Consumption value in itself does not differ from utility value, for consumption (of whatever kind) is never its own proper end. If we produce in order to consume, we consume in order to live the good life. If this is not to the taste of either the economist or the ethicist, then we should say that the end of all human activity is life, and different sciences concern themselves with different aspects of life. Economics is concerned with the material aspect of the well-being of man. It is wrong to think that material well-being is *merely* a means to the intellectual, the moral, and other aspects of welfare. A means it is, but in the same sense in which the intellectual may be said to be a means to the moral (knowledge, it is said, is for the sake of action), the moral to the spiritual etc.. In significant addition to it, it must also be said that the economic or material well-being of man is in itself an end of life as much as beauty, knowledge etc.. It is not merely foundational to the rise of the other values, it is part of the superstructure itself. For following Croce we may say that while material welfare *could* exist by itself, the other values involve it. It is, however, more natural to regard the distinction of means and end as essentially relative: all objects, and all values, may be means and ends relatively to one another. That is, the concrete life of the spirit is one whole of which the ethical, the economical, the aesthetic etc., are different moments or expressions, co-ordinate with one another, but all subordinate to the whole. They may interact among themselves; one may regulate the other or be a condition of the other or involve the other; in a complexus of living parts, such regulation, control and conditioning are indispensable; but they do not absolutely subordinate any one part to any other. If we may designate the general study of means and ends as such as Normatics or Axiology—the science of values or well-being in general—the science of the means to material well-being with its specific ends would be economics. In this sense economics would be subordinate to normatics, but in that same sense ethics, politics, aesthetics etc., would also be subordinate to normatics.

3. It is however, sometimes urged that no special domain of life can be assinged to economics and that its jurisdiction extends to the whole of life normally considered. Prof. Wicksteed, for instance, declares that *all* preferences are comparable and that the question of the economic commensurability of goods can *always* be raised.¹ Mill, desirous of maintaining that economics is not dependent upon any other science, defined the use of a thing in political economy as its "capacity to satisfy a desire or serve a purpose," thereby implying that *any* end or purpose of life, so long as it is operative, may be discussed in economics.² But it is to Prof. Knight that we owe the most elaborate and plausible defence of this view.³ Now it is true that there are no separate activities which are as such economic only and not also moral, aesthetic or spiritual in their implications. But this does not invalidate the contention that only one particular aspect of life, *viz.*, the aspect of material well-being, is governed by economics, and that the question of human welfare as a whole can be discussed neither by economics, nor by ethics, nor by any other science singly, but by normatics alone, the general science of well-being. Mill's opinion would reduce economics merely to a formal science of means, and even so, surely not all means to all ends—how best to make men moral, for example,—are discussable in economics? It is one thing to say that economic activities should be so directed as to promote human welfare on the whole (the point of view of what is called "welfare economics" which is increasingly coming into vogue); it is quite another to hold that welfare as a whole is the end of economic life or economic science.

But the matter is not so simple. Suppose that a church is to be built in a borough and that the municipal government raises the necessary funds by additional taxation. If the building of the church is calculated to realise moral or spiritual values, does it not seem as if those values were realised here by means

1. *The Common Sense of Political Economy* p.32.

2. *Principles*, Book III, Chapter 1, Section 3.

3. *The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays*. Knight, however, is arguing for the dominance of the ethical spirit in economics. Prof. Marshall defines economics as "a study of man's actions in the ordinary business of life"; but he adds, "it inquires how he gets his income and how he uses it."

of a purely economic act? The case is similar to the one discussed by Bosanquet in connection with his contention that state action, in relation to the promotion of morality and freedom in society, is essentially negative. How can, he asks, the endowment by the state of a first rate educational institution, like a University, made possible by coercive taxation, be regarded as merely a hindrance of hindrances? Material well-being, we shall agree in thinking, refers to the well-being of the organic life of man expressed in appetites like hunger, thirst and sex, and needs like clothing, shelter etc.. Economics primarily subserves such satisfactions, and acts conducive to such satisfactions are primarily economic. But division of labour and exchange of services have become such ineliminable features of social life that economic acts and services sometimes become indispensable even to bring aesthetic, moral or spiritual values into being. Be it noted, however, that merely building a church will not by itself bring about spiritual value. There must be able and willing spiritual teachers on the one hand, and spiritually hungering and thirsting souls on the other, in order to produce spiritual values. Moral and spiritual values, that is, depend more upon mind and character and will which certainly cannot be stimulated by economic considerations, though they may greatly be helped by them.

Hence building a church etc., stands midway between a purely economic act like building a house for dwelling in, or ploughing the field, and a purely non-economic act like giving moral or religious instruction. We must therefore recognise economic activities of a secondary order in addition to those of the primary order referred to before.

4. And now we must go back to our first question and ask: What exactly is the place of value in economics? Is there any room for value judgments at all in economics? Or, is economics a purely positive science based entirely upon natural laws of the universe, in so far as man and society form a natural part of that universe? In view of the enormous literature that has recently grown around these questions, one must perforce be brief in discussing them. It is clear that the classical school laboured under a confusion in this matter; and what is generally called the neo-classical school has also to some extent perpetuated this confusion. The corner-stones of the magnificent edifices of both

schools have been concepts like "normality," "economic equilibrium," "opposed pulls," equalisation of competing forces "at the margin," "harmony," "natural order" etc.. And as for natural laws of economics, apart from their number, their influence upon economists may be gathered from the following statements: "The harmonic scheme of automatic action of natural laws must be taken to represent Clark's mature thought;"¹ "He (*i.e.*, Marshall) is displaying groups of attractive and repellent forces, whose normal action under competitive conditions will result in a sort of solar system of counterpoise and balance, marked by a 'fundamental symmetry.'"² And yet if economic life be determined solely by mechanical factors of natural science, if economic motives are nothing but patterns of elastic forces, where is the relevance in discussing the problem of "value" (from the human point of view) so elaborately as the classical and the neo-classical economists do? What is determined by mechanical factors can only be an "is," never an "ought-to-be." Nay, as Prof. Knight maintains,³ the very use of the term "economy" in such a connection becomes a self-contradiction, for "economy" is a teleological concept, and automatic inevitable behaviour is a contradiction of economic action. The economic situation involves the presence of wants in human beings and the desire to satisfy them; it thus involves purposes and effort (which may not always be successful) to realise those purposes. Can we say that such a situation is brought about and controlled solely by mechanical factors? Do not the chameleon-like changes in our material wants themselves, and the ever-renewed attempts to gratify them in fresh ways and enjoy fresh values, belie such an assumption? Mechanism and value cannot lie down peacefully together even in the land of economics. And when we add competition—perfect or imperfect—to the list of operative motives, and realise its logical implications, we have well-nigh sounded the death-knell of mechanism in economics.

But economics has progressed since the days of Smith and Ricardo, Mill, Clark and Marshall, and to-day we are witnessing

* 1. *Contemporary Economic Thought*, by P. T. Homan, p. 94.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

3. *The International Journal of Ethics* : Vol. XLV, p. 214.

the development of a new kind of mechanism in economics the "institutionalism" of Thorstein Veblen, Wesley C. Mitchell, and others. It is inexact to apply these labels, "neo-classicism," "institutionalism", "psychologism" etc., to any thinker or group of thinkers; they at best indicate only *tendencies*, and a thinker may combine in himself different, and sometimes even opposed, tendencies. But it is not by accident that the institutional school, so-called, has allied itself with the historical school in economics. The historical school denied all value and normativity in economics; it emphasised the changefulness of social institutions and modes of life and contented itself with analysing them logically in their material relationships; it could perceive no general ends as guides to economic procedure within the science itself. Veblen accepted these conclusions; purpose and meliorative trend in social history he threw overboard as remnants of a rickety metaphysics; normativity and value were for him the shibboleths of a by-gone age. Institutions were the realities of social life, and evolutionary development afforded the key to their interpretation; but he could see no destined end to which the whole process moved, nor any laws of progress controlling the process itself. Social institutions at any given stage were simply the result of the evolutionary process of "cumulative causation" working upon the original instincts of human nature. To psychology therefore Veblen naturally turned as the science which could shed light upon the dark corners of economic life. Prof. Mitchell has accentuated these emphases. In particular, his affiliations to psychology are more pronounced. He first accepted the instinct-psychology of McDougall and considered that institutional life was merely the outcome of habitual automatic action, of the play of enduring instincts to which intelligence or rationality played only second fiddle. When, however, McDougall began to emphasise the hormic side of his psychology, Mitchell appears to have leaned over to behaviourism for support. He conceives economics as a science of human behaviour, concerned with the study of the objective human manifestations in one particular department of life, *viz.*, the economic. It is the structure and functioning of the institutions through which economic activity takes place that interest him most, it is the "process" that holds him in thrall—he has no use for equilibrium or normality. Economic

theory, in his opinion, should be an account of the cumulative change of economic behaviour.

It will now be clear why such theories are to be characterised as mechanistic. Behaviourism in psychology is, if anything, mechanism pure and simple, and the eschewing of the concept of purpose in economics by Veblen is significant only from this standpoint. But psychology will prove a hostile witness to Veblen's and Mitchell's case, for behaviourism is going out of court and sounder views of human nature based upon purpose and intelligent control of behaviour—such as the *gestalt*—are coming to their own. And it is difficult to see what inconsistency would result were institutional economics to be informed with the light of purpose and intelligent control. Cumulative change resulting in the formation of a given cultural institution—which is not, of course, final but only a passing phase of an endless process—may be admitted; but does it involve any direction at all? Is the quality of life—individual and social—improved at all in the course of the ages? If we answer these questions in the affirmative, then, unless we believe that humanity has all along been stumbling into higher levels of progress, we must admit that there has been an agency of some kind shaping the present to receive the impress of forms to come. The only question is, whether we should regard this agency as a kind of blind fate inherent in the constitution of things themselves, or as a super-temporal world-spirit trying to realise itself in and through the temporal process, or finally as the embodied reality of human-moral categories themselves. The materialist interpretation of history and the economic determinism of the Marxian School voted for the first, and the institutionalists feel a cousinly kinship to that school. They may as well contemplate Hegel's proposition that institutions are "ethical ideas." But the conception of freedom as "conscious necessity" is only a dilute variant of the Hegelian Absolutism (with the Absolute turned into incandescent vapour), and in either case the dilemma presents itself: either the world-spirit or the necessity really operates, and then human effort and struggle are at best supererogatory; or human agency is real, and then the conception of necessity etc., becomes otiose. Mitchell, strangely enough, runs with the hare and hunts with the hound. His system (if he has one) is the dynamics of statistics, (if we may call it so), just as those

of Clark and Marshall were the mechanics of static equilibria; and he believes in control which means "the alluring possibility of shaping the evolution of economic life to fit the developing purposes of our race."¹ He believes in social melioration as the object of economic endeavour; but how can it be achieved unless we transcend the purely evolutionary character of cumulative causation and attempt to control institutions themselves which are the product of human motives? What otherwise is the guarantee that cumulative change is going to produce *desirable* change?

5. So far we have been considering the different standpoints from which economic science—following on the heels of the prevalent economic organisation of society, perhaps—has been approached. The fundamental characteristic of that organisation has been a frank and unequivocal recognition of competition as "an inextinguishable force" which was calculated to bring humanity peacefully to the borderland of the millennium. "If nothing suppresses competition," wrote Clark, "progress will continue for ever."² Though individualism has been given up in its extreme *laissez-faire* form both in politics and economics, so far as "price economy" or "entrepreneur economy" or "the economics of enterprise" has dominated economic organisation, it has practically continued unchecked till to-day. It is not for me to enlarge here upon its ubiquitous failure. Others, economists themselves, have already sung its dirge. The divorce of the economic from the ethical point of view both in economic theory as well as in economic practice, the ballasting of economic practice with the purely economic ideals of "maximum efficiency," and "highest productivity" and "private gain," the inability to perceive the inseparable organic connection between the individual and the society, have been the main causes for the colossal failure of competitive or price economy. Competition, of course, has never been perfect; and already the trend of recent economic thought has been towards a fair recognition of the welfare standpoint in economics. To thinkers like Knight and Hobson is largely due the credit of having brought forward this standpoint to the forefront. How economics, starting as it did as a social science *par excellence*, ever came to be

1. *The Trend of Economics*, p. 25.

2. *Essentials of Economic Theory*, p. 372.

entangled in the choking aridities of "pure" natural science, or the boa-constrictor formulæ of mathematics, has been a mystery which nobody has explained; but it is now high time that we definitely and deliberately accepted and adopted the ideal of social welfare for our economic study and organisation of society, an ideal which in the nature of things must perforce be ethical, if we seriously intend to achieve it. I have already pointed out what kind of relationship would then subsist between ethics and economics. There is no question here of economics being subordinated to ethics; the pursuit of social welfare is itself an ethical ideal though that welfare can never be comprehended by moral perfection as such. The distinction here involved between values in general (making up the content of social well-being) and moral value or perfection of character in particular, I shall discuss later on; here it is only necessary to say that on this view economics and ethics would both be co-ordinate studies of different aspects of social welfare, but that the one needs to be *regulated* by the other—just as it forms the basic condition of that other—in the interests of total well-being. Ethical considerations should never be irrelevant in the discussion of economic problems.¹ This is the significance of what is sometimes called "functional" or "volitional" economics. Ultimately it is the interest of total well-being that will decide both the ethical regulation of economics and the economic conditioning of ethics—both would thus be instrumental to human welfare—and that decision will be taken by normatics.

This statement of the relationship between economics and ethics can harmonise the evolutionary, psychological and institutional approach to economics with the standpoint of welfare and purpose. For institutions are not external data given to us to work with anyhow, but are the objective embodiments of our own inner purposes developing in relation to the ideal of welfare, and according as we evolve nobler and more satisfactory ideals of well-being, the institutions of society also become amenable to control and re-fashioning. As regards the dependence of economics upon a psychological analysis of human

1. *The Trend of Economics*: pp. 414-420; 469-473. It should be noticed that I have not entered into the details of the bearing of the ethical standpoint upon the different problems of economic process; I am here interested only in the general relation.

nature, too many economists of recent years appear to have thought that because hedonism in certain of its indefensible forms was severely criticised by philosophers of the last century, they should immediately disown it and disinherit it too. The light that ancient teachers saw in hedonism, interpreted as the philosophy of happiness, was not a mere will-of-the-wisp; it was a beacon-light which is yet destined to lead the pilgrims safely to their ethical destination provided they do not tumble into it and get consumed. I have shown the possibility of such a re-interpretation of hedonism in the section on hedonic value. On the basis of such an ethical strand woven into the fabric of social welfare, I wish to sketch in outline a theory of social economics which, it is hoped, will enable us to determine the precise nature of economic value.

6. What in the first instance is the view of society which we should adopt for our purpose? It is not pure individualism or pure collectivism or socialism as these terms have been understood in the social philosophy of the recent past. Without more preface, let me say at once that it is Individualism (with a capital 'I') in the best and noblest sense of the term as expounded by idealistic thinkers like Green and Bosanquet; or, from the side of society, I would call it co-operationism. The individual is not merged in society losing his individuality or uniqueness, nor is he treated as a mere limb of the social organism passively receiving nurture from the centre. He is a living reservoir of energies and conscious purposes, who appreciates his *differences* (in character, capacity, position etc.) from other such individuals as much as his similarities. There is unity of life, aims and ideals as between the different members of society, but this unity is not bought at the price of sacrificing their diversity of views and pursuits. It is on the contrary *achieved* by conscious adjustment and accommodation of individual claims and differences. The individuals act and react upon one another; they consciously relate themselves to one another; and, so long as they are living members of society, they perceive their necessary dependence¹ upon one another. In short, such a society is a consciously co-ordinated co-operative body, which is perhaps, so far as the unity of the social body

1. The meaning of "dependence" discussed elsewhere applies here to the relation of the individual to society. See the chapter on Social Value.

is concerned, less than an organism and more than an organisation loosely so-called. It is, unlike an organism which is only an unconscious unity, a conscious unification of the parts which thus make the whole instead of finding it. It is based upon the reflective intelligence of the members, and makes possible the realisation of purposes truly individual, *i. e.*, universal, through common concerted action.

7. What next are the aims and ideals which such a co-operative society places before its members for realisation and which constitute the elements of social welfare ?

First and foremost, to make possible the living of *the good life, the higher life*, for as large a majority of the members as possible. The nature of this good life will be discussed in detail in a subsequent connection, but the opportunity for self-realisation or self-development will constitute its supreme element. There must be scope for the liberation of the individual energies for the sake of cultivating non-economic values like art, beauty, truth, religion, freedom and so on. Man does not live for bread alone. Lack of goods for the higher wants is indeed one kind of poverty; but there is a worse kind of poverty still, lack of want for the higher goods, which must also be minimised.

Secondly, as a basic condition of the above, to produce material goods and comforts, not indeed in superabundance as often happens in price economy, but in sufficient abundance to meet the needs of all. The question of production, as will be shown later, must at every step be controlled by considerations of social welfare, and more importantly still, equality of distribution and enjoyment must, as far as possible, be established among all classes in society. Not the productive, but the use value, is to be treated as the more significant.

Thirdly, to encourage in persons the instinct of creativity or workmanship so that they may not find work a heavy cost disutility. Great importance is attached to this suggestion. At present the dominating motive in economics is the spirit of acquisitiveness or possessiveness. It is this which has dictated the adoption of the method of competition in business. There is room for competition even in a co-operative society, as we shall see; but it is certainly not in the race for pecuniary gain. Industry should be so organised as to induce in the workers the

simple joy of creation by appealing to their instinct of creativity or workmanship. Industry will profit by such a re-orientation of its motive, for pleasure in one's work is a surer guarantee of productive efficiency than the goad of pecuniary gain. Work must appeal to the exercise of one's personal qualities like effort, judgment, skill, genius etc., and thus lead to self-expression or self-development. It is only attention paid to this side of work—the side which will call forth the latent capacities of the worker's personality—that could prevent our workers from deteriorating into robots. Discovery and problem-solving are of the essence of creativity. Economics in short should regard itself as an "art"—the art of creation, wherein alone, as we shall see, there is true freedom.¹

Fourthly, to recognise withal, and afford scope for, individual differences of character, ability, initiative and training. Since it is the nature of a co-operative society to develop on the strength of individual members, there must be full opportunity in the society for the individuals to develop their own individual mental and moral resources; at the same time those abilities and resources will be recognised and allowed more as a matter of social investment than as instruments for enriching individual pecuniary gain. In this sense competition will remain even in such a society and, to a certain extent, inequalities also even in the matter of possession and enjoyment of goods.

Fifthly, to inculcate in the members a sense of their unity and mutual dependence strong enough to lead them to place the welfare of the society above their own individual well-being. They must be capable of feeling like blood-brothers towards one another, prepared to sacrifice on occasions, if necessary, their individual gain for the sake of their brethren less capable than they, always sustained by the consciousness of their social unity and solidarity. This is not too much to expect of human nature anywhere; only, we have for so long been emphasising the doctrine of individual marginal *utility* in our economic life that towards our brothers and sisters of the same family we can now feel only marginal *unity*! I am pleading for a more liberal dose of this sense of unity among people, and—in any case, for an abandonment of the doctrine of marginal utilities!

1. *Vide* the section on Recreative Value in Ch. VII. *ante*.

8. Such then are the aims and ideals of the co-operative state. How are they to be realised? If there has been one thing more responsible than any other for the inequalities of modern economic life, it is the existence of disproportionate ownership of land, with the consequent right of bequest or disposition, thus causing the concentration of huge estates in individual hands. No individual then in the co-operative state will be allowed to own land or buildings beyond a limit to be fixed by the state. Further, in every state there will always be a large number of people—destitutes, beggars etc.—who for one reason or another are incapable of owning property for themselves. For their sake, the Government will establish common holdings or collective farms of reasonable size worked by a fixed number of families jointly. There will be re-distribution of land among the collective groups once in eight or ten years so as to render possible equal division of fertile and infertile lands. Or in the very beginning plots may, if possible, be so allotted to the different groups as to include a fair share of both fertile and infertile lands. The collectives would be entitled to accumulate only the wealth thus obtained from the land and bequeath it to their children. There would necessarily be inequalities in the accumulation owing to the differential wage or share of the produce which the individual workers or families receive owing to differences in the quality or quantity of their work; but it is obligatory upon the group as a whole to find work for every hand in the farm, or in the alternative, to maintain everybody on the farm. All industries and other productive concerns would be managed by guilds, municipal corporations and trusts and ultimately owned and controlled by the state. Here again differential wage-rate would prevail, and necessarily make room for differential accumulation of wealth. Even for such accumulation of wealth—money or movable goods—an upper limit would be fixed, sufficiently high to allow of elastic fluctuations but not so high as to induce extravagance in the owners.

It goes without saying that in such a state intelligent economic planning prevails. Over-production and unemployment would be eliminated. Nobody would have any anxiety for food, clothing or shelter. To a large extent common messes would prevail, and thus the time and trouble of women would

be saved for more useful and intelligent work. The conception of social welfare would dominate every one's mind and the necessary ideology would be built up in the schools, farms and factories. Competition of a restricted kind would remain, but co-operation and mutual dependence would tell most.

9. The best method of building up such an ideology of social collective welfare, and mutual dependence and co-operation to realise it, is to introduce a conception which, while acting on the popular consciousness in the same way as Sorel's "General Strike Myth" is intended to do on the syndicalists' minds, or Plato's myth of Mother Earth on the minds of the three classes in his republic, is also eminently suited to serve as the standard in theoretical economics with which to measure actual economic achievement in different departments. This is the conception of "Social Substance" or "Social Tissue." Its value—in both the directions that I have indicated—can be appreciated only after its nature has been explained. Social substance is the organisation of those factors, forces and forms, both material and immaterial, which are calculated to realise the total welfare of the society, to achieve social efficiency, and to build up social unity and solidarity. It may be viewed in two aspects; (i) in relation to itself, its own internal content and constitution; (ii) in relation to the members of the society, especially in regard to the major departments of their economic life, *viz.*, production, consumption and distribution.

Living substance consists of matter *i.e.*, material particles with which the cells build themselves up, vital force which enables them to manifest action, and some kind of instinctive mentation—such as is exhibited in appetition and aversion—which is involved in the cells fulfilling their distinctive functions. All these three principles—body, energy and mind—enter into the constitution of the cells which form the tissue. Social substance may similarly be conceived of as having a body, a principle of energy, and a principle of mind. The body is the content of social substance, consisting of cells which are themselves organised on the three-fold principle of matter, energy and mind. The matter of the cells is supplied by economic values predominantly, but organic and hedonic values also permeate the cells. The satisfaction of the organic,

hedonic and economic needs of individuals—such as hunger, thirst, shelter, comfort etc.,—forms the material of the cells of the social substance. This body-material is basic for social life. The energy of the cells is generated by personal, intellectual and aesthetic values. The instinctive mind of the cells or cell-groups which maintain their proper relation, order etc., towards one another, and the harmony or balance of the whole system of cell-life, is supplied by social, moral and religious values, by the values of political and social unity, of love, sympathy etc.. The organisation or synthesis of all these values, then, in such wise that social welfare will get enriched both in the variety and the quality of the values realised at the same time that it is strengthened by internal harmony and integration and solidarity—such an organisation of values is the body of social substance, social substance considered in respect of itself, its own content or internal constitution. It is thus characterised by inclusiveness or expansiveness—the more numerous the values realised, the more expansive the social substance,—as well as by harmony or integration—the absence of conflict, contradiction or inconsistency in the development of values. Injury may be done to social substance by the destruction or non-cultivation of some of its values on the one hand—this would result in the emaciation or depletion of social substance; and by the over-development of some at the expense of others—this would result in the disorganisation or disintegration of social tissue. Poverty and disease are both fatal to social tissue. Economic activities in particular should be so directed as not to jeopardise non-economic values, for otherwise there will be either poverty or disease of social substance ending in its final decay.

And now for the societal relationship of social substance. Values organised as above yield, I said, the body or content of social substance. Such a body requires in its turn—i.e., in relation to the members of the society (in whose life alone social substance lives) and their activities—a principle of energy and a principle of mind. The departments of production, consumption and distribution may be said to be concerned with the three principles respectively. Production—including the primary economic activities where the direct object is the satisfaction of the material wants of the people, as well as the secondary economic activities where the immediate creation of

a material object serves only to release some spiritual value latent in the people—is responsible for the growth of the body. At the same time this growth is also determined by *efficiency* which is mainly the result of proper consumption. And finally, the principle of mind or form which makes for the unity, integrity and solidarity of the members, which maintains like Plato's justice the proper balance or harmony of the different classes, and which is the condition of the existence of the other principles, is the result of a proper and equitable distribution, both among persons and among productive factors.

10. Such a conception of social substance, hypostatized as a living principle of social well-being, would be intangible enough to escape rational analysis in concrete terms; but for that very reason, it would fill the people's minds with ardour, like the conceptions of the "Motherland," the "Fatherland," "family honour," "gentlemanliness," etc., and working in the intuitional part of their nature, engender in them the noblest, deepest and most moving sentiments they possess. At the same time, embodying in concrete form the principle of social welfare, it would serve as the norm in terms of which social wealth—land, labour and capital and forms of economic activity—could intelligibly and consistently be measured. Land, labour and capital could be reduced to a common unit which measures the amount of social substance produced or built up by each, the unit, *viz.*, of "nutritive power." If we should divide land into grazing, wet and dry land, any given area of grazing land, for example, will be paid according to the "units of grazing nutriment" it is capable of producing. Two labourers, again, in digging a well, would be paid according to the "units of drinking nutriment" which they produce. Land, labour and capital then are rewarded, not as areas, men or money-value, but in accordance with the number of units of nutriment to social substance which they produce. And in each case, for each unit of a stronger or healthier nutriment produced, a higher rate of payment would be necessary than sufficed for a unit of a weaker or less healthy nutriment.¹

1. Production of units of nutritive power should, of course, be considered in relation to the difficulty of the job, especially as there may be cases, like research work in science, where no immediate results would be available. Hence measurement of nutritive power would, to some extent, be relative. But in the generality of cases, the principle suggested for

11. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that wealth from the standpoint of social substance would not be identical with wealth in its ordinary sense in economics. Whatever is productive of social substance in any of its three aspects of body, mind and energy would be wealth. It thus includes both tangible and intangible "goods" and services. Wealth is what furthers social weal. Anything harmful to social substance would be, not wealth, but "illth" (Ruskin). Anything which furthers purely individual interests and ignores the larger interests of society cannot be deemed wealth in a co-operative economy—e.g., Gyges' ring, Alladdin's lamp etc.. Merely to be an object of human motivation—individual or social—is not enough to constitute wealth, it must satisfy the requirements of social substance. For the rest, we may say, in conformity with orthodox economics, that usefulness, (or validity as I shall call it) utility, scarcity, transferability or exchangeability and measurability are the characteristics of wealth. I omit *appropriability*, because that savours of individual economics where acquisitive or possessive values alone are emphasised, and I substitute for it, as conveying the same economic meaning, but without its overtone of acquisitiveness, the characteristic of *sharability*. Nothing that cannot be shared among persons is wealth.

12. It is possible to develop the economics of social substance into adequate theories of production, consumption, distribution and so on, but space forbids the treatment of such exfoliations since we are mainly interested in the theory of value which is their flower and fruit. We may, however, make some general observations. Private gain is not the test of economic productivity irrespective of any ethical criteria from the standpoint of social substance. The opinions of writers like Davenport in this matter are hardly acceptable. The peruna, burglar's jimmy, robbery, arson, libel, adulteration, prostitutes, fire-bugs, etc., cannot, in any true sense, be called productive, for they impair social substance in vital parts. The *entrepreneur's* point of view is so prominent in current economics, simply because we look at the situation from an individualist standpoint and do not visualise social life as a whole which is necessarily involved

measurement would be capable of practical application. Objective output needs to be considered along with objective conditions and subjective determinants of labour in measuring and rewarding the output.

in such partial perspectives. How can any activity which diminishes the total amount of products in society without substituting or creating other utilities in exchange be called productive? What further would happen if *all* people in society followed these same methods of "production"? Kant's formula of universalisation as a test of right conduct is not without value in such cases. Again, we must distinguish between physical products and value products. Ordinarily speaking, the larger the supply of goods, the larger the utility, *i.e.*, the want-satisfying power of the aggregate product. But if we remember that social substance is a complex living tissue characterised by the *expanding variety* of values included and by the *unifying spirit of harmony* prevailing among them all, it becomes clear that over-production in any direction produces only abnormal and morbid growths in the tissue and that a *balanced* production of as many types of value as are necessary for social welfare alone will keep the substance in a healthy condition. This can be achieved only in a planned economy where the actual needs of men are systematically studied and planned beforehand thus eliminating dumping, waste, the necessity for destruction of goods produced etc.. Production itself becomes efficient because it calls for many-sided consultation and co-operation throughout the process.

13. Co-operation is needed, not merely among different branches of production, but between producers and consumers also, for only by proper consumption, resulting from such co-operation, can the efficiency of the whole society be secured. The question whether consumption controls production or *vice versa* is futile; we produce largely to consume, no doubt, but not always if we remember the creativeness involved in production, the "art" side of economics which we emphasised. The truer view is, we both produce and consume in order to live, and life means the *good life*, the life of self-development, the life of values or welfare. Both production and consumption then require to be regulated and organised with reference to the creation of an efficient social substance. And if we include in the situation the savers, the investors, and the suppliers of money and credit also, it becomes abundantly clear that a proper relationship of balance must be maintained amongst them in order to realise the healthy distribution of nourishment

throughout the whole substance. Under-consumption, over-consumption, extravagant living, ostentation, harmful consumption etc.—all these abnormalities can be explained as defects tending either to the emaciation or the disorganisation of the living tissue.

We must be briefest in connection with distribution. Distribution is the mind of social substance—the principle of synthesis upon which depends the unity, integrity, harmony and contentment of the social body. It is the improper distribution of social surplus among the different factors of production that has created the numerous diseases of that body in modern economic life. Wages for labour in a co-operative economy would mean not merely subsistence wages just sufficient to support a family but (social) substance wages, *i.e.*, wages sufficient to enable the labourer to acquire efficiency in work and to reflect the social substance in his own life. The wage rate would depend upon the capacity, aptitude and training of the labourer, and the more units of substance-nutrient he produces, the more wages he gets, the rate per unit being the same.¹ This is not, however, equivalent to the marginal productivity or the specific productivity theory of wages. Production being a co-operative concern of different factors, it is not easy to determine the exact amount of the physical product or its value created by different factors. And in a planned economy in particular, there are so many devices by which an obviously losing concern, otherwise essential to the growth of social substance, is kept going that there is no justification for saying that every factor receives its product as pay. Omitting capital from our consideration, we may say that land is the staple food of social substance, the source of all values, for which reason the accumulation of vast estates in single families is to be discouraged as much as possible. Rent for land is the payment for the units of social nutrient it produces. There is no unique law of rent which does not operate equally in wages or capital; for just as rent is the reward of a unit of land-nutrient produced, wages are also the reward for a unit of labour-nutrient produced, and interest is the reward per unit of capital-nutrient created. (In a planned economy, however, there is a tendency for the

1. To be understood with the qualification mentioned in the foot-note on p. 294.

rentier to disappear). All such values are created by the valuations set by social needs upon scarce qualities; and since collective welfare and not profitability is the aim of society, the productivity of land or buildings will not be measured by the high rent that they may fetch; this latter possibility will itself be taken as an indication of the need for a more equitable distribution of land etc., among the different classes in the interests of social substance.

14. And now we reach the heart of our study—the problem of economic value. Suranyi-Unger tells us in his *Economics of the Twentieth Century* that one notices a gradual but pronounced retreat of the value theory in Anglo-Saxon economics, that it has no importance with, for instance, Prof. Pigou in England or Prof. Fetter in America. Friday talks of the “moribund” theory of value. It would appear, however, that this dismal prospect is suspected more for the theory of value based upon marginal utility (whose fate, one learns, is once for all doomed) than for the value concept as such in economics. It cannot well be so for this concept, for it is foundational for any social science. It cannot be replaced by the concept of welfare, for welfare presupposes value. Nor can price be a good substitute for it, for price, it is clear, is only a derivative of value, and unsuitable to serve as a basic concept since it hides the essentially fluid and reciprocal situation of supply and demand which generates value and makes price appear as if it were a given, external, predetermined ultimate in a fixed static market over which the individual has no sort of control.

The treatment of economic value must follow the general lines of the treatment of value in general. We saw that generic value yields on analysis the existence of certain qualities in the object, the existence of certain systems of desire in the subject, and the relation between the subject and the object which gives rise to value. It is, we said, a certain status of satisfyingness which we attribute to the object in virtue of its possession of certain qualities desired by us. Now in economics we always meet with the distinction between value-in-use and value-in-

exchange. Exchange value—discussed by "Catalactics"¹ or the science of exchange—evidently derives from use-value which is more primary, but use-value itself, when we forget for the moment the essentially contributory character of *all* values, may be distinguished from consumption-values or consummations. However, we have already shown in what sense economics must be regarded as a science of means and with what class of goods in particular it deals. "Value-in-use" simply tells us of a value found in *using* an object, but by itself it does not tell us what that value *as such is*. In fact, if we carry analysis in this matter far enough, we shall meet with four or five stages in the development of the notion of economic value. To begin with, we must distinguish the usefulness of the objects themselves by virtue of the possession of certain qualities—e.g., sweetness in sugar, heat-producing energy in coal etc.,—from the value which we attach to them. This natural affinity between objects by virtue of which one object appears to be peculiarly suited to subserve the needs of another, I have called validity in objects. Some, though not all, economists recognise this stage as distinct from that of value. When we come to the human recognition and appreciation of such qualities from the standpoint of their capacity to satisfy some human want or desire, we reach the conception of "utility"—the magic word of economics. But here there arise difficulties—apart from those noticed already in connection with the kind of utility-goods that economics is supposed to treat of. If utility is defined as "a quality attributed to the goods and derived from our desire"—the quality of allaying "our feeling of discomfort arising from the want"²—this in itself would appear to be a fair definition of value, as I conceive of it (disregarding as unessential the pain-psychology of desire involved in it).

But one ambiguity in the definition must be noticed. Is the desire a *conscious* desire or not? Is the satisfaction a *consciously* felt experience or not? On this question we find no light thrown in any work on economics. And for the theory of value, the question *is* important, for, according to the argument of this work, unless one is *conscious* of the utility of an object, for a

1. Used by Whatley in his *Introductory Lectures on Political Economy*.

2. Birck: *Theory of Marginal Value*: p. 11.

baby crying for milk, for instance, there is or arises no value. If again, following Marshall and his school, we substitute "satisfaction" for "utility," and talk only of felt satisfactions, are there not things which have high value and yet which are not satisfactions, for the simple reason that they are impossible of attainment? Perpetual peace is obviously a dream, and yet who can deny it the highest value? And what of cases where the expected satisfaction from one object is not realised? These difficulties make it plain how cursory has been the treatment of "utility" or "satisfaction" in economics. It is to avoid such troubles that value has been defined in these pages as the "status of *satisfyingness*" (not satisfactoriness or satisfaction) of an object emerging out of the *process* of contemplation. Moreover, utility and the psychic factor of desire behind it are explained by economists in a narrow sense as essentially determined by the immediate needs of the moment and future security. While this is true enough, we must also remember that the psychological determinants of economic behaviour comprehend a vaster concourse of factors. The impulse of self-assertion, social sentiments such as patriotism, loyalty and fellow-feeling, acquired sentiments such as the desire for collecting autographs and old editions of books, sentiments of hatred and love, religious sentiments—these are some of the non-economic psychological elements whose satisfaction will affect economic value either favourably or adversely.

Utility then as desire-satisfyingness should give us the essence of value-in-use, which is only a periphrasis for value in general. But this is not, strictly speaking, utility in economics, much less economic value. Economic utility must at the same time be a scarcity. Where one person, or a number of persons, exist and all things are to be had for the asking, there would be generic value or use value but not economic utility or value. Why or how scarcity is necessary to confer value upon objects it is not easy to understand. Scarcity may increase the value of the object that is scarce, but how can it be a constituent of value which in its nature is determined entirely by objective validity and subjective desire, unless we suppose, ludicrously enough, that validity and desire are themselves conditioned by scarcity? And yet according to economics the desiring agent must perceive the limitation of supply before he can attribute

worth or utility to the object. Such a kind of utility is variously known as "desiredness", "wantability" (by far the best term), *wert*, subjective worth, "natural value" etc.. And some economists add that a choice and comparison of the marginal utilities of qualitatively different objects or acts is necessary before there can arise subjective value. So far then we have value-in-use (which is non-economic) and wantability, subjective value or what we may call primary economic value.

15. These values can exist even if there be a single individual in the world. But now economic value proper or exchange value emerges when a *society* of persons, big or small, is established, and division of labour, consequent upon limitation of circumstance or individual capacity, becomes the rule. Even here, however—and I should like to stress this point—, granted division of labour and the other natural factors of scarcity, utility etc., catalectical value does not arise except on the assumption that people are not willing to work for one another except for reward, or *quid pro quo*. The parents do not value economically this labour of love for the children, nor do lovers or friends with respect to one another. It follows therefore, that *if* a society could be organised purely on the basis of mutual love, value, and primary economic value dependent upon validity, utility, scarcity, labour, cost etc., would continue to exist without necessarily giving rise to secondary economic value, conditioned by *quid pro quo*. It is thus necessary to bear in mind that if we consider the point of neutral relations among persons or of "marginal unity," so to say, as the "zone of indifference," the indefinite extension and variation on either side of love or hate marks the stages through which economic value completely disappears or reaches its culmination respectively. The zone itself would indicate the point of normality in value. The matter is of considerable significance in relation to the determination of value in a co-operative economy where *exchange* as such is not the ruling principle of organisation. And a theory of value must be elastic enough to be applicable both to the competitive capitalistic economy as well as to the non-competitive socialistic economy.

Stable ground, in any case, has not yet been reached in the discussion of exchange value. For some economists like Birck distinguish subjective exchange value from objective

exchange value.¹ The former represents the ratio in which the individual is willing to exchange for another commodity while the latter stands for the proportion in which two things have *actually* been exchanged frequently in the market by other persons. Objective exchange, that is, is market-value or price. Here at last we seem to have reached the last word in economic value unless we want to go further and talk in terms of money-price!

The question of peculiar importance, then, for orthodox economic theory is to explain what determines exchange value primarily, apart from the refinements of market-value and normal value. Here a number of theories have been put forward from time to time of which the most important are the labour theory of value, the cost of production theory, and the theory of marginal utility. Each one of them—the last most of all—has been subjected to scathing criticisms by economists and non-economists alike. From the point of view of the present writer, they all suffer from this defect—that they have been propounded under the impulsion of an individualist and competitive economy and take no account either of the social implications of the process of valuation or of the possible situation in a co-operative and planned economy shot through and through with the ethical presuppositions of freedom, equality and self-development. To make use of a current but none-too-academic distinction, these theories belong to the realm of "price economics," not to that of "welfare economics."

16. Moreover, all these theories have been vitiated by a wrong or at least inadequate application of the psychological fact of desire to economic transactions. It is supposed that desires, wants etc., can be quantitatively measured in exact terms. Doubtless introspection reveals differences of greater or less in our desires. And the amount of effort we are prepared to put forth to realise our desires is a rough indication of the strength of our desires. But it is clearly impossible to determine that one desire is so much greater than another and thus to state the strength of our desires in exact quantitative terms. If I buy a pair of shoes for six rupees and a fiddle for sixty rupees, between these two *prices* there is no doubt an exact arithmetical relationship, one is ten times as great as the other. But

1. *Theory of Marginal Value*: pp. 103, 13.

can we say from this that my *desire* for a violin was ten times as great as my desire for a pair of shoes? Obviously not. Desire was only one factor in the total situation determining the price I paid; my friend's inducement, the persuasiveness of the seller, a false sense of honour or prestige on my part when it was put to me that the amount was not large for my purse—any number of such other factors may have combined to make me pay the amount I actually did for the violin. And above all, since I wanted a violin *and* a pair of shoes although I might have wanted the foot-wear more urgently than the violin, supposing that that was the only instrument available, I should certainly be prepared to pay a heavy price for it although psychologically my desire for the instrument might be less strong than my desire for the foot-wear. My desire for food is certainly stronger at any time than my desire for a coat; but if I want a coat at all, I should always have to pay more for it than for a full meal. Price is no indication of the strength of a desire.¹

17. The same attempt to introduce exact quantitative measurements into human desires—when they are not thus susceptible of measurement—is responsible for the time-honoured theories of diminishing utility and valuation, and marginal utility and valuation. In the first place, the value of an article may remain the same while its utility would vary with different consumers at different times. A loaf of bread costs the same to the rich man who can afford a large price for it and to the poor man who can buy it only with difficulty. While the price of the loaf remains the same for both, the loaf has obviously greater utility to the poor man than to the rich man. Secondly, there is the paradox of value according to which utility and value seem to vary inversely with each other. Goods with the greatest utility have the least value-in-exchange, like bread and meat, while things having the highest value have the least utility. In the third place, utility does not grow less with every additional loaf bought. A man, let us say, requires ten loaves for his five children: here every pair of loaf is equally useful and the doctrine of diminishing utility becomes meaningless. If he buys more than ten, it is only for future use,

1. See on this point Thouless' *General and Social Psychology*, pp. 361-368.

and then they will be as useful as the ten loaves. The law of satiable wants is simply inapplicable in such a case. Just as no person wants to buy the whole supply of any commodity but only a very small quantity, so no person wants only a few loaves for all time, but would like to extend his demand every now and then over a long time, and then the law of satiety will not apply. Are human desires satiable at all? What about greed, ambition and ostentation? On the other hand, the law of satiation will sometimes act in such a manner that it belies the doctrine of diminishing utility. It is true that a man with a large stock of potatoes will desire an additional sack less than another with a small stock, but it is not true that his desire in such a case is always determined by considerations of diminished utility which implies deliberate calculation etc.. When a child is being fed with spoonfuls of milk, as it approaches the point of satiation it will drink less and less and finally not drink at all. Would anybody suggest that the child calculates here the usefulness to it of successive increments of milk as it became gradually replete? Is not much of adult human behaviour, where cravings come into play, also the result of such automatic action implying no deliberate calculation as regards utility?¹

18. How does marginal utility explain the paradox of value? Is bread cheap because people have enough of it? The rich may have enough of it—how about the poor? According to the argument of diminishing utility, things like bread have great utility for the poor people; in order of importance, bread comes first to them, hence they should be prepared to pay a much higher price for bread; why should they not then be charged a higher price for bread than the rich? Different prices, it may be said, can't be charged to suit the pockets of different people because of competition in the market. An excellent reason. But what has competition to do with marginal utility? Granted that everybody has enough of bread and therefore the price is low, how does the consideration of marginal utility enter here to determine the low price of bread? The marginal utility, say, of the fifth loaf would be the same to a family of three persons whether bread becomes dear or cheap. If it be said that not the fifth but the fourth or the third would

1. This whole question has been admirably discussed by Thouless, *General and Social Psychology*, pp. 371—377.

then become the marginal unit for the buyer, this will then depend, not upon the utility, marginal or maximal, of bread, but upon the purchasing power of the buyer, which is quite a different thing.

The simple truth is that marginal utility has no meaning in such cases. Bread costs the same to the rich and the poor alike because it is foundational for social substance: material wants of the elementary sort are to be satisfied first in the case of all persons, and while other things like diamonds could be eliminated from life, things like bread cannot be eliminated without danger to life. Add to this the consideration of the scarcity or the superfluity of the article in question, you have the explanation of the paradox of value also. In any case valuation by marginal utility is entirely hypothetical and unreal to facts of life. Nobody calculates or decides according to such a table of valuation, so as to arrive at the exact marginal price. Nobody in the first place goes to a market with any definite price figure in his mind for a commodity which he wants to buy. To think so is to assume again that the desire of the buyer, as the desire of the seller, can be expressed in exact quantitative forms. In normal cases what happens is that if a certain article, or a certain quantity of it, is absolutely necessary, the buyer will pay any price for it, and not calculate by the margins. If it is not absolutely necessary, he may or may not buy the article, or he may offer a price which he thinks to be reasonable, and which will lie anywhere between a highest which he will in no circumstances pay and a lowest which he will most readily pay. Thus value really depends upon and varies with the actually felt wants of people, *i.e.*, upon utility merely (though even this, as we have seen, is not always true), and not upon marginal utility.

The theory of marginal utility can hold only of commodities which can be divided into small portions in such a way that each portion can be sold out independently of other portions. Where this is not the case, the doctrine has simply no relevance. When it is linked with the doctrine of consumer's surplus, several things are confused, *e.g.*, the times of purchase, the effect of having already had a certain quantity of the article etc.. Further, it does not describe the actual satisfactions of men under normal conditions, but only their possible attitude in

times of scarcity. The doctrine, again, considers only single commodities and their separable portions. In practical life, however, many things together become indispensable, such as food, drink and clothing, and the destruction of any one of them would be as great a disaster as the destruction of any other. What relation has the doctrine of margins to such a situation?

Marginal utility does not even determine price, for even before the point of satiety has been reached the buyer has to buy goods, *i.e.*, pay the price which is normally fixed by the seller irrespective of the buyer's calculation of margins. It may determine how much of the article he will buy, but it determines neither the economic value of the article—for this depends on want in general, not upon the point of satiety,—nor the exchange value.

19. The labour theory of value and the cost of production theory are as imperfect and inadequate as the theory of marginal utility. Without discussing them, therefore, it is proposed to state here a theory of value from the standpoint of the recent re-orientation of economic thought to social welfare, which yet will be found to do justice to the elements of truth contained in the orthodox theories.

One or two simple facts may be admitted at the outset. Any theory of value in economics must proceed on the basis of supply and demand. In a competitive economy, sometimes supply may set the tune, at other times demand may be king and call for the tune, as Marshall has shown by his ingenious analysis of prices in relation to short periods, long periods and very long periods. In any circumstance, however, and even in a socialistic economy, both factors must be present,¹ though in the latter condition of things, if we suppose that planning also prevails, supply obviously follows on the heels of demand, either natural or determined by the state. Further, whatever state of moral perfection we may suppose a society to be in, exchange *must* be the ruling principle of economic life, exchange not merely in the sense of exchange of services (which may prevail even in a society of saints) but in the sense of *unwillingness* on the part of one person to work for another with-

1. With some exceptions. For there are cases where price-fixing bears no relation to, *i. e.*, is not in any way determined by, the demand-supply situation.

out some *quid pro quo*, which therefore inclines him to *evaluate* his work in terms of an accepted unit. A co-operative economy may show a willingness to moderate this tendency in various ways, but it cannot remove it altogether. *Some* part of work may be taken as pastime, *some* as art or pleasure, but there is bound to be an irreducible minimum which is felt to be distinctly—like work, involving discomfort.

Bearing these facts in mind, we may say that economic value or exchange value is the vitalising distribution of social substance determining the degree of conformity between the absolute disutility of producers and the relative desirousness of consumers.

This definition, intended to suit both a competitive and a non-competitive economy, has its own peculiar features. Like other forms of value, economic value is also a form of satisfyingness, in this case the satisfaction obtained for the whole society as well as for the exchanging parties by the proper distribution of social substance among them all. The enhancement of the health of the social substance—its "vitalisation"—is a point for satisfaction for all. Of this more anon. The definition points out further that, in consonance with the spirit of a co-operative economy, there is no economic value apart from relation to social substance. In their own nature, producer's disutility and consumer's desire are different from, *i.e.*, undetermined by, and underived from, each other. They are not, however, antagonistic to each other. But in their mode of existence or self-fulfilment, they as well as social substance, involve one another. Production is largely for the sake of consumption, *i.e.*, for the sake of living the good life. Consumption requires production. The one cannot fulfil its end without relation to the other. But both production and consumption depend, in their turn, upon social substance, for it is in the interests of social substance that production, distribution and consumption are all undertaken. They depend upon social substance in the sense that the latter determines the kinds and the degree, or extent, of production and consumption and the equitable method of economic distribution. It is the standard with reference to which the three great aspects of economic life are worked out and adapted or adjusted to one another. It is thus their controller and guide. It is the

regulative idea of economics. It is the presupposition of economics.

Production, consumption, distribution and social substance exist in an inseparable union which realises the good of the society as a whole. Social substance supports, sustains and directs the activities of production etc.. These exist no doubt to realise their own individual natures—e.g., producers want good profits, consumers cheapness and good quality—but ultimately it is in promoting the interests of social substance alone that their individual natures are fulfilled. These are the effects, social substance is the cause. They may be said to be the modes of social substance. Further, each one of them not only has its own individuality, but also value; for as distinct entities, each having a nature of its own, and each a function corresponding to that nature, they each have a value of their own. But their value is enriched, enhanced and perfected by the inseparable and vital union into which they enter with social substance. To explain this in economic terms: bare production, we may say, results in value-in-use or non-economic value; the bare desire of the consumer represents primary economic value or subjective value or worth or wantability. But when the two enter into union with social substance (which forces the consideration of the producer's disutility to the forefront), there emerges secondary economic value or exchange value. Exchange value is thus seen to be emergent from, or supervenient upon, the relation of dependence upon social substance into which production etc. enter with it. For it is in accordance with the requirements of social substance that, human nature being what it is, and conditions of society being what they are, those who produce a larger amount of a given good than what suffices for their own consumption should demand *quid pro quo* of those who, not having directly contributed to its production, nevertheless show a great desire for it. Further, exchange value—or secondary economic value—bears a peculiar relation to wantability, utility or primary economic value. Utility by itself represents only a vague desire on the part of the consumer. He may feel that several objects or classes of object are capable of satisfying his want and that some satisfy it better than others, but he might not have the necessary means to buy the former in preference to the latter. Hence utility is a stage of economic

value which is inchoate and indeterminate in kind. What goods he is going to buy he himself has not yet determined. Upon this stage of value-indetermination, there arises the determinate stage of economic value when the purse, or, it may be, the necessity of circumstances, determines what utilities or kind of goods the consumer shall buy. Exchange value therefore is a more determinate, clearer and higher form of economic value which is supervenient upon the lower stage of mere wantability.

20. "Disutility" means the excess of pain over pleasure, or the unredeemed sacrifice that a person has to make in the production of goods. It tells us that up to a point, which varies of course with different individuals, work, enlivened by factors to be considered later, does not sink to the level where alone it can generate economic value (in the sense of exchange value). There is no disparagement intended in the use of the term "sink," for it states only a scientific analysis of facts, and in the recognition of this fact alone consists the economic salvation of human society. Up to that point, therefore, there would be no *cost* in the economic sense, for cost is merely the sum of those same factors in their *negative* aspect which acting upon human will and exertions so as to limit them, limits thereby production and supply of goods also; and up to that point no such limitation would be felt. These factors, indicated already in a previous connection, are the satisfaction involved in the instinct of workmanship, the sheer joy of working, and the sense of unity and love felt for those with whom the commodities are exchanged.¹ In a co-operative economy, they would take a longer time to pass over into their negative phase which may collectively be called the stage of "disutility" (counted in respect of the time-element, degrees of agreeableness of working conditions, etc.), for the sense of unity is stronger in such a society, and the instinct of workmanship is given a freer play. Owing to these reasons, prices do not, even in the long run, entirely depend upon the cost of production in such a society—the needs of social substance are more imperative than the scramble for profits. But leaving the fullest margin for the operation of such

1. There is no doubt that these last sentiments powerfully affect economic value. The hospitals of a country charge a much higher rate for medical treatment for outsiders than for its territorials; non-co-operation with the enemy conquerors may lead even to the refusal of all economic transactions with them!

factors, there must come a time sooner or later when work would become irksome labour from every point of view, and then it may be said that it has passed into the stage of *absolute* disutility, unredeemed so far as the worker's own psychology is concerned, and sustainable only by the consideration of exchange or reward. Then appears "cost." Cost indicates scarcity also because the pain felt in producing a given quantity of an article proportionately to the demand determines its availability. And, needless to state, it includes reluctant waiting and expenses of production in all its various forms such as fixed charges, operating expenses, differential and residual costs, prime and supplementary costs, sunk costs, joint costs, selling expenses etc., etc.. It does not, however, include "opportunity cost" which has no meaning in a co-operative economy owing to reasons which should already have become clear.

"Desirousness" is used, not as equivalent to desirability or utility in the sense of marginal utility, but purely as meaning the craving or attachment for an object accompanied by a sense of want. The present theory makes economic value depend upon the valuable object's relation to the psychic factor of desire, both on the side of supply as well as on that of demand. The desire is determined by the usefulness of the object in contributing to social substance, but this usefulness is not itself the source of value. The desire of the consumer must, moreover, be effective, in the sense that it must be backed up both by his willingness and capacity to purchase the article. The capacity to purchase is essential in determining value, which corresponds on the side of demand to scarcity on the side of supply. Further, this effective desirousness would naturally be relative to persons, place, time, circumstances and goods. Value in itself is a relative conception.

Disutility in production, measured against desire and capacity in demand, determines economic value. When we take into consideration the distinction between "market value" and "normal value," we need to say that the producers are "marginal" producers, and the consumers "marginal" consumers. "Marginal" producers are "those producers who will withdraw from production or materially reduce their production unless prices in the long run are high enough to cover their expenses of production including minimum or necessary pro-

fits."¹ And marginal consumers are the bulk of the people who can be counted upon to buy at the marginal cost of production. The producers and consumers are not different groups of people who are simply given and who come face to face with each other. They affect and determine each other. And particularly in a planned society, production and consumption would be controlled and regulated at every step, and so no rigid meaning can be attached to these terms. The margin in each case becomes elastic owing to control and direction.

And this brings out another characteristic of economic value contemplated by the definition. The idea of a "fair price" or "just price" so much emphasised by Gabriel Tardae and Alfred Tardae, which appears to be inveterately rooted in the popular consciousness, can easily be realised in a co-operative economy, for in such an economy, price has a relation, not merely to producer's cost in the long run and on the whole—whether it be analysed with reference to short, or long or very long periods—but to the needs and capacities of the marginal consumers, meaning by the phrase here, not what was explained on the previous page, but consumers of average buying capacity. The price that "ought to prevail" is the price that brings about an equitable distribution of social substance amongst the members of a community *as a whole*, judged by the "vitalisation" thereby introduced into social substance. Likewise, the definition provides for the social absorption of profits and surplus, for all such surplus would automatically flow into the heart of social substance vitalising it and developing it both in the direction of expansiveness and in that of integration. Above all, however, the definition has the merit of relating value to *distribution* as well as to production and consumption. Economic value formerly used to be explained solely in terms of production; later on, the consumer's point of view was also felt to be equally important for the discussion and was brought in. But it is surprising that economists should not as yet have perceived that unless the factors of production are *explicitly related* to exchange value, the *notion* of economic value is not complete. Doubtless the discussion of production involves them, but unless we theoretically at least assume that in any given case of exchange, land, labour and capital have each received their

1. Richard T. Ely: *Outlines of Economics*: pp. 185-6.

due proportion of returns, the idea of value would be imperfect. It is at any rate certain that the idea of distribution among the different *classes* of people is not included in contemporary discussions of economic value. For the present theory of value, this is of the very first importance, for upon it depends the soul or mind of social substance which would otherwise get disorganised, disrupted, and disintegrated owing to lack of good-will and harmony among the different classes.

21. From the standpoint of social substance, the distinction between normal value and market value cannot be pressed. In either case, value is not a fixed given something which the individual has to reckon with and submit to helplessly, as it were. It is the interest of the individual to which scarcity and utility are related as the obverse to the reverse of a coin, coupled with his capacity, that generates value, and this value gets a fixity when the similar interests of numerous individuals in a group are fused together and socialised and expressed in the form of a demand schedule, to which corresponds the supply schedule of the producers based upon their disutility and their estimates of the possible valuations that society as a whole may place upon their products.¹ The two schedules are supposed to meet at a particular point of equilibrium in the competitive price economy; they will be made to meet at some point in the planned economy by control and direction exercised in the interest of social welfare *as a whole*. That is why we need to emphasise in our analysis of value the importance of social substance rather than "opposed pulls" or "equalisation of opposing forces at the margin." The greatness of Marshall consisted in the fact that he sought to discover the factors of *ultimate causation* of value, the totality of the conditions that determine demand and supply, and came to the conclusion that price is ultimately determined by cost of production; but he did not see that social welfare or modes of living could act as the ultimate determinant of all other factors and conditions. In fact, individual valuations are largely determined by social valuations, *i.e.*, by what others—one's friends, neighbours, leaders of fashion etc.,—consider valuable. There are price-facts which escape the demand and supply formula altogether as interpreted by orthodox economics, and

1. The meaning of the two schedules, as used here, is thus slightly different from their ordinary signification.

they can be explained only by the introduction of social considerations of a non-economic character. Still, for practical purposes, the factors of ultimate causation must be sought for in the totality of the demand situation, *i.e.*, a given group of individuals who have desires of varying intensity and effectiveness.

22. The drift of the above argument is to suggest that to define economic value, as is often done, as "a power of exchange" is to define it in objective terms as a quality or capacity inherent in objects by virtue whereof some of them exchange with each other in fixed measures. Value is not an objective quality or capacity primarily, but a subjective fact of *the intensity of one's desire* for an object and the amount of effort or sacrifice one is prepared to put forth to obtain it. The fact that *two* such desires approach each other, meet at a particular point and then interpenetrate peacefully does not alter the desire-basis of the meeting point; instead of, or in addition to, two individual satisfactions which two persons could independently obtain by their independent exertions, as in primary economic value, there is now a single fact of *mutual satisfaction* by exchange, and exchange value is the objective expression, in terms of price, of this mutuality of satisfaction. Conformity, we saw, is the common objective characteristic of all kinds of value; here the conformity is between one person's effective desire for an object and another's disutility in producing it. The degree of this conformity, however, is itself determined by the degree of vitalisation of social substance consequent upon its distribution and that shows that economic value is ultimately rooted in the structure of social welfare. It shows that economics is after all a normative science.

Whether economic value is a varying relation or an absolute quantity is often debated with great acerbity, and the concept of quality is sometimes indiscriminately applied to both. In the light of the foregoing analysis, it can now be seen that value is certainly relative, but it is neither a relation, *i.e.*, a ratio, nor a quantity, but a fact, an event, which can both qualitatively be analysed and quantitatively measured.

23. Freedom is realised in every value, and the nature of freedom achieved in economic life may briefly be indicated. Economics, I said, must be regarded as an art, and the governing motive of an art is the desire for freedom. But all art works under limitations, which constitutes therefore the moment of necessity. The emancipation from the pressure of the acquisitive or possessive instinct effected by considerations of social welfare and social substance is the main element of economic freedom, while the limitations of supply, the limitations of human capacity which makes division of labour inevitable, and the limitation of the sense of human unity which makes exchange unavoidable, are the deterministic elements of economic life. In so far as man can utilise the material basis of life to serve the non-material needs of the spirit, he enters the expansive regions of spiritual freedom; but as yet this entry is halting and exceedingly slow, for mind is still weighted down by the heaviness of material goods. Mind has certainly escaped from the thralldom of the body, but only to attach itself to other material bodies such as land, house, money etc.. Still, inasmuch as the spirit has disentangled itself—disengaged itself—from the closest material sheath in which it had hitherto enveloped itself, and leaped over, as it were, to the freer atmosphere of the outside world, mind has achieved a forward step in freedom.

A time will come, however, in the evolution of the spirit's freedom¹ when the spirit will consciously distinguish itself from economic goods also while continuing to utilise them for its material well-being. At this stage, external objects would come to depend on the self, not the self on them. They would have a significance only in relation to the self which utilises them. Thus there would arise a co-operative union between the self and its objects in which, while the self uses the objects for its own purposes, involves them, so to say, and objects "depend" on the self, the value of each factor is enriched and realised. This means that even while continuing to live its life in the economic sphere, the spirit would actualise and enjoy a higher degree of freedom akin to moral freedom. Hence the importance of economic value in the hierarchy of values.

1. After the level of Social Value has been attained. See the concluding section on Social Value.

CHAPTER IX

EMERGENCE OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF VALUE :

PERSONAL AND SOCIAL VALUES.

(5) Personal Value

1. The appropriateness of treating of individual or personal value after economic value will be apparent to any one who reflects how economic factors play an important part in the development of individual life. The relation between the two—both actual and ideal—will become clearer as we proceed.

By "personal" values, we shall understand to begin with not merely the value of ambition, but all that goes to enhance the personal status of the individual, all that goes to form a "personage." Personality in this connection should not therefore be interpreted in moral or ethical terms—that belongs to a later stage of our enquiry; here we are concerned with personal values in their ordinary non-ethical sense as including such things as the individual's status, place, or rank in society, his power, prestige and influence, society's estimation of him, his private profit and enjoyment, his possessions and pursuits, his interests and the methods he may adopt to realise them etc.. We are in short raising the question of the value of the "high Egoist" in society. We shall see, as we proceed, how the connotation of "personal value" changes.

There are those who believe that as the individual *qua* individual has no independent reality apart from society, he can have no value of his own either. But this view of the individual has been given up in the section on economic value. In the co-operative community, the individual is real and has a life of his own, in a sense independent of the lives of others; it is in virtue of this independence that he consciously reacts to the influences of others, *i.e.*, co-operates with them in order to realise a common good (so-called) which is, however, individually shared, coloured and enjoyed. Mutual and conscious dependence on society itself presupposes independent members.

And these independent individuals have their own individual value or significance—their own contribution to make to the common treasury—however much that value be capable of being enriched by the interpersonal intercourse of individuals.

We start, then, under the assumption that egoism is in a sense right. For it supplies the fulcrum to the lever by means of which all other values are raised into life out of their inconscient state of mere validities in the naturalistic realm. If personal development had no value, none of the other values could find a *locus* or even be brought into being, for it is the individual who creates the other values—the economic, the intellectual etc., and if he thought that his own existence had absolutely no value, he would sooner commit suicide than live and realise those values. Every individual, therefore, is *prima facie* an end in himself constituting, in Kant's words, a member of a kingdom of ends. Whatever enhances his individuality should thus be of supreme value both to himself and to society. Hence the general condemnation of all egoism as unalloyed selfishness is unfair and misleading.

2. The "egoist" who would thus live as a member of a kingdom of ends is one who has a high consciousness of his *ability* to advance the society's interest as well as his own. But egoism is ordinarily used in ethics to denote the pursuit of policies calculated to further the individual's own ends. It may assume either an ethical form stating that my own good ought to be pursued as the ultimate end of conduct, or a psychological form insisting that as a matter of fact in all human acts, however apparently altruistic they be, it is one's own good that forms the inspiring influence of conduct. Hobbes and Spinoza illustrate the latter type, Butler and Sidgwick the former. In both forms, it must be noticed, altruistic conduct is not forbidden; it may even be necessary sometimes, but only as the best means of achieving one's own happiness. Distinct from this type of egoism, is the other type which says that I ought to pursue my own pleasure always because thereby I should be realising the ultimate end of bringing about the greatest happiness in the universe. The one considers altruism as a means to egoism; the other regards egoism as the means to utilitarianism. These different forms will be examined here in summary fashion.

It is desire which is the primary cause of the sense of "individuality." The character of a man's life is determined by the colour of his persistent desires, and it is character that makes the individual, that makes him feel in himself a separate existence. The desires connected with the deepening of this sense of individuality are of diverse kinds. We may broadly classify them as follows: (1) the desire for self-preservation, self-maintenance or self-persistence, seeking satisfaction in the appetites of hunger and thirst; (2) the desire for self-enhancement, self-adornment or self-enlargement which makes one build a home, crave for wealth, possessions, property etc.. It is in (1) and (2) that economic values find the clearest scope for the operation of their influence; (3) the desire for self-glorification, for honour, place, power, prestige, victory, fame, etc.. It is in (2) and (3) that we find the field over which "ambition" has sway; (4) the desire for self-multiplication or reproduction evidenced in sex-appetite. This may be said to reinforce (3), for propagation of oneself or one's species is often a means of strengthening one's own power in behalf of oneself or against others. It may be observed that none of these desires, at the pre-moral level, can by itself be said to be good or bad, they are simply non-moral. In this sense both egoism and altruism may be found to be inherent in the individual's nature. The same instinct which excites an animal to fight for its safety may sometimes impel it to sacrifice itself for the protection of its young. In man, however, living in a society, and living, as he sometimes does at least, by means of reflection, it is not always apparent that he would be doing the best thing possible in the world by pursuing the good of others only. Hence the sophistications of egoism which, as formulated above, have, it must be confessed, a certain amount of plausibility.

3. It may be admitted at once that "with only a little more rational self-love, the largest portion of human misery would disappear." And it may also be admitted that the appeal to what is called "enlightened self-interest" in matters of national or social regeneration often succeeds better than the appeal to the purely moral sense of mankind. But the danger of such policies lies in the fact that self-love and self-interest, when once accepted as guides to conduct, can with difficulty be kept within the bounds of prudence or rationality. More

important, however, for our purpose is the theoretical difficulty lurking in egoism. Prof. G. E. Moore has pointed out¹ that to say that "my own good is the sole good" or that it is "the ultimate rational end" of conduct is to say that it is good absolutely or good-in-itself. And what is good-in-itself or absolutely good is something which every one should try to promote or aim at producing. Hence if the exclusive possession or enjoyment of something by myself be absolutely good, it follows that it is everybody else's duty so to act as to aim at my having it and enjoying it exclusively. But further, if every one argues in the same manner, we reach the astounding paradox—nothing short of an absolute self-contradiction—that "each man's happiness is the sole or absolute good!" That is, "a number of different things are each of them the only good thing there is!"

Moore is unanswerable in this criticism of his. But it is surprising that he does not see that if this criticism is applicable to egoism which says that my own good should be aimed at as the sole good or rational end of conduct (ethical egoism), it is equally applicable to egoism which regards itself as a *means* to utilitarianism. For here also every one would be aiming at *his own* pleasure or happiness as the best means to the realisation of the ultimate end of greatest happiness. The ultimate end being identified, as Moore does in effect identify it, with the happiness of oneself and of those immediately connected with oneself, one can imagine the contradiction in practical life issuing out of the conviction that each one's good is the absolute good! And apart from practical life, the theoretical contradiction involved in saying that each man's pleasure is the *best means* of realising the greatest happiness is no less apparent. Alone of the three forms of egoism, psychological egoism seems to escape these inconsistencies. For like psychological hedonism, (which has been defended elsewhere) it avers that whatever the conscious ideals of life, conduct is, on an ultimate analysis, found to be rooted in the desire to achieve one's own good. But if this be true, and if it involves no contradiction, it is only because, like psychological hedonism again, it does not recognise any unbridgeable gulf between my good and another's good. To hold *in thought* that my good

1. *Principia Ethica*: p. 99.

alone is the absolute good results in the self-contradiction noticed above. But if in aiming at another's good I am at the same time realising my own, no contradiction arises. Such a possibility, however, requires further explanation and qualification before it can meet with acceptance at the hands of the critical reader.

There are some who consider that ambition has great significance in relation to the development of moral life. It is a great incentive to achievement; it integrates human nature in a way that no other force can; it has a morality of its own expressed in the code of "prudence;" and it demands that every significant capacity of the individual be developed in relation to his programme of achievement.¹ All this, of course, is eminently true, but it does not even touch the fringe of the moral problem connected with egoism. If the pursuit of the end for which ambition works so helpfully be itself logically self-contradictory or ethically unjustifiable, if ambition to achieve one's own glory and gain be undesirable, what availeth it to sing of the other virtues of ambition or egoism? Ambition may have a morality of its own; but it is a misnomer to call prudence morality. The "will-to-power" may place the highest value on efficiency, but it is misleading to identify efficiency with virtue. If it is not true that the end justifies the means, it is emphatically not true that the means can ever justify the end.

4. Egoism, then, as it is ordinarily understood, appears hard to defend. Idealist thinkers have perceived it ever since the beginnings of moral reflection, and they have therefore uniformly been advocating the suppression—rather, the sacrifice—of egoistic tendencies and the cultivation only of altruistic motives. But probably even this is not a correct statement. Rather, we should say, they have perceived no contradiction at all between egoism and altruism when once the ego and the alter have, as they think, been truly conceived. So conceived, self-sacrifice for the sake of society becomes the best means of self-realisation. It is best to allow idealists themselves to speak on this point. Prof. Mackenzie, one of the leading and most balanced of British idealists, writes as follows:—"The truth seems to be...that there is even less opposition between egoism and

1. Dewitt H. Parker: *Human Values*; pp. 164—168.

altruism...We can realise the true self only by realising social ends. In order to do this we must negate the merely individual self which...is not the true self. We must realise ourselves by sacrificing ourselves." Thereby we reach a universal point of view "from which our own private good is no more to us than the good of any one else." This is working out one's own nature to its perfection "from the point of view of the whole" when "it is no longer to be described as Egoism...In such self-realisation, the mere wishes and whims of the private self have been sacrificed" and we live for those same ends for which we want others to live. We thus seek the good of ourselves and of others "as members of a whole, and the ultimate end may be described as "the realisation of a rational universe, rather than as self-realisation."¹

To my mind this passage—and a host of similar passages in idealistic writings—has always appeared to contain a core of difficulty. What *is* the merely individual self which we should sacrifice or negate? What exactly is the meaning of *sacrifice* involved in self-realisation? The merely individual life, it will be said, is the life of impulses, instincts, sensations and desires, lived for their own sakes, each impulse or desire pursuing its own way and seeking its own good or satisfaction. As opposed to such a life, moral life, it is said, consists in the correlation and organisation of these impulses and desires so as to make them instrumental to the fuller and higher life of the rational self or person as a whole. Organisation of the sentient self and subordination of it to the rational—these appear to be the *conditio sine qua non* of self-realisation. *Negation* of our impulses or desires could not be meant here, for if the life of desires is to be annulled, what remains as the content to be organised? Good. But in what sense can such a systematisation of impulses and instincts be said to involve their *sacrifice*? One is said to sacrifice something which is worthy of being offered as sacrifice. As between an ordinary soldier and a great scientist who both fall on the battlefield, the scientist, we agree, has made a true sacrifice. If then the *organisation* of the sentient self be considered a sacrifice, it should mean that the disorganised life of impulses and instincts was in itself a thing of great value! Nor

1. *A Manual of Ethics* (Fifth edition, 1918) : pp. 320—321.

can we say that such an organisation is in the interests of the *total* self, for clearly some elements of the self need to be suppressed in the process. (Such suppression cannot be characterised as sacrifice, for even the selfish man who also has to organise his life in a particular direction, is forced to suppress some elements of his life.)

Further, rationalisation of the impulsive life is taken by idealists as equivalent to its socialisation. Is it not possible so to organise one's impulses and desires as to remain fundamentally an egoist? Organisation is possible both on a lower and on a higher level, but at neither level is mere organisation identical with socialisation. Rational desires like love of knowledge, love of art, desire for freedom etc., are as much liable to compete and conflict with one another as sentient ones;¹ in this sense, their organisation should mean a greater self-sacrifice on the individual's part than in the case of impulses and instincts! But even when thus systematised, there is no guarantee that these rational desires will always accord with the demands of the social spirit.² That is, sacrifice in the sense of integration, systematisation, of desires is not the same thing as sacrifice in the sense of *readiness to deny oneself a possible advantage*. It is this confusion between the purely intellectual or logical and the moral signification of the term "sacrifice" that lends plausibility to the view that the more the individual dies to a merely individual life, *i.e.*, sacrifices his impulsive life, *i.e.*, organises it,—by that very process does he live the more the universal social life of the community. He may conceivably do so, but that requires in him, as we shall see, moralisation of a different sort from that of mere logical organisation or integration.

Or shall we take sacrifice in the strictly popular sense of surrendering once for all some part of our possessions without hope of regaining it in any transmuted form? This appears to be intended in the exhortation to sacrifice oneself for the sake of country, cause or religion. We may sacrifice our opportunities of cultivating our higher capacities for knowledge, art

1. *Vide* the present writer's article on "The Theory of Moral Goods" in the *Proceedings of the Indian Phil. Congress* for 1925.

2. W. G. Everett: *Moral Values*: p. 236; Sidgwick: *The Ethics of Green, Spencer etc.*, pp. 71—72.

etc.. This may be regretted, but until it is known definitely that those opportunities were going to be fully and properly utilised, we cannot conclude that there was any real sacrifice in such a case. If after having achieved the best and the highest that an individual was capable of, he is called upon to "sacrifice," this is meaningless, for he has realised what he had in him to be. And so finally we are left with only one possible notion of self-sacrifice, and that is, to be called upon to renounce one's life or opportunities while one is still giving active proofs of realising the fundamental values of life and of enriching the world thereby. Excepting, however, as a heroic or prudential policy, such conduct always excites different opinions as regards its moral justification.

5. The truth is that unless the relation between the individual and the society is properly formulated, the question of egoism and altruism, self-assertion and self-sacrifice, cannot be fruitfully discussed. The value to be attached to personal ambition and development must depend upon the place the individual occupies in relation to society. It will also largely depend upon what we conceive to be the best kind of life for individuals. Postponing this second problem to future consideration, it may here be pointed out that all those theories which emphasise the unity of society at the cost of the reality and freedom of the individual are apt to consider the moral distinction between a "higher" and a "lower" self as reflecting the ideal relation that ought to hold between the society and the individual. They are apt to construe the whole problem—moral as well as social—in terms of the "contents" of the self, the things or objects which it should include or exclude. They forget that on the one hand even at the "higher" level of life—in the pursuit of knowledge, love, beauty, freedom etc.,—individuals are as much prone to cross each other's paths as in the pursuit of the more sordid things of life. They forget that on the other hand even when a whole society has achieved unity of will and purpose, they may have all become of one mind just because they may have all gone temporarily insane. The point of view of the whole need not necessarily be the point of view of the moral, just as the point of view of the rational self need not necessarily be the point of view of the social self. It will be replied to this that we are confounding between the general

will and the will of all; but that again reduces the question to the old terms. For the general will is nothing but the most rational self, the self in my "deepest" or "truest" moments, the self which I ought to be but which I never actually am. It is in short a psychological or moral we-know-not-what unless we again fall back upon inclusion, exclusion, integration, systematisation, non-contradiction etc..

Such is the logic of systems which conceive of the relation between the individual and the society in terms of the relation between the "rational" and the "empirical" self in the moral person. The problem of individual moral personality is not now under discussion, but it is not difficult to see that the introduction into social phenomena of the concept of "mental synthesis" or "mental organisation," which may satisfactorily explain the working of mental phenomena, is bound to distort the facts of social relationship between individuals. On this view,¹ society is an organisation characterised by "control by a general scheme," or (taking the organisation to be that of an army) a unity characterised by "the determination of every unit in it, not by the movements and impulses of his immediate neighbours, but by the scheme or idea of the whole." The parts of such a whole have no independent initiative, they have simply to obey orders from the centre. The parts may themselves be grouped into subordinate systems, but every such system, superior or subordinate, has "its own nature and principle which determines its members as such.....every one, consequently, tending to impose upon its members a peculiar capacity or point of view, which, in so far as a given system is active, tends to put all other systems out of sight." Further, such a societal whole differs from an ordinary organism by the fact that the whole is present in every part through the action of consciousness. This presence of the whole in the part, however, it is important to notice, *is not the result of reflective consciousness on the part of the individual*, but is merely a given fact of consciousness of which the part or the individual does not know the how or the why. If pressed further, the absolutist would perhaps reply that it is due to the working of the Absolute Self—that same Self which is at work in nature as the "spirit behind nature," in

1. Bosanquet: *The Philosophical Theory of the State*: Ch. VII, "Psychological Illustration."

society as the "common or social self," and in man as "the rational or higher self." In fact, he would say, the rational *is* the social self.

Such a view of society is admirably fitted no doubt to establish a theoretical unity between the individual and the society, (the very comparison of a society with an army is significant in Bosanquet's philosophy) but it is able to do this only at the cost of ignoring actual facts. It ignores the actual clash of wills, the rivalries, the jealousies, the struggles, etc., between individuals in a society on the one hand, and between communities and states on the other, which make up one half of the social life of individuals and communities. It ignores again the *striving* for unity or harmony, the *effort*, the *conscious effort*, at conciliation, the likes and loves, the compromise and the co-operation, which make up its other half. Both the struggle and the striving, the conflict as well as the co-operation, are either the work of "the world-spirit" or mere "appearances." At any rate, whatever the differences, they all "come together in the Absolute." Such a view forgets that the kind of organisation necessary or sufficient for knowledge, for an animal organism, for art etc., is out of place in connection with the harmonisation of wills. If the individual is free only in so far as the "whole" is present in him and moves him, then he is really not a free agent but only an instrument in the hands of the Absolute.

6. A truer philosophy of society would not take the harmony of wills as given or achieved for the individuals by a common or social self with which we need only identify ourselves in thought and action. The individual is an indivisible unit. There is a common basis indeed for his life, and that is represented by the common human nature, the common physical and psychical qualities, the common needs, the common ideals and aspirations, in short, the common social, intellectual and moral heritage into which he is born. Society in one word, we may say, is the presupposition¹ of the individual. But this conception, we have seen, reveals the fact that the individual, as such, has a unique and independent being and nature of his own but that he *depends* upon society for the fruition and fulfilment of

1. The notions of "presupposition" and "dependence" discussed elsewhere apply here to the relation of the individual to the society.

that nature. That fulfilment, however, comes only when the individual consciously seeks the help of others in such self-realisation, and is likewise prepared to extend his own helping hand to others for the same purpose. Social solidarity—the "common self"—has thus to be achieved, won and established by the conscious mutual co-operation of individuals. The mere pursuit of the higher values of life does not guarantee such commonness of purpose, one must always be ready to reckon with a certain amount of "contrariness" in the individual, a certain amount of selfishness, ego-importance, ego-worship. Nor can the mere isolation of the self be taken as a sign of its rebellion against society or the moral law. The noblest purpose of life may *sometimes* be achieved only perhaps by remaining "far from the madding crowd."

It may not perhaps be out of place to point out in this connection that the term "the common good" is capable of a double interpretation. A good may be common in so far as all persons in a society feel the same need for it and in consequence put forth their efforts to realise it. There are indeed many such goods in a society which are common to all its members, for example, postal and transport facilities, police protection, defence of the country, the common law, institutional religion accepted by a large majority, the political institutions of a country etc.. This is the usual meaning of the phrase current in idealist philosophies. When the attainment of virtue or self-realisation is suggested as the common good, it is still this same meaning that is behind the suggestion, for the goodness of the will that constitutes the essence of virtue in the one case and the reality which constitutes the self that is to be realised in the other, are of the same common pattern in all individuals and have no fundamental intrinsic differences in different persons. In this conception of the common good, therefore, the unity is *given* to start with and all that the individuals have to do is to seek and find it. The more consciously they seek and find it the greater the integration in society and this is the essence of moral progress. The fundamental defect, however, of such a conception of common good is that contrary purposes, in the form of individual preferences, predilections and prejudices, are as much given in society as common loves and hates and they fail to find a proper logical place in the individual or social

scheme of life. Hence the necessity for "sacrificing" or "suppressing" them or sublimating or rationalising them.

It must be admitted that this is an important sense of the phrase "common good" and social life simply cannot be lived even for a day unless such suppression or sublimation was a common fact. But there is another and more important sense according to which diversity of interests and ideals may frankly be recognised and taken as the basis or starting-point of a society. Freedom for every one to live his own life according to his best lights, to realise his own purposes contrary though they be to the purposes of others, would be the key-idea in this conception. Note that the purposes are said to be contrary to, but not contradictory of, the purposes of others. In things that the individual cherishes as affecting his personal being and well-being, there may be nothing which is significantly common to all individuals. *But this very freedom for everyone to live his own life, without encroaching upon the freedom of others to live their own lives*, is the good which it is the common interest of every one to maintain uninterfered with and which therefore is the common good. Individual preferences, based upon fundamental intrinsic differences, are accordingly logically woven as warp in the texture of social life while the maintenance of common purposes as already described enters into it as woof. A harmony of wills, a mutual trust and tolerance, are thereby generated which are consciously maintained by individuals who are aware that their purposes differ; a unity is born which is consciously achieved out of differences as an ideal rather than given as a fact. Social life becomes richer and variegated and the clash of ideals and ideologies leads to concrete progress. But the clash is controlled by a conscious concord which is the very soul of the whole scheme.

7. Morality, so far as it is a social phenomenon, is a question, not primarily of inclusion, integration, or systematisation of persons, objects or contents of the will, but of adopting the proper *attitude* or *point of view* towards persons. An impulse is not bad because it is particular, isolated and lives for itself, because it refuses to fall into a system; it is bad if it indicates a motive of hostility, a lack of the spirit of accommodation, of give and take, towards others. It is bad because the person deliberately chooses to tarnish his will, to

stain his character. Of this, however, more anon. It is enough to note here that, though rationalisation and systematisation of the contents of the will or of persons is to a large extent the *result*, and therefore the *sign*, of a social or moral action, the essence of morality or sociality consists in the *will* to co-operate with others, to respect their claims, actively to relate oneself to the lives of others. This necessitates an independent individual to start with willing to establish a co-operative harmony with other independent individuals similarly willing. It does not however, deny, the possibility that these individuals in their united capacity engender a common social order which has a destiny or purpose of its own different perhaps from the destiny or purpose of other similar social orders, but not entirely *in pari materia* with the purposes of the individuals composing the society. True social solidarity consists in such a co-operative activity, and the spirit of mutual service and dependence born of such activity, illumining the consciousness of individuals, as well as the unique individuality of the society created by such united activity, represents the only "Social" or "Common" self that we can think of. The whole is indeed present in every part, but only as the result of the reflective consciousness of the individuals perceiving their dependence on one another.

Whether, in addition to the co-operative harmony contributed by individual wills, another and a higher source of harmony is necessary to perfect our conception of society, will be examined in the next section on "Social Value."

8. From the standpoint of the above interpretation of the relation of the individual to society, we may now go back to the question of egoism and personal values and try to reconstruct these concepts. The individual has a being and a nature of his own—and a value of his own—which, however, can bloom into perfection only through the interpersonal intercourse possible in society. The essential condition for the maintenance of such a relationship is, we said, the existence of the proper *attitude* towards persons born out of the recognition that every one is a member of a kingdom of ends. If this recognition and the consequent attitude be granted, then none of the desires connected with individuality (mentioned previously) is liable to turn the individual into a bad egoist. For

he will soon discover that they are at once strengthened and limited by the fact that *he depends upon society* at every turn for their realisation. Every assertion of the self is not egoism, nor every sacrifice of it altruism. Where the self is asserted in disrespect of the claims of others, or purely with a view to one's own profit, involving the loss of others, that is egoism in the bad sense. In the co-operative state, as we saw, there is no scope for unregulated private profit. There is, however, room for competition of a different kind. Every individual is at liberty—nay, required—to compete with every other in offering his best services to the community. Since it is a competition in love and service, it no longer exhibits the spirit of egoism. The community certainly needs the best men for its service, whatever be its standard of "the best," and is always at liberty, within certain reservations, to re-place a present best person with a better one, if available. And if as the incidence of service the individual obtains place, power, rank, honour, fame etc., these values are not tainted by the consciousness of having sought for them, and, as such, cannot be reckoned as the fruits of egoism either. Such service moreover affords further scope for the fuller realisation of one's capacities. The good sought for is the opportunity for service which therefore must also be recognised as part of the good aimed at. This egoism, interpreted as the high consciousness of one's own capacity to serve the community, is reconciled with altruism, and becomes what I called psychological egoism in which one's own good is realised in achieving the good of others. What is aimed at is one's own good—the opportunities for self-realisation. This good is individual, personal, unique, depending upon the inherent capacities and interests of the individual. Nevertheless it depends equally, if not more, upon the co-operation of others and on the effectiveness of the service you render to them according to your capacity. This service rendered should not be looked upon as a *means* to your own good, for it is a form of your own good, a part of the good aimed at; it is a form of the exercise of your own power, a form of your self-realisation. (Emoluments, honour, rank etc., are, as already pointed out, only the incidence of such service. Egoism in the bad sense forgets the true interrelationship of individuals in society). Such self-realisation, however, brings about the good of others as

well which may also in one aspect be individual and unique. Egoism thus says that my good is the end of my conduct. It does not say that others may not have *their* good—the realisation of their unique capacities—as the end of *their* conduct. It does not deny the possibility that in another aspect these individual goods may not only have much in common, but also affect each other and condition each other in various ways. All that it denies is that there is one all-comprehensive, colourless, distinctionless single good called “the common good” or “the absolute good” which is the same for every one.¹ And it denies further that the distinction between means and end, immediate and contributory, intrinsic and instrumental, as applied to *values*, is ultimate. The service rendered, the social good realised, is not a *means* to your own good, any more than the capacities exercised in such service are a means to that good. It emphatically asserts that the specific goods of the individuals can only be realised by mutual dependence and service in society. It is only social life that gives the direction to, and enhances the value of, the individual.

9. Self-assertion or self-development, then, *is* compatible with altruism. It remains to show still that it is consistent with self-sacrifice. The error in connection with self-sacrifice is that it is popularly viewed as entailing upon the agent loss of an absolute kind. The truth of the matter, however, is that short of laying down one’s life, wherever an agent is found to “sacrifice” some interest of his, it is only because he takes an equal or greater interest in something else which he in consequence finds equally or more valuable. A legal practitioner, let us say, gives up his lucrative practice for the sake of joining in the fight for his country’s freedom; a talented youth discards an attractive public “career” for the sake of devoting himself to the pursuit of science. In all such cases, calm analysis will reveal the simple fact that freedom for one’s country and advancement of knowledge were found to be of a higher value, *i.e.*, of greater interest to the agents, than lucre or a rank respectively and

1. It is this assumption which, it will be noticed, renders invulnerable Moore’s criticism of Egoism. Egoism is not necessarily committed to this assumption though the usual forms of it criticised by ethicists do make it. It will be seen further that the individualism or ego-altruism maintained above does not result in the fallacy of composition in which Mill’s utilitarianism lands itself.

there is no real sense in speaking of "sacrifice" in such cases. If a person again were entirely attached to one institution, object, or hobby for a long time, and is prevailed upon finally to renounce his love for the sake of pursuing a new cause, say, the removal of untouchability or village re-construction etc., either he does it willingly or unwillingly, with or without conviction. In the latter case, he has indeed "sacrificed" but his sacrifice has no value *for him* though it may be of some value to the country. The desirability of such a course of conduct is always open to doubt. In the former case, in addition to the fact that the individual now prefers a new value, we must also consider the fact that he has explored the possibilities of his former attachment for some time. Far from there being any sacrifice on his part, he has, one must say, been progressively realising his self. Indeed, by constantly applauding men for their "sacrifice" in such cases, we only betray our own indissoluble attachment to, and our high estimate of, such things as money, land, power, prestige etc., and seem to place a premium on such attachment. If instead of praising public benefactors for their "sacrifice" we congratulated them upon their acquirement of a higher sense of life, we should not only be showing a juster appreciation of values, but laying a surer foundation for benevolence. Thirdly, there is the common case of an elder brother foregoing his chances of a higher education etc., and stinting himself in other ways in order to provide for the education of his younger brothers or sisters. And there is the still commoner case of a poor person putting his mite into the charity box. Such cases are sometimes characterised by the fact that they are renunciations by people who do not seek in return other values, higher or equal in kind, but who are still attached to the very values which they are willing to forego. The motives, however, in such cases are often mixed and not always praiseworthy; but where they are pure and simple, they are true cases of "self-sacrifice."

The only remaining possibility of "self-sacrifice" which apparently refuses to fall under the above explanation is the deliberate laying down of one's life for the sake of country, cause or religion. Here again we must distinguish between two cases. A common soldier dying on the battle-field may be said to realise a high value for himself (of having done his duty, if his country

had justice on its side) on the assumption that his soul survives and he believes in such survival. On this assumption, however his act ceases to be one of "self-sacrifice;" without it, it is a case of true self-sacrifice, for the soldier is animated purely by love of country and desire for her freedom and has no expectation of any return for himself from his act. Such cases afford examples in which self-sacrifice is *not* compatible with self-realisation, unless we project into the argument the conception of a "social self" which, however, as the idealists interpret it, creates more difficulties than it solves. A prince or a saint losing his life in order to save that of a street child is another case of pure self-sacrifice (unless, that is, we assume personal immortality) in which there is only absolute loss of value with no definite or only a doubtful compensatory value.

It is only these two cases—along, perhaps, with the two mentioned previously—that illustrate the incompatibility of self-development with self-sacrifice. They form the irrational surds of moral life. They make it clear that there is true self-sacrifice only where there is no hope of just return in the same field of value, or where no higher value is sought by the sacrifice, or when a greater value is deliberately sacrificed for a lesser one. (This last is relevant only when the choice is purposely made *in the interests of moral life*). Apart from such cases, there is no "radical vice" inherent in the very conception of goodness as such (as Bradley thinks) in the form of a double contradiction. (His other contradiction regarding subjective goodness and objective efficacy will be examined in the chapter on "Moral Value"). The antithesis between self-assertion and self-sacrifice is *not* present in the nature of the self, and, further, it cannot be stated as the oppositional relation between the part and the whole. The self ordinarily "sacrifices" one value only in order to gain another—and possibly higher—and it only illustrates the limitations of human endeavour under space-time conditions which make it impossible for one to realise *all* values at the same time and in one life. If the part is (as Bradley wants us to take it) an aspect of the self considered with reference to other aspects, it is inconceivable how an *aspect* can aspire to become "rounded and concrete" in isolation from other aspects which penetrate it through and through and

condition its activity. It reminds one of the stomach's revolt in Aesop's fable.

10. It may be objected that very little has been said in this connection regarding *personal values* as such, the values of ambition, wealth possessions, honour etc.. The reason is that these values, apart from the social function in which they involve the individual, have not much significance, especially in the co-operative society that has been taken as the ideal. Possession and ownership are not as such ultimate facts either in individual or social life. A little reflection will show that ownership by the individual has its basis in social recognition and allowance of such ownership. A lonely individual in a forest—the Crusoe of classical economics—owns nothing, not even his body. It is social recognition and toleration that creates rights for the individual, the rights, in this case, of possession of property, ownership of goods, the right to a place, a rank, in society, to honour, esteem etc., at the hands of one's fellowmen. But further such recognition and allowance the society is prepared to extend to the individual in certain things only because *through them*, or through their enjoyment, the individual comes into certain relations with other individuals, relations through which alone he can best develop his unique capacities and endowments. The relation of a brother, of a husband, of a father, of a citizen, of a teacher, of the manager of a firm etc., implies, as pointed out before, interpersonal intercourse with others based in every case on mutual dependence. Such dependence is partly for the sake of giving adequate reality and expression to the interests, purposes, energies and abilities of individual members of society. And it is partly also for the sake of enabling the common social order with its common customs, institutions, traditions etc., to realise a destiny of its own which it has as truly as a violin composed of a frame, strings, key-board etc., has a purpose of its own. But it is only through the realisation by individuals of their individual purposes and aims that the destiny of the society as a whole could be achieved, just as it is through the proper working of the frame, the strings, the key-board etc.,—each of which has its own particular function—that the violin as a whole can fulfil its function of producing good music. At the same time, however, the aims and purposes of the individuals themselves are partly

determined by the nature of the common social order which expresses itself in their lives. In any case, the interpersonal relations through which the individual as well as the collective purposes of society are achieved express the essence of the condition of such achievement. Property, possessions etc., are only the instruments of such relational functions. Even rank, honour, place etc., are only such instruments—social devices, we may call them—by means of which the functions appertaining to interpersonal relations can be discharged.

11. If this truth is recognised, it will not be difficult to grant that the form of the instrument, *i.e.*, the form of property-holding, which will get social recognition and allowance, will depend upon the type of interpersonal relationships that society would like to see established among its own members. And the type of these relationships will in its turn depend upon the nature and extent of the self-realisation that is made possible to members in society. It was this need of self-realisation to be made possible for *all* in society that dictated the necessity in the previous chapter of regulating the ownership of property in land and buildings. Now we may go further and say that *ownership* as such—the idea of possession itself interpreted, as it ordinarily is, as the absolute right to do what one likes with what one owns—needs to be re-interpreted in an enlightened co-operative community. The application of this suggestion to property, *i.e.*, material goods, can be better appreciated by reflecting on the analogous case of *place* or *rank* in society—especially offices under government—to which it already applies. Nobody thinks of the Prime Minister's or the President's post as being *owned* by the individual incumbents at any given time. Those offices—and the powers and the privileges appertaining thereto—are, we may say, only held *in trust* and only so long as the incumbents satisfactorily discharge the duties belonging to their respective offices. In a similar manner, one may say, property etc., may also be only held in trust and administered on behalf of the whole community. How in practice this actually works is to be seen in the next section on "Social Value."

12. It is now time to discuss the question of the subjective and the objective processes tending to the rise of personal values. By personal values in this connection we shall under-

stand not merely the value usually attached by people to property, possessions, status, place, honour, fame etc., but also the sense of efficiency or capacity which is the pre-condition of service as well as self-development. The subjective processes or desires constituting the universe of such values have already been enumerated in connection with the elements of individuality. The persistence and massing of organic values tend to generate and deepen the sense of self-preservation. The interaction and intermingling of economic, organic and hedonic values encourage the desire for a home, possessions, property etc.. The miser's love of hoarding money for the sake of money is accounted for by the principle of heterogeneity of ends, operating as between economic values on the one hand and organic and hedonic values on the other. The amassing of wealth and property earned by the labours of a single individual in his life-time is only possible when the primary values of health, strength and pleasure get arrested at every point. To the same end operates the opposition between economic and hedonic values. The will-to-power, to honour, fame, status, place etc., is served by the confluence between social and economic values, the correlation between economic and intellectual values, and the conflict and counteraction between intellectual and hedonic values. The consonance between organic and social values and the adaptation of economic to organic and social values, help the tendency to self-multiplication. The fusion of organic and intellectual values and the integration between intellectual and moral values determine the sense of efficiency or capacity which is indispensable for an individual both for self-development and service of society. Finally, the self-limitation and self-transcendence of organic values, and the exteriorisation or objectivisation¹ of hedonic values (as described in the section on hedonic value), help to produce that incipient sense of mutual dependence amongst members in society which is of the essence of personal value.

13. And now a word about freedom in personal values. Even from the standpoint of the ordinary conception of personal values, we must reckon it a great advance in the realisation of the freedom of the spirit to have reached this stage. In the

1. Passing into, penetrating into, other objects or persons, after self-transcendence ; different from "objectification."

creation and appropriation of economic values, we saw, mind in its sensuous aspect was involved ; its attachment to the physical was certainly less than in the case of organic or hedonic value, but still it was considerable. With the dawn of personal, individual values, the value of individuality as a spiritual reality begins to appear, though that individuality is still that of the mere individual as a unit among other units in society. That means, the self awakes to a perception of its independence of, and difference from, the physical, and the identification of itself with the material definitely ceases now. Mind truly discovers itself in personal values, in the sense of "egohood" felt in them, though that sense still finds its focus of being partly in material objects like a home or property, possessions etc.. But in the importance attached to "place," "status," honour, fame etc., such dependence of the "I" upon *material* bases for its being appears to be removed notwithstanding that it still continues to rest upon *external* factors in the environment. This is pre-eminently the stage of the self-consciousness of the spiritual subject felt in and through object-consciousness. The distinction between "self" and "others," between subject and object, between mind and the external world, gets firmly fixed in the self's consciousness in this stage, and though this distinction will never henceforth disappear completely, and though the further stages in the progress of the spirit's freedom will largely consist in refining the object to as near a likeness to the subject as possible, to have consciously attained to this distinction is in itself equivalent to taking a large stride in the march of spiritual freedom. The sense of mutual dependence developed in this stage is a preparation for this ultimate goal of personal freedom enjoyed in a kingdom of spirits.

(6) Social Value.

14. Social value may be said to be the correlative to individual value. There is a sense in which social values include almost all other values, for the values of pleasure, play and economic possessions, of intellectual, aesthetic and moral development, are obviously the products of social life, of the interplay

of the lives of individuals in society. But it is not this sense that is important for us in the present connection although we cannot altogether ignore it in considering the nature of social value. Life falls into several modes or patterns, so to say; in one we are concerned with the satisfaction of our material wants—the economic mode; in another, with the development of our intellect and the acquisition of knowledge—the intellectual mode; in a third, with the cultivation of our aesthetic susceptibilities—the artistic mode and so on. In like manner, there is an aspect of life in which *banding or herding together, living together, group contact, interpersonal intercourse* etc., are prized both for their own sakes (relatively speaking), and for the sake of their consequence—the more effective way of life resulting therefrom. Such intercourse constitutes “social” activity in a special sense and has a value of its own which may be called “social” value in a special sense. It has its own peculiar stimuli—the emotions and interests which draw men together. As just now pointed out, every value has a social side (just as it may be said, perhaps, that every value has a moral side); but the social side of life has a value of its own. It is the value of the social side of life that is considered in this section. This social value is one amongst many values of life; at the same time, it is the pre-condition of all the others, (with the possible exception of the organic and the moral)—at any rate it is their nursery. Hence its peculiar significance and attraction for the modern mind which is nurtured in some form or other of “socialism.” The social is indeed one of the “sheaths” or “envelopes” of individual life, along with the physical, the vital, the mental etc..

Since the forms of associational life comprise not merely institutions like the family, the church, the school, the trade union etc., but also and pre-eminently the political state, I include under “social values” the value for life of some such political organisation as the state. For our purpose the distinction between “society” and “state” is not important.

15. The social as a category is of great philosophic importance. It represents a distinctive level of emergence in reality with the appearance of vital and sentient phenomena. Its rudiments, however, go far deeper into physical nature and are to be discovered in the facts of grouping or clustering

among atoms and electrons. The principle in virtue of which electrons cluster themselves round a central nucleus and keep on revolving round it is at bottom a social principle though "social" may be a metaphor when applied to such a case. All facts of adhesion, cohesion, attraction, aggregation, assimilation, inclusion, incorporation, integration, fusion, synthesis, unification etc., to be found in nature are illustrations of forms, however rudimentary, of the social category. In fact, the very principle upon which evolution is said to proceed is the principle of integration albeit it involves at the same time the correlative principle of differentiation. And when we interpret evolution as emergent, the social as a category of the universe is illustrated more effectively in the fact of new modes of "fellowship" "collocation" or "relatedness" into which the elements of a given stage enter in order to give rise to a higher entity. The physical thus evolves into the organic or vital on the basis of a fresh mode of synthesis of its constituent elements. When we reach the level of the vital, the phenomena of mutual attraction and integration become more definitely social in character. The body of an animal is built up of cells each one of which is relatively independent, but which combines with other cells in order to form "groups," "colonies" etc.. The perfect adaptation which these different groups manifest in relation to the carrying on of the work of the body—some cells acting as "reserves," being kept ready for any emergency duty, others doing active work in manufacturing the needed secretions and fluids for the system, some performing the work of carriers, others doing scavenger work, still others acting as the police force or army etc.,—can only be appreciated if we interpret these groups as participating in some kind of "social" life. "Cell-life in the body may be compared to a large colony, operated on a co-operative plan, each cell having its own work to do for the common good, each working for all, and all working for the common welfare." Cells not only participate in a common bodily life, but through our body, they seem to participate in the life of cells belonging to other bodies, and as these express the lives of persons possessing those bodies, we seem to be connected with the lives of other organic individuals. The vital in its turn leads, by a higher form of association, to the mental.

Thus the unconscious sociality at the basis of the physical

and the vital. Not that the physical, or the organic, has no existence in its own right, but it is only when each of them is taken up into larger wholes which give the fullest scope to their potencies of action and re-action that their distinctive characters are exhibited, and each gives rise to a higher level of existence above it manifesting new properties. The fact of association is thus universal in nature and sociality would appear to be woven into the very fabric of reality. It was this principle which was symbolised by Empedocles in his characteristic phraseology as "love" while its correlative, differentiation or opposition, was called "hate." Abstract monism which postulates a relationless reality as ultimate would thus appear to be discountenanced even by the empirical facts of the universe.

But the distinctive field of the social is the distinctively mental. In the realm of minds, we can confidently and intelligibly talk of "association" and, higher still, "organisation." Mind, *per se*, has its own powers and tendencies which are not as such social, and which are different from the powers of the physical and the vital; but in order to realise completely its nature, mind must associate with mind in mutual participation and communication thus obtaining opportunity for the fullest exercise of its functions and capacities. Associational interaction is the bright moonlight in which the lily of mind blooms in order to attain to the richness of its intellectual, moral and aesthetic life.

When once the value of socialisation has dawned upon the minds of individuals, they tend to socialise not only with other individuals but also with their physical or natural environment in contemplation thus giving rise to the values of art. But further, they tend to personify the forces of nature as "spirits" and try to establish social relationships with them in worship, meditation etc.. The range of their associational life is thereby enlarged and this is at least one mode in which the religious impulse shows itself. Thus the circuit becomes completed and nature who begins her life in the clustering of electrons and the grouping of atoms ends by herself entering into social relationships with man her highest product by becoming the object of his love and adoration, by becoming his companion and confidant. Whether we accept the "fear theory" of religion or not, the socialisation with nature which it suggests is a precious idea

whose significance for a philosophy which attempts to determine the relationship of man to the universe cannot easily be exaggerated.

16. What is the nature of society? Is society merely a convenient name for the aggregation, or even the association, of individuals, or does it denote an over-individual life or existence which, while it may be expressed in individual lives, is nevertheless distinct from them and not exhausted by them? In particular, is there a "social mind," and if so, what is its nature and what is its relation to the individual mind? These are some of the vexed questions to be discussed in connection with the origin and character of social value. They were partly anticipated and discussed in the previous section on individual values, but an adequate discussion or solution can properly belong only to the present section. Moreover, while the discussion in the previous section was critical, here it will have to be largely constructive.

Notice, however, must be taken of the opposing theories in the field. They are dim reverberations in modern sociology and social psychology of the din of the nineteenth century battle in economics and politics between individualism and collectivism. Social psychologists like Allport and Thouless declare that society is not and can never be anything over and above the individuals that constitute it. To talk of a "social mind" or "social consciousness" in any sense other than the minds of individuals composing the society, is, in their opinion, to be guilty of the "group fallacy," which falsely imputes life and activity to a non-existent entity, the group. On the other hand, scholars who have made lifelong studies of different cultures, both living and dead, either assert with Durkheim that "The individual does not exist" or invoke with Kroeber a super-organic element to explain the growth of cultures. It is needless to state that this opposition is unreal and largely the result of stressing partial view-points—either that of individual psychology or of biology and physiology or of history. Still to perceive this error is one thing, to explain the nature of society so as to vindicate both the reality of the individual and the reality of society, quite another.

17. Every society starts of course with individuals. From the standpoint of scientific sociology and psychology,

there is no social mind as such apart from individual minds. Whatever else we may or may not regard as responsible for cultural process, we must recognise the existence of individuals as the prime condition and the solid substratum of social life. One may doubt everything else in society, but the doubters cannot doubt themselves away as individuals. The *cogito ergo sum* is the rock-bottom of sociology as it is of metaphysics or epistemology. The existence of the individual *qua* individual implies a unique intellectual constitution with its own powers, aspirations, ideals, achievements etc., everything, in fact, that goes to distinguish one individual from other individuals. But in sociology (whatever be the case in epistemology) we must take the individuals, not in isolation, but as members of a group, a clan it may be, a tribe, a family, a nation or a race. This at once introduces certain common elements into the lives of the individuals. In the first place, there is the physical environment—a given geographical area of the earth's surface with rivers, seas, mountains, hills, a certain climate, soil, natural resources etc.,—which constitutes the physical basis of the group existence of the individuals. If we discount nomadic tribes, the locality wherein a given people choose to live produces significant effects upon the course of their culture and civilization. The contour of the earth's surface determines the size and isolation of a social group and the lines of social movement. Influences of climate like light, temperature and moisture determine the degree of the development of a people's culture, their bodily and mental development, the virility of their character, their predominant pre-occupations etc.. And finally, the inorganic resources available in the country, the fauna, the flora etc., affect the industrial and commercial development, the habits and modes of life, and also the migrations of the people.

Secondly, environment alone being only one factor in the physical life of society, many ethnologists and sociologists add to it the influence of heredity as operating through "race." There are thinkers who swear by "race"—the superior strains that have produced the world's civilizations etc.. There are others—more balanced and judicious, it would seem—who believe that "the racial purist is the victim of a mythology." Heredity is a matter of family lines, operating upon the physiological

and the psychological constitution of individuals, but when applied to groups extended over a wide area, say, to Nordics, it has no basis in reality. Cultural types are an affair of local and historical growth and do not correlate with the known biological relationships of the various groups. While then individual and family heredity is a fact and must be reckoned as among the factors acting upon environment, racial heredity, we are told, is only a slogan "to rally a group of persons of about the same economic status, graduating from much the same schools, and reading the same weeklies." This is, however, equally an extreme view. Racial heredity is a fact, but it can operate only through individual heredity. And that means that acquired characters also, provided they undergo a sufficiently long period of *mental* incubation, maturation and assimilation, can be inherited by individuals. Doubtless cultural patterns are a matter of historical growth, but when the *psychical* life of individuals owning a given pattern has continuously, for ages and centuries, been affected and moulded by it, it is transformed into a set of innate characters which is thereupon inherited by individuals born under the same pattern. Such characters, however, are always liable to variation and change due to the action of a new environment or culture, again for a sufficiently long time, upon *mind*. And thus heredity and environment, psychology, biology and history work hand in hand and determine the shape of a culture at any given time.

It is, however, desirable not to mix up the strictly biological heredity of individual family lines and the historical or cultural heredity of given peoples. In a society, then, two entities have indisputably emerged: the individual *qua* individual, with his particular intellectual constitution, talents, abilities, ideals, aspirations, achievements etc., partly the result of hereditary nature and partly the work of environmental, cultural nurture; and the physical environment together with the physiological characters and psychological *tendencies* manifesting themselves in the individual. This latter provides a common stock or capital for the members of the society with which they are commonly equipped to begin their life's commerce in that society, to make or mar their lives as best they may. It marks on the whole the material substratum that commonly underlies the "society" as a whole.

18. Now we have to examine the emergence—on the basis of the associational interactions between the psychically distinct individuals and the common material substratum—of a third element in society which is also, like the second, common to all the members and which, in fact, forms the common "social mind," the "social self," which has been made so much of alike by idealist philosophers and sociologists.

The associative and interactional existence of individuals in a community naturally results in a common life with a common language and modes of thought, common beliefs and practices, common possession and use of technical skill and practical knowledge, common methods of investigation and of proof etc.. Their habits and modes of life, their customs and manners, become common to the social group. They set before themselves common ends of action and ideals, they judge the actions of individuals by common standards, they even develop common types of feeling and emotion appropriate to particular occasions. Thus develops—almost insensibly in the beginning, and gradually—a common life of the society, a common culture or civilization which expresses the moral and spiritual tendency, the direction and the destiny, of the community or the nation *as a whole*. In a real sense, this social life is independent of the lives of *individuals*, *i.e.*, of *this* or *that* individual; it continues to develop along its own peculiar grooves while this or that individual may die out or radically change his mode of life. Of course it lives only in the lives, the minds and consciousnesses, of individuals. But in so far as any particular individual is concerned, this common social life, this culture, this racial *soul*, is objective and constrains him to conform to it in his modes of thought, action and behaviour. More particularly, it may be said that the self of a society is the synthesis of the several *values* which it has achieved or aspires to achieve, the peculiar synthesis or harmony which every society achieves for itself among values (by emphasising some, and subordinating others) like the economic, the ethical, the intellectual, the aesthetic, the religious and so on. It is such a synthesis that, from the economic standpoint, was called "the social substance" and that was set up as the standard of economic value.

This synthesis of values achieved by every culture according to its native prejudices and preferences is a very important

phenomenon in the study of social values. Every cultural type has its own dominating idea—what Spengler calls the destiny idea¹—which expresses the soul and character of the people who have developed that culture. It is ordinarily called the genius of the culture. Leslie Stephen called it the "Social Tissue." Dr. Benedict calls it the cultural "configuration."² "A cultural configuration patterns existence and conditions the thoughts and emotions of the individuals who participate in that culture." It is called the racial "*saṃgskāra*" in Hindu thought. It serves to unify peoples otherwise separated by numerous local differences. It is the soul of their culture. And it serves to differentiate, better than does colour, complexion, or geographical boundary line, one race of people from another race. It is the banner to which people will rally in times of national danger and under which they will fight to the very death rousing themselves with patriotic sentiments. It is indeed this social tissue which, as the seed of the racial culture, is, after it has been sufficiently assimilated in the racial consciousness for a long time, transmitted as a matter of individual heredity.

Further, this common life, this social self, this racial or social tissue, this cultural configuration, which expresses the essence of a people's moral and spiritual culture, needs concrete expression and protection in a system of laws and a form of government. Laws are enacted in a society with a view to the propagation and proper protection of the social substance, but to formulate and administer these laws, and to enrich that tissue, a system of government or constitution is necessary, maintained by representative leaders of society who embody in themselves the inmost spirit of the culture. Such a constitution or system of laws need not be political only, they may well be social also. The distinction between a society and a state may be real, but there is no doubt that both express, in the person of representative leaders and with an accepted constitution, the common life of a people, the soul of their culture. It is this same quintessence of a people's cultural life that idealist philosophers seek to express by their theory of the general will.

1. cf. Spengler's contrasting configurations of western civilization,—the Apollonian of the classical, and the Faustian of the modern, world.

2. In *Patterns of Culture* by Ruth Benedict.

Here there is the reality of the "Social Self" or the "Social Mind." The essence of mind is that it is an organised system of telic energies, and in this sense an organised society has a mind of its own. And organisation need not necessarily be spatial, it may be immaterial also, as a musical mode or a thought-system. Hence the social mind is truly real. The fact of its not being separate from individual minds is no evidence against its reality. It exists as the common psycho-social substratum of individual minds. Group life kindles this common substratum into activity, and that is why individuals in a crowd think, feel and act as one man. In order to comprehend its nature more clearly, its relation to the individual mind must be appreciated.

19. The social mind is nothing but the system of the ideas, the wills, the feeling and the valuations of men who have been thrown together in the achievement of common purposes. It consists not merely of the common features in the mental life of the individuals, it consists of them as systematised, synthesised, under the dominating influence of one or two governing cultural patterns or configurations which form their "soul." But such a mind can stand to the individual mind in two relationships. The unity of mind and character, will and purpose, habits and modes of life, in a community may simply exist *as a fact*. It may merely be the result of the circumstance that the individuals have been thrown together and are compelled to seek their goals in common ways. They need not necessarily be conscious of this unity of life and purpose, or realise its reason or necessity, or guide their individual lives reflectively by common standards. The common life, the cultural soul, still lives in them, and moves and guides them to conform to the pattern of communal behaviour: the individuals simply obey the communal impulse, they know not why or how. In ethics such a stage of social life is ordinarily known as the stage of customary or group morality.¹ The individuals are not conscious of their distinctive characters as individuals; reflection or deliberation does not generally precede action; the common standards, customs, modes, aspirations, institutions etc., are given facts

1. Here arise the Hegelian doctrine of the *Sittlichkeit* and the Bradleyan thesis of "My Station and Its Duties." cf. the statement: "To wish to be better than one's society is already to be on the threshold of immorality."

for the individual which he simply inhales into his soul as he does the air of the surrounding atmosphere into his lungs.

This is the stage of unconscious social mind. 'The social mind lives in the individual mind, directs and guides it, rules it, yes, and overrules it completely. There is indeed consciousness in society, but it is a common consciousness which has not become aware of itself. In short, the individual mind is merged in the social mind here—and, as a result, there is only one Life, one Mind, and one Consciousness. This is the Absolute Monism of social and political philosophy. It is for such a society that the analogy of an "organism" fittingly holds, bringing out the complex unity of the social structure, and the dynamic interdependence of the different social elements in one great process.

The unity of mind and character, will and purpose, habits and modes of life in a society may exist, however, as a *conscious* fact. The individuals may reflectively realise the unity, perceive their interdependence, and consciously try to cultivate a closer unity and a more complex interdependence. Alongside of this unity of social type, they may also perceive, reflectively again, their individual differences in a variety of social modes of living. The differences, however, only contribute a richer significance to the unity of mind and purpose. In fact, differentiation and specialisation of capacity and function may be felt to be indispensable for the achievement of a true cultural configuration.

As soon as this change has taken place in the viewpoint of the individuals, the face of the society stands altered. It is now the stage of reflective, individual or personal morality. The common life is now coloured by individual differences and reflective assimilation, adaptation, rejection, modification, improvement etc.. The common life continues, to be sure, but now it lives on a higher level. It now becomes self-conscious in each individual, for the individuals now consciously feel their commonness with, as well as their differences from, other individuals, the one not denying the other, but both contributing to a common stream of social life and purpose which flows in the veins of the members. The members thus achieve commonness of mind and purpose consciously through co-operation, adjustment, accommodation, which do not, however,

negate the possibility of conflict, struggle, and contrariness of individual inclinations.

The conscious commonness, as distinguished from the common consciousness of the previous stage, is developed sometimes more vigorously as the result of contrast or conflict with other types of culture. Pressure from outside, temporary sojourn in strange lands, the need for realising some definite common purpose (as, e.g., the attempt to obtain a higher wage rate on the part of the members of a Trade Union), etc., all aid in intensifying this conscious commonness. This is the stage of concrete or pluralistic monism in social philosophy. It is a development upon the previous stage of Absolute or Abstract Monism.

What then is the relation between the individual mind and the social mind in this second stage? While the two were identical and undistinguished in the first stage, in the second, the system of laws and customs and institutions on the one hand, and the constitution, social and political, upheld by representative leaders, on the other, in both of which the social mind expresses itself, now consciously enter into union with the individual mind. As such, the social mind exists commonly in all individual minds, but is not identical with them. It goes far beyond even the very best minds of the society, for it is a psychical synthesis of the highest values in society, and such a synthesis, though it is envisaged by individual minds, is but an ideal and an aspiration which cannot be said to have been *realised* completely at any time by individuals. There are major points of contact between the individual mind and the social mind, there are also significant points of contrast between them. But the social mind exists in the individual mind as its inner self, its higher self, its basic self. It is the 'support, the guide, the sustainer, of the individual mind, the source of its inspiration. Upon it the individual mind depends for the realisation of its potentialities, for its self-fulfilment. For the individual can hope to perfect himself only on the basis of the support given him by the social culture which he inherits and assimilates. Its approval he seeks in all his ventures, its judgments he accepts in all cases of conflict, its enrichment he makes the goal of all his ambition. But such social approval and fulfilment do not negate his own independent judgment and self-effort. He can but seek its

guidance, help and direction, he has necessarily to depend upon it for his own self-culture, but in any case he cannot sell his soul. The individual may be said to be a mode of the social substance, not because of the sameness of characters between the two—they may partly agree and partly differ in this—but because of the complete dependence of the individual upon the society for the realisation of his own destiny.

But while this or that individual may be said thus to depend upon the social self for his mode of existence or fulfilment of function, shall we say that the common self in its turn depends upon the individuals or the people as a whole? Great care is needed to distinguish in this connection the being and essence of the social mind from its temporary manifestations, or existence in this or that form, in the lives of the people at any given time. In the very fact of social existence, which implies the pursuit of common ideals and values, the being of the social mind may be said to be given; social life presupposes social mind. While social mind, *qua* mind or psychic and spiritual unity, is different from social life, and has a nature of its own, it exists in inseparable relation to it, and this relation is two-fold in character. There is in the first place the *péculiar* synthesis of values, achieved by every society in its own unique way, emphasising, it may be, the religious and spiritual, or the scientific, or the rationalistic, or the economic and hedonistic, outlook on life. This is what was called the genius of the culture, the racial *saṃskāra*, the social tissue. To this spirit of culture, the people as a whole are subject and it dominates and sways their whole life and soul. This pattern of culture is not easily changed, so long as a society remains integral and one. Its contents may be enriched, its significance enhanced, but its soul, its heart, cannot be radically altered, for racial heredity, operating through individual heredity, protects it. It does not therefore depend upon the people as such. But in the second place, the living tissues of the social substance are constantly undergoing change, modification, development etc., and in so far as the social mind is related to individual minds which express such change or modification, it may be said to depend upon them and itself undergo corresponding modifications in its parts.

20. Three principles, then, have emerged from our analysis of social life and experience: (1) the individual physically and psychically distinct from other individuals, (2) the physical environment together with the physiological characters and the psychological tendencies of the individual; and (3) the social mind or self which in its highest form of psychical and spiritual unity become self-conscious in society exists as the inner principle of control and regulation, support and guidance, in the individual mind and helps it to realise its potentialities. The second and the third naturally fuse together and present themselves as one to the individual's mind, as the concrete unity of body and spirit which rouses the deepest sentiments of love and reverence in the individual and for which he is prepared to sacrifice his all, if need be. Born in the matrix of country and race, he breathes the life of society and is nourished by the nutritive power of social substance. These three entities are different in essence but one in existence. They exist in an inalienable unity which forms the true ground of social value. Social value then is the value of one's country, race and the institutions that represent the social mind upon which the individual depends—in enabling him to realise the best and the highest that he has it in him to be, and such realisation is possible for him only in inseparable union with, and participation in the life of, these institutions.

It must be remembered, however, that such a union or participation does in no wise jeopardise the reality or the individuality of the individual, as explained in the previous section. It is not a question of the individual expanding indefinitely so as to embrace the whole state without, however, finding for himself ground enough to plant his own feet on, as is the case, for instance, in Plato's communism. Concentrated cultivation of individuality goes along with expansion in socialisation. The individual primarily works to realise his potentialities, but this he is able to do only by working for over-individual values such as education, science, politics, social reform, art, religion etc., all of which express some element or other of social substance. Such working, it has been pointed out, is not a *means* to his own good, it *constitutes* his good—the development of his faculties—while at the same time it also achieves social good. Individual betterment is indissolubly bound up with,

and dependent upon, social welfare. Absorption in over-individual values does not deteriorate but enhances such eminently individual traits as force of will, personal initiative, the spirit of battle and victory etc..

21. So far, the ideal relation that ought to subsist between the individual and the society has been explained. The basic condition necessary to maintain this relation is love. There is a tendency in a certain class of thinkers to exalt the claims of love to an extent that would deny or subordinate the place of other values in life. It is considered to be the moral absolute *par excellence*. But it must be remembered that love is not equivalent to *life*. It is *one*, albeit a pre-eminent, value of life. And it is appropriate only in certain relations and contexts. Love is not the thing we require in many persons and situations, in an engineer, for instance, in a horse-bargaining (to give Socrates' example), or in curing a disease. And even in the beloved, love is not the only thing which the lover would prize: he would like her to possess intelligence, knowledge, skill in household work, the arts and graces of life etc., in addition to her love. If the world had only love and nothing else, it would be a very poor and tiresome world indeed.

Nevertheless, it remains true that love is comparatively the highest value that human experience can create or feel. A world without knowledge, art etc., would be poor indeed but not insufferable; a loveless world would be hell. We have seen how the evolutionary progress of the universe, depending upon higher forms of "fellowship" or integration, may itself be said to be based upon some principle of unconscious love; the spiritual evolution of persons, at any rate, is entirely determined by a possible expansion in the consciousness of love.

22. Since we are not concerned with a discussion of love as a primary value, we cannot enter into the dialectic of love; we can only consider its working in social life, and the significance it gives to different aspects of life. But this requires that we should first briefly outline the organisation of society appropriate to the budding and blooming of such love. Our theory is not, it will be noted, the individualism of the *mere* individual, nor is it the absolutism of society or the state. While guaranteeing the primary value of individual personality, it recognises also the supreme dependence of the individual upon society

and social institutions for the actualisation of his own value. But the institutions upon which he depends must be such as, in accordance with the ideals laid down in connection with the theory of social substance, to liberate his spiritual energies, and particularly, to give scope to his instincts of creativeness and workmanship. The conditions of work must be such, we said, that the worker should come to regard his work more and more as an "art," if not as play. Art and play are both incompatible with acquisitiveness or possessiveness, the "grabbing tendency" unfortunately so predominant in human life. Yet private property, it can be proved, is not absolutely essential to the development of personality. It is not an "ethical idea," although our present culture regards it as one. Its indispensability for moral life, emphasised in our civilisation, is purely the result of our own selection of a certain "segment of the arc of possible human behaviour" which has been deepened and patterned. Yet the selection is purely cultural and is replaceable, under favourable conditions, by other segments of the arc. Original human nature and endowment are largely malleable and people will with equal readiness accept the substitute—provided it is not entirely antagonistic to the genius of their culture—and acclaim it as an "ethical idea" when once it is firmly established. Sudden changes, however, in cultural patterns are always inadvisable and so gradualness in the process is inevitable, if it is to produce lasting results.

In the institutions that we desiderate, then, individual ownership in land, buildings, and the major tools and instrumentalities of production, would be rigorously regulated. Possession is limitation. Fellowship in service is freedom. And where freedom is, there is the sure basis for love.

If we are to realise these ends, the only form of social organisation we should favour is a society of guilds, or autonomous working groups, for each industry and each technical and cultural service, consisting of all who work within the industry or service. It is not necessary to enter into a detailed account of the scheme here, but some such organisation appears to be the only hope for safeguarding the spiritual interests of the individual. Certain general features of the guild organisation adopted here may be noted. (1) There should be a hierarchy of guild institutions beginning with the local craft or industrial

group and ending with the National Guild Congress. (2) Each guild should be run by a managing committee presided over by two kinds of officers: a technical expert chosen by the committee, and an advisory officer elected annually by the public in order to represent the consumer's point of view especially in matters like fixing prices (according to local conditions) and testing the quality of goods and services. This officer is liable to be recalled by the public at any time during the year if he is suspected of treachery towards the public. (3) The National Guild Congress, which will also include representatives of the consumer's point of view, will doubtless be the final representative of the guild system on its industrial side laying down and interpreting the general principles of guild organisation, and acting as the final court of appeal in all purely guild matters such as disputes between different guilds, wages etc.. But there will be a permanent Planning Commission appointed by the Government to which the Congress will send its own representatives and which will determine beforehand the nature and extent of the goods to be produced for the whole year and the fixing of the quotas for each district. The consumer's representatives would be of great assistance in this matter, while the Government's representatives would safeguard the interests of the Government in production. The technical experts in each guild may be entrusted with the charge of seeing that the fixed quotas are produced. (4) Wherever a question is not satisfactorily settled by a guild committee as between the consumer's representatives and the worker's representatives, say, in the matter of prices, it should be referred to the ordinary judicial court of the shire or the district. Appeal will lie ultimately to the Supreme Court of Justice in the land whose verdict will be final. (5) Plants, tools and other principal resources and instrumentalities of production and distribution will be owned by the State, but they will be leased out to the guilds which will hold them as trustees of the state. (6) The state will also control the general economic policy of the whole country, such as importation of foreign labour, negotiations with other countries regarding conditions of trade etc., Taxation etc., may also be left to the state in order to obtain revenues for financing both its own activities and those gratuitous services provided by the civic guilds.

The advantages of this form of guild organisation may briefly be pointed out. The guild organisation will remain completely autonomous in the internal administration of its economic affairs, having its own banks, issuing its own credit etc.. The producer's demand, then, for responsibility and self-government in industry, for controlling the conditions of production etc., for functional democracy in short, would be fully satisfied. But protection to the consumer is also offered in such a way that it will become part of the duty of the guild organisation itself. The chief defect in the later scheme of Cole's guild philosophy is that, what with the producer's guilds on the one side and the consumer's councils on the other side, and the communes on the third, so much of the normal citizen's time would be taken up with work on these bodies that he would have precious little time left to the pursuit of the higher ideals of life such as art, religion, science etc.. The present scheme obviates this difficulty. It combines planning with guild organisation. But above all it leaves the sovereignty of the state intact, the state continuing to be the representative of the community at large, of the individual in his capacity as citizen as distinguished from his capacity as producer or consumer. The state will certainly perform fewer functions but possess no less authority. It will cease to interfere with the economic and cultural life of the country and will confine itself mostly to "political" matters, such as formulating and enforcing civil and criminal law, police protection, army and navy, foreign relations etc.. But as between producers and consumers, it will act as the final arbiter, and in general control the broad principles of the economic life of the nation as a whole, particularly through its Planning Commission. For the rest it will act as the friend and guide of the guilds whose freedom it cannot annul.

Thus the individual, the autonomous guild-groups, and the state would form three parts of a triune entity—the nation as a whole—in which each retaining its proper individuality and meaning, enters into inalienable relations with the others in order to secure the enhancement of the value of the parts as such and of the whole. The corporate personalities and the state together express the social mind in its different phases, as economic, cultural, religious, political etc., and this mind stands to the individual mind in the two ways already explained, either as a

given common consciousness which the individual unconsciously accepts and obeys, or as a conscious commonness of which he is clearly aware and which he makes by his own conscious co-operation. In the latter case alone does he *depend* upon the social mind in order to achieve the actualisation of his own potentialities.

23. The essence of the social order advocated above is that it recognises the advisability of having two states within the State, *viz.*, the economic state and the political state¹. It is the belief of the present writer that political democracy and, more importantly, economic equality are the two great conditions of social freedom. These two things are nowhere to be found in union in the states of the world to-day. We can classify modern states into (1) capitalistic democracies (Great Britain, France, America etc.), (2) capitalistic autocracies (totalitarian Germany, Italy, Japan etc.) and (3) socialistic autocracies (communist Russia). Where economic inequalities exist, as in most countries of the world to-day, freedom is a lie, be the form of government democratic or autocratic. And in the one country where we might have expected the realisation of freedom owing to the absence in a large measure of economic inequalities, the absence of democracy, the other essential condition of freedom, has effectively prevented its realisation. Totalitarian states are said to be a sign of the failure of democracies. The precise significance of this failure is not, however, often understood. It simply means that failure is inherent in the very nature of a democracy which allies itself with a profiteering industrialism which has hitherto worked largely blindly. Conscious rationalist planning is the only remedy for this disease. This being so, the collapse of democracy and the rise of dictatorships simply means that clear-sighted capitalists have perceived that unless they take the leadership in planning and establish a government of the people by the politicians for the profiteer, that process will take a socialist or communist shape. But of course a profit-rooted industrialism, whether ostensibly democratic or openly autocratic, contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction—a thesis which it is not necessary here to prove. However, so

1. What follows, upto the end of section 26, is a selection, with additions and alterations, from a Symposium paper on 'Authority and Freedom in the Modern State'; *Vide, Proc. of the Ind. Phil. Congress, 1938.*

long as the profit motive is predominant and private ownership in land and economic goods is unregulated, economic inequalities are bound to remain and multiply themselves. Hence, if we are to realise the one great condition of freedom, economic equality,—not of course in the absolute sense, but in the sense of equality of opportunity and consideration—ownership of property should, as suggested in the preceding paragraphs and in the chapter on economic value, be strictly regulated. An economic state should be established which would be an *imperium* in itself based upon efficiency and qualification but which would nevertheless and on the whole be subordinated to the political state.

24. And now for the other essential condition of freedom in society, political democracy. The economic state is on the whole to be subordinated to the political state which is an association of men, not as producers or consumers, but as citizens in general. So long as we are dealing with the organisation and governance of the life of men in masses we cannot dispense with some form of state, yes, even the coercive state. A society of saints needs no government, coercive or other, and the problem of freedom does not arise at all; where the rulers alone are saints and the subjects ordinary men of flesh and blood, the rulers alone are free—even so, vicarious suffering by rulers for crimes committed by subjects may be a bright idea in Bedlam and a lucid one in the land of the Fourth Dimension, but it is unspeakably absurd here and now. But utopias apart, where in the region of practical politics we are faced with the problem of governing masses of average men, physical coercion is indispensable and some ultimate authority for settling disputes and enforcing decisions, for maintaining peace within and preventing aggression from without, is a bare necessity. And so here arises at once in all its intensity and acuteness the problem of the relation of authority to the individual and his freedom.

It would be convenient to take our starting-point from the idealistic theory of the state. The fundamental mistake which that theory commits is two-fold. Firstly, it identifies the government with the state. In insisting that the state embodies my "real will" to which my actual will must be made to conform, it is in effect idealising the existing government and identifying

it with the state since in sober fact we do not ever meet with the state as such. And the problem of freedom does not arise at all since constraint is merely making known to me my "real" will. But granting that the (ideal) state embodies the common good, why assume that the actual state, the existing government or institution, does always body it forth in its measures and policies? And in what sense is the good a "common good" according to the idealist? Some things may be truly common to all, such as hospitals and educational institutions, but what is there common to the R. P. A. and the Theosophical Society, about differing religious, economic and political beliefs? If nevertheless we say that there is a common good being sought in all this in spite of such fundamental differences of outlook, surely that sense of commonness is not the one usually understood in the idealistic conceptions of the general will and the common good? In the one the common good is *created* in and through our mutually differing interests; in the other it is *given* to us as an over-individual value at which all must aim.

Secondly, the idealist theory in politics is blissfully innocent of all the thousand and one ramifications and complications in political issues brought about by the influence of economic factors which plays such a large part in contemporary politics. The idealist theory was conceived at a time when capitalism had attained its zenith of success and glory, and we can hardly expect such a theory not to play into the hands of profiteers—in truth, the logic of absolutism is incompatible with a true democracy. But the rise and progress of socialism in contemporary politics has brought about an entire change of the political outlook in the light of which we must pronounce the idealist theory to be a theory not indeed of the first but only of the second look.

But criticism of the idealistic theory does not mean acceptance of political realism *in toto*. We may maintain with Laski and Hobhouse that the claims of the individual conscience are supreme, that ours is not a universe but a multiverse embodying an ultimate and irreducible variety of experiences sometimes similar no doubt, but never identical or the same, and that the ultimate isolation and uniqueness of individual personality is the basis of politics. But on every one of these points one finds oneself making reservations. Can the supremacy of individual

conscience give us in all cases a clear rule of resistance to the acts of the government? Is it the conscience of the majority or of the minority that is to prevail? Even if the conscience of a single individual remains unsatisfied, is not the exercise of authority upon him so far coercion pure and simple? Ought we not in any case to inquire into the question whether, apart from individual conscience or consent, there may not be at least relatively objective standards of right and wrong, good and bad, unperceived by individuals, and if so, may not the government be embodying them in its measures as in the Harijan temple-entry measure of Travancore? This view of course rejects the purely "hindering" conception of the state and assigns to the state a more positive role in promoting the moral interests of the subjects. And is the individual really given as a full-fledged personality with all his uniqueness and differences to form the basis of politics? Is it not true that while the individual and the society may each possess an underived nature or character, the value of each is realised and enhanced only in their inalienable relationship? Shortly, is not the individual as much as the society being continually made? Hence the paramount significance of the conception of social substance for a true social and political philosophy—a conception which attempts to do justice to the claims of both idealists and realists in politics.

25. From the stand-point of this conception, we cannot talk of authority and freedom as if they were fixed entities confronting each other, and each trying to swallow up the other. They both express the two facets of social substance, the aspect of the continuity and integration of social substance represented by authority,—and here the individual as citizen is subordinated to the state—and the aspect of expansion and development of its tissues represented by the individual and his freedom,—and here the state is a means of enhancing the moral growth of the individual. No act of the individual is free which injures the vitality of social substance, and no act of the state is justified which tends to diminish the moral stature of the individuals. For this stature in its turn determines the development of social substance and so the sanction for authority is not individual freedom as such but this freedom as consistent with the vitality and development of social substance. The

work of conserving social substance is not incompatible with the initiation by the government of measures to enrich it. Hence the actual government must be in the hands of an intellectual aristocracy strong enough to maintain the pattern of culture, wise enough to body forth visions of vitalisation, willing enough to respond to liberal and spiritual influences from below. It must rest upon an essentially democratic foundation of election and representation, for power always corrupts and absolute power absolutely corrupts; and while the government is free to initiate new measures and policies as it deems fit, they must ordinarily speaking obtain the approval of the people's representatives in the Houses of Legislature, and delegated legislation must not be allowed to develop into a "New Despotism." But it is idle to make a fetish of democracy or political liberty where it is not founded on economic equality, for in such a case political democracy would by itself be only a device for consolidating the power of the haves against the havenots. You ask for bread and you receive a ballot. Political democracy is by itself no guarantee of freedom, individual or collective. Democracy is more a form or way of life. Freedom is indeed a thing of the spirit, but in politics the qualities of disinterestedness and creativity can be developed only under certain conditions, such as equality in economic competency, universal education, adult suffrage and the capacity for the selection of wise leaders. Hence the establishment of a wholehearted co-operative democracy in every state willing to undertake economic planning to be carried out by the guilds, not in the interests of the nation only, but as guided by an International League for Planning, alone can, by killing the profit motive in the human breast, prevent the recurrence of business cycles in the economic world and the rise and development of totalitarian states in the political world (with their incidence of wars etc.) which are nothing but organisations of big business using political and technical experts to plan industry, commerce and finance so as to maintain the power of the propertied classes and procure the acquiescence of the working classes by concessions of wages and other conditions of labour.

26. The root cause of the ills of modern society as well as of the frequent recurrence of devastating wars is thus essentially

economic—the existence of unjustifiable economic inequality among the classes in society. Nationalism and political sovereignty are largely the consequences of the unchecked reign of the profit motive in the hearts of the property-owning classes. The resulting lack of adjustment between production and consumption at home forces the capitalists to make huge and profitable investments abroad—hence the acquisition of colonies, protectorates, mandated territories, spheres of influence and even spheres of legitimate aspiration. When several nations follow this same policy, it is small wonder that they should come into conflict with one another and dead-locks in markets ensue. And in order to resolve such dead-locks, it is inevitable that one nation should attempt to use force against another where settlement by good understanding or arbitration fails. Political sovereignty is ultimately this right of a nation to declare war against another, and this right is generally exercised by the propertied classes who have vested interests abroad. That is to say, a nation's right to declare war—wherein consists its so-called sovereignty—is ultimately the right of the propertied classes of that nation to call upon the government of the day—supported by such classes—to use the standing armies—largely maintained in behalf of the interests of such classes—to protect such interests of theirs against threatened invasion. Nationalism is primarily economic and all the other factors of nationalism such as the social, the cultural, the linguistic, the racial etc., are subservient to the economic aspect. Economic nationalism results in political sovereignty. Political sovereignty breeds military chauvinism. And chauvinism—often loudly acclaimed as patriotism at white heat—is the prolific parent of wars. The logic of the situation—the dialectic of the profit-rooted organisation of society—does not materially alter whatever may be the form of government, whether ostensibly democratic or openly autocratic.

The only remedy, it would appear, lies in the willingness of nations to resolve to shed their sovereignty—understood as the right to declare war in the last resort—and submit themselves to the control of an International Body like the League of Nations of which they would be member-states. The right to declare war against a recalcitrant nation would then rest with such a Body and with it alone. In order to actualise and fully empower such a League of Nations and prevent it from

degenerating into merely a League of Nations, the member-states should agree to an equitable re-distribution of the world's economic resources and undeveloped markets, abolish the existence of economically unequal classes in their own territories, and establish a co-operative democracy willing, as said above, to undertake economic planning, not in the interests of the nation only, but as guided by the Planning Commission of the International Body. For only thus could the profit motive be killed, or at least weakened and regulated, production adjusted to consumption, and the incentive to make gainful investments abroad taken out. Only thus could the incidence of wars be greatly decreased, if not completely ruled out. Otherwise, under the present conditions of societies or states, peace is only, as Laski would say, a spell between two long wars.

Thus alone will social freedom be realised and reconciled with authority. Such freedom is the value emerging from the inseparable union of the individual mind and the social mind—a union in which the individual spirit pursues its creative capacities under conditions determined by social substance. This, to repeat, is possible only in an internationally organised co-operative democracy in every state—under any other condition the profit motive is sure to raise its ugly head and liberty and equality would simply be charmed away. In such a state alone would liberty be consistent with equality and both reconciled with the authority and the sovereignty of the state: liberty for the individual, authority for the society (the social mind) and power for the government (the few). The sanction for authority here would be the integration and the enrichment of social substance which under the aspect of growth necessarily depends upon individual freedom. The right of individual conscience is indeed indefeasible, but on any given question neither the conscientious objection of a minority nor the unconscious acquiescence of a majority can as such be said to have the right with it; we must believe in the possibility of relatively objective standards whose ultimate utility in respect of social substance is the sole test of their validity in society. There *is* such a thing as long-time value in society as in the case of prohibition in the Madras Province; and so though we agree with Laski that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," we can subscribe to his view that "actual

government is an essay in the conditional mood" only on the stipulation that immediate discontent, partisan opposition and merely sectional disaffection will not be recognised as sufficient conditions for invalidating the essay.¹

27. Such an ideal social order is eminently fitted to evoke the love and devotion of its members. For it embodies the social or common self which exists in the individual self as its inner principle of guidance and helpfulness. All love, it is said, is at bottom some form of self-love, for all objects of our aspiration are to be found only in the self, and in all cases of willing the self alone is the ultimate object. If we interpret the "self" in this sentence as the common self as described above, we can see how this apparently egoistic paradox enshrines one of the noblest truths. Man in "the state of nature" living a wild, and in many cases unorganised, life of impulses and desires, his "self" largely attached to his own kith and kin, does not look upon other people as in any way related to himself. This is self in a purely egoistic sense. Through the agency of several psychological and sociological factors the content of "self" expands and the individual is now merged in the corporate life of a clan, a tribe, a guild, a caste or a class. His love which was originally rooted in the family, now expands so as to embrace the guild or the class, for common interests and occupations, common enjoyments of life etc., have made the self comprehend a vaster concourse of people than was the case before. This is self-love in its class or caste form. The progress of the guild and its interests naturally brings it into community as well as conflict with other guilds as well as non-guild members and associations, and forces upon the individual the truth that the good for the private self which came to be recognised as the good for the community, must now be identified with the good for the whole nation or the state. Self-love in this stage is love of one's country, one's race, and one's culture and civilization. And it is necessarily a conscious love, the highest form of love possible for the majority of persons. In certain cases the national may evolve into the international life, and then self-love would be

1. For an examination of Laski's theory of "Consent" in politics, see the present writer's paper "The Nature of the Methods of Political Science" in the *Proc. of the Ind. Phil. Congress*, 1940.

identical with the love of humanity, for the "self" in this case would be mankind itself—nay, Nature herself as the inner Guide and Friend of man. Love of humanity, however, appears to be a different species of love altogether, different from the ordinary love of man for man. Thus all along a gradual extension of the denotation of "self" takes place and one's love correspondingly expands. But in so far as we consciously feel our kinship with wider groups and do everything in our power to knit our lives into a common whole, the expansion of love would be accompanied by a corresponding integration, and love will not suffer diminution in its intensity or force.

28. We may now turn to the problem of the emergence of social value. The universe of desire in this case includes what is called the gregarious or the "herd" instinct, the instinct for fellowship and companionship, for finding another similar to, yet contrasted with, oneself. Human nature, as does animal nature in general, abhors solitariness; the solitary "does not rejoice, does not find interest and amusement" in life. "Let me that am One be also Many" says the primeval spirit to itself and evolves forms. Both the self-regarding emotions of anger, jealousy, envy etc., as well as the sympathetic emotions directed generally to one's fellow-men, and particularly to individuals in connection with the sexual instinct resulting in founding a family, come into prominent play in this connection. In addition to this primary instinct, which is essentially social in character, there are other desires which predominantly predispose the individual to sociality. Such are the desire for food and warmth, the original goad to social activity, and the last to lose its force. The need of capturing animals among primitive men, the making of tools for offence and defence, the domestication of animals—all these tasks were only possible through combined activity. And in developed society, the complex character of these needs has only brought about a closer interrelation of people. Likewise the need of protection against cold and heat is equally important in its effect on social activity and on social progress. The preparing of some kind of clothing, the building of houses, the use of fire, were all significant as socialising agents. And lastly, the need of protection against hostile influences such as wild animals, one's own fellow-men etc., necessitating defensive as well as offensive measures, and

the institution of dancing in primitive peoples, such as the hunting dance, the war dance etc., were powerful influences in uniting people into groups and kindling in their breasts sympathy and fellow-feeling.

The objective processes in values, which signify new forms of relatedness, tending to the emergence of social value, are also diverse in character. The interaction between organic and economic values, and the counteraction and conflict between economic and personal values, help in the genesis of social value. The integration of hedonic and recreative values and their adaptation to each other are very favourable to the rise of social value, for pleasure cannot be enjoyed, nor recreation obtained, except in company, while our sweetest pleasures are those that are derived from play, and pleasure itself is a powerful incitement to play. The perception of the value of family life, of friendship etc., is facilitated by the baulking of personal and economic values on the one hand, and the co-operation of these values and the hedonic value on the other. For the pursuit of ambition, glory, wealth etc., will prove unsuccessful if not actively backed up by one's friends and fellow-workers, while the consciousness that your success gives happiness to your friends and relations is the most powerful stimulus to such pursuit. Of the derived modes of relatedness leading to social value, we may mention the subordination of aesthetic to organic and economic values, the integration and expansion of intellectual values, the confluence and co-operation of moral and religious values and so on. The friendship based upon devotion to the same moral and religious ideals is one of the highest, noblest forms of social companionship.

29. And lastly regarding freedom in social value. We saw that in personal value the distinction between the self and the objective world became firmly fixed in the individual's consciousness. The further stages in the progress of the spirit's freedom, we said, would consist in transforming the object to as near a likeness of the subject as possible. Now social value marks the first attempt in such a process of object-transformation. Mind definitely discovers itself in personal value as the ego, and the *alter* does not exist for it in its own right. But now the *alter* also begins to appear as a person in his or her own right, whom the individual learns to regard as an end in himself or

herself. For in such respect for others' personality consists the value of the social in man. The individual's yearning for society, for companionship, fellowship, satisfied only by interpersonal intercourse and love, represents a higher stage of the spirit's freedom, for that freedom is not the empty freedom of the ego's own unbounded will but the freedom of a *person* feeling his unity with, and dependence upon, other persons. It is the freedom of a larger self, the social or the common self, or rather, the freedom of the individual self as directed, guided, controlled and supported by the larger social self. In such security and support is the exercise of freedom real and significant and contentful. The self distinguishes itself consciously from other selves. It has already detached itself from objects and persons with whom it had blindly identified itself in previous stages. But now, a conscious relation of dependence is set up between itself and other selves in society. The sense of freedom is heightened when the social self exists in the individual self not merely as a given fact, but as a *conscious* fact involving a consciously accepted choice of dependence (of the latter upon the former) and spiritual kinship. All in all, it may be said that the social represents a definite *sheath*, as it were, of the self's being and constitution, along with the physical, the appetitive, the sensuous, the rational, the blissful and the spiritual. It is the dividing line between the first triad and the second.

The dividing line marks a curious but important turning-point in the evolution of the self's freedom. When once the self becomes familiar with the spiritual process of distinction from, and yet dependence on, other persons, it will naturally be impelled by the same inner logic of its evolving freedom to turn back and adopt a similar attitude in its relationship with external objects like economic goods, hedonic goods etc., but with a significant difference. The self now no doubt distinguishes itself consciously from external material objects with which it had identified itself before, and as we have put it, it detaches itself from them. But the positive relation that now comes to supervene upon the negative one of detachment is a relation in which the external objects come to depend upon the self, not the self upon them. The self now becomes their pre-supposition. There will indeed arise a co-operative union, so

to say, between the self and its objects, a union by means of which both will have the opportunity of realising and enhancing their value, but the self no longer "depends" on its objects. It involves them, utilises them, uses them as conditions of its own well-being. But in social, rational and spiritual values, the self having distinguished itself from its objects, (such as other persons, truth, beauty), once again consciously enters into a relation of "dependence" upon them for the enhancement and realisation of its own value.

CHAPTER X

EMERGENCE OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF VALUE:

(7) Intellectual Value: Knowledge and Truth

1. We now come to a triangular section in the field of value which has been looked upon with almost religious reverence as the peculiar province and possession of philosophy. And the term "religious reverence" is not wholly metaphorical as used to express the attitude of philosophers towards the problems that we shall now have to face; for the trinity of values—truth, beauty, and goodness—is not uncommonly regarded as expressing the triune nature of Godhead.

"Beauty, good and knowledge, are three Sisters
That dote upon each other, friends to man,
Living together under the same roof,
And never can be sundered without tears."

—Tennyson.

In fact there has been a persistent tendency amongst philosophers not merely to accord a special niche to each of these three values in the temple of higher philosophy, but to consider them as the only values deserving to be called intrinsic. This work, it is hoped, will not be found wanting in religious reverence, but on principle it is bound to treat all values—be they economic, intellectual, ethical or aesthetic—as intrinsically of the same nature, *viz.*, as only, so long as they remain *values*, relative. Of the three, it is usual to discuss truth first.

There is a certain advantage in envisaging the epistemological problem as a problem of "value," for it at once brings knowledge and truth nearer to the human standpoint. Logic and epistemology become related to life. And probably that way alone lies the solution to their central problems.

The problem of knowledge has several aspects. There are the psychological aspect of the genesis and the subjective conditions of knowledge; the metaphysical aspect of the presuppositions of knowing involving such problems as the relation

of experience to reality, of knowledge to existence etc.; the logical aspect of the expression of knowledge in statement and inference; and finally the epistemological aspect of the validity of knowledge involving the problems of truth and error proper. At the outset the question forces itself whether we should distinguish between knowledge and truth or consider them as identical. There is certainly justification for holding, as is often done, that they are identical, for knowledge is cognition that, in a sense, is valid and true, and whatever is not in this sense true cannot be called knowledge. On this ground philosophers have differentiated from the days of Plato onwards between knowledge, belief, and opinion. And yet it would be wiser to think that while the *problem* of knowledge and that of truth are identical, knowledge as such is not the same as truth. The full distinction between them will appear in the sequel, but here it may be pointed out that knowledge and truth are different stages in the development and expression of the same cognitive activity. In the first stage, knowing is concerned with sheer existence and takes nothing else into consideration. Mind here just *apprehends* existents, and lies alongside of them, so to say. In the second stage, the same knowledge is judged by a standard, a norm or an ideal, and is valued accordingly. Then it becomes truth—or falsity. The dominance of our cognitive interest by life's meanings is characteristic of truth. And such permeation of knowledge with truth values has a determining influence on the practical life and character of the knower which knowledge *qua* knowledge can never exercise. The cognitive interest in truth has a reactive influence on the correlative. Mind in truth *comprehends* existents and possesses them.

An example or two might make the distinction clear. Science tells us that coal and diamond consist essentially of the same substance, *viz.*, carbon. To say that coal and diamond consist of carbon is to express a piece of knowledge, but to say that coal is diamond or *vice versa* is not true. \ Man belongs to the genus, animal, and the proposition embodies a piece of knowledge, but the statement that man is an animal would not be considered as expressing the real truth about man. \ Coal as coal cannot be put to the same use to which diamond can be put, and man, though an animal, possesses some powers which have elevated

him far above the level of the animal. Certain ideals or norms expressing, it may be, our practical interests and needs determine us in deciding questions of truth, meanings which are strictly not relevant to the question of knowledge. This is further illustrated by the significant fact that while the antithesis of knowledge is sheer ignorance or blankness of mind, the opposite of truth we call error or *falsity*. When a man is ignorant of a fact, we do not say that he is mistaken about it, as we do say when he has an erroneous belief about it.

2. I look out of my window in the evening and perceive in the distance the outline of a moving figure which I immediately identify with that of my friend whom I have been expecting to join me at 5 p.m. Reflection on this event discloses the fact that the knowledge thus obtained (supposing my judgment is true) consists in a process of awareness or experience. To know anything at all is to experience it, and apart from experience, there is no knowledge. But from this it has often been concluded that reality *is* sentient experience, and outside of sentience or psychical existence, there is nothing real, no being or fact at all. These statements are ambiguous and equivocal. In the sequel we shall find reason for holding that all that is real is *within* experience or awareness, in the sense that it has relation to experience. But this is not the same thing as to say that "to be real is to be indistinguishably one thing with sentience."¹ That is to say, the doctrine in question obliterates in effect all distinction between subject and object, or reduces the object to the subject. The doctrine has been criticised *ad nauseam* and there is no need to go over old ground again in these pages. Suffice it to say that from the epistemological standpoint experience is always experience of something, and knowing would be meaningless if there were no object to know undetermined in its reality by its being known. As Alexander puts it,² "not its *esse* is its *percipi*, but merely its *percipi* is its *percipi*." We must, that is, make a distinction between the reality or the essence of the object and its mode of existence of which being known or experienced by a subject is perhaps a primary form. Being known as an object is an event which may happen to an existent. This may determine its *mode* of existence, but not its

1. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 146.

2. *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 259.

essence. Its relational character with reference to a knowing subject is other than its essential character with reference to itself. The underived reality of the object is thus presupposed in epistemology, and, so long as the epistemological relation holds, unevaporable and irreducible to any other terms. If the object is real only because it is experienced, and anything is real only in so far as it is one with sentience, then the experiencing subject—which at any rate must be granted to be real, for otherwise there is no experience—also is real only because it is experienced, and such a position, it is easily seen, leads to an infinite regress—unless, that is, we are prepared to sink back into the arms of solipsism, in which case, of course, there would be no knowledge problem at all.

3. In every experience one has to distinguish between the "that" and the "what." We shall find that a firm grasp of this distinction will repay us in our efforts to solve the knowledge problem. The "that" refers to "something which exists" and which cannot be conjured away by the philosopher's magic wand. It may be an object of sensation or perception, of conception or judgment. It is concerned with existence, and existence cannot be created or destroyed by knowing. Here, existence and essence would be one. To say that a thing is independent of any knowledge of it is to say that its existence is underived so far as the knowing of it is concerned. The "what" on the other hand is concerned with the content of the "that," with what the "that" claims to be. The "what" is thus what the mind apprehends of the "that"—of the moving figure in the distance, of which the "what" asks whether it is the figure of my friend or of an animal or of something else. It is thus partly at least dependent on the mind, and, as such, not real apart from experience. But only partly. "The table in my room is brown." The brownness of the table in my room—the "what" of my experience of the table—is no doubt on the one side conditioned by my experience, but on the other side, and at the same time, it is determined by the table itself, for it is the *table* that appears brown to my perception, and not the wall in my room, for instance. It is what the mind apprehends of the object, and in so far, it is what is grounded in the object itself. That is, sense-data are neither entirely subjective nor entirely objective, but they are conditioned by subjective

factors of perception (along with those of space and time) while being grounded in the objective. This is the explanation of sense-data which appear the same to all normal percipients. Even in the case of a sensum which appears only to a single percipient, like the yellow colour to a jaundiced person's eye, there must be something in the nature of the objective, *qua* objective and perceivable, which when exposed to his perception, determines him to perceive the yellowness of his own diseased eye-ball, as projected on to the object.

The point, however, relevant to our present question is this: when the "what" of an experience is itself independent of experience *in so far as* it is grounded in the objective, how much more so should be the "that" which is *given* for experience and which is that of which the "what" pretends to give us the content? And if the question be asked as to what the "that" is which thus possesses an underived reality, the answer is that so far as we can tell, the "that" is inseparable from the "what," and it would be foolish to attempt to state the one apart from the other. Knowledge must necessarily contain a subjective factor, unless, of course, one holds that one knows the object by becoming one with it! But because it must thus include the subjective, it does not follow that knowledge is not directly of the objective reality, untransformed either by our thought or perception. To hold otherwise is to land oneself in subjectivism—to believe that one knows only one's own ideas. Knowledge is self-transcendent and reaches out to the object directly. Or, to use an illustrative metaphor, it is a lamp which can reveal the presence of a jar (say) as well as its own. What, then, is meant by a knowledge which must necessarily contain a subjective element and which yet directly encompasses the object? The answer must be postponed to a later stage.

4. To deny the reality of the object of experience is a grave sin indeed; but it is more heinous to negate the reality of the subject of experience—as the neo-realists do,—in fact, to refuse any status to the specifically mental as such, and to maintain that knowing is just one among so many other facts in the world. On this view, there is no mental "act," truth and error are equally realities, rather, there is no distinction between truth and error or reality and unreality. Such an objectivism is worse than subjectivism, for in the former case, *experiencing*

itself becomes impossible, and we must believe that one object experiences or knows another object—a chair a table; the wind the rain and so on. Metaphysical monism may be an untenable doctrine but epistemological monism stultifies the fact of knowing. Even if it be held that ultimate reality consists of some neutral stuff of which one part, under certain conditions, is aware of another, we must perforce maintain some distinction between knowing as in some unique sense subjective, and the known as objective. Since for purposes of a value theory we have found the reality of the valuing subject indispensable, we need not labour this point further in the present connection.

5. A common sense analysis of the knowledge situation, then, reveals an object which is known and a subject which knows. On our theory, the essential nature of the knowing subject is, not that it is consciousness, but that it is conscious. It has consciousness as its *attribute* or as its *function* by means of which it becomes aware of objects. Consciousness, be it noticed, is not regarded here as a diaphanous entity *through* which the self looks out upon an outer world. Consciousness is not an entity or stuff. The entity view of consciousness would not only make of it stuff but also nonsense. It is a function, a power, an essential quality, of the subject of experience, which is known by what it does. As possessing this essential attribute of consciousness or intelligence, the knowing subject is the substrate of consciousness which is its quality. And yet this quality of consciousness is such that it can light up other things also for the knowing subject, just as the flame of a lamp, while being self-luminous, produces light which illumines other objects.

6. The knowing subject—which for shortness we shall henceforth call the self—is conscious. And consciousness is self-luminous. What precisely does this self-luminousness involve? It is often supposed that to be conscious is to be conscious only of an object, and never of oneself at the same time. Consciousness, that is, only knows other objects but never itself. If this were true, what we call self-consciousness would be an impossibility. The self being a knower, and consciousness being always of the known, how does it ever happen that we know the self as the self, i.e., as a knower? It may be said that we know the self reflectively as the subject of all experiences. But to believe in self-knowledge on the basis

of such reflection is to believe in the most baseless thing in the world, for what we directly perceive in the reflex attitude of the mind is not the self as the *knower*, but the self as the known *i.e.*, as an object, and we can never be sure that the self which is an object is a self at all, *i.e.*, is identical with the self as the knower. There are, however, two considerations which lead one to think that self-consciousness, as experienced, is really knowledge of the self *qua* self or knower, and not knowledge of the object. There is in the first place the purely logical consideration that there is no inherent self-contradiction in believing that consciousness, even while becoming an object, yet retains its quality of consciousness. Knowing may be known and yet need not cease to be knowing. The essence of consciousness is not that it is the quality of the knowing subject. The two are not identical. If never to become an object were of the essence of consciousness, a hare's horn also is never known to become an object of consciousness, and, as such, should be reckoned as one with consciousness. In the second place, self-consciousness is a fact because in every case of self-conscious experience, it may be that the self, while appearing to become an object, does really never become an object, but remains, and is truly known to remain, as the self and the self alone. This is a case where *a priori* theories are formed in complete disregard of facts. Why should knowledge make objects of all that it knows? To know is not necessarily to know an object. It is a prejudice—which it is difficult to eradicate—to think that we know only objects. When I am looking at a picture, I am aware directly no doubt of the picture, but surely I am aware also of myself as looking at the picture? The first is object-awareness, the second pure self-awareness. And this latter awareness is not a second act of awareness supervening upon the first act of awareness of the picture, and interfering with it, but integrally part and parcel of the single indivisible continuous act of awareness of the picture *viz.*, of looking at a picture while being all the time aware of myself also as looking at it. I have tried this experiment a number of times in order to test the theory that self-awareness is set over against object-awareness, and every time I have failed to verify it. I have found no doubt that if I dwell too long and intently upon myself, it distracts my attention from the picture, but I have

found it possible to feel that it is *my* awareness, that it is *I* who am aware, while actually being aware of the picture without interruption, just as in feeling strong and healthy, it is my strength and health that I feel. The whole question of whether self-consciousness is involved in consciousness or not is, it seems to me, a question of degree. In actual experience, consciousness of anything presupposes self-consciousness, but generally of an indeterminate and elementary type. In self-consciousness properly so-called, it becomes explicit and determinate, but even here, be it noted, it is not of the self as an *object* that we are said to be aware, but of the self as the *subject* of experience. Otherwise, I repeat, self-consciousness in the true sense of the word is only a fond fancy or a fraud. The self is not merely "enjoyed" but "contemplated" as well; but it is able to contemplate itself not as an "other" but as itself.

7. In perceiving a moving figure in the distance, I perceive, it was said, a datum in which both an element of "thatness" and an element of "whatness" can be distinguished. It is sometimes said, however, that the datum is a fact, a "brute" fact which must *qua* "brute fact" be distinguished from the theory, the interpretation, or the construction which in some sense is later and put upon it. Perception, in other words, is, according to this view, of the indeterminate, non-differentiated being or existence as such, processless, relationless and instantaneous. It reveals pure being in which distinctions of subject and object have not yet emerged. Thought or judgment, on the other hand, begins with the world of relation and determination, of multiplicity and differentiation, which it organises and synthesises into an integral conception. It is unable to apprehend the original homogeneity of absolute existence. It works—and necessarily can work—only by the help of previous experience, by means of what Kant called the synthetic unity of apperception. As contrasted with such a relational experience, perception, and even, for that matter, sensation, involve a form of experience which is direct, immediate, unmodified, self-complete, neither leaning back upon past experience, nor leaning forward to anticipate the future. It is, in Prof. Spearman's words, the pre-cognitive stage of primary sentience, the stage of "simple apprehension."

This theory is a mixture of both truth and error. The pre-cognitive stage of primary sentience, call it sensation, indeterminate perception, lived experience or what you will, is, so long as it is regarded as divorced from elements of thought proper, a mere figment of the psychologist's brain—one more illustration of the prolific "psychologist's fallacy." Perception is a process, and at no stage of it is there an apprehension of a "brute fact" as such and for what it is, unmixed with elements of construction or interpretation. Nor is there, on the other side, apprehension of pure being or absolute existence unaccompanied by the perception of some qualitative characteristic of that existence. All states of consciousness have for their object some complex presentation or other, something marked by internal differences, something possessed of qualitative characteristics. There is no object presented to experience without relations and qualitative differences. The only difference then between the indeterminate and the determinate stages of perception consists in this: that while in the former differences and relations are potential and implicit, in the latter, they have become actual and explicit. "It is a human figure" I may say of the moving figure in the distance in the first instance; then, on looking closer, or in the next instant, I may declare "It is my friend;" on looking closer still, I may remark "It is a stranger." The successiveness of the different moments of perception here exemplified is not necessary; in one and the same instant the different stages may be gone through. But at whatever stage we choose to analyse perception, we shall always find it focussed upon an object with some special feature of make or structure, involving relations between parts etc., the relations and the qualities remaining vague and inchoate in indeterminate, and rising to full form in determinate, perception. We may characterise the distinction further by saying that in the determinate stage the percipient becomes aware of universals as universals, while in the indeterminate stage he is conscious only of particulars. When I happen to see a rhinoceros for the first time, I may notice the generic characteristics of the animal but shall have no ground to believe they would persist. Consequently the perception here is indeterminate. When a second time I perceive an animal of the same species, I would naturally say: "This also

is a rhinoceros," and this would be determinate perception. Persistence of the generic characteristics of the object in the second, third and later perceptions is thus the differentiating feature of determinate perception; but this does not mean that in the indeterminate stage the generic characters and the structural differences and relations were not perceived; only they were not perceived as persisting. Nevertheless, they were perceived as *generic*. For even if perception be instantaneous, we apprehend relations of similarity and difference; we apprehend not only the peculiar characters of the thing itself, but we apprehend it as being similar to, or different from, the peculiar characters of other things or objects we may have perceived before. For the consciousness of a universal, then, not merely the perception of the generic characters of an object, but their perception as enduring, is also necessary.

The doctrine of universals set forth above is very similar to the theory that Aristotle advocates in a famous passage regarding the process of discovering a general rule in a special case of it. Says Aristotle: "Though sense-perception is innate in all animals, in some the sense-impression comes to persist, in others it does not. So animals in which this persistence does not come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of perceiving, or no knowledge of objects of which no impression persists; animals in which it does come into being have perception and can continue to retain the sense-impression in the soul; and when such persistence is frequently repeated, a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematising them, and those which do not. So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of memories constitutes a single experience. From experience again—*i.e.*, from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all—originates the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science.....

"We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor developed from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception.....Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by

induction; for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive."¹

8. If perception is a process involving the apprehension of generic characters, of structural peculiarities and relations of similarity and difference, it is clear that such apprehension is not free from, or possible without, elements of thought and construction. Whether in the indeterminate or the determinate stage, the perception of the generic characters of an object, necessitating the exclusion of everything else—of thought and speech referring to other things,—the perception of relations between the parts of a complex presentation, and the perception of such generic characters and relations as *persisting*, must all involve judgment, incipient in the indeterminate, and full-fledged in the determinate, stage. It is impossible to find any stage of perception, from the most elementary sensory awareness to the most complex thought construction, characterised by immediacy and *immediacy alone*. This is not to say, as it is sometimes said, that perception *is* judgment or inference, or that there is no logical difference between perception and judgment. It only means that the direct knowledge of the object in perception is not direct in the sense that the object is grasped by the mind in its own native hues and pristine purity uninterpreted and unenveloped by human-mental categories. We can no more escape interpretation and construction in perceptual experience than a man can jump out of his own shadow. For, to put the essence of the matter in a nutshell, perceptual experience is *significant* and *meaningful*. We understand what we perceive. And understanding, meaning, significance etc., imply grasping the relations of the object, its similarities to, and differences from, other objects, often naming it, briefly, placing the object within one's system of experience. Such placing must necessarily take the form of a judgment—"this is such and such." There is truth in the statement that all cognition is re-cognition. Knowledge is a system of pigeon-holing our experiences. Whoever is not capable of this work of pigeon-holing, of recognising, of naming, of placing, stands in stark dumbfoundedness before the object—nay, rather, he perceives *nothing* and simply passes on. Further, such a percipient cannot be said to be a unitary self in himself.

1. *Analytica Posteriora*, in *Works* ed. by W. D. Ross, Vol. I, 1928, p. 99b.

For in knowledge, subject is correlative to object, and whoever cannot unify, systematise his experiences—and unification or systematisation implies judgment—, whoever finds a "bare this," or a "naked that," a "pure here" or a "sheer now" in experience, divorced from the "what," the "there," and the "then," unrelated, isolated, utterly indeterminate, —in short unplaced—cannot in himself experience a continuous, recognisable, identical self, and, devoid as he must be of the synthetic unity of apperception, must fall into a number of broken isolated states of sense.

9. The same remarks apply to sensation also. It is self-contradictory to call the pre-cognitive stage of primary sentience (if there be such) *lived experience*. For the least experience involves consciousness, and consciousness means understanding in some form, recognising, placing. It is not necessary to deny the long chain of ether waves, chemical processes in the eye (in the case of vision, for instance), current in peripheral nerves, chemical processes in the sensorium etc.,—the chain beginning with the object and ending in sentience. But when we have arrived at the stage of sensation, it is no longer pre-cognitive, *i.e.*, unapprehended; and if it be truly pre-cognitive, it is really not *lived experience*. And *unlived experience* is an intolerable contradiction in terms.

Neither perception nor sensation, then, can be said to be free from intellectual elements. No form of conscious experience, in fact, not even primary affection or feeling, is so free from rational elements. There are no bare events, nor is there a pure flux, a simple datum, stripped of all significance. To apprehend a datum is to interpret it and to interpret it is equivalent to judging it. It is an old story that the "simple ideas" which according to Locke are the building bricks of knowledge are in fact the turrets projecting from out of the peaks of the edifice.

It is sometimes argued further that perception and sensation are doubtful cases of immediate knowledge and that we must look to consciousness of mental states for a genuine case of immediacy. It does not need to be pointed out, however, that wherever consciousness be present, whether of mental states or of external objects, the same considerations as above adduced apply showing that at any rate in the sense which we are now examining, *viz.*, as bereft of all intellectual construction and relation to a synthetic unity of experience, immediacy is

unknown to experience. In short, it may be said that experience and immediacy are incompatible terms.

10. This does not, we must hasten to add, mean that we are denying here all genuine elements of perception as distinguished from judgment or inference. We are not saying that because perception is judgmental or inferential through and through, therefore perception is nothing but judgment or inference. This would again be contradictory of experience. For in experience we do appeal to perception every now and then to settle doubtful issues in judgment and inference. True, in experience perception never occurs in isolation uninformed by the light of judgment. We cannot apprehend an object except in terms whose meanings we already know; except, that is, in the form of expression or statement (not necessarily for the purpose of communication). Perception in this sense is equivalent to *statement*. And statement, we shall see, is always modifiable or corrigible, owing to the limitedness of our experience and the imperfection and inadequacy of our terminology. But ideal interpretation, subjective construction, judgment or statement, itself presupposes a basis in perception, *i.e.*, direct apprehension of objects, otherwise we need not appeal, as we usually do, to perceptual experience for testing the truth of our statements. Perception involves judgment, but judgment presupposes or depends upon perception. I may declare that the moving figure in the distance is that of my friend, another may affirm that it is that of a stranger. But both our assertions relate to, and depend upon, the common object of our perception, the moving figure. The "what" of experience necessarily presupposes the "that," and the latter is a perceptual content. We have already seen that the subjective and the objective factors in perception are indissoluble and both ineliminable. And the predominance of the subjective in the matter of the understanding of experience does not nullify or obliterate the reality or the validity of the objective.

It is wrong then to assert that perception is judgment or inference or that there is no immediacy involved in perceptual experience. But we must explain again. The immediacy which was formerly denied of perception and sensation was an immediacy of apprehension of bare particulars on the one hand devoid of qualities and relations and parts, and of a kind of

sensuous or non-sensuous intuition on the other, unmixed with rational elements like selection, comparison, discrimination, recognition etc.. Such an immediacy is not possible for any theory of knowledge which holds that knowing has to do with meanings and that it is different from the object known. The net result of our discussion there was to show that perception is a process of unity-in-difference, not a bare static identity, but an identity which permeates the system and which lives in the differences, while the differences are unified by the identity. In short, perception is of universals, and such universals are the basis of all reasoning and knowledge. But what should prevent one from holding that it is qualified events, characterised occurrences, having relations and differentiations, which I know and know directly, not in the sense that judgment is excluded in such knowing, but in the sense that the whole judgmental process forms one continuous integral activity, beginning with the mind and ending with the object cognised, in which there is ordinarily no reference to explicit grounds and consequences, conscious premises and conclusions? Explicit inference and conscious elucidation of relations are only later refinements and products of logical analysis. Knowing experience as such—whether perceptual or conceptual—does not formulate them though it is all along the line and implicitly relational, judgmental and inferential. And knowing does not cease to be direct and self-transcendent simply because it has to work through physiological and physical processes and media on the one hand and logical and psychological activities on the other. Knowledge, as remarked previously, has the capacity—and the capacity is unique and needs no further explanation—of reaching out to its object directly, of enveloping it, so to say, and without this capacity the object could never be known. The distinction, that is, between mediate and immediate knowledge is ultimately not tenable. Like the other distinction between determinate and indeterminate perception, it marks only a difference of degree in explicitness and development and not an intrinsic difference of kind. The same remark applies also to the now somewhat fashionable distinction between "knowledge of" and "knowledge about."

Knowledge thus has its ultimate basis in the objective which is directly encountered in perception. And perception must

thus remain the ultimate test of truth and error. True, perception is itself often subject to error and distortion, and subjective and imaginative filling out of hazily perceived outlines etc., but the remedy for all these defects is only more careful and accurate perception and not something which excludes or is opposed to it. At some stage or other, we must perforce make a distinction between awareness of facts and our constructions, and test the latter by means of the former. If such awareness were either impossible or intrinsically untrustworthy, there would then be no hope indeed for human knowledge and human truth.

11. But, it will be said, was it not previously laid down that knowledge at *any* stage must contain subjective elements and that it can no more free itself from them than a man can jump out of his own shadow? Yes, and that brings us to a definition of the "subjective," the "objective" etc.. The objective element in perception, whatever ultimately it be,—*"this" tree, "that" chair, "my present" toothache, etc.*—can only be apprehended, grasped, experienced, *i.e.*, stated, in human-mental categories, *i.e.*, by means of universals or meanings. But for purposes of practical life an indispensable minimum of such *common* and *universal* human-mental construction is taken as allowed, and, within this well-understood conventional limit, the subjective is considered as practically equivalent to the objective, which thus acquires objectivity and an underived status. Men have agreed to call a particular kind of living organism rooted to the earth—a complexus of certain qualities—a *"tree,"* another variety moving about on earth, an *"animal"* and so on. It may be that originally even such names were given to objects on account of their practical availability, and thus their apprehension was inseparable from an element of purpose and use. But now we are agreed that these names shall denote nothing but the objective, *qua* objective. That is, the objects as constructed by human categories or universals have become the objective. As such, perception apprehends them directly, rather, they become objects of common and universal cognition. Such objectivity is supposed to belong not only to common qualified objects like tree, house, light, ship etc., but also, within a given system, to the relations of parts within that system. The objective in this sense thus becomes the standard, the

criterion, for judging the truth or error of individual perceptions which, *qua* individual, are called subjective and personal. Whether the moving figure in the distance is that of a man, or an animal,—my perception and yours respectively, let us say—is only to be decided by waiting for its near approach and *then* *perceiving* it. Not that this perception will give us the object completely denuded of human, and in this sense subjective, construction either—no, that is impossible—but it will give us the objective as defined above, *i.e.*, the object as accepting the construction "man" or "animal." In other words, the test of perception even when it is direct is whether the "that" perceived accepts or rejects the "what" put upon it. It is a further question whether even the "what" is entirely a subjective (even in the sense of human) construction or is itself based upon real elements in the "that."

These observations apply, not merely to sense-perception hitherto discussed, but also to perception of mathematical or logical truths, axioms and so on.

In conclusion, therefore, we may say that perception involves judgment, but still has a genuine element of immediate intuition or cognition. It is implicit judgmental activity guided by, or dependent upon, apprehension, intuition, or immediate cognition of the "that." It is recognition indissolubly blended with cognition. It is the infusion of universals into particulars.

12. Perception, we said, involves judgment. All thought is implicitly judgmental. "The moving figure in the distance is an animal" is a judgment. It is clear that the present view looks upon judgment as an act. It is also clear that it regards this activity of mind as crucial in the knowledge situation. For we have seen that knowledge must necessarily contain a subjective element and to its further elucidation we must now turn. The greatest and the most revolutionary contribution of Kant to the theory of knowledge was his insistence upon the transcendental unity of apperception operative in all judgment. In apprehending an object, mind works according to rules and in the direction of system and unity. Unifying and systematising are the characteristics of mental activity. In order to achieve such unity and system, mind must bring to bear its past experience upon the present problem of investigation. It must, that is, so deal with the facts that they will be forced to fall into unity

with its past experience. If the facts cannot thus be harmonised with its past experience into a system, mind ordinarily fails to grasp them. Judgment expresses this activity of mind whereby it tries to achieve unity of its past with its present experience. This is what was meant when it was said that knowing is a kind of pigeon-holing of one's experiences. It is otherwise expressed by saying that all judgments, *i.e.*, statements, are essentially modifiable or corrigible. So long as it does not believe that the unity is there in the facts simply to be intuited or apprehended, but is something to be achieved or produced, mind feels free to modify the parts of its experience if they should be found not to fit. That means, no terms expressing independent chunks of reality can be said to be given to the mind in judgment; in judgment we are concerned with reality indeed, but the terms in which we express it are moulded after the nature and capacity of the knowing mind to such an extent that, without reference to the total meaning expressed in the judgmental system as a whole, the terms by themselves cannot be said to have anything corresponding to them in reality. And it is only to be expected that if we should make statements or judgments with reference to this total meaning of our experience as a whole, those statements or judgments are liable to be modified or corrected every now and then and so the terms used in such judgments cannot be said to express "brute facts," clear-cut and independent objects of apprehension. The reality and unity of the apperceiving mind determine the reality and unity of objects perceived.

13. From this foundational doctrine of Kant idealistic logic has moved several steps further.¹ Kant reached the conclusion that the mind no doubt seeks for unity and system but *only in connection with the given empirical material of experience*. And according to him, if perceptions without conceptions were blind, conceptions without perceptions were empty. But his successors pressed the idealistic logic further and concluded that if system-making is of the essence of thinking, then the given only serves to *illustrate* this system-building nature of mental activity so that it is not the given as such, but the systematic nature of thinking, that has the decisive voice in

1. For the views expressed in sections 13 and 14, I am mainly indebted to the admirable work of Prof. C. R. Morris, *Idealistic Logic*.

determining the truth or falsity of our thinking. The unity which it thus reaches is not the reproduction of an intuited unity, but the production of a unity of its own by binding itself to a rule, for example, the law of causality, or the law of conservation of energy. Whenever a scientist makes a judgment about causality, for instance, his idea of causality will undergo indefinite modifications brought about, be it noticed, by the judgment itself; for the judgment has ramifying implications, and by working out these necessary implications, the scientist is compelled to correct and modify his notion of causality at every step. Thus the ideal of "pure thinking," of "coherent thinking," of whole-making, of thinking in accordance with rules, came to be the test of truth. Facts as such were not important in the question of truth, but the fitting of facts into a system, into a coherent whole.

But such a position proves itself weak at many points. There are two difficulties in particular which it cannot overcome. The indefinite corrigibility of judgments is no doubt true in the case of empirical sciences like physics where we are concerned with fundamental principles and their implications. And to a certain extent it may be said that even judgments of fact such as "this tree is green," "that is a hayacinth" etc., are liable to modification, for, we have seen that there is no bare apprehension of particulars as such, but that all apprehension involves expression, *i.e.*, statement in terms familiar to oneself acquired in past experience. And *statement* of observed facts, even of one's own organic experiences, can never be perfectly accurate, precise, and fully adequate to the facts or the experience. In this sense we may say that there is no apprehension or statement of "brute fact" as such in the physical sciences. But what about statement of particular mathematical truths, in geometry and arithmetic, for instance? Do not judgments like " $2+2=4$," "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles" etc., appear to be apprehensions of brute facts, final, absolute, incorrigible? They may fit into a system with other facts of a like nature, but their truth or falsity does not obviously depend upon their capacity to fit into a system—even prior to the formation of any such system, they, as single isolated facts, manifest their intelligibility and incorrigibility. The appeal to a system in their case, for instance, to the numerical

system, or the system of space, is at best only supererogatory and you cannot, in order to show their corrigibility, appeal to the *meaning* entertained by any one who makes such a judgment, for that would be equivalent to giving up the fundamental standpoint of idealistic logic which swears by logical *statement* or judgment only and not by what was intended or meant by such statements.

"Coherence," again, or "pure thinking" may guarantee formal validity of knowledge, but it is difficult to see how the problem of truth or real validity is going to be solved by it. Thinking in physics has a deceptive appearance of being completely free from empirical taint because it is aided by mathematical reasoning which does not lean upon observation. But as a matter of fact, even in physics, when we raise the question whether the coherent theory is *true*, the final verdict must rest with observation. Is there a new planet in the heavens to account for the aberrations of Venus in her revolving course round the Sun? When a flash of light is sent out from the neighbourhood of the observer to a distant mirror and then reflected back to him, is the instant of the return of the flash *simultaneous with* or appreciably *after* the instant of its departure?

The answer to such questions can only be given by means of a direct, immediate apprehension or observation of facts. Idealistic logic, however, loth to summon facts to its aid, and following only the "high priori" road of pure thinking, has declared that coherence and truth are identical by denying that any theory can be coherent without being true. Here, it would seem, it is committing the fallacy of simple conversion. Any theory to be true must certainly be coherent, but it does not follow that all theories which are coherent are therefore true. Coherence by itself confers upon the theory only formal perfection—otherwise how explain the rejection of many theories in physics which were in themselves perfectly coherent in their own day? How account for the progress from system to system, from theory to theory? Having rejected the appeal to "brute" facts in the beginning, it is not *now* open to idealistic logic to plead that the rejected theories were rejected because they were found not to comprehend all the facts, for that would be to recognise that immediacy of facts which *ex hypothesi* is denied

by idealistic logic. It would mean abandoning the central contention of that logic that there is no "apprehension of fact" as such, that no "brute fact" can be given without being modified or corrected in being given.

Thus idealistic logic has to own two main failures in its discussion of judgment: (1) it cannot give a plausible account of the nature of mathematical proof, and (2) it cannot explain the advance from theory to theory in experimental science in general and in physics in particular.

14. The main reason for these failures lies, it would seem, in the obstinate refusal of idealistic logic to recognise the apprehension of brute fact, to concede the possibility of direct and immediate apprehension, or intuition. It has already been shown that such apprehension or intuition need not necessarily be devoid of rational elements, *i.e.*, of judgmental activity. Perception, though involving judgment, has, it was said, a genuine element of immediate intuition or cognition of the "that" of experience. Mental construction of a judgmental type there is in all perception; all apprehension involves *statement*. But humanity has agreed that certain statements, *i.e.*, certain apprehensions, should be recognised as ultimate, absolute, unmodifiable and incorrigible, as giving us "brute facts," the "that" element of experience with a minimum of common and universal human construction and interpretation. The minimum represents the objectivity of perception. To go beyond that minimum and try to seek the "that" itself in its natural nakedness is to seek the unseekable—the thing-in-itself of Kant. But to reject the conventional "that" on the ground that it contains elements of interpretation and statement, and to hold that therefore even this statement is restatable, modifiable and corrigible is equally to place ourselves beyond the possibility of knowing any concrete reality at all. For that way we shall be led to a *regressus ad infinitum* and shall never come upon the "objective" or "reality" itself, *i.e.*, shall never know whether our statements are true or false. Knowledge, to repeat a thrice-told tale, is, we must believe, self-transitive and has the capacity to reach out to, to envelop, its "objects"—objects understood in the sense of human constructs. It reaches out to its objects directly or immediately in the sense that knowing is

one continuous process from mind to external object and is marked by no intervals between.

This ultimacy of appeal to immediate apprehension of fact also makes it clear that mind does not, as Kant thought, *impose* unity upon objects, but only *discovers* it. The given, we have seen, does not consist of bare discrete particulars, devoid of parts and relations, disconnected, undifferentiated, simple entities as it were. The given is not a continuum of chaos into which thought has to introduce, *ab extra*, order and sequence and intelligibility. If such were the case, thought could never hope to comprehend experience or reality, for there is no knowing whether the given, in itself void of order, would be susceptible to the unity imposed by the mind. The truth is, on the contrary, that the given in experience is itself a *world*—a complex whole of order and unity, uniformity, sequence, intelligibility, meaning. The absolutely disordered is the absolutely unintelligible, and the unintelligible simply cannot be given. Mind is no doubt so constructed as to seek for unity and orderliness in experience, but what it seeks for, order and system, wholeness and unity—*meaning* in general—is itself contained in the objective world of experience. And so it is that the unity of the objective world forms the ground of our felt unity of consciousness. What is achieved in experience, then, is only a more systematised and unified world than the one found in experience; a greater degree of orderliness and systematisation is the result of mind's activity; but such a world is not different from, or discontinuous with, the given world, it is continuous and one with it, it is the given world itself made more whole and systematic, more explicitly united and integral.

We reach then the following conclusion regarding judgment. Judgment is an activity of mind. But the activity does nothing to alter or affect the object. The activity consists only in *knowing* or *cognising* the object. In all experience there is a genuine element of immediateness, of direct apprehension of the given. And the given is apprehended as a *whole*, a *unity*, a *system*. It may be one's inner experience, it may be a part of the outside world—whatever it is, it is directly cognised as it is and for what it is.¹ But this direct cognition involves stating, expressing, or judging the object. And in stating the experien-

1. Waiving for the present the question of error.

ced element of immediacy the mind is necessarily controlled by its own laws of system-making, apperceptive experience etc.. It struggles to discover the most accurate and adequate form of expressing the felt immediacy. Consequently it goes on modifying and correcting its own statements in the light of its accumulated experience of the past. But all along, this struggle, this striving, this modifying, correcting etc., is only to express the felt experience most adequately and accurately—what is thus corrigible and corrected is not the object of experience itself, but the *statement* of it. Mind does construct, and even in a sense create, its object as has been abundantly shown before; indeed, the objects of experience are nothing but constructs—the “thats” are known only as the “whats.” Mind constructs dictated by its own needs, interests and desires. But even this construction is still primarily guided by the qualities of the object which then in their collective capacity receive a local habitation and a name—the “what” of experience. A can may become a sponge. It becomes a sponge when it does duty for a sponge in removing the water accumulated in a row-boat. It is the real qualities of the object that we express in the “what” of a judgment. The “what” is not an *ideal* content attached to the “that;” it is, in a true judgment, a *real* content of the object, ideally *stated* or *expressed*. To represent thinking as a qualification of existence by an idea is to misrepresent it; it is a qualification of existence by itself, rather, of one aspect of existence symbolised by the “that” by another aspect of existence symbolised by the “what.” Meanings are part and parcel of objective existences. This holds true of all primary and secondary qualities. Values, however, are not meanings in this sense. They are pure impositions of mind upon the object, pure creations, determined no doubt by the object’s qualities in the process of being created (as fairy tales are determined by considerations of relevance and consistency), but having no *locus standi* in the object itself.

The same considerations must be urged in regard to the idealistic doctrine of inference. When once it is admitted that judgment presupposes the objective as given as much as it involves the subjective as construction, the nature of inference becomes clear. If judgment were entirely an affair of ideal construction, then inference could also be represented as aiming

only at whole-making and as moving only within such thought-systems, for thought of its own accord can produce such systems. Then pure coherence would express the nature of truth. And since no whole found in experience could be absolutely coherent, there would be justification in appealing to an Absolute Experience which would be absolutely coherent. This was the line of development through which idealism passed into Absolutism. In the light of such assumptions it now becomes clear why idealistic logic stresses so much implication and organic wholes in inference. The whole alone is living and significant, and the parts are subordinated to its meaning, just as terms or concepts are subordinated to the meaning of the judgment as a whole.

But we have seen that if judgment is to express living truth, it cannot be allowed merely to circumambulate within the thought-circle and get choked within its arid atmosphere. It must reach out to the outside world and get into direct contact with facts. Otherwise, we saw, idealistic logic cannot explain the nature of mathematical intuitions (which do not depend upon system or apperceptive unity for their significance, and which are not corrigible) or account for the development from theory to theory in experimental science. It cannot moreover render intelligible the nature of reasoning in the historical and the biological sciences where no pure system-making is possible without the help of empirical observation and experience. Here also mind seeks necessary connections and unity of statement, but the attainment of such unity is always determined by the position of biological or historical knowledge available at a given time.

A second factor, then, which has deceived the unwary into believing that mind can produce thought-systems showing absolutely necessary connections between judgments with no trace of the empirical element is the wholesale employment of mathematical reasoning in physics. It may be possible to produce such systems—but only at the cost of truth. Idealistic logic discovered this error, and that is why, one must suppose, it finally ended by identifying coherence with truth. But that, as we have seen, gives rise to fresh difficulties of its own. It is safe to say that in any department of enquiry whatsoever, thinking gives us—and can give us—only a necessary condition of attaining know-

ledge of objects. It trains us to ask the right kind of questions—to frame our hypotheses, and to make the necessary deductions therefrom. And in helping us to do this, thinking shows itself to be constructive, systematic, always obeying rules of its own, and thus producing a system of interdependent judgments which are more or less corrigible. But that is all. To get a definitive knowledge of objects, we must necessarily fall back upon intuition or direct apprehension of facts. That is, for the possibility of knowledge, we must somehow accept the possibility of irreducible, absolute elements in perception or intuition, elements which are no longer corrigible or modifiable, which cannot be rejected, but which serve as the standard for rejecting other things. Such perceptual residua, however, cannot be *stated*, for statement is corrigible.

15. The nature of thinking may finally be represented thus. In all thinking there are two elements: (1) an element of intuition or immediacy of cognition, if not of apprehension, which cannot be stated; and (2) an element of systematic thinking activity of mind, working in accordance with rules, informed with the light of the synthetic unity of apperception, and essentially constructive or creative. These two elements always work together in experience in order to produce knowledge. When I perceive a brown table in my room, I must be supposed to have an immediate awareness of the table and its exact colour. But I cannot *state* what exact colour the table is, I can only state what it is *like* in the light of my unity of experience working upon present perception. The exact shade of the colour may be a trifle different from the browns I have actually experienced, and then I may have no name for *that* particular shade. And so my statement of the colour-experience is indefinitely corrigible. All these statements are offered to the mind for acceptance or rejection and logic is concerned with the principles governing the formulation of such statements; but with the acceptance or rejection of any statement as such, logic—pure thinking—has nothing to do, for that is the work of immediate cognition.

While this dual analysis of knowledge holds true of all sciences, the emphasis falls on different aspects in different sciences. In mathematics, especially in geometry and arithmetic, we seem to have final, absolute, immediate cognitions dissociated from any necessary connection with systems; in biology and

history, system-making is present and necessary, but it is not divorced from the empirical knowledge of the sciences, available at any given time; in physics and the experimental sciences generally, coherence and system-building appear to be all-important.

16. We may bring out the error of idealistic logic in another way by saying that it looks upon inference as *entirely* a matter of *implication*.¹ I am aware that this is considered the most noteworthy achievement of idealistic logic. And one can easily grant it. But its all-comprehensive application to all thinking as such is questionable. There are spheres in which implication most appropriately works. These are spheres in which the subject-matter most naturally falls into a system of such a character that the whole not only determines the existence of the parts but affects their very nature and character. The parts have no independent being or significance apart from the whole, and they are in a true sense constituted by the whole. Such statements are often criticised as being superficial and unjust to the true implicational relation. They miss, it is said, the deep truth of the paradox of inference, that inference must both fall *within* the premises and yet go *beyond* them. But it is difficult to believe that there is a genuine transition to novelty in the inference from "Every honest merchant will prosper" to "therefore this honest merchant will also prosper," or from "the king can only act through his ministers" to "therefore the king can do no wrong." In these and similar instances of implication, the most significant and central point is the statement made in the implicans. The implicans is more fundamental than the implicate in the sense that it expresses the rational and necessary ground for the possibility of the implicate.² It is in this sense that the system in an inferential whole is said to determine the nature and character as well as the existence of the parts within it. In such a case, that a part is a part of a whole is a predicate which enters into the definition of the part which has it. Implication, in short, is mere explication of a truth already latent in the implicans.

Perhaps the above account of implication requires quali-

1. The discussion of implication and presupposition in this chapter is a continuation, on the logical side, of the discussion of these subjects on the metaphysical or axiological side in the VI chapter. 2. See p. 255 sqq., *ante*.

fication. It may be admitted that there is a genuine element of novelty in implicational inference. But this is confined to the *inferential* aspect of the question, not to its *implicational* relation. *Inferring* is a mental activity and to the person who infers a conclusion from a premise the conclusion may present a genuinely novel aspect of the situation which he had not noticed before. Or at any rate he may be obliged by the necessity of logic to draw that inference and that only. It is sometimes said that the novelty of inference need be confined only to this subjective or epistemic aspect of it—the relation of the thing inferred to the inferring mind. Necessity, not novelty, it is said, is the main feature of inference. Inference, according to this view, is not concerned with the objective relations of things. But this is to take one's stand upon that whole vicious doctrine of judgment and inference which emphasises merely coherence or pure thinking divorced from truth and which we found in the end to stultify itself. It is, however, recognised by all schools of thinkers that *implication* at any rate is constitutive, *i. e.*, that it is concerned with the objective relations of things among themselves. And from *this* point of view it is beyond doubt that there is, constitutively speaking, *no* element of novelty in the conclusion as compared with the premise, in the consequence as compared with the ground, in an implicational inference. The implicative situation forms a whole indeed in which the implicans includes the implicate. But such inclusion adds nothing significant to the implicate; in fact, as implied by the implicans, the significance which it possesses is nothing but the consequence which follows necessarily from the original ground, *viz.*, the implicans; that is, its significance is only a borrowed significance. "If private property be legitimate, then stealing is unlawful." The very nature and significance of stealing is here so necessarily and logically bound up with the nature and meaning of private property that it is nothing more than an expression in a different form of the nature of that institution.

A most eminent example of such an implicans is Spinoza's definition of substance as that which can be conceived to exist in itself or independently of anything else. If we could fully grasp the significance of this definition, then such a comprehension would be equivalent to knowing the possible implicates,

that, for instance, substance must be infinite, that it must be one and one only, that it is self-caused, that it is free and self-determined etc.. Every one of these conclusions is and nothing more than the consequence which follows necessarily from the original ground, viz., the significance of the implicans, that is, in this case the definition of substance. Inference by deduction in such a case simply means starting with an adequate idea of the reality concerned, and then discovering in it everything else. Such deduction is in short merely the explication of a truth already latent in the implicans. The inferential system here is no doubt full of deductive possibilities at every point, but the possibilities are already contained in the implicans. It was Spinoza's awareness of this implicatory sense of containingness or inclusiveness that made him start with the idea of an all-comprehensive Being as the source of all other ideas and that induced him to regard "the knowledge of the effect" as "nothing else than the acquisition of a more perfect knowledge of the cause."

17. In contrast to such a form of inference, I have suggested another form which I have called presupposition. It is as commonly made use of as implication and consists in inferring, by means of a proposition or series of propositions taken as the starting-point, the truth or falsity of another proposition (or series of propositions) which is accordingly said to be *assumed* or *presupposed* by the former proposition or series of propositions. The basis of inference (premise) is called the *presupponens*, and the inference itself (conclusion), the *presuppositum*. "Here is smoke," therefore "here is fire." "This is red," therefore, "this is coloured." "This is a right angle" hence "this is an angle," hence "two straight lines have met here." " $A > b$, $b > c$, $c > d$," this chain of propositions assumes that " $a > d$." "A is the father of B; B is the brother of C;" therefore "A is the father of C." In fact, all relational (*a fortiori*) arguments conveniently illustrate inference by presupposition. To give some more examples: "I think," therefore, "I exist," "This fact is or exists," therefore "it must have had an adequate cause;" "I am suffering from indigestion," therefore "I must have over-eaten."

In implication, as we have seen, the parts themselves are not independently real—not as parts of the whole because in it their significance is entirely derived from the nature of the

whole, nor outside the whole, because then they are less than nothing. The parts, as significant, are really constituted by the whole, and the implicans—which does duty for the whole—determines the *nature* as well as the *origin* of the implicate. In presupposition the presupponens and the presuppositum form a whole indeed, but the whole thus formed is not constitutive of the parts, but is itself constituted by them. And the parts themselves are all equally real in the sense that each expresses a different cognition having an essential character of its own, no one being derivable from any other. "The virtues of moral life have evolved in course of time" presupposes "morality was to begin with involved in human nature;" "A has inherited musical gifts," presupposes "A's father or grandfather possessed musical talents;" "I want food" assumes "I have a good appetite;" "I see a light in the room" assumes "I have the power of sight." In all such inferences, the two propositions express different apprehensions or cognitions; they are independent of each other in the sense that the character of either cognition owes nothing to the character of the other, *i. e.*, either is underivable from the other. The character of each is determined only by the reality apprehended in it. And yet, how is inference made possible from the one to the other?

In the first place it must be noticed that the presuppositum is simpler¹ than the presupponens. In so far as the apprehension of "what it means to be coloured" is simpler, more ultimate and fundamental than the apprehension of "what it means to be red," the former has (logically) to be presupposed (in what particular sense will be discussed presently) for the possibility of the latter.

Again, inference requires that there shall be a community of nature between the premise and the conclusion which are thus said to hold within a *system*. In presupposition the presupponens and the presuppositum together form a whole exhibiting in most cases a common nature which runs continuously through their terms and relations. There is something in common between the apprehension of "this is red" and the apprehension of "this is coloured," between "here

1. The sense of this simplicity has been explained in a previous connection, see p. 193 *ante*.

is smoke" and "here is fire."¹ The two are no doubt distinct apprehensions undetermined by each other in their individual character or essence as apprehensions. But the community of nature between such propositions is unmistakably revealed in their terms like red and coloured, smoke and fire, appetite and food, sight and light etc., and by the fact that on the occurrence of the cognition "here is smoke," only the cognition "here is fire" or some similar cognition connected with smoke or fire will occur and not a cognition like "here is a stone" or "there is music." This community of nature between the presupponens and the presuppositum is partly the ground of connection between them. It is this which characterises presupposition as a form of *inference* and distinguishes it from associational recollections based upon chance conjunctions. Further, there are two kinds of order subsisting between the propositions, a temporal order which requires that epistemically the presupponens (e. g., "here is smoke") should precede the presuppositum (e.g., "here is fire"); and a logical order according to which the presuppositum is constitutively prior to the presupponens which thus presupposes or "depends" upon it. The relation of presupposition is transitive, asymmetrical, and aliorelative and therefore what particularly validates the sense or direction of the inference here, say from "this is red" to "this is coloured," and not *vice versa*, is this fact of the ultimacy and simplicity of the presuppositum in relation to the presupponens in a sphere of reality which is common to both. The presuppositum, which is epistemically inferred, is constitutively more fundamental, or simpler, as I call it, than the presupponens. Both the constitutive and the epistemic conditions which are necessary for valid inference are, it must be remembered, present in presupposition. Further, the temporal order is prescribed by the logical order, *i. e.*, the necessities of thought, which in the long run are an expression of the necessities of things themselves.² This signifies that there is in such inference

1. I am aware that the examples given for presupposition are not all on a par; but the contention relates just to this point, that presuppositional inference will apply to different kinds of case, systems of experience or modes of thought.

2. The question whether this would not postulate a parallelism or a pre-established harmony between mind and the objective order of things need not be discussed here.

not merely an apprehension of necessary connection among the facts, but also a necessity of apprehension, not merely a necessary connection *intuited*, but a necessary connection *instituted*, by the mind, binding the propositions expressing the apprehensions. If smoke presupposes fire, then on the occurrence of the cognition "here is smoke," mind of necessity is compelled to think of fire although the inference "here is fire" may not be verified in fact. This two-fold order obtaining between the presupponens and the presuppositum is also what justifies the inference from the one to the other.

But the common nature underlying the presuppositum and the presupponens is not so deep, all-encompassing, or intrinsic to the terms, that it will enable us to *deduce* either from the other. Deduction, we have seen, is possible only within a system which holds within itself—through the subsistence of abstract relationships—a number of possibilities ready to spring to birth on the affirmation of the central ruling principle of that system. It is, in other words, ruled by the generating relation of implication. We have said that the significant feature of implication is that in it the implicans expresses the rational and necessary ground for the possibility of the implicate—thus only is deduction possible. "*According to the British Constitution, the king can do no wrong because he can only act through his ministers.*" The reason given here is a rational ground because it states a condition whose nature contains the consequence implicitly within itself. This necessity of connection internally subsisting between a ground and its consequence could be stated in the form of a hypothetical judgment: "If...then." "If joint responsibility, then no individual wrong." Bosanquet offers an excellent discussion of the idea of "ground" which "includes the sphere of the hypothetical judgment, and indeed wherever it appears, may be said to involve a hypothetical element."¹ For our purpose, however, we may note two chief characteristics of this conception: (1) "Ground implies a consequent other than, *though fundamentally one with*, itself;" the system involved in it "is the same in the one difference or aspect as it is in the other;" (2) The hypothetical judgment, in which the idea of ground is brought out, "when ideally comp-

1. *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 238 ff. (Italics mine in the following quotation).

lete, must be a reciprocal judgment. "If A is B, it is C" must justify the inference, "If A is C, it is B." A true whole in which every part coheres with every other has a nature independent of time—implicatory relations subsist timelessly, as I said—and it is only the introduction of a time-order into the relation of ground and consequent, added to the fact that in every-day life, the grounds alleged are burdened with irrelevant matter, that makes it appear that the relation in question is irreversible.

It is in such circumstances that one notion is *deducible* from another notion. The presupponens is not deducible from the presuppositum because the common nature underlying them both is not of such a deep or fundamental kind as to affect their essential being. It touches only some of their properties and leaves their essential nature unaffected on the whole. The system in their case, instead of determining the parts, is itself determined by them. They are essentially different from one another. Hence the presuppositum cannot be said to be the ground of the presupponens. The relation between the presuppositional propositions cannot be stated in the form of a hypothetical judgment. We cannot, with logical significance, say, if fire, then smoke, or if coloured, then red etc.. And even if we could presuppositionally (and not implicatively, be it noted) assert, if smoke, then fire, or if red, then coloured etc., still it will be admitted that smoke and red are not the grounds of fire and colour respectively. A thing is not coloured, *because* it is red, any more than there is fire, *because* there is smoke. Red and smoke are not the *rational grounds* of colour and fire respectively; these latter find their justification in more ultimate, more general principles of physics, such as the reflection of decomposed rays of light, the energy produced by the irregular motion of molecules coming into contact with combustible matter in the presence of oxygen etc.. These being the proper grounds for the phenomena of colour and fire respectively, it simply happens—through what kind of necessity it is not easy to determine—that a particular object is coloured red and a particular case of combustion gives rise to smoke. But in any case, it may be said, the presupponens, this is red, forms the basis of *inferring* the presuppositum, this is coloured. If so, why can we not say that the latter is *deduced* from the former? Because you cannot, by denying the so-called basis, *i.e.*,

the presupponens, deny the presuppositum also as you can by denying the implicans deny the implicate too.¹ Nor can we say that the presuppositional judgment is or could be reciprocal. "This is red" presupposes "this is coloured" but "this is coloured" does not presuppose or even entail, "this is red."

18. The presuppositional system, then, does not admit of any form of deducibility of the presupponens from the presuppositum. How in that case do they form a system at all? It is here that, in addition to the logical element already described, the *factual* element of presupposition comes in. Though the presupponens and the presuppositum are not necessarily connected together in their nature as the implicans and the implicate are, still actually, so far as they occur at all, they always occur together—the one is not possible without the other. No amount of apprehension that a particular thing is red will tell me what it means to be red unless I have apprehended before what it means to be coloured; and no amount of contemplation of the coloured character of objects in general will tell me that this thing is red unless I actually look at the red thing. The two apprehensions are thus united in the relationship of "inalienability" or "inseparability" and it is this relation, otherwise called presupposition (logically), or dependence (metaphysically), and not implication, that holds between the presupponens and the presuppositum and that forms the generating relation of the presuppositional system. The interesting feature about this relationship is that while within the frame-work of a community of nature touching some of their properties the presupponens and the presuppositum still maintain their underived reality and difference as individual apprehensions, their union in a systematic whole of inference is made possible by the fact that the presupponens logically presupposes the presuppositum while the latter *factually* involves the former. Hence this relation is partly logical and partly factual, causal-logical so to say. The causal or factual aspect will be explained presently, but it is to be noticed that this is a peculiar relationship which occurs nowhere else and which deserves close scrutiny. It shows that a system may have other than purely logical or purely factual generating relations. It shows not only that there are both necessities and contingencies in our universe but also that the

1. See p. 198 *ante*.

self-same group of facts may have its facts connected on one side logically and on the other causally or only empirically. It shows that a relation which binds one member with another of a system need not bind them both ways, that dependence may be entirely one-sided. It raises in short more ultimate issues as to what we should mean by logic and what by fact, but if this discussion has shown that there is a real problem about presupposition both as a form of inference and as exemplifying the nature of a possible system, its purpose will have been served and the matter cannot be pursued further on the lines suggested here. Suffice it to state in this connection that the whole theory of presupposition is based upon the distinction between the essence and the existence of an entity or a proposition. Two apprehensions may, so far as their logical content is concerned, have an essential character undetermined by each other, but so far as their mode of occurrence is in question, have a relational character whereby one (the presuppositum) determines the existence and the mode of functioning of the other.

At the same time, this determination of the presupponens by the presuppositum is not universal, necessary or absolute. The union of the two is only factual, functional or causal, and not logically necessary, or, when we regard the logical element involved in the inference, we may call the relation logical-factual. This union concerns the existence of apprehensions and propositions asserting existence or any aspect of it are always synthetic, and never *a priori*. The presupponens and the presuppositum form a whole indeed of which they are parts, but the very conception of part and whole is a conception asserting relations of existence, and in consequence one can never be logically certain of such assertions. That a whole involves parts is indeed logically certain, but what particular parts are involved in a given whole is something which cannot be deduced from the nature of the whole. This is because in a presuppositional whole the parts are truly parts each having its own individual reality and essence, which is not the case in any implicational whole. In consequence, in the presuppositional whole, the union or organisation of the parts is such that the mode of occurrence of one part is connected only by a causal or existential—or at best, by a logical-factual—necessity with

the mode of occurrence of the other parts. True, "here is smoke" cannot be cognised without assuming "here is fire;" but smoke, as smoke is different in nature from, though not opposed to fire, and the ground of the relationship by which the cognition of fire has come to be united with the cognition of smoke is only a causal or existential or semi-logical necessity, not an intrinsic necessity of nature. In its mode of occurrence, the cognition of smoke is so determined that you can never have it without presupposing the cognition of fire. But the determination of the first cognition by the second is not absolute, for the cognition of fire need have nothing to do with the cognition of smoke, it may be a case of apprehension of pure fire without smoke as when a piece of flint strikes against steel. Colour-cognition may have to do not with the cognition of red, but with that of blue, yellow or any other colour. Presupposition emphasises the difference in the being of the parts as well as the determination of the parts in a certain way in their mode of occurrence; this determination, however, being only causal or functional, the relation of co-operation between the parts thus brought about, their union in a system, is only factual and not completely logical or *a priori*. In this respect, the principle of presupposition seems to resemble Leibnitz's principle of sufficient reason which governs empirical knowledge of truths of fact which are contingent, *i. e.*, contain no inner necessity, in the sense that the opposite of every truth of fact would involve no contradiction.

The factual element in presupposition extends further. Presupposition also recognises the immediacy of "brute fact" in perception and judgment. It accepts that in every judgment there is an ultimate element of direct apprehension of fact which however is not as such statable. It is the presence of this element which alone guarantees that our knowledge is knowledge of an objective world. We express this in modern terms by saying that knowledge is self-transcendent or transitive, and reveals the object directly but not fully. The judgment is an attempt to state this element of immediate perception as approximately as possible in the light of the judger's synthetic unity of apperception, but in such an attempt the fact perceived or judged is not thereby transformed. It is only our statements that are indefinitely modified so as to reach a form which will

express the element of immediate cognition as approximately as possible.

19. There is one possible danger of misinterpretation of the doctrine here expounded which must be explicitly guarded against. When it is said that from one proposition or series of propositions we can presuppositionally infer another proposition, it should not be understood that the proposition which is thus inferred is both presupposed to begin with and then inferred. If this were so, the presuppositum would be both a conclusion and its own proof. The argument in that case would be circular. It is necessary therefore to point out that when "this is red" is said to presuppose "this is coloured," the former presupposes the latter only constitutively; the presupposition, that is, states only a constitutive condition of the inference. But the inference is none the less real, and epistemically, the presuppositum is not presupposed, it is actually *inferred*. Hence when it is said that the presupponens as a cognition is not possible without the cognition of the presuppositum, the term cognition in the latter case is used only in the sense of recognition and really means *judgment inferred*. It is possible to have the cognition of smoke as smoke without the simultaneous cognition of fire or without presupposing the latter epistemically *i.e.*, the presuppositum (e.g., cognition of fire) is presupposed only logically, and that is why it is possible to *infer* it from the presupponens (the cognition of smoke). Presupposition is thus constitutive and in this it is one with implication. In actual inferences, we may avoid the ambiguity by saying, for example, "here is smoke, therefore here is fire," or "I think, therefore I exist," and so on.

20. Now to sum up our argument so far. The strength of implicational logic lies in the fact that it recognises the inadequacy of the Cartesian account of knowledge as consisting merely of a series of intuitions without the necessity of the mediating element of thought. It recognises that mind must connect or relate in various ways the elements of the given, that mind does not discover or intuit unity but achieves or produces unity of the given in the direction of what Kant called the synthetic unity of apperception and in obedience to certain rules of unity such as the law of causality or the principle of the conservation of energy etc.. It also recognises that judgments expressing such principles are never absolute but indefinitely

modifiable or corrigible in the light of the implications to which they give rise. It recognises in short that knowledge is a construction and that logical certainty is to be found only within the intelligible structure of this construction. In this very strength, however, as we have seen, lurks the weakness of implicational logic. For thereby it seems to posit an unbridgeable gulf between the given and the constructed. It fails to notice that the given is already a world of order, unity and intelligibility though of an implicit kind and that the irrational simply cannot be given or experienced. Mind accordingly does not impose its unity upon the so-called manifold of sense, it simply discovers, elaborates and makes explicit the unity of the unifold, so to say. And because of this failure, implicational logic concludes that the parts of an inferential system are not independently real—not as parts of the whole because in it their significance is entirely derived from the nature of the whole, nor outside the whole, for in that case, they are less than nothing. Presupposition, we have seen, while recognising that knowledge is a construction, recognises, in its insistence upon the constitutive relation between the presuppositum and the presupponens, that the elements of order, unity and intelligibility are implicitly contained in the given itself. In consequence, it allows that the parts of a system are in essence independently real and meaningful both within the whole as well as without it. Further, implicational logic seeks truth only within the ever-widening relationships to which a position gives rise. The insistence upon the indefinite modifiability of judgments has led the "corrigibilists" to the acceptance of coherence as expressing the nature of truth in disregard of the obvious fact that falsehood and mere supposal, without involving the truth-falsity claim, are sometimes eminently coherent. The root cause of the whole trouble consists in the refusal of implicational logic to recognise any element of immediate apprehension or intuition in knowledge. It is this *lacuna* in it that has rendered it incapable of satisfactorily accounting for the progress of science from one theory to another (both of which may be equally coherent) or of explaining the development of knowledge in biological sciences where mathematics plays no important part. If Cartesian logic emphasises "pure intuiting," idealistic logic stresses only

"pure thinking" as capable of giving us truth. But while the one secures material truth in inference, and the other only a formal validity, the question of real validity escapes both. Descartes' logic could not appreciate the mediating element of the universal in thought as such; that is to say, connections and relations are only intuited (every one of them as a separate intuition) but not instituted by thought itself binding propositions, and so it had to take universal principles for granted as the starting-point for knowledge—principles which Descartes called "simple natures." Kantian and idealistic logic, on the other hand, do not admit the element of immediacy in knowledge and so cannot see the truth of the particular as such. The particular to gain truth has to be deduced (by implication) from the universal, hence the importance of thought-systems, coherence etc., in idealistic logic. Cartesianism is completely objective, idealism completely subjective, in epistemology.¹ The logic of presupposition, on the contrary, recognises both an element of mediacy as well as one of immediacy in knowledge and so is able to solve the problem of real validity in inference.

21. There is a certain resemblance between the doctrine of direct cognition here upheld and Descartes' doctrine as annotated by Cook Wilson in modern times. There are, however, significant differences between the two doctrines. In the first place, Cook Wilson believes that his simple apprehensions, such as "this paper is white," are absolutely different from judgments in so far as they are devoid of all elements of reflection or recognition. And he agrees with Descartes in thinking that a simple apprehension is not in any way influenced by that unity and continuity of experience which is the soul of the idealistic doctrine of judgment. Now the logic of presupposition admits that *in any given presuppositional argument*, the individual character of the cognitions remains unaffected by their place in such a chain of propositions. But it holds that every such apprehension, though uninfluenced by other apprehensions

1. That Descartes' logic could be more sympathetically interpreted as uniting the subjective and the objective and thus illustrating the method of presupposition, has been shown in the writer's paper, "The Nature of Descartes' Method:" *Proc. of the IX International Cong. of Phil.* III-15-20. I now see, what I did not see then, that symmetrical relations, though they could be interpreted presuppositionally, (because presupposition is transitive) are still against the spirit of presuppositional logic.

in an argument, it still not undetermined by that continuous and systematic nature of experience which Kant called the synthetic unity of apperception, and in so far, is still judgmental in character. Apprehension and judgment are of the same character, both involving discrimination, recognition, comparison etc.. The judgmental character of an apprehension, however, does not destroy its immediacy—a feature which according to presuppositional logic is present in all judgments or cognitions. Secondly, Cook Wilson's theory of inference as a timeless apprehension involving no necessary connections between statements but only between facts is also questionable. It is in this connection that he draws the famous distinction between the logical character of an apprehension and the psychological conditions of its occurrence. This distinction, it will be noticed, is somewhat similar to the one that has here been drawn between the essential and the existential character of an apprehension. But there is an all-important difference. Cook Wilson hedges about the question of the relation of inference to the time-order. While he usually says that the time-order is indifferent to inference which is as a whole a timeless apprehension, he still thinks that in order to secure the possibility of inference certain apprehensions must be preceded by certain others. The reason for this attitude appears to be that he is unwilling to recognise any genuine mediacy of thought. He can thus give no explanation of the possibility or the validity of inference at all. How can a series of isolated particular apprehensions, unmediated by thought, give rise to the appearance of *inference* of one from the others? Immediacy, in Cook Wilson's logic, has outrun its scope and swallowed all logic and thought.

The strength of presupposition, on the contrary, is that it has, as shown above, both a logical and a factual element. The connection of parts through an underlying common nature, as well as the two-fold order subsisting between them, constitutes the logical element of mediacy which validates inference; the "brute fact" immediately cognised in them, and their mode of occurrence or existence, the form of their union in an inseparable or inalienable relationship which is only causal or functional, or at any rate not completely logical, constitute the factual element. Idealistic logic denies all immediacy, Cook Wilson denies all mediation; presupposition harmonises mediacy with

immediacy, logic with fact. Presupposition, in fact, is a development supervening upon implication. Knowledge begins as an inchoate whole in which abstract relationships of implication tyrannically hold; knowledge in its developed form attains to a stage where it differentiates itself into individual integral elements inalienably united together into such self-conscious systems, so to say. Knowledge as implication is mechanistic; knowledge as presupposition is "organismic" or "co-operative." Both have their own proper spheres of application, and both are necessary for knowledge. The progress of knowledge consists in discovering what facts in the universe are connected together by way of implication and what facts by way of presupposition. The presuppositional method would be found to be more fruitful because it would reveal undetermined facts and systems of fact in different fields of nature related together in their modes of existence and operation. Causation and genetic functioning, so significant in the constitution of the universe, are explicable only on the basis of presupposition, not implication. Mill's experimental methods, and the whole of inductive procedure, in short, lend themselves more logically and successfully to presuppositional treatment. Further, presuppositional logic may be taken as the genus under which Russell's logic of formal and material implication, the doctrines of counterimplication and superimplication, the logic of analytic and synthetic judgments, and the logic of relations may be considered to fall as specie. This logic, moreover, can be developed into appropriate theories of perception, conception, judgment, inference, the doctrine of truth etc.—theories more adequate and satisfactory than the sketches attempted in these pages. It is not possible, however, to enter into these exfoliations in this connection.

The recognition of presupposition would appear to go some way in solving many of the usual difficulties of epistemology. The problem of the relation of the universal to the particular may be solved by suggesting that while both are equally real, the particular *presupposes* the universal while the universal involves the particular. A particular red object presupposes the generic character of redness while redness as a universal involves a particular object with which it exists indissolubly united. That is, presupposition brings out the truth that a true

universal is not an abstract idea unrelated to particulars—it lives in the particulars, in the differences involved in the particulars, it is indeed a unity-in-difference, a truly concrete universal. And such a unity-in-difference is the foundation of all reasoning, all knowledge and all experience, as we have seen in connection with perception and judgment. Again, the vexed question of internal *versus* external relations would admit of a solution. All relations are external in so far as the individual, unique and underived nature of each real is concerned. There is no inherent necessity of mutual connection in their individual essence. Yet inasmuch as the meaning and significance of each can only be *realised* or brought to *fruition* by coming together in a system or whole, all relations are again internal.

22. And now we approach the question of truth. Truth and error have sometimes been regarded as properties of objects themselves. And sometimes they are looked upon as properties of propositions and even as relations between them. Without entering into a discussion of these questions, we must simply maintain that truth is a value which springs from out of the cognitive relation between a knowing mind and a known object. In this sense truth is substantival. Truth is sometimes conceived as adjectival also, as characterising some things which are then said to be true. These things are what are called beliefs. In either case, the *nature* of truth, or trueness, is, we shall see, the same. Since we have argued, however, that in no case is value a quality, we treat here truth as primarily substantival, the adjectival sense being derived from this. We say then, in respect of its relation to belief, that truth is a value which springs from out of the relation between a believing mind and the object believed in.

What is involved in belief, and under what conditions are beliefs called true?

A belief is not a mere occurrence in some one's mind, but an event which has a *meaning*, which signifies something, which has a content, so to say. The content or meaning may be

called the objective¹ of belief. It is generally stated in the form of a noun clause: "I believe *that* the moving figure in the distance is that of my friend." Since, apart from the content of belief, a belief is nothing, we may take the belief as equivalent to the objective itself. The objective or the belief, further, is only a judgment with special reference to the content in it. Some thinkers, however, emphasise the content aspect to such an extent that they consider the objective—propositum, as they call it, the content of judgment—as existing independently of the believing mind in the world of reality. This, however, is misleading. For on the one side, the objective is nothing apart from judgment and judging is always by some mind. And on the other side, the objective is not itself part of the real world—by which is meant here the external world of objects—but *refers* to it. Since this is an important question, it is worth while discussing it a little more closely.

What exactly is the nature of the objective and what is its relation to fact?

A fact is defined (by McTaggart, for instance) as the possession of a quality by something, or the connection of that thing with something else by a relation. Summer-being-hot, for example, is an objective fact of this kind. But if I judge *that* the summer is hot, or express my belief *that* it is hot, the judgment or the belief is not a fact (in the above sense) though it may contain one. The content of the belief, *viz.*, *that it is hot*, is thus not a fact of the natural world. It is not a fact as such at all, nor is it identical with one. But it is the *fact as thought of*, and that makes a difference. It is the product of my thinking and the real world. And in so far as it is entertained by the mind in belief, we may characterise it as subjective, though not as mental. It is timeless because although my thinking of it is now, the fact which I think of may have been in the past, and so it is out of relation to present, past and future. It is the mode in which our judgment of things—our thinking about them—

1. This meaning of "objective," it will be noticed, is different from the sense in which it was used on previous occasions. This other usage cannot entirely be avoided in future also, but the context will make it clear which sense is meant. Where the word is used continuously in different senses, the objective as the content of judgment will be denoted as the "objective of belief."

expresses itself. It is at best only logical or epistemological.¹ As the subjective, it is correlated with the objective order of real existents either in the past, the present, or the future, to which therefore it *refers*. It only refers to fact, but, as said before, is not identical with it. But what is meant by such reference to fact? Is there anything common between the objective and the fact?

We need not consider the theory that when I think of a fact, the fact itself literally gets into my head and becomes the content of my thought. This is to obliterate all distinction between the subjective and the objective factors of experience, and between truth and falsity. The other extreme is to hold that the objective has nothing in common with fact. Then it becomes a sort of *tertium quid* between the mind and the external world, and the truth or falsity of a statement would have to be decided with reference to its *correspondence* or otherwise with fact. But correspondence in *this* sense becomes an impossible conception and we need not flog a dead horse. In the third place, it is sometimes maintained that the objective and the fact have only one constituent in common. But it will be maintained here that while they should always have at least one constituent in common, usually they have two constituents in common. In order to make this clear, it is necessary to analyse the knowing process into its different factors on its objective side just as we have analysed it on the subjective side into the judging mind, the act of judging or believing, and the content of judgment or belief, *i. e.*, the objective. Knowing, we said hitherto, grasps its object directly. But it should now be pointed out that the object thus directly cognised, in perception, for example, is not the object as such or in itself, but the object in some of its aspects. Knowing apprehends the object directly indeed, but not fully. The object is partly immanent in knowledge, and it partly transcends it. In perceiving a table, it is only some one of its several aspects or perspectives that I perceive. If in perception the object were immediately cognised completely or as a whole, then there would be no room at all for error. The object in its entirety, as a portion of the real physical world, is *given* indeed for perception and it was such a given object that was said to

1. I am indebted to L.A. Reid's *Knowledge and Truth* for this view of the objective.

contain elements of unity and wholeness within itself. The given may therefore be called the datum in a broad sense. But the datum in the narrower, more usual sense, the "sensus" as it is often called, the immediate content *in* perception, is only a portion of the entire object, or rather the object *appearing* under some one or more of its aspects. In so far, it is an appearance (not to be distinguished, however, as is done in idealistic philosophy, from Reality as a thing-in-itself, for the appearance is the thing-itself-as-appearing-to-a-mind-under-certain-conditions). It is the "that" element in perception which is directly apprehended. Nothing that appears (in this sense) appears fully, appearances are always partial. The full object has to be constructed out in thought—the appearance or the sense-datum has to be interpreted—but, we have insisted, knowing is a continuous and integral process in which the elements of direct perception and of interpretation can at best be distinguished, but not separated. The object of judgment stands for such a construction or interpretation of the meaning of the datum, and whether the judgment is true or false depends upon the correctness or the incorrectness of the interpretation. But there is no doubt that the objective is *based* upon the datum or the appearance.

It is now clear that there are usually *two* elements in common between the objective and the fact. If we mean by the fact the datum in the broad sense, the portion of the physical world given *for* perception, then it is common to both the subjective and the objective factors of knowledge. By saying that it is common, it is meant that the objective of belief *refers* to the fact intended, the real physical table, for instance, and to nothing else. Again the datum in the narrower sense, the sense-datum or the appearance (the content *in* perception), is also common to both the objective and the fact. Commonness here means that the objective is based upon, or grounded in, the sense-datum. If the objective does not refer to the fact intended, and again if it is not based upon the datum, it has plainly missed its mark, and cannot give us knowledge of the object.

So much at least is involved in belief. Its essence consists in the assertion of the objective. But this is not the *object* of knowledge (as Prof. Alexander thinks), for in that case there would be nothing to distinguish truth from error, since false

objectives would be equally objects of knowledge. The object of knowledge is always some portion of the external world (except, as we have seen, in the case of self-consciousness, and of truth, presently to be discussed) which should as such be distinguished from the subjective factors of knowing. The self-transcendent character of knowledge by means of which it directly grasps objective reality does not nullify its difference or distinctness from the latter.

23. There are, however, two stages in the relation of mind to its object before the objective of belief can attain its full status, and be converted into truth. Knowing, according to our account, makes no difference to objects. Mind in the first stage simply apprehends or cognises reality. True, such apprehension involves judgment which works in accordance with rules and aims at building systematic wholes of knowledge. And in this work it appears to modify the fact so as to make it fit into a system. All along, however, it is the judgment or statement of apprehension that is being modified and not the fact. In this stage, therefore, mind is active, but with regard to its own proper apprehension. So far as the object apprehended is concerned, mind just lies, so to say, alongside of the fact, mind is simply compresent with fact. Here, therefore, knowing and its object appear to fuse into one inchoate whole, bound together by the relationship of inalienability, so far as their functioning as subject and object is concerned. This is the indeterminate stage of knowledge, if we may so call it. In it, the reference to the object is prominent. It is the object that, in a sense, controls the subject and holds it in thrall. This stage is to be distinguished from the stage of truth proper. In truth also, the object remains unaltered or unaffected intrinsically by the knowing relation. The object here, however, is not merely the external object, but the object as already having been apprehended by the mind. In truth, accordingly, the mind assimilates the object, owns it, possesses it, so to say, comprehends it, is united with it in one whole situation, and, what is more, is conscious of so holding it. This, as I understand it, is one meaning of what is often called *Intuition*. It is a way of personally realising or *experiencing* knowledge that is ordinarily obtained by other methods, e.g., by reasoning or logic. Such experiencing involves the operation of what may be called

the integral consciousness, *i.e.*, the simultaneous exercise of the cognitive, the affective and the conative factors of mind. It is a way of *seeing* the truth, and *seeing* is *believing*. And it is only in such a conscious relation that value springs. Such a conscious possession of the object is what is called belief in the full sense of the term. But of course there are higher and lower reaches of such seeing or believing, and what is usually called belief is a very imperfect way of seeing. Truth and error, however, are thus directly related, not to knowledge, but to belief which emphasises, not the object's qualities, but the subject's *attitude*. Truth is the *imprimatur* set upon knowledge by the mind, and when that is done, knowledge becomes universally accepted. This means that while strictly speaking knowledge and truth should be identical, there may be some knowledge claiming to be true which is yet not true, and, on the other hand, there may be some truths regarded as such by some minds which yet are not knowledge. The active, conscious mental possession and assimilation of (correct) knowledge is truth. Truth does not add anything to the knowledge of the object, but expresses only the acceptance or rejection of knowledge by the mind in the light of its own ideals, meanings and purposes. It is knowledge criticised, weighed in the balance and found satisfying, it is knowledge become self-conscious. While knowledge may be said to involve a dyadic relation between a knower and some object, truth expresses a triadic relation between these two and the subject's attitude of belief or unbelief. Propositions may express knowledge, but they cannot express truth independently of the believing mind. Truth, then, we may say, is the determinate stage of knowledge in which knowledge has become conscious of itself. To identify truth with reality is therefore to identify knowledge with reality and then to make this reality self-conscious.¹

Such is the categorical structure of knowledge and truth respectively.

24. Taking knowledge in the strict sense and truth as identical, we may now define truth as follows: Truth is the

1. See the next Ch. on Aesthetic Value for a further discussion of the meaning and nature of intuition and its relation to knowledge.

satisfaction derived from the appreciation of the conformity of the belief-objective, practically undistorted and coherently contemplated, to the objective system of facts on which it depends.

What is truth? asked Jestling Pilate and would not stop for an answer. The quest after Truth has been humanity's quest for the Holy Grail, as the search for the *nature* of truth has been the search for the *ultima thule* of the philosopher's exploration. The definition suggested above raises several issues which, however, owing to the fear of extending this chapter beyond its proper limits, cannot be discussed fully but can only be indicated. It shows, first and foremost, that truth is satisfaction—a value. All values are primarily values of satisfyingness. The motive or universe of desire satisfied by truth is sometimes curiosity, the desire to comprehend things in their proper relations. Sometimes it is the desire to solve a practical problem of life, to overcome a felt difficulty which has arrested conduct. It thus helps the progress of life's activities, the realisation of life's purposes. And this is what brings satisfaction. Like other values, again, truth is an *emergent* from the fact of appreciation—the conscious evaluation of knowledge in the light of certain standards. These standards, included in the above definition, thus express the nature of correct knowledge or truth. They may be explicitly formulated as follows. A belief is true when its objective (1) is not unduly distorted by the subject's own individual or personal needs and desires while still formed in accordance with common or collective lines of interpreting the object; (2) has been arrived at by means of a coherent process of thinking about the object; and (3) partially conforms to the object. These standards, it will be noticed, are not extrinsic to the belief or judgment; they are not ideals foreign to the nature of judgment, imposed on it from without. They are factors implicit in the judgmental process as a whole, expressed in the form of norms. They show that if judgment is true to itself, *i. e.*, fulfils its own proper nature, it will become true. Every judgment—perceptual or conceptual,—we saw, expresses a conventional or universally accepted method of approach to, and interpretation of, experience. Coal, though identical in substance with diamond, is yet not called diamond because it cannot be put to the same uses or purposes to which diamond

can be put. The definition of oats given by Dr. Johnson is an opposite example of the conventional method of interpreting objects. The adoption of such a method involves selection from amongst the properties of the object, or concentration upon the preponderating element in it, or the possibility of collective experience. A judgment which disregards these pragmatic considerations, would, to that extent, falsify itself. Secondly, every judgment involves coherent thinking, and represents the mind's attempt to achieve unity and wholeness of experience in *stating i.e.*, interpreting, the element of immediate cognition. While conventional interpretations would often omit certain features of the object of experience in the interests of selection, coherent thinking requires comprehensive and complete survey of the object, not, of course, opposed to the pragmatic motive. Complete knowledge is the ideal though often human truth is unable to attain it. Lastly, a judgment is usually based upon an element of immediate apprehension in experience, and where this is lacking, the judgment cannot hope to become true.

The question now arises, are these three independent standards or do they form only one standard? If independent, are they all of co-ordinate importance, or is any of them of primary significance? It will be admitted, I think, that the definition contains only one standard, or rather, that it offers only a single explanation of the nature of truth—an explanation which, however, takes into account the several aspects of truth. If truth is in its own nature many-faceted, why should not our explanation of it take account of them? Truth is a living experience in which the pragmatic or practical, the logical or rational, and the ontological are differentiated moments—truth is not a point but a polygon. No one of the three aspects is eliminable in an accurate description of the nature of truth; not the pragmatic because, while usually determining the line of interpretation to be adopted, it may sometimes obtrude itself unnecessarily and distort our beliefs; not the logical, because we may not think systematically or coherently about the object; nor the ontological because sometimes our beliefs may not have even a single feature grounded in reality. Why not take the agreement with reality as alone final? Not possible, for the agreement is in no case complete to start with, but always partial. The agree-

ment refers, it will be recalled, to the fact that the objective is based upon an element of immediate perception, *viz.*, the datum or the appearance. Whether this partial agreement justifies us in inferring complete agreement between objective and fact is the question of truth to be decided in any given case. Provided that the first two conditions are satisfied, the paradox of truth may be expressed by saying: If a belief partially agrees with fact, then it wholly agrees with it. But partial agreement *per se*, unsupported by the other considerations, does not give us truth. Hence it is not begging the question to say that beliefs must partially agree with reality to be true.

25. It may be said that in the last analysis we are merely adopting the correspondence theory as expressing the nature of truth. This may be admitted at once, for philosophy should not be afraid of labels; but since we have already dismissed the correspondence theory in its usual form while treating of objectives, we must hasten to explain in what precise sense we are here adopting it as an account of the nature of truth. It would seem that some form of correspondence is ineluctable in describing the nature of truth. Treat the objective as you will. Call it mental. The reality which is said to accept or reject your judgment would then be of the same nature as the judgment, for it also cannot be known except through "sense, ideas, imagination, memory, conception, judging" etc.. That is, reality also is known only through propositions, and the only way of determining whether the proposition expressing the objective embodies truth is to confront it with the set of propositions expressing reality and to see whether the one agrees with the others. Call the objective physical, or non-mental fact. Then reality would be non-mental too, and there would be no question of truth or error, for everything would be fact. Still, if you wish to ascertain whether one fact truly is fact at all, the only course open to you is to see whether it bears upon its face the meaning which it professes to, and that means, to see whether it agrees with another fact, unless you want to entangle yourself in a regress. Call the objective neither mental nor non-mental, but merely logical or epistemological. In that case, if truth is to be something more than formal coherence, or a mere reflex of practical activity, one will have to fall back upon some distinction between the subjective and the objective in knowledge and the

former will be true only when it in some sense agrees with or conforms to the latter. Even to make a claim for truth, knowledge must involve beforehand an appeal to some irreducible element of perception (if not my perception, then yours or the scientist's)—direct and immediate intuition of fact which must be accepted as final, and this is the first meaning of agreement in our theory, the (at least) partial agreement of the objective with the datum presented. Granted this kind of agreement based upon immediate intuition, the question of the agreement of the objective with the object as such—the object in its entirety—arises. And here the agreement would mean, not that the objective is *like* the appearance (as the datum is said to be like its object) but that (it being the object as thought of) it is a correct thinking of the object, or thinking of it in its right relations and context. For it is possible to think of it wrongly and then the objective as a whole would not agree with fact. The truth of the objective then involves both these factors; the nature of truth is to be defined by reference both to the element of perception (partial agreement) and to the element of thought (agreement in full). Correspondence involves both these elements.

Those who loudly declaim against the correspondence theory of truth and shut it out from the front-door are still forced to admit it by the back-door. Alexander, for instance, who is "compelled by the whole spirit of his enquiry to give short shrift" to correspondence,¹ nevertheless, in describing his view of coherence, says that "the internal structure of reality" "allows us to retain certain propositions" and "reject others." "The agreement of many persons in the belief that the rose is yellow and not white does not make the rose really yellow, it only follows that reality."² Now if the internal structure of reality is to determine the truth of our propositions, then our propositions must also have some structure, *i. e.*, represent reality in right relations, and we retain or reject the propositions "at the guidance of reality" only when we are sure that the two structures agree. And that is correspondence. In fact, in his latest book,³ Alexander gives up his former contention and frankly accepts correspondence and coherence as equivalent.

1. *Space, Time and Destiny*: Vol. II. p. 252. 2. *Ibid*, pp. 253, 254, 255; italics mine. 3. *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*.

It is not idea corresponding with fact. It is the objective of belief (which is not a mere idea) agreeing with the objective system of facts. How shall we find out this agreement or disagreement? *That* certainly requires observation and sometimes experiment—this is *the final test* of truth. Experiment and observation, it is obvious, are needed to test not only correspondence, but every other theory of truth, including coherence; it is not such a *test* that is meant by saying that the nature of truth consists in the agreement or conformity of the belief-objective with the objective world of facts. A belief is true when, in addition to the other conditions specified, its objective, first, *partially* agrees with fact (based as it is upon immediate perception), and, second, represents the same reality or fact in its right relations and context. The reality that it thus represents, or should represent, is, it will be remembered, not the entire fact which is not apprehended in judgment, but only the datum, the appearance. The importance of such partial agreement we shall appreciate in connection with the explanation of error.

26. It may be said again that we are giving a double explanation of the nature of truth in first having advocated direct cognition of facts and next in admitting correspondence. But there is really no conflict here. Knowledge certainly directly apprehends reality—this nobody, not even a realist accepting correspondence,—need deny. But the direct cognition of object means only *cognising* the object—a purely psychological process. To say that truth is knowing's successful function and error its failure is to beg the whole question, unless one is prepared to accept the position of Alexander that truth and error are both objective facts. That the direct cognition of object is not of itself a sufficient guarantor of truth becomes evident when we ask: Of what is knowing a direct cognition in the case of error? What do we directly apprehend when we misapprehend? Some further logical explanation of truth and error thus becomes necessary, otherwise we should be saying that all cognition, because it is direct, is *ipso facto* valid. If two people look at the same moving figure in the distance and one thinks it is an animal, and the other believes it is a man, how does it happen that knowing successfully apprehends its object in the one case (when the cognition is true) and fails to do so in the other? If there is "a plain difference between my knowing of an object and the

object which I know"—i. e., between the subjective and the objective,— it is plain indeed that my knowing by itself—however direct—does not guarantee truth. Lastly, direct cognition, to repeat, is only of the datum as such, and not of the entire object.

27. These matters receive further light when we consider the case of error. It may be admitted that knowledge is self-transcendent and reaches out to its objects in both true and false knowledge. But in the case of error, some one of the three conditions laid down for the attainment of truth would be found lacking. It would conduce to clarity if we should analyse carefully the different cases of false knowledge.

We must first consider cases of logical error proper, involving no perceptual mistake—cases of the kind noted above. In all such cases, cognition directly reaches its object, *viz.*, the *sensum* which is only one appearance of the object. The element of immediate apprehension is always present in them. Since, however, the appearance is always partial, the object in its entirety has to be constructed out in thought. And here it is possible that either pragmatic considerations may intervene or a sheer error of the reasoning faculty may occur; in either case the result is a wrong interpretation of the *sensum*. If I am expecting my friend at 5 o'clock in the evening, it is very likely that I may believe the moving figure in the distance to be that of my friend; or because my friend usually carries a staff in his hand, and the figure on nearer approach is found not to carry one, I may conclude that it is not my friend.

Next, there are cases of perceptual illusions and hallucinations. We need not consider cases where there are physical distorting media like the appearance of one's face in a convex or a concave mirror. In some cases, wrong perception arises owing to the predominance of pragmatic considerations as such. The stump of a tree may, in the dusk of an evening, be mistaken for a devil. A rope may be mistaken for a snake. Or in the bright noon, a shining shell in the distance may be perceived as a piece of silver. In these instances, the element of immediate apprehension is really present: it is the weird appearance of the stump, the length and coils of the rope, the brilliant lustre of the shell etc., that are directly apprehended. The objective—that it is a ghost, a snake etc.,—partially agrees with the object in so

far as some of the features of ghosts or snakes are actually apprehended in the datum perceived. The mistake arises in inferring that the objective entirely agrees with the object, in thinking—perception involves judgment—that the datum, perceived to possess some qualities of objects like ghosts or snakes, also possesses their other qualities which are *not* perceived. And for this thinking which causes wrong perception, the fear of snakes and ghosts, experienced or heard of before, or the cupidity of the percipient, as in the case of shell-silver, is entirely responsible. In other cases, it is purely a failure to think coherently (which also requires that the facts must be comprehensively considered) that accounts for the illusion. In perceiving a stick half immersed in water to be bent, or the sun to be moving, or a mirage to be a sheet of water, the qualities attributed to the object are really there in the *sensum*. Reality accepts our placing of it—the objective agrees with fact to this extent. But we fail to consider the possibility of other factors influencing the situation, the bent character of rays reflected in water, the motion of the earth (on which we, the observers, are ourselves placed) relatively to the sun and so on. Even if we should consider them, we may not be able to think of them consistently with the characters directly apprehended.

In still other cases, it so happens that the element of immediate apprehension will be totally absent and it is this absence which explains the illusion. A person suffering from jaundice sees a white conch yellow. Another suffering from over-eating or heart-trouble will find himself in the night oppressed by something sitting on his chest. There is nothing in the object, in the white conch, for example, which warrants the perception of it as yellow. Yellowness is a pure imposition on the object, as the night-mare is a pure creation of the mind. Such is also the nature of all hallucinations—the space into which they are projected has absolutely nothing in it which should form the perceptual basis for the constructions. Here also knowing directly cognises—nothing in the external world, but the organism's own peculiarities or the mind's own obsessions which are then projected on to space or out-ward objects. It is these subjective factors themselves which form the sense-datum in such cases, or rather the datum here is the object—or space—as enshrouded or covered by physiological

as in the case of perceiving yellow) or mental (as in the case of hallucination) factors; that is to say, there is properly speaking no datum here at all. The objective of belief does not agree with the fact even partially, for there is no datum which exhibits any of the qualities perceived. Consequently, there is no truth in such perceptions.

The last kind of cases is important because it shows that the definition of truth must include the partial agreement of objective with fact. Even if the other two conditions be satisfied, a judgment will not express truth if it is not based upon an immediate apprehension of fact. In knowing, the object can never be forced to conform to the subject; rather is it the case that the judgment, by virtue of an immediate cognition, should be made conformable to the object. This is the meaning of the objective agreeing with fact. Hence to lay down this as a *conditio sine qua non* of truth is not to beg the question.

28. The problem of the emergence of intellectual value needs now to be considered. In the hierarchy of values, intellectual value (by which is meant not merely truth value, but knowledge values in general) occupies a very high place: it emerges only late in the experience of the race or the individual, after the emergence of organic, individual, recreative, social and economic values. How does it arise? The dominant universe of desire determining its genesis consists of elements like curiosity, inquisitiveness, the desire to achieve greater efficiency in one's work so as to obtain better results with less labour and cost etc.. Learning and insight are primarily in the service of organic needs like hunger, thirst, comfort, sex-impulse etc., knowledge is primarily a means to life's activities. Memory or hindsight involved in knowledge is also based upon the desire to preserve in idea a plan of action originally found serviceable in furthering some interest of life. Anticipation or foresight is equally a mental preparation to meet adequately some forthcoming favourable or unfavourable situation in life. Such then are the subjective elements constituting that universe of desire to which the individual is attached. The object which

is the object of knowledge, or the subject of intellectual value, upon which the agent's desire focusses itself in contemplation (thus setting in operation the teleological causation of value), and towards which his action is directed, may be any existent of the world which becomes relevant or important in some practical situation of his life, either directly or indirectly, for instance, some instrument to plough the field, some plan of action for getting water, some specific for a disease etc.. Only it must possess, in order to become the focus of the individual's desire, the qualities of relevancy to some purpose of life, novelty and knowability. The importance of these latter qualities can be appreciated when it is remembered that there can be no knowledge either of the thoroughly unknowable or of the thoroughly known.

It remains to show how, *i.e.*, through what natural processes, according to the present theory, the earlier values enter into effective relatedness with one another in order to generate intellectual values at a higher stage. These natural processes, be it remembered, are only auxiliary to the effective functioning of purposive causation, just as the current may help a person wishing to swim down-stream. There is to begin with an integration of organic values, producing a consciousness of their persistence and the necessity of adopting proper means to realise the goal in each case. There is, secondly, an interaction between organic, individual, social and economic values resulting in various kinds of conflict and consequent adjustment, such as the conflict between the values of individual self-preservation and those of social progress and stabilisation, between organic demands and economic limitations etc., and the adjustment between the economic and other aspects of social life. (Such conflicts and adjustments lead to the development of intelligence and knowledge). Thirdly, recreative and practical values are sometimes transmuted or sublimated into intellectual values. Play in itself involves the governance of activity by meanings or ideas, and work, as an attitude of mind, implies that meanings get appropriate concrete embodiment. Finally, we have to reckon with cases where the arrestation of any of the primary values—the organic, the economic etc.,—results in the concentration of attention upon the situation and in the discovery of ways and means to remove the obstacle.

29. A few words, in conclusion, about freedom in intellectual values. After the stage of economic value, freedom consists, we said, in distinguishing oneself from the object and at the same time recognising the significance of the object as such. Personal value marks the first step in this progress of freedom. Social value takes a step further inasmuch as it recognises the value of personalities. In truth mind becomes aware of the underived existence and meaning of objects—meaning by "object" anything which the mind thinks about. The "truth" about things—their qualities and properties, their real relations towards one another, in short, their individual as well as relational essence or character, becomes known. Mind in this stage has attained a pure form: it is now pure mind, untrammelled by the shackles of the body or the external objects. Therefore it is able to contemplate objects in a dispassionate, impersonal mood and grasp their independent nature. The "scientific mood" of mind with its characteristic qualities of disinterestedness, impartiality, accuracy etc., is a symbol of the attainment of a high degree of freedom. In the rough and tumble of life, ignorance and darkness constitute man's chiefmost enemies and they forge for him his heaviest chains of slavery. They are the source of fear and passion and prejudice which possess the soul. Knowledge, on the other hand, is man's true ally, the saving grace which casts these evils out, and thereby makes man truly free—free from fear, from passion, sin and servitude. In this sense also, knowledge is power, for a true understanding of the nature of things enables its possessor to manipulate and control them, and power is freedom.

But knowledge, as we saw, has another aspect in which it is transformed into truth. The characteristic of truth is that mind in this stage not only apprehends the object, but comprehends it, *i.e.*, compenetrates it, appropriates it, possesses it, is united with it into a unitary whole, and is conscious of such union. While knowledge, *qua* knowledge, gives us only a natural view of objects for what they are in themselves, truth climbs on the shoulders of knowledge, so to say, and obtains an inward spiritual peep of things—comprehends their spiritual significance as judged by a norm or an ideal. It is not merely an intellectual apprehension of an object and its relations, it is a face-to-face vision of it, a heart-realisation of its essence, an intuitive appreci-

ation of its inwardness. And reason (or knowledge) presupposes such an intuition of truth. In truth, therefore, mind possesses, so far as it is possible in truth, the heart of reality, feels its pulse-beats, so to say. Its freedom is thus richer in significance and content, for whereas in the previous stages of value there was a separation of subject from object gradually culminating in knowledge, in truth subject and object are reconciled and enter into a conscious union which enables both to realise an enhanced value for themselves. Detachment from lower things necessarily implies attachment to higher objects. From attachment to material goods (economic value), the agent progresses to attachment to oneself (personal value). From attachment to oneself, he rises to attachment to others—in a limited sense—in social value. In truth he breaks off his attachment to concrete objects and persons and attaches himself to the essences of things, to norms or ideals; for it is only by such attachment that he not only apprehends but *realises* truth, and thus truly knows. It is then that the eye of the soul is opened. True freedom consists in such conscious dependence upon another for the realisation of one's value, but of course the worth of such freedom is determined by the nature of the object with which mind enters into a relation of co-operative dependence. In truth this object is the external world as illumined by a norm or ideal of belief. We shall see in the next chapter how this process reaches its culmination in aesthetic value, but it commences in truth. It was with a mind pregnant with such rich suggestions that Socrates said that knowledge is virtue. By knowledge he meant knowledge in its idealised aspect of truth—the inward heart-realisation of the spiritual significance of things. The sage knew then this power of truth when he declared "Know the Truth, and the Truth shall make you free," and when he enjoined upon us to pray :

"Lead me from untruth to Truth,

"Lead me from darkness to Light,

"Lead me from death to Immortality."

CHAPTER XI

EMERGENCE OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF VALUE:

(8) Aesthetic Value: Art and Beauty.

1. While the devotees of knowledge and truth are few and far between, the votaries of art and beauty are decidedly legion. Aesthetic values hold a unique position in the scale of values, for their appeal is as wide as humanity itself. The feeling for beauty has been coeval with mankind; there has not been a single savage tribe which has not attempted to help nature with adornment; there has not been a single human mother who has not thought her child beautiful. Ethical values may be paramount in their claim—they need to be acknowledged; economic values may be imperious in their demand—they need to be obeyed; aesthetic values are ingratiating in quality—they are readily accepted and doted upon. It would seem, in short, as if aesthetic values were going to falsify the account of value given in these pages, and to prove themselves to be absolute, independent of mind, and intrinsic! The problem therefore calls for a certain firmness of mind which would enable one to resist the insinuating influence of aesthetic values and to conduct an impartial and scientific examination into their nature and characteristics!

It is generally admitted that nature and human art are the two great sources of beauty. But their exact connection with beauty and the consequent relation between themselves are matters upon which no unanimity of agreement has been reached. Reserving for later treatment the case of natural beauty, the immediate question that now arises is, is art necessarily connected with beauty? That is, should we *define* art in terms of beauty, so that without introducing the latter conception we could not explain the essence of the former? The question, it is necessary to perceive, divides itself into three subsidiary issues: (1) What is the aim of art, what is it that the artist wants to achieve? (2) What is art as a process, how shall we describe the activity of the artist, both in its origin and process? (3) What is the product of this activity? To

every one of these problems we must find an adequate answer if we are to decide, with any show of accuracy, the exact nature of the connection of art with beauty.

2. There are about half-a-dozen, if not more, formulations of the meaning and aim of art. Of these, the definition that art is that form of human activity which produces beauty may immediately be ruled out, because it is the very thing in question at the moment. And it would at best be only rhetorical to modify it and say that art is the activity which *aims* at, or *claims* to produce, beauty. That there is such an inherent and natural, or logical, necessity of connection between art and beauty—so that the connotation of either includes partly at least the connotation of the other—is not immediately self-evident. Whether it would be possible to sustain it by arguments is the very task that is now undertaken. And so we pass on to other definitions of art. The genetic school of aestheticians like Dewey and Santayana, Baldwin and Tufts, believe that art and life are not disparate, and that art springs from the same instincts or impulses that are connected with the vital functions in other departments of life. They thus connect art with the tendency to imitation and self-display or explain it as the product of economic, sexual and military demands. The practical and the physical are not divorced from the aesthetic and the contemplative, and all activities would appear as art, and all perceptions as beautiful, when there is a perfect adjustment of the psycho-physical organism to the environment. The neo-Croceans like Carritt, Collingwood, J. A. Smith etc., are equally wedded to the equation of art with general life believing that the foundations of art are laid deep in common human nature itself. Without subscribing to all the contentions of this school, we may observe that the physiological evolutionary view of art, especially in its modified form that art is the expression, in outward channels, of the surplus emotional energy of man, contains a solid grain of truth revealing the natural processes of relatedness which constitute one line of explanation of the emergence of aesthetic values. The view makes it clear, however, that beauty has no special prerogative to be connected with art since according to it all activities of man, regarded from a certain point of view, engender in us the perception of beauty. There is no real distinction

between beauty and ugliness in this conception. Beauty is here at best the efflorescence of the perfection of the biological process, the perfect adjustment of the psycho-physical organism to the environment. It happens to be connected only indirectly, if inevitably, with the activities which result in art. It does not define the meaning or nature of art. But our concern at present is with the other, the mental-teleological factor in the birth of art, the aim or purpose which the artist consciously keeps before his mind in producing a work of art. What is the primary impulse that art calls into play—an impulse which, transformed into desire by the agency of the artist's soul-life, no longer works blindly as an impulse but consciously as an accepted motive which the artist wants to realise? It is a fruitful line of investigation which Alexander, following Hume, has laid down that in art we should seek for an impulse other than the sense of beauty itself (beauty being the result, not the aim or character, of an impulse) just as in science or morals, our activity is the expression, not of knowledge or of conduct, but of the impulse to know (curiosity), or of the impulse to be social. Otherwise to say that beauty is what pleases the sense of beauty would be tautologous. Such an impulse Alexander finds in the impulse of "constructiveness." But "constructiveness" does not bring out the essentially *personal* character of art—the inward relation of the artist to his material. It suggests that the material stands in a purely external relation to the artist (which it does not in Alexander) and thus fails to distinguish human from animal constructiveness. To denote the inwardness of the artist's relation to his subject-matter and his *fusion* with his material (by which the material stands transformed in content) we should rather say that art appeals to the impulse of man's *expressive-creativity*. This phrase, uncouth though it be, avoids the subjectivism latent in theories of pure expressionism on the one hand and the externalism implied in theories of pure creationism on the other. It points out that art is a unique form of human activity in which man expresses himself indeed—his mind, his heart, his soul—but expresses so as to create, to produce, (out of the material contemplated) an object external to himself which has absorbed his mind and heart and which stands out there as the emblem or embodiment as much of his mind as of the subject-matter he depicted. Whether the

artist expresses his emotions or thoughts or will is a different question; it is also another question whether he expresses his individual or universal feelings and thought; suffice it to say that it is this inner urge to self-expression, an expression in the form of creation, that is the aim of all art. The artist constructs, but he constructs by mixing himself with his subject-matter and by filling the physical medium with a formal meaning (to be explained shortly) which is the result of such intermixture. Shortly, art is that form of human activity in which man expresses himself by creating an external object which he has filled with formal meaning. This outline definition will be filled in as we proceed.

3. It is sometimes said that to deserve the name of art, the activity should be *disinterested*. Does this mean that the artist should seek no personal advantage in producing his work of art? Is a work then a product of art only when the author works not for profit or gain but purely for the sake of art? How many artists the world honours to-day would stand such a test? Does it mean that the product of the activity should not be intended for practical use, but solely for the benefit of contemplative joy? But this distinction between "fine" and "applied" art is "odious" and "pernicious." Why should we not try to import gaiety and colour to the objects of our daily use—to our carpets and saucepans and chairs and ink-bottles? From the standpoint of the artist, the term "disinterestedness" commonly means that the artist, *while excited by and preoccupied with his material*, is not determined solely by the idea of personal profit or practical use (economic motives, both of them, as we have seen), but largely by love of forms and the impulse to expressive creation, as a consequence of which he is sometimes prepared to spend on his work some surplus energy more than is absolutely warranted by considerations of profit or practical efficiency. A chair may be done with four plain legs; but if the maker, carried away by his love of forms or patterns, introduces some carving into the legs, then it becomes truly a work of art. The love of forms or patterns is only the other side of the love of the medium in which these forms are realised, and here the artist seeks deliberately and lovingly to handle his stuff—colours, words or marble—so as to produce enchantment out of them. The poet then chooses his words, as the painter his colours, words which

strictly from the standpoint of practical efficiency in conveying meaning, are unnecessary and perhaps even—to the prosaic reader—unintelligible. Instead of saying simply that life expresses the richness of one's spirit through the peculiar qualities of man's diverse emotional states, the poet sings :

"Life like a dome of many-coloured glass

Stains the white radiance of Eternity."

and that is art. It is this excitement over the subject-matter and the loving concentration which the artist bestows in consequence upon his medium trying to mould it into charming shapes and forms that constitute the essence of disinterestedness in him.

"The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,

Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven

And as imagination bodies forth

The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen

Turns them to shape and gives to airy nothing

A local habitation and a name."

That is art. From the standpoint of the spectator, the listener or the reader, disinterestedness would mean the untaintedness of his aesthetic experience, *while contemplation is in process*, with worldly concerns or anxieties. It means detachment from life's ordinary desires and freedom from their pressure. What precisely is involved in such detachment will be seen in the sequel.

What is the motive of the artist ? To express himself so as to create a product of forms. These phrases certainly require further elucidation, but even at this stage we may ask : Does the artist intend to produce beauty ? Hardly, any more than the genuine scientist may be said to seek truth ; for this if no other reason that he does not know what beauty is till he has, by the process briefly described above and to be described at some length below, *happened* to have produced it, just as the scientist, working upon a problem on which his whole mind and heart is set, happens to land upon its solution. The scientist cannot even be said to be guided or controlled in his activity by the ideal of truth, for what in particular cases the truth is, he does not know beforehand ; and not knowing it, he cannot be said to be controlled by it. He is certainly controlled by his knowledge of the relationships of the phenomena he is dealing with, by the laws of logic and by the principles of the scientific

method which he is adopting such as openness of mind and fidelity to facts etc.. But beyond this, he is guided only by his love of the problem and the desire to discover relationships of unity, difference etc., among the phenomena. Similarly the artist is doubtless controlled by his knowledge of the possibilities of the material he is dealing with and of the limitations of the medium he is adopting (though such limitations may become his opportunities), by the laws and technique of the particular art he is working in, by the laws of art-psychology in general and imagination in particular, and by his love of forms; but beyond this he is determined in his work only by his excitement over the subject-matter and his desire to create an embodiment of it full of meaning. Whether such embodiment happens to possess beauty or not is a later result which is as much a discovery to the artist as to the spectator or contemplator. It may even be that working as he does according to the laws of imagination and his knowledge and love of art-forms he cannot but produce beauty in his products. Even so beauty would happen to be but an incidental, if inevitable, result connected with a particular phase of art-activity and would neither express the motive of the artist nor define the nature of his activity.

4. To proceed with our explanation of self-expression and formal meaning in a work of art. This brings us to a consideration of the second question we proposed to ourselves, viz., what is art as a process, both in its origin and execution? And it will give us an opportunity to examine other definitions of art. Art is sometimes defined as the activity concerned with "significant form." The definition is true so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. The question is, how does form come to be significant? And what, from the point of view of art, is the significance of such significant form? The artist, we said, is filled with excitement over his subject-matter. He has meditated upon it day and night. He has pictured it in his mind. He has imagined it in his heart. He has looked at it from a hundred different sides. Conflicting impulses, emotions and thoughts have passed through his soul. His whole being is in a state of tension and turmoil. He has seen a vision. Or he has caught glimpses of it. The vision has become an obsession. It has become a nightmare. It grows upon him. It gives him neither rest nor peace. It imperiously demands expression. He would

transcribe it in words, colours or marble. It is a soul-necessity for him to do so. He must express himself if he would live.

But what exactly does this self-expression amount to? It is said that the artist embodies his *emotions* in the picture, poem etc., that art lives by emotions. It is one of those statements which escape truth by falling very close to it. And so it does not know itself. The excitement of the artist over the subject-matter has been described above. But it is certain that while he is actually under the sway of the emotions and feelings that surge through his soul he cannot voice them forth. He will remain dumb. And if the emotions be particularly intense, his nervous organism may be paralysed under their pressure, and his whole being—body and mind—disintegrated into fragments. Emotion as such is the greatest obstacle to expression. The same is the case with a strong imagination. In imagination the organism is not, as in emotion, in a tense but in a relaxed condition. A person under the spell of a particularly vivid imagination is, *at that moment*, not in the regions of art, but dangerously near to the haunts of madness. This is how poetry is "to madness near allied." As in the case of emotion, in imagination also soaring uncontrolled, the organism—the body and mind—of the person is imperceptibly being disconnected or loosened from the waking life and the normal world, and there is the risk of its disintegrating into double and treble personalities as has not infrequently happened in the cases of persons living purely in an imaginary world. That is why imagination constantly needs to be brought down to the earth and made to face facts. It is in this process of capturing imagination back to the earth, or of critically controlled objective expression of emotion, that, I think, poetry—and all art—is born.¹

5. It is not emotion then that enters into art. Not at any rate directly as emotion. The stress and strain of emotion is lived through and got over, and there succeeds—the interval

1. Some believe that when I cry out to express my sorrow, it is not art, but when I cry out to excite sorrow in others, it becomes art. This, as will be shown later, is entirely mistaken as it directly connects art with *communication of feeling*. What determines the birth of art is not whether I cry out for myself or for others, but whether I cry out as a *natural* mode of giving vent to my feelings, or whether I consciously, *i.e.*, critically, attempt to control and express my feelings objectively, by writing a sonnet, for instance, upon my forlorn love, or by preaching a sermon upon the enduring grace of divine love etc..

may not be large enough to be noticed—the stage of secondary emotion (I am not referring to derived emotions) or emotion assuaged but still emotional in tone or flavour. The experience is quite common. It is like the experience of a fresh bruise or wound which having first given hot burning pain gives way after some time to a sort of dull dumb sensation which may in some cases not entirely be unmixed with a distinct feeling of agreeableness. So in the case of emotions. A lived emotion is succeeded by a state which is the after-effect of that emotion, which has the emotional colouring or aroma about it, which is a tasting of that emotion, so to say, which is that emotion reflected in consciousness, or remembered, as it were, and which is distinctly agreeable. It is the essence of the emotion, its juice, or sap, as it were. It is the emotion which having been brought under control in a manner shortly to be described relapses into an emotional "taste" or "relish" or "zest" having in the meantime been mixed with extra-affectional elements.

Every emotion has thus its corresponding emotional *feel*. It was said that this "feel" or "taste" or "zest" is distinctly agreeable. This has nothing to do with the pleasurable or painful character of the emotion as such. Even painful emotions accordingly when brought under control and reflected back in consciousness acquire this "tasty" character. It is as if the emotion were held back, retained in the mouth, and leisurely "chewed" as the cow leisurely chews the cud, and allowed to yield its "juice" or "sap." It is then "enjoyed" or "contemplated," or appreciated. That is, the result of such "chewing" of the emotion is a peculiar modification of consciousness in which the affective and the cognitive elements have, as will be shown below, interblended, excluding the volitional or the practical altogether, and which, as such an intermixture, has a sweetness of its own.

That the mixture is, for all practical purposes, free from the influence of the conative or volitional aspect is a very important consideration relevant to the present issue, for it is what makes the emotion secondary, contemplated or "tasted." Emotion is no doubt a form of desire and desire is essentially conative. But if this conative aspect prevailed, *i.e.*, if the emotion-desire had full force and naturally worked itself out, it would immediately lead to its own appropriate action and then there would be no

"chewing the cud" of emotion, no tasting, no enjoyment. To make this latter possible, therefore, there should be no thought of the natural fulfilment or frustration of the emotion-desire. The artist or the spectator, to be true to his function, should not be interested in the practical aspect of the emotion which he is contemplating. He feels, on the other hand, that the emotional value of the situation is only an "imputed" or "imagined" value. This is the true significance of the "disinterestedness" of art.

It is such emotional memories or the artist's cognitive (not necessarily conscious) reactions to emotions that enter into art. Their basis, of course, is an emotion or an emotional tendency. We may call it a "governing emotion," or in the language of our value theory, a "universe of desire-emotion." It may be any one of the nine or ten primary emotions of life into which Prof. McDougall has mapped out our emotional life, such as fear, anger, laughter, disgust, wonder, love etc.. There is no reason, however, why their number should be only nine or ten. They may be more numerous still. Their number apart, a governing emotion does not refer to a particular outburst of emotion of a given character, but to the character, or type, of the emotion. It is a permanent emotional tendency or disposition. Its basis may be said to be instinct or impulse. It is inherited. It comes into play when a suitable object presents itself and excites it. It is then kindled into a specific emotion. Such an exciting object or stimulus may be said to be the major cause of the emotion. There may be minor or accessory causes also which heighten its intensity. And the emotion thus excited in the breast may manifest itself in outward physical expressions, such as sidelong glances, smiles etc. (in the case of love). And it may be accompanied by other prominent physical effects such as horripilation, sweating, tremor etc., as well as by some minor collateral feelings of pleasure or pain, such as exultation, depression, languor, satiety, impatience etc.. But so far there is only emotion but no emotional relish or tasting. If left to itself the emotion may seek fulfilment in practical action and then it would work itself out in a natural manner as when we seek an outlet for the emotion of anger by beating, or at least heartily abusing, our enemy. When no such outlet is provided for, emotion may produce dangerous effects in the organism such as convulsions, catalepsy etc.. When, however, as soon as excited

the emotion is checked back from its onward rushing pointed course, and spread out, so to say, over the whole area of consciousness on the one hand, and the whole environmental situation on the other—spread out in such a manner that it loses in intensity or poignancy but gains in expansiveness and width—when, instead of allowing it to dominate the self, it is gradually (by the process to be described below) brought under the control of the self and *referred* to the self, in such wise that the self recognises that the emotional value of the situation is only imagined, then the emotion loses its sting and comes to be relished or tasted or enjoyed as an emotional delicacy. The emotion then yields its nectar or juice. The pleasurable value of the emotion emerges.¹

It is these emotional juices or essences that are, strictly speaking, embodied in art, in the poem, the picture, the song or the statue. This is what Wordsworth perhaps meant when he said that poetry is "emotion recollected in tranquillity" though he went on to say that such recollection gradually drives away the tranquillity and gives rise to an actual emotional state of a milder sort resembling the original emotion contemplated. It is now generally recognised that he was wrong in this latter statement which was probably an after-thought. This after-thought must have been dictated probably by Wordsworth's peculiar theory of poetry that it must be perfectly intelligible and communicable to every one, which it can be only when it adopts the language of the fireside talk. So also Tolstoy held that the

1. The process of "holding back," "checking" or "spreading out" the emotion, of "recognising" it, etc., described in these paragraphs, is, I believe, the same as the problem of "psychical distancing" in modern aesthetics. "Distance is produced in the first instance by putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear with our practical, actual self; by allowing it to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends—in short, by looking at it "objectively" as it has often been called; by permitting only such reactions on our part as emphasise the "objective" features of the experience, and by interpreting even our "subjective" affections not as modes of our being, but rather as characteristics of the phenomenon." (*British Journal of Psychology*, V. 94). The only remark that needs to be made on the above is that the last statement regarding the projection of even "subjective" affections on to the phenomenon is not a *necessary* condition of "distancing." The emotional experience may, as we have maintained, be "referred" to the self, it may be "recognised" as it is and for what it is, and yet it may be "distanced." Projecting the subjective experience on to the phenomenon is a logically different and subsequent process, consequent no doubt upon distancing, but not conditioning it. It is the problem of "imputation" or "imagination" to be dealt with later. Distancing involves also the idea of detachment or disinterestedness.

ideal artist is one who "by means of some external signs hands on to others feelings he has lived through" so that "others are infected by these feelings and also experience them." This is a misreading of the whole situation. It is doubtful whether communication is essential to art; we shall see later on in what sense it is. Even if it should be, it cannot be feeling as such that is communicated for the simple reason that, as we have seen, it is not the lived feeling that is embodied by the artist in his work of art, but the relished or tasted feeling, the emergent emotional value, as explained above. And surely from the standpoint of the aesthete also who enjoys the poem or the picture, it must be admitted as evident that we do not go to a music-hall or a theatre to have our feelings excited or stimulated so that they may blaze forth from face to face. "That is only the function of the crudest forms of art"—I cannot do better than quote Herbert Read in this connection¹—"programme music, melodrama, sentimental fiction and the like. The real function of art is to express *feeling*² and transmit *understanding*. That is what the Greeks so perfectly realised and that is what, I think, Aristotle meant when he said the purpose of drama was to purge our emotions. We come to the work of art already charged with emotional complexes; we find in the genuine work of art, not an excitation of these emotions, but peace, repose, equanimity. Nothing is more absurd than the spectacle of an ardent young snob trying to cultivate an emotion before a great work of art, in which all the artist's emotion has been transmuted to perfect intellectual freedom. It is true that the work of art arouses in us certain physical reactions.....But they do not agitate them so much as soothe them, and if we must, psychologically speaking, call the resultant state of mind an emotion, it is an emotion totally different in kind from the emotion experienced and expressed by the artist in the act of creating the work of art. It is better described as a state of wonder or admiration, or more coldly but more exactly as a state of recognition."

Aesthetic enjoyment thus consists in contemplating the

1. *The Meaning of Art*: p. 158. 2. I have often felt, on reading this sentence, that, in the light of Read's meaning, the emphasis should be laid upon the verb "express" and not, as in the text, on the noun "*feeling*."

emotional juices or zests embodied in a work of art and getting those juices secreted, so to say, on the palate of our own psychical being and consciousness. In reading or witnessing a drama of Shakespeare, say, *The Merchant of Venice*, it would betray a poor sense of aesthetic appreciation if one were to be excited by the feelings and emotions which are said to have actuated the hearts of the characters of the play, e.g., Shylock's spirit of vengeance, the Christian hatred of the Jew, the court's sympathy for Antonio etc.. Doubtless there is a tendency for these emotions to be excited: since the emotional disposition is there, and the proper objects of stimulus are present, the emotion begins to bud, but it is, as it were, nipped in the bud (in proper aesthetic appreciation) and not allowed to bloom, by the fact that it has come under a form, a pattern which is also aesthetically appreciated; it is thereby not only brought under control but unified with the rest of psychical life, and perceived or "recognised" or "remembered" or "recollected" as it is, and for what it is. It is recognised not merely as such an emotion, but as only an "imputation," as a value which exists only in imagination. It is then enjoyed or leisurely tasted. It becomes an object for a subject; in the moment of "tasting" it, the enjoyer is aware of the essentially dual nature of the experience and is aware of the aesthetic perceived object as distinguished from himself, the perceiving subject. He is aware of it as related to himself and his consciousness and it is this self-reference that conduces to "the chewing" of the "emotional cud" and the tasting of its essence. The resultant, rather emergent, state of consciousness is peculiarly agreeable or satisfying. That is why even a tragedy pleases though the incidents are painful. It is said that the pleasure is derived from the form, but this is only a half-explanation, for the perception of the form on the part of the spectator—or the imposition of form on his material on the part of the artist—involves the process of the objectification of the emotion that is being described.

6. This objectified emotion or emotional essence necessarily has the character of universality in it. It has lost its particularity of time and place, circumstance and context. It has lost the personal touch and the local colour of the particular setting which originally called it forth. It then represents once more the type or character of the emotion in question in its secondary

or reflected form. The emotional disposition latent in the spectator or the listener has a kinship with the universal aspect of the emotion embodied in the picture or song, and in consequence contemplation of the art product kindles the corresponding aesthetic mood in his breast which he begins to taste. Such universality of appeal of the work of art, however, must be taken as relative; for while the permanent emotional dispositions are indeed the same in all mankind, the conditions of the recognition of the emotional essence embodied in the work of art may not be equally available to every one, and so the work may fail of its intended effect in the case of some persons. A natural aesthetic endowment and a certain training in aesthetic perception are an indispensable condition for all; but in addition, acquaintance with a nation's literature and emotional life in general and its different forms of manifestation, practice in sympathetic appreciation of its art products etc., may often be necessary. The emotional like the intellectual *a priori* needs to commingle with experience in order to give rise to aesthetic knowledge and delight. Otherwise we shall commit the error of thinking that the greatest art is that which is most universal in appeal. For it means that the greatest art is that which is within the comprehension of the largest number of *average* men, and then it means only the Rāmāyana, the Bible, folk-songs and———short stories.

7. It seems to me that the objectified emotional essence I have been describing may for short be called a *sentiment*. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word as: "(Art) moving quality resulting from artist's sympathetic insight into what is described or depicted."¹ This is exactly the meaning of the reflected emotion and its relishing—the zest of the emotion—described above. McDougall in his *Energies of Men* describes the sentiment as a propensity which has become, through the individual's experience, functionally linked with a cognitive ability in such a way that when the ability comes into play, on sight or thought of the corresponding object, the propensity also is brought into action and engenders its peculiar emotional tendency directed upon the object. Further the incipient sentiment makes the object interesting to us and thereby acquire positive or negative value. Here we have, if we

1. P. 785 (Impression of 1928.)

do not stretch language, the psychological description of the essentials of the reflected emotion theory I have been advocating. A sentiment may suggest the dominance of the intellectual or ideal element, and it may seem to stand more for the permanent propensity or disposition than for anything else. But the emotional zest also is largely contemplative and cognitive in character, as will be shown; and it should not be forgotten that a sentiment is not merely a propensity, but a propensity in action—as engendering a peculiar emotional tendency making the object upon which the tendency is directed appear valuable to us. It is the moving quality of the emotional tendency, resulting from a sympathetic appreciation of the object, here the work of art, that is the essence of sentiment. Naturally it includes also the idea of “relishing” or “tasting” the emotional essence.

8. So far, we have been concerned with the psychological implications of self-expression in art. It is now necessary to look at the process of controlling the emotional tendency roused, of circumscribing and deliberately directing it, of “distancing” it, so to say, so that it may turn into a relishable juice or sentiment. This is achieved, it was said, by consciously imposing a form, a pattern, upon the organism, and through it, upon the emotion. A consideration of this problem also helps us to determine the cognitive or ideal element entering into the zest or sentiment, and through it, into art, the nature and function of “imagination,” and the meaning of “imputation” in art.

We may begin by admitting that form is the *differentia* of art, for it implies expression or embodiment and art is nothing without expression. It is what converts blind dumb experience into articulate and effulgent living reality. And it is that which solves our emotional problems for us. But the exaggerated importance attached to it by formalists like Bell and Fry is unfortunate because it leads to a mysticism in art which is little better than obscurantism, and an orthodoxy which ends only in an aesthetic hagiocracy. They interpret “form” more or less as a Platonic idea and seek for “the pure forms of intuition”—the universals which inform all particulars, the universal aspects of natural form. But this is to start with a prejudice in favour of the objectivity of beauty and other values—the “Great Tradition” again, now in the realm of aesthetics,

the tradition about the Absolute Beauty or the Idea of Beauty of the *Symposium*. Without committing ourselves to any such doctrine of ideas, either Platonic or phenomenological, we may observe that form represents a permanent element in human constitution, *viz.*, man's aesthetic sensibility. It is instinctive or intuitive in character, that is to say, man has an instinctive liking for form, for pleasing forms, and this susceptibility to form is almost universal. His thoughts, his emotions, ideals, beliefs, impulses, desires, in short, his whole inner life is lived by expression through forms. External activities may in this sense be said to be the forms of inner life. An athlete or a player is in this same sense said to be in or have a good form. In any case, form is nothing but the *structure of expression*. It is the inner control that an object imposes on itself in manifesting, *i.e.*, expressing its potencies or capacities. It is, in Aristotle's sense, the principle of growth and development. It is the principle of actuality converting every moment blind matter into higher and yet higher living entities. But if so, the matter cannot be entirely blind, or rather, the form cannot be entirely foreign to it or imposed upon it *ab extra*. The principle of growth must be inherent in the matter itself and so matter assumes different forms as it grows or evolves. Form and matter are thus inseparably united together though they must be accounted to be different principles. The form of a thing depends on its matter in the sense that the way in which that thing behaves, acts, or develops, or the shape it assumes in the course of its existence, is largely due to its "stuff" and its properties, for example, its molecular groupings or structure. It is this determination by the stuff and its properties that explains why iron, for instance, or steel, can assume certain forms which wood cannot. So that ultimately form and matter appear to become almost indistinguishable, though, it should be noted, the distinction *never* disappears.

9. In aesthetics, the same general principles hold. Form is the shape, the arrangement of parts, the disposition of the material, the material's outward, sensible aspect. We have been talking of matter as opposed to form; but in aesthetics there are different kinds of matter thus distinguishable from form. We must distinguish between (1) the subject-matter, the fact, event, story etc., treated of by the artist; (2) the material in which he

works, or the medium employed, words, colours, clay, marble etc; and (3) the content,—emotional or intellectual (a point to be discussed shortly)—meaning, significance or value. Aesthetic form is relative to all these different kinds of matter, to the latter two more than to the first, to the last most of all. As relative to the subject-matter, form is the same as body, including both shapes and colours; as relative to the medium, form means only shape or structure as opposed to the *sensa* such as colours, sounds etc.. In all the three cases, form and expression are identical, but it is only when form is thought of in contrast to "content" or aesthetic value, that "expression" gains pointed reference and significance, especially in the form of the question whether the "content" is *adequately* or *perfectly* "expressed."

Artistic activity, it was pointed out, starts with emotion. But on a superficial perception of a work of art, what appears salient is the form or pattern (we may for our purposes use the words interchangeably, though there is a difference), the distribution of line and curve, the disposition of mass and space, light and shade etc.. And indeed, as Herbert Read points out, the aesthetic sense proper is concerned only with the first two stages in a work of art, *viz.*, the perception of material qualities—colours, sounds, gestures etc.—and arrangement of such perceptions into pleasing shapes and patterns. The correspondence of such perceptions with a previously existing state of emotion or feeling in the beholder is a logically subsequent stage.¹ But in the creative artist, as we have seen, the imposition of a pattern of movement upon his emotional experience is the means whereby that experience is brought under control and converted into the tasting of the emotional juice or sentiment. The criterion of such successful "enforming," so to say, of the emotional life is the capacity of the work of art to please, to give pleasure—the "thrill"—to the percipient spontaneously or instantaneously. A work of art, above all, pleases and it pleases immediately by virtue of its form.² The artist is called a "creator" because he endows his material with form and makes of it an aesthetic object. True universality in art belongs, or ought to belong, to this element of form alone; because form being the most natural stirring of the human heart which man instinctively seeks,—the basis of all rhythm, order, symmetry and harmony—its appeal

1. *The Meaning of Art*: p. 7.

2. *Ibid*, p. 18.

must of necessity be universal. A European is pleased with Oriental art as much as the Oriental with European art; the forms of primitive art are as enchanting as the patterns of Classical Greek art or those of modern art. Sensibility to form is an *a priori* element of human nature.

Thus results what is called formal art, or the art of patterns, in which the arrangement of our sensible perceptions into pleasing shapes and forms is carried out with the greatest skill but with the least appeal to any subject-matter. The possible relations that may hold between our perceptions in any given material¹—be it words, tones, colours etc.,—relations that are capable of appearing as striking and of thereby engendering immediate, pure, unalloyed joy in the aesthetic experient—are alone carefully studied and reduced to a definite number of pattern-skeletons. In this context, it is needless to point out, "form" means not this or that particular form in any particular work of art, but a class of forms which is exemplified in numerous instances of works of art such as the dactyl or the trochee in metres, the musical scale of notation in a particular key, or the three-four or the four-four time in music etc.. Or it may refer to certain types of art products as a whole, such as the lyric or the epic in poetry, the sonata or the suite or the symphony in music etc.. The best and simplest examples of such formal art are the striking and pleasing patterns which Indian ladies draw with their fingers out of white or coloured powdered earth or chalk—the art of *Rangavalli* as it is called.² These *rangavalli* drawings, with which they adorn the inside as well as the front-yard of their houses daily, and which may sometimes become very elaborate and complex in structure, are the results of a long study in the purely formal relations of line, curve, dot and circle—a study which has been developed into a regular art. Every art has its own formalistic or stylistic traditions, its own rules and technique in general, which he who would do good work in that art has perforce to master. But a genius is he who, having mastered them, is not bound down by them and not only deviates from them but also creates new forms.

10. The full significance of form, however, can be appreci-

1. Used here in the sense of medium, because there is here no "material" or subject-matter other than the medium itself.

2. A foliage or coppice (literally, a "creeper") of colours; an ivy of colours; decoration in colours.

ated only when formal art passes into imaginative art. It is not enough that the artist brings his emotional experience under the control of a form or pattern, he must endow that form with life and movement and withal secure unity and coherence of emotional apprehension of the subject-matter. It is imagination which helps the artist to create new forms. And this reveals the close relation of emotion to imagination. An emotion involves a desire and an intellectual consciousness. Should the desire fail to secure immediate fulfilment, it works in and around the intellectual consciousness, or rather the latter works in behalf of the former, exploring "fresh fields and pastures new," reinforcing the former and getting itself reinforced, and, in any case, never separated from it. When the intellectual element thus predominates in emotion, fanned simultaneously by the element of feeling, it assumes the form of imagination. Emotion feeds upon imagination and itself grows strong and irresistible. Stage-fright, for example, is the emotion of fear, resting no doubt on some sense-basis, but largely helped and reinforced by imaginary apprehensions of one knows not what. However, from the standpoint of art, imagination is essentially creativeness, or rather, prior to the stage of expression, inventiveness. Its function is to weave out a given situation into an elaborate and consistent whole on the basis of a certain principle assumed at the outset by the artist and to clothe it with charm and grace in style and expression in such wise that the work, when completed, reveals ever-new aspects of radiance and enchantment.

11. It is here that the question of art and truth arises. Plato condemned art on the ground that it is mere imitation of a concrete particular object which is itself a copy of an ideal original, and that in consequence it cannot, as it pretends to, give us *knowledge of truth*. Aristotle in defence pointed out that artistic truth is of a different character from historic truth but that nevertheless art deals with universals and not particulars. The drama, for instance, tells us what persons of a certain class or character would think or how they would act under given circumstances. We shall find that this statement contains an important truth as well as a significant error. To give us general or universal truths is, ordinarily speaking, the work of science and of philosophy, and nobody claims that art is either. Art is concerned principally with individuals, not with laws or principles. No one goes

to poetry or dancing or music to learn universal truths. And what could these truths be about in these arts, or even in a drama? Certainly not truths of nature. Nor could they be "truths of character." Why should a play appear to us to be beautiful simply because the hero or the clown is drawn "true to character"? Real life is not wanting in true heroes and clowns and yet we don't find them beautiful. It is sometimes said that art gives us a deeper insight into the nature of an object than science, and in so far, gives us truth. This statement is so important that we must devote some attention to it.

In any obvious and superficial sense, the proposition is manifestly false. It cannot be maintained that we understand better the nature of daffodils by reading Wordsworth's poem about them than by studying the botanist's description of them; or that we learn more about human ambitions and their inevitable doom by attending a play of Shakespeare than by contemplating the life of a Napoleon or a Kaiser. There are, however, two considerations which may lead us to a better appreciation of the claim of art to give us deeper truth than science or life. In the first place, in some cases at least, there is meaning in saying, as Aristotle said, that the artist imitates the idealised form of an object. He apprehends nature's own mode of development or growth, and by a strenuous but happy act of intuitive imagination, catches a glimpse of what an object might develop into, what nature intends to perfect it into, or, at any rate, what would be most appropriate for the object to attain to. It is immaterial whether Nature will ever put forth that form or not; *that* at any rate appears to be the tendency to the artist's mind of the object's natural line of development, and as reflecting the tendency, the work of art gives us "truth." The poet

"Nor seeks nor finds he mortal blisses,
But feeds on the aerial kisses
Of shapes that haunt thought's wildernesses.
He will watch from dawn to gloom
The lake-reflected sun illumine
The yellow bees in the ivy-bloom,
Nor heed nor see what things they be;
But from these create he can
Forms more real than living man
Nurslings of immortality !

—P. B. Shelley

Pictures of hermaphrodite humans are occasionally to be seen ; and many have wondered why they were produced. Probably the artist was trying to imagine a way out of the stress and strain of sex-emotional life, the feeling of weariness and *ennui* that is overtaking men and women more and more, the sense of disappointment and discontent that is everywhere felt with the present order of nature and the organisation of family life. I sometimes imagine that man may develop a third eye in his forehead : the progress that is now being made in telepathy, clairvoyance, and other phenomena of psychical research and intuitive power may one day justify that piece of imagining ! I do not say that these instances exactly bring out Aristotle's view of the imitation of the universal, they but illustrate one possible mode of application of that view. The view itself means something simple and less sophisticated, *viz.*, that art gives us the universal form of things existing no doubt in particulars but divorced from everything that is irrelevant in the particulars. As applied to human beings and their actions, the doctrine means that art reveals the essential qualities of human nature, purified again from all irrelevance. The possibility of persons existing with such qualities is immaterial. Pictures are to be seen of maidens of entrancing beauty gently moving about in lovely bowers and gardens wearing in their tresses a fresh-plucked flower or two, while buzzing bees busily glistened upon the plants. I have often imagined what a transforming effect would be produced if while most bees sat upon the living flowers on the plants, one were shown as trying to sit upon the plucked flower on the maiden's tresses to suck honey ! Such a picture would of course from one point of view be absurd, but would it not reveal "truth" of a more essential and significant kind than the ordinary and prosaic picture does ?

Secondly, the truth that art reveals—whatever it be—is *felt* to be deeper because of the artistic way in which it is presented. Science and philosophy also embody values—but in propositions which assert them. The values in their case thus appear to be external to their embodiment and so fail to appeal to the heart. But in art, the values are one with their embodiment, they are presented to us in immediate sense-perception in individual instances. Truth, or value in general, thus appears to us in a living form, a form of flesh and blood, as it were, and naturally

we seem to see more profoundly, firmly, clearly, and comprehensively. The artist presents us only with perspectives, but because of their concrete embodiment, they appear to possess a character of wholeness and completeness and perfection which the propositions of science with their ragged edges and torn ends woefully seem to lack.

But the third and most important sense of the profounder nature of artistic truth remains to be mentioned. And this relates to the nature of art as a disinterested activity. In ordinary life—and even in science to some extent—we are never impartial spectators of things. Our observation and consideration of them are always coloured by human-practical needs and desires. "What can we do with it?" is the question that we immediately ask of an object after inspection. Cognitive interests, we have seen, are never free from conative or practical interests, and truth, we have said, is the evaluation of a piece of knowledge by individual as well as collective meanings, norms, ideals etc.. In knowledge, existence can never be separated from meaning. And meaning is always meaning for some one. What does it mean? means what does it mean to me or to you, or to the standard mind of the scientist? Science is not an impartial observation of facts—it is observation with a bias in one's mind, the bias of a problem, a question, a point of view, which is worrying the scientist's mind and for which he is seeking an answer. And it is well-known that we find what we are looking for. If we don't find it, we so arrange our apparatus and conduct experiments that we at last do find it. We get from the facts what we have already put into them. But there is a possibility—just a possibility and nothing more—that in art—in contemplative aesthetic activity, for instance—one may sometimes enter into an experience in which the empirical and practical veil has been torn off from our face, the scales have fallen down from our eyes, and we seem to stand face to face with the countenance of reality! This is *not* mysticism, one must hasten to add. For in any true mystic experience, there is a wholeness and completeness of vision—and also an experienced integrity of one's being—that cannot be found in artistic experience. The completeness of artistic experience is only relative, confined as it is to the object under contemplation, which is not true of mystic experience. And the experience

itself is still charged with the consciousness that we are imagining, which would be absurd in mystic experience. All that happens in the former—all that is claimed to happen—is that the fact confronted raises no problems, no issues, no reactions either of a cognitive or of a conative character. We are not worried with questions of what it may possibly *mean to us* or to *anybody*, how to interpret it, etc., much less what to do with it, or what it would be useful for. We are content simply to be with it, to be in it rather, or to possess it. Meaning of some kind it will have—without meaning there is no experience, as we have seen—but it would be the meaning proper to the thing itself, the essence of the object, so to say, as it is in and for itself, not for any other being. Here also there is presented only a perspective, but a perspective which does not distort, for the medium of experience is not coloured by the dark hues of utility, convention, practicality etc.. The perspective—the aesthetic object—is seen as an integral part of a larger whole in which it exists in its own inherent right and as enjoying its own existence. It lives for itself, rooted in its own environment and reveals itself as such to the eye of the contemplative artist. In a sense, therefore, we may say that the empirical is transcended and the ideal, the universal, the true form or essence of the object, revealed in artistic experience.

When Shakespeare pictured

"Daisies pied and violets blue
 "And lady-smocks all silver white
 "And cuckoo-buds of yellow hue
 "Do paint the meadows with delight";

when Shelley cried to the skylark:

"Waking or asleep
 "Thou of death must deem
 "Things more true and deep
 "Than we mortals dream,
 "Or how could thy notes flow in such a crystal stream ?
 * * * * * *
 "Teach me half the gladness
 "That thy brain must know,
 "Such harmonious madness

"From my lips would flow

"The world should listen then as I am listening now!";

when Keats[†] mused :

"Bright Star, would I were steadfast as thou art—

"Not in lone splendour hung aloft the night,

"And watching, with eternal lids apart,

"Like Nature's patient sleepless Eremite,

"The moving waters at their priestlike task

"Of pure ablution round earth's human shores,

"Or gazing on the new soft-fallen mask

"Of snow upon the mountains and the moors—";

and when Wordsworth experienced

"A presence that disturbs me with the joy

"Of elevated thoughts : a sense sublime

"Of something far more deeply interfused,

"Whose dwelling is the light of the setting suns,

"And the round ocean and the living air,

"And the blue sky, and in the mind of man ;

"A motion and a spirit, that impels

"All thinking things, all objects of all thought,

"And rolls through all things."

these sons of Appollo—these children of immortality—saw the truth far more truly and deeply than any scientist or philosopher.

Not scientific truth, then, nor historical truth, but the truth of individuality, and of its possible perfection, the truth of individual self-existence, is the truth revealed in art. But it is incorrect to say that art has nothing to do with truth in any other sense. If we do not become sticklers to words, we may say that art reveals values or valuable meanings, not merely immediate meanings such as the meanings of colours, sounds or lines, but even ideal meanings, (and this is the fourth sense of artistic truth). Poetry, and the drama, for instance, give us the truth of experience—the mature experience of life seen in the large by the poet or the dramatist, his outlook on life, his vision of life, his criticism of life. It may be pessimism, or optimism, or tolerance of the world. It may be his sense of the struggles and

strivings of humanity, of the abuse of opportunities, of the waste of the unfinished attempt, of sad disappointments and delusions more sad. It may be his appreciation, on the other hand, of the supreme destiny of man, of the successes of man over nature, of the vast vistas that lie yet unconquered, or of the friendship of man with nature. The poet may sing of the law of divine justice in the universe, of justice tempered with mercy, of the need of human charity and kindness, of the human, all-too-human, errors, follies and foibles, of weaknesses that are at the same time man's own strength. Truth in poetry in short may consist of any reflective insight the poet may have gained out of the fullness and maturity of life's experience, an insight which may quicken others' perceptions, ennoble a living soul. Not that it should necessarily be moral (the question does not arise here), but only significant, revealing an aspect of life which one can appreciate, and in itself a genuine expression of experience. Poetry and philosophy are to each other near allied; both spring from the same rich soil, human life and experience. And the truth of poetry is of the same species as the truth of philosophy. All great art embodies "truth" of this kind.

But of course poetry is not philosophy. Meaning in poetry—or any other art—is never felt apart from its embodiment: its embodiment *is* the meaning. And the meaning is appreciated and enjoyed because of the appreciation and enjoyment of the embodiment. Otherwise no one would go to poetry to learn about life or experience or vision or insight as the prime object of study. After having sufficiently insisted upon the primacy of formal perfection in art, however, one may be permitted to observe that without valuable meaning, a work of art may appear delightful and charming, but it can never be truly great. The deep and enduring loves and passions of humanity, the eternal quest of man, the longings of soul-life, the soul's reactions to natural phenomena—the mighty mountains, the stupendous sea, the starlit sky, the oceans of space, the circling glories of the celestial spheres etc.—these form fit material for great art. Who shall say they cannot yield valuable meaning?

12. "The soul's reactions to natural phenomena"—the words have been advisedly used. The "revelation of the universal" which is here being defended is certainly not true of all art, it is true in a pre-eminent degree only of poetry, the drama

and other such representative arts. But unless in *some* sense it hold also of non-representative arts like music and sculpture, art as such cannot be the giver of valuable meaning.) We may review the previous contentions regarding poetry and tragedy from a slightly different point of view and say that what they express is the truth of human emotion or feeling. The artist, it was said, endeavours to objectify his feeling by bringing it under the control of a pattern. The feeling expressed must be such that the artist himself—after the work is produced—or others, would be able to recognise and identify it as one which they themselves have felt or might under given circumstances feel. (Truth in art is the truth of the human heart. Ultimately it is only human feelings that are fit subject-matter for art (and so far Aristotle was right). Accordingly, mere presentations of nature's scenery or phenomena cannot be art, any more than mere descriptions of historical facts. They would only be equivalent to science, history or philosophy.) The *differentia* of art are the zests, gustos, sentiments or emotional flavours. It is only when these are brought to bear upon the subject-matter, it is only when presentations become representations in this sense—and the process, of course, involves selection of perspectives, emphasis etc.,—that art arises. (The subject-matter of art—the "material passions" as Alexander calls them—may not indeed be confined to the emotions, though it may include them; it may range over the whole field of human experience, intellectual, practical, speculative etc., but the product is truly art only when it embodies the artist's emotional reactions to such experiences. Nothing is art that does not touch the heart. And in this sense, it is not very difficult to see that music, architecture and other non-representative arts do express feeling and touch the deepest chords of the human heart. They are also accordingly revelations of the universal.)

It is from this standpoint again that lyrics like Shelley's *To the Moon*, *To a Skylark*, *Hymn to the Spirit of Nature*, *Ode to the Western Wind*, etc., Keats's *Ode to a Nightingale*, *Ode to Autumn*, *The Terror of Death* etc., Wordsworth's *To the Skylark*, *By the Sea*, *The Daffodils*, *To the Cuckoo* etc., become poetry of the highest quality. The revelation of the universal is in such cases the revelation of soul-life, and this is the fundamental characteristic of Romantic Poetry. When we read a poem like

Hood's "Past and Present," and especially those lines :

* * * * *

"My spirit flew in feathers then
 "That is so heavy now
 "And summer pools could hardly cool
 "The fever on my brow.
 "I remember, I remember
 "The fir trees dark and high
 "I used to think their slender tops
 "Were close against the sky.
 "It was a childish ignorance,
 "But now 'tis little joy
 "To know I'm farther off from Heaven
 "Than when I was a boy."

or Wordsworth's

"My heart leaps up when I behold
 "A rainbow in the sky."

which heart does not remember its childhood and ache with a gnawing pain with Hood's, which heart does not leap with joy with Wordsworth's in elation ?

It is also evident that all such revelations, be they ideal or emotional, are the results of what is called imputation or, to use a philosophical term, superimposition, the result, in other words, of imagination. This is what differentiates art from reality as fact or existent. Damayanti's sorrows and sufferings were her own, Chandramati's trials and tribulations affected none but herself and her husband Harischandra, but when we now read their stories in the great Indian epics, we imagine as if we were in their place and undergoing their experiences. The story produces a reflection of a great feeling in the reader kindled by an inner kinship with the universal aspect of the particular emotion which the story describes was felt by the heroine or the hero. But the emotional stirring in the reader is not so great as to make him feel the sufferings in his own breast—that would be not art but the fact of the past reproduced by defect either of excessive sentimentality in the reader or of melodrama in the art. Art stops short of the actual *working* of the emotion in the beholder. There is no feeling *per se* in art, that is certain; there is only enough of genuine *expression* of feeling to make us feel imaginative by our human kinship with it as described in a given

situation ; in the following epitaph on a Jacobite, for instance;—

"To my true king I offer'd free from stain
 "Courage and faith ; vain faith and courage vain.

* * * * *

"For him I languished in a foreign clime
 "Gray-hair'd with sorrow in my manhood's prime ;
 "Heard on Lavernia Scargill's whispering trees,
 "And pined by Arno for my lovelier Tees.

* * * * *

"O thou, whom chance leads to this nameless stone,
 "From that proud country which was once mine own,
 "By those white cliffs which I never more must see,
 "By that dear language which I spake like thee,
 "Forget all feuds, and shed one English tear
 "O'er English dust. A broken heart lies here."

Even an Indian heart can shed a human tear over such broken-hearted faith immortalised by Art's beauty.

Or in this, poor Henchard's self-condemning will ; —

"Michael Henchard's will :

"That Elizabeth-Jane or Farfrae be not told of my
 death or made to grieve on account of me.

"And that I be not bury'd in consecrated ground.

"And that nobody is wished to see my dead body.

"And that no mourners walk behind me at my funeral.

"And that no flowers be planted on my grave.

"And that no man remember me.

"To this I put my name

Michael Henchard."

The reader of this will cannot but exclaim, as Elizabeth-Jane exclaimed, "What bitterness lies there !"

But the feeling expressed gets sufficiently refined artistic elaboration so as not to make us lose consciousness of the fact that we are only in the presence of a work of art, that we are only imaginatively imputing emotional value to it. The nice balancing of these two possibilities and striking the point of their equilibrium so as to make us indeed sensitive to the emotional situation but at the same time to enable us to enjoy its zest or savour by reflecting it and spreading it over, to seem to feel and at the same time to know that we are only "empathising" with the object,—this is the work of artistic

imagination both in the creative and in the appreciative artist.

We have considered at some length the relation of art to truth. We saw that the artist starts with a certain emotion which he wants to control by imposing a form upon it. This is the work of imagination. But imagination is not divorced from cognitive activity, the latter reinforces the former, and is itself transformed by it. It thereby supplies art with the insight born of a sympathetic understanding of the object—an insight which reveals the "truth" of the object. What the artist transcribes in the work of art is not emotion or feeling, not, at any rate, *qua* emotion or feeling, as we have seen. It is, if we may call it so, emotional or imaginative insight, the understanding of the object determined by his emotional reactions, or resulting from the simultaneous and co-operative working of both the heart and the head.

In this sense and this sense alone, it seems to me, can we give a meaning to the well-known identification of truth and beauty in Keats's lines, "Beauty is truth, truth beauty" etc.. Taken at its face value, the identification appears meaningless. Truth is of the intellectual, and beauty of the affective, order, and there seems to be about as much legitimacy in equating the two as in equating beauty with goodness or truth with goodness. But if we remember that art can combine imaginative vitality or truth (as described in the preceding paras) with beauty and charm of expression or embodiment, that the revelation of truth in art—whatever be the truth revealed—is an artistic, graceful, moving, enchanting revelation in which one is not sure whether it is the truth revealed or the beauty concealed (or is it beauty revealed and truth concealed?) that enchants us, and that in particular it is the embodiment of universal emotional truths (values) of the heart that constitutes the strength of art's appeal—if we remember all this, Keats's lines may not after all appear so perplexing or enigmatical as they have appeared to many. If, moreover, the semi-mystical character of aesthetic experience described above is true, such an experience not merely discloses the "truth" or "reality" of things as they are, but discovers the subject himself in a state of equilibrium (to be explained in the sequel) in which he attributes "beauty" to the object contemplated. That is to say, the artist's perception of truth is inseparable from his perception of beauty. Lastly, if by "the perception of truth" we understand a true mystic experience,

this experience involves such an integrality and wholeness of being, both subjectively and objectively, that the experient hardly knows whether what he is experiencing is "truth" or "beauty." These are some possible explanations of Keats's lines.¹

13. It is sometimes held that artistic experience is pure imaginative activity devoid of rational or thought processes, and that there is no self-awareness or distinction of subject and object in it. It is difficult to substantiate this view which is one of those *a priori* assumptions which are never critically tested by experience and which we referred to in the section on intellectual values. We can only repeat that there is no level of adult human experience in which thinking, and with it self-consciousness, are not present. Imagination is nothing but controlled thinking at a level different from that of thought, different because it is relatively free from the fetters of thinking at its own proper level, fetters such as assertion, belief, correspondence with fact etc.. It has, however, its own coherency and systematic connections—a coherency to be determined by reference to the aesthetic product's own internal structure and not by reference to any external object as in the case of ordinary thinking. It is coherency of imagination which distinguishes it from dream or reverie, and bestows upon the aesthetic object a unity and a harmony of parts all its own which in their turn are responsible for the instantaneous pleasure obtained by looking at a picture or hearing a song. Not only so, imagination is also controlled by thinking, the artist is aware that he is imagining and is thereby enabled to know when his imagination does good work and where it goes wrong. But his experience is of course integral in which he is not aware of this distinction between imagining and thinking. As for self-awareness, appeal must once more be made to introspection which bears out the fact that the span of apprehension is not limited to only one thing at a time. Nothing prevents me, while I am contemplating a picture, from having the marginal and concomitant consciousness that I am so contemplating. It is said that such self-consciousness interferes with my enjoyment of the picture and the pleasure to be derived from it, that it is a lapse from pure aesthetic experience. Nothing can be farther from the truth.

1. See the section on freedom towards the end of this chapter for one more explanation of Keats's dictum.

Concentration of mind upon the object is indispensable for any kind of intellectual work, of course; but it seems to me that the paradox of hedonism is peculiarly weak when applied to aesthetic enjoyment. For in this case consciousness of the pleasure that is being enjoyed and of oneself as enjoying it intensifies that pleasure, especially as the emotional zest or sentiment is to be savoured, deliberately rolled in the mind, as it were, and relished, so that it may yield its full content of juice.

Thus the cognitive element plays no mean part in aesthetic activity. It is as necessary for aesthetic contemplation as it is for aesthetic production. At the same time, however, it must be remembered that the concepts of truth and falsity are not relevant to the imagining activity as such. Whether the artistic representation is "real" or "unreal," "true" or "false," is a question which has no meaning in connexion with art. The imaginary does not exclude the real, but it has a "reality" and a "truth" of its own which need not coincide with reality and truth. The artist himself is not aware that he is embodying any "truth" in his art. For imagination which is indifferent to truth and falsity is a more primary form of mental activity than logical thinking and is presupposed by it. Secondly, the thought-values that we have pleaded for in art are not its aesthetic values. They may be necessary for great art; they may as a matter of fact exist in all significant art; but in themselves they are *different* from the aesthetic values.

14. The psychological implications of self-expression as well as the logical or cognitive implications of the formal control of emotion have been considered so far. It remains to say a word about expression itself. The question is often debated whether the work of art is a translation, for purposes of communication, of a previously existing imaginative experience which was perfect and self-complete in itself, or whether the experience itself is "discovered" or "revealed" to the artist in and through the act of self-expression. Professor Lascelles Abercrombie takes the first view while the weighty authority of Prof. Alexander supports the second. According to the first, a poem, as a self-complete inspiration, exists and pre-exists its actual expression in the mind of the poet. It is hard to believe this unless one interprets poetic inspiration as an excitement about the subject-matter which fills and over-flows the poet's soul, and

which may contain a tentative and inchoate outline—far from being perfect or self-complete—of what the poet wants to say. The poet need not entirely be "inspired" in the sense that the "many-coloured experience with all its complex passion," which we call the poem, "flashes" "into complete single existence" in his mind. He may think and think about what he wishes to say, and even make his own notes! But in any case it is certain that poetic experience is different from this previously existing state of excitement or exuberance even as containing the vague outline of what the poet wishes to say. For what he does say in the poem, full as it is of fair images and fanciful conceits and felicities of expression, is entirely different from the hazy outline which may have formed itself in his mind before. This latter may have been struggling for expression indeed—and that is what is meant by artistic emotion—but what is actually expressed—in response to this impulse—is concretely different from it. And this actual expression in words and images is what is meant by poetic experience, in which, it is necessary to note, the original excitement still continues till the poem is completed. It may not only add to the original outline, or subtract from it, develop it, deepen it, or in any way modify and alter it; it entirely clothes that skeleton with flesh and blood and creates a living and breathing form out of it. It—together with the artistic excitement—is the spirit which broods over the bones to infuse life and motion into them.

Note, however, what happens. With every act of expression, a new thought, a new conceit, a new image or a new phrase, which the poet had not thought of before, surges—shall we say, emerges—into his imagination. Alexander therefore calls the artist's work a process of "discovery" or "revelation" to the artist himself. In a sense of course it is, especially as each new image leaps into existence before his mind; but it is a little unkind to say of these little, blithe and lissom creatures that they are "wrung out of" the poet. Far truer were it to say that they "spring" from out of his heart; they are created by the artist especially as it is by the *contemplation of what is already said or expressed* that the new thought or image or expression emerges. Hence the work of art is not exactly a "discovery" or "revelation" but a "creative emergence," from the standpoint of the product, or a "creative self-expression," from that of the

artist. The gift vouchsafed to the poet or the musician, for instance, is "That out of three sounds he frame not a fourth sound but a star."

15. Expression and form, we have seen, are ultimately one. Expression includes the various devices of art such as rhythm, symmetry etc., the excellences (in poetry) of decorative language, of diction, idiom and of decorative ideas. It is unnecessary to discuss these elements of expression in this connection. But what, we may ask, is the aim of them all in poetry or other arts? They may be said to help the concentration of attention upon the work of art and its steady maintenance. They also secure the unity of artistic design truly pleasurable in a work of art. Above all, they are intended to heighten the emotional zest underlying the work. After all, the art product is appreciated for its value, and expression is the embodiment of value. But this value or significance may be of different types. The work may emphasise the interest of the story or the subject-matter primarily; or it may aim at embellishments and ornamentation, charm and grace of expression, imaginative flights and conceits; or, finally, it may intend to express the governing emotion and the sentiment emerging from it. All the three meanings again may either be indirectly suggested or directly expressed. The direct meaning may be either the literal meaning of the words (in a poem, for instance), or its secondary, figurative, allegorical significance, or finally, what is logically and necessarily implied by them. Direct expression in any case thus appears to be equivalent to what has been called implication in these pages. The suggested meaning, on the contrary, is identical with what has been discussed under the name of presupposition. It is unnecessary to discuss this distinction again between implication and presupposition which has been attempted elsewhere, but it is clear that in aesthetic values, presupposition is more important than implication. It is not what a work of art tells us directly or by implication, *i. e.*, by logically necessary connection, that is aesthetically significant or pleasing or that will engage the attention of the spectator or the reader. There is no room for imagination or imputation of values in these cases. When Antonio concludes at the end of every one of his counter-claims for Caesar that "Brutus is an honourable man" and "they are all, all honourable men," or when the little cottage girl, after

enumerating the two brothers that at Conway dwelt, and the two that were gone to sea, and *the two of them that in the church-yard lay* still 'innocently declares, "We are seven," it is neither the directly conveyed nor the logically implied sense that brings out the irony and impeachment in the one case, and the overwhelming pathos of innocence in the other. It is the *suggested* sense, the sense *imagined* by the speaker or the hearer as appropriate to the occasion, that transmits in such cases the delicate nuances and shades of emotional life. Such meaning is fused with the outer expression of a work of art by presupposition, using this term now in a wide sense so as to include suggested meanings of all kinds—suggested by contiguity in time and place, by similarity, by contrast, or by individual, common, natural, artificial, or conventional association of ideas. In any case, what is suggested is a zest, and it is the zest that is the presupposition of artistic expression. Expression, then, should aim at suggestion of this kind. The expression is best and sweetest when the underlying meaning is not expressed. The highest art is to conceal art. The expressed beauties are sweet indeed but the unexpressed are sweeter far. Consider, for instance, that non-pareil of poetic beauty;—

"A blank, my lord. She never told her love,
"But let concealment, like a worm i' the bud
"Feed on her damask cheek: she pin'd in thought,
"And with a green and yellow melancholy
"She sat like Patience on a monument,
"Smiling at grief."

—Shakespeare.

Who would say that the significance or the beauty of the lines consists in what the words bear on their face? Dissect the beauty of thought and language here as you will; still you cannot account for their enchantment.

Suggestiveness, as noticed above, may relate (in a work of art) to the element of fact or thought, to the element of imaginative grace and charm of expression, or finally, to an emotional zest. While suggestiveness of any kind has greater aesthetic value than explicitness of expression, suggestiveness of sentiment marks the highest kind of art, because it affords the keenest and subtlest pleasure and gives rise to the truest perception of beauty. For sentiment is the soul of poesy and song, and it

is relished most zestfully when it breaks in upon the mind through suggestion. "The thing is to direct the attention of the spectator in such a manner," says Matisse with reference to painting, "that he concentrates on the picture but *thinks of anything but the particular object which we have wished to paint*, to detain him without embarrassing him, to lead him to experience the quality of the sensation expressed."¹ Suggestiveness of subject-matter and imaginative grace and decorativeness of style are not unimportant, but their main function is to be the feeders of sentiment. A work of art may lack in many of the outer graces and qualities of style, but if its emotional *quale* rings true, it has achieved its end as a work of art. For "beauty unadorned is most adorned." Such beauty touches the soul, and is the condition of the existence of the other kinds of aesthetic value.

There is one other significant feature of expression which requires short notice. It is generally assumed that expression of emotional life is the same in all people, and so we have formal laws of interpretation of expression in terms of emotional significance. But is it not just possible that different natures prevailing in different men, their modes of expression of their inner life should also be different?² Suppose for one moment that humanity was really divided into three classes in accordance with Plato's scheme, the first class governed by gold, the second by silver, and the third by iron and copper, and that these qualities were inheritable. The difference in their respective natures would show itself not only in their capacities to follow different occupations of life, as Plato thinks, but also in their outward behaviour, carriage, manners, tastes, and, above all, in the mode of expression of their feelings. Plato himself suggests, for instance, that the guardians--members of the first class--ought not to be given to violent fits of laughter but must exercise moderation and restraint upon their expression of feelings. Where the people of the third class would display their anger by violent gestures, clenching of fists etc., those of the first would manifest the same emotion but by the contraction of their eye-brows or perhaps by lowering their eyes in silence.

1. Quoted by Herbert Read in *The Meaning of Art*, p. 157 (italics mine)

2. I owe this suggestion to my friend Mr. N. S. N. Sastry, of the Department of Psychology, Mysore University.

Expression of feelings then assumes different forms in different people, and it becomes exceedingly difficult to interpret such expressions by recourse to a common set of canons. What is needed in such a case is a thorough study of the different natures of men good, bad and indifferent, and of the mode of expression of their emotional life in each case. Such a study is bound to throw considerable light on many a dark corner of aesthetic expression.

Art in its intention, it was shown, is not necessarily connected with beauty. We have taken a long step to examine art as an activity, both in its origin and progress, and at the end of it all, we must once again ask the question: Is this activity necessarily connected with the production of beauty? We need hardly answer the question in the negative. In origin, art is born as a mode of escape from the stress and strain of emotional and imaginative life, and the thought of beauty is farthest from the artist's mind. We may even say that this escape from the tyranny of emotion and the monotony of imagination is the motive of the artist, and then self-expression would be the means of realising it. Neither the end nor the means has any necessary relation to beauty. Nor is art more intimately connected with beauty when considered as a process of construction or creation. For then it is concerned with the "en-forming" of the inner emotional experience of the artist, with the critically *i.e.*, consciously, controlled objective expression of his emotional reactions. By such embodiment of his inner life, the artist, whose inner being would otherwise be liable to serious disintegration or disruption, has his equilibrium restored in his organism. By such embodiment, he is coming back to the earth and enabled to renew his contact with the work-a-day world with sanity and tolerance. And what is logically responsible for restoring his equilibrium is the fact that the artist, by means of his embodiment, realises or actualises the ideal in a true sense. The realisation of perfect love between man and woman, for instance, may be possible only in a story, a play, or in a poem or song, or in colour or marble. None the less it is realisation, and the artist who has produced the play or the song or the statue obtains as good a satisfaction, if not as great, as if he had realised the love in his personal experience. That is what reintegrates his centrifugal impulses round the form which

is the spatialisation of his emotional nuances, and that is what enables him to taste the emotional juice or zest. But, in all this, *i.e.*, while the work is in process of construction or has even found completion, there is no experience of beauty for the artist who is concerned only with the most appropriate way of embodying his felt value. For some reason or other, the work may actually turn out to be ugly, but that is an entirely different matter which does not, and cannot, annul the process of equilibrium restoration and the consequent pleasure to the artist, for ugly or beautiful, the work is an embodiment still of a felt value. The process of artistic creation in short consists in the perception of sensible qualities and the arrangement of them under a pleasing form, and so far the question of beauty simply does not arise.

16. Let us now consider our third question: what is art as an achievement, what is the product of this activity?

It is here, if anywhere, that the question of beauty arises, but not even here necessarily. The question is pertinent only from the point of view of the spectator. (And the artist himself, after the completion of his work, may turn spectator and re-live the whole experience). What happens when a person contemplates a portrait, for instance? First, the form as a whole—in its unity and entirety, as a picture—probably strikes his mind. And it generates its own peculiar pleasure. Without thinking of beauty or ugliness as yet, let us suppose that the portrait has attained a sufficient degree of formal perfection, and naturally it should produce instantaneous pleasure. One criterion of good art is that, as already pointed out, the form (which in the case of the artist was achieved last) should first and immediately strike the spectator and produce in him a thrill of pleasurable emotion. No one contemplates a picture for long and then declares he is pleased. On the basis of this first pleasurable emotion, imagination begins to work in the mind of the spectator who thereupon tries to represent to himself the possible situation depicted in the picture. It seems to be the common opinion among writers on aesthetics that the subject-matter of art, the

story, the fact, the event, the person, or whatever it is that a picture is supposed to represent — the question arises particularly with reference to representative arts — is absolutely unimportant and irrelevant to the appreciation of the aesthetic value of the work. Aesthetic appreciation, the highbrows hold, should base itself upon the ability to appreciate the formal relations of line, curve and colour, the principles of unity, symmetry, imaginative grace etc., present in a work of art, and should not ask: what is this about? or what does it represent? I sympathise with this attitude myself, for after all our main interest in the contemplation of a work of art is intelligent enjoyment of the work *as art* and not as story, or history, or biography, or anything else. At the same time I am tempted to think that knowledge of the subject-matter is not entirely irrelevant to, but in a great measure aids, appreciation. I am tempted to think that this impatience with those who ask what a picture is about — impatience because connoisseurs in art may be supposed to know already what classical pictures are about! — involves a vicious and impossible abstraction of the given in perception from its construction by the mind, an abstraction as vicious and impossible as the one which Prof. Moore asks us to perform when he bids us imagine the two worlds, the one a world of entire beauty, the other a world of unrelieved ugliness, in connection with his method of isolation. Poetry and the drama are great arts precisely on account of this reason, amongst others, *viz.*, that by enabling us to apprehend the subject-matter dealt with, they enable us to appreciate and enjoy them most fully. Supposing that an *entirely unfamiliar* play was presented on the stage as a *pantomime* even before a most cultivated audience — one would like to know what would be its appreciation!¹ But even here we are allowing too much. For by their gesture and acting the actors would reveal to the audience the different situations they were trying to represent! Strictly to test one's powers of artistic appreciation, poets should write on nothing in particular, and readers should make no intelligible sense out of what they read! If meaning is thus indis-

1. I do not of course suggest that here is a reason why silent movies have disappeared giving place to talkies! But it is one of the reasons for the extreme difficulty often felt in appreciating and enjoying the art of Indian Classical Dance (Bharta Nāṭya) which is highly symbolical.

pensable for appreciation, where shall we draw the line? What are the logical or philosophical grounds for dissociating natural, *i.e.*, conventional, meaning¹ from associative meaning? If extra-aesthetic meaning is taboo, what becomes of the contention that poetry and art in general give us a profound insight into life and truth? The situation depicted must at any rate be intelligible to the spectator. Should we not have a more certain standard for judging the "faithfulness" of a representation—Irving's acting of Macbeth's part, for instance—if we knew whose representation it was we were witnessing? How otherwise shall we judge the "truth" of a character?

It is clear therefore that the line between aesthetic meaning and material meaning is a thin one and the one shades off into the other. But it will be shown presently that there are deeper aesthetic grounds for assigning an important place to situation and subject-matter in aesthetic appreciation.

17. On the first excitement of a pleasurable emotion on beholding a picture, the spectator, it was said, concentrates on the picture and tries to imagine the possible situation depicted in it. That naturally releases his emotions. "Empathy," sympathetic insight, imputation,—call it what you will, there is a power in the spectator which leads him to visualise the meaning of the picture and to feel with it or into it. Successful imagination releases the emotions and the spectator begins to experience the situation in himself, the lover's experience, let us say. This is the danger point, as it were, in the process of contemplation. It is said that a great king who was a devotee of Sri Rāma was having the Rāmāyaṇa read out to him. When he heard how Sita had been carried away by Rāvaṇa, the tyrant of Lanka, and how Rāmachandra grieved for her, the pious king was so deeply moved to tears for the sake of Sri Rāma that he immediately sprang up and ordered his Commander-in-chief to muster all his state's forces and forthwith proceed against Lanka! It must be pointed out here that neither for the artist nor for the spectator is it absolutely necessary to experience the emotion in their own being, although this would secure sincerity and genuineness of feeling and facilitate to a great extent their respective functions of art creation and appreciation. Sincerity, however, need not necessarily be a virtue resulting from a felt emotion alone. It

1. *Vide* the Chapter on Intellectual Value.

may be secured even if the artist or the contemplator could only sympathetically *imagine* the situation and, if they cannot feel the emotion, at least imagine themselves into it, or as affected by it. We must bear in mind the shaping power of an intense imagination to body forth the forms of things unknown. It is not possible to suppose, for instance, that Shakespeare felt all the varied emotions of his numerous characters in his own breast. The result, however, whether of experience of emotion or of exercise of imagination, is the same. To proceed with contemplation. The disturbance of bodily and mental equilibrium in the contemplator results in the diffusion of his muscular and nervous energy which immediately calls for re-adjustment. Left to itself, it may work itself out to exhaustion or, (what more often happens), find re-adjustment in the performance of some appropriate activity in the external world. Just at this juncture, however, the saving grace of art begins to show itself, if, that is, the contemplator happens to be blessed with the artistic capacity. The emotional excitement in his breast is set to form, so to say, by the realisation of the perfect form of the picture. There is no attempt at analysis here—that would be to give up the aesthetic attitude for the intellectual. As Matisse says, "The problem for us has become that of keeping up the intensity of the canvas whilst getting near to verisimilitude. Ideally the spectator allows himself, without knowing it, to be engaged by the mechanism of the picture."¹

What happens to the contemplator in such an appreciation of form? This is the heart of aesthetic appreciation and the point of possible contact between art and beauty.

The appreciation of the formal elements in a work of art such as rhythm, proportion, order, symmetry, balance, unity-in-variety, colour, brightness, grace etc., requires the unimpeded free flow of attention upon the work. The contemplator has to realise how the artist was confronted with a particular situation,—a situation involving the play of a dominant impulse, a governing emotion—what particular phase, form or mood of that emotion he has chosen to represent, and how, through what particular arrangement of line, curve and colour, light and shade, environment and circumstance, he has sought to express that phase in every salient feature of the work. The permanent motif may be

1. Quoted by Herbert Read in *The Meaning of Art* : p. 157.

love, for instance. Is it love in union, or love in separation, or love without fruition, that the artist has selected for representation? What are the principal and exciting, and the stimulating and accessory, causes of this love, as the artist has conceived them? How is it manifested—through side-long glances, or smiles, or feigned frowns, or blushes? And through what formal arrangements have these effects been sought to be embodied? Thus, almost unknown to himself, the spectator concentrates his mind on the mechanism of the picture, following in imagination every movement of the artist's hand, every stroke of his brush, re-creating the picture, in short, for himself.

While contemplation—and concentration—are thus in process, there takes place a metamorphosis in the contemplator's being. The energies and impulses which on the first excitement were getting diffused and frittered away now begin to re-integrate themselves round the perception of form. The feelings originally released are now heightened, tautened and braced up. Release is followed by quiet re-collection. The organism as a whole is reintegrated into a new unity or wholeness which even in its normal condition it does not always possess. The contemplator is taking on the mood of the artist when the latter was engaged in his work. He is attaining the state of equilibrium or equipoise—both of body and of mind. The cognitive, the affective and the conative capacities, the energies of the mind, of the heart and of the body, are all strengthened, sharpened, and matched against one another in a perfectly balanced manner. The individual in this condition is like the cat lying in wait for the mouse—perfectly serene and reposed in its outward form, but with intense vitality coursing through every one of its veins, unattached to any one impulse in particular, but preserving free play to every one as the occasion may arise, responsive to the least noise, as ready to spring on its prey if sighted as to run away from danger if scented. The individual is truly detached during these moments, detached from his desires, loves and hates of normal life, from his obsessions and idiosyncrasies. He is from himself set free. His personality is liberated. And he may be said to have recovered the pristinely pure and free condition native to a child or unsophisticated person, with this difference, *viz.*, that while the child's condition is one of innocence and ignorance, the contemplator's is one of transcendence with knowledge.

For even in this condition, he does not lose consciousness of body or control over it. The disturbances of the body and the agitations of the thinking principle have been overcome and the mind attains clarity and illumination through single-pointedness. No passivity but intense activity, no canalisation but centralisation, *concentration* of powers, no division but systematisation ---this is the characteristic state of aesthetic experience at its best, the state of unified consciousness or integral being. It is indeed a transcendental state.

It is the state which may be called "intuition" and which was referred to in the chapter on Intellectual Value. In it there is a unification of every aspect of consciousness and being. While in ordinary life each aspect works alone sundered from the others insomuch that where the head is present the heart is not, and where the heart is alive the head is inert, and where both are active the hand is slow, in this state of unified being or integral consciousness the intellectual, the emotional and the practical capacities are all simultaneously awake and stirring with the result that, under the conditions of peace and tranquility that now prevail, there breaks in upon the soul a state of direct apprehension, immediate experience or *illumination*, in which the realities of things are revealed as they are. Such a state may either *originate* new knowledge or *confirm* and *ratify* knowledge acquired by other means. While aesthetic intuition, at its best, gives us fresh knowledge, intellectual intuition but confirms our old knowledge. The completion of aesthetic intuition lies, however, in mystic experience.

It follows that the individual, withdrawn from his normal passions and predilections which render him a slave to external objects, is in this state regaining his true individuality as distinguished from those objects. There is no question of identifying himself with the object contemplated, much less of merging himself in it. He just contemplates it, but he is disinterested in his interestedness. Conscious of his re-collected personality, he is impersonal in his attitude towards the object. Above all, the emotion with which he started is now being generalised, universalised. It is checked in its onward rushing course, and spread over the whole form of the work of art, so to say. It is recognised as it is and for what it is, it is tranquilised by the equilibrium coming over the being of the contemplator, and in this trans-

formed state, it is, as described earlier, *tasted*. It becomes a zest or sentiment having its own peculiar flavour, and the zest is leisurely held in the palate, so to say, and enjoyed. In such a state of equilibrium and tasting of sentiment, beauty is ascribed to the work of art.

18. We have at long last sighted the countenance of beauty in art. A work of art, we say, possesses beauty when in its presence we are transported out of this mundane world of everyday matter of fact into a transcendental realm of purity, integrity, power and bliss—a realm of balance, in short. The balance is certainly in the being of the contemplator, but it must be remembered that it will not result unless there is a corresponding balance in the work of art also. Otherwise the subjective balance may be produced by any kind of work, and then beauty would have no objective reference whatever. Herein consists, it would appear, the truth of Aristotle's theory of catharsis in tragedy. There is an element of purgation in tragedy: what is purely individual or eccentric in one's emotional life is purged away; but, more importantly, there is an element of purification in so far as the emotional life is systematised and re-integrated, on a higher level, with the rest of one's personality. The individual feels himself refreshed, re-invigorated, after undergoing a truly aesthetic experience. But, it is necessary to observe, this resuscitation is not opposed to the resumption, on the part of the individual, of his normal duties of life. On the contrary, it fits him all the better to discharge them. The higher does not negate the lower but involves and ennobles it. Art ennobles life. It produces sanity and tolerance of outlook on life. This is the difference between artistic experience and such experiences as catalepsy, swooning, dreaming etc., which enervate the individual and unfit him for life.

19. The disinterestedness and liberation of personality attained in art have, however, a deeper significance. When the whole being of the contemplator is thus for the time being at least equipoised and stabilised, he perceives the mind and heart of the artist in his own being, and the emotion which animated the artist is reflected in his own consciousness. Enough has been said already about this reflected emotion. But, it is necessary to insist, unless this reflection of feeling occurs in the contemplator accompanied by the equilibrium on the one hand,

and the tasting of the emotion on the other, there is no beauty in the work of art. Now as regards the tasting. This is what is called aesthetic pleasure proper. \ It is to be distinguished from the ordinary pleasure of the senses on the one hand, than which it is higher, and the bliss of the mystic on the other, than which it is lower. It is also to be differentiated from the aesthetic pleasure which is excited instantaneously on the perception of an art object. This latter is the pleasure resulting from an apprehension of mere formal perfection in the work and is capable of being enjoyed by any one who has a sense for artistic form. And it is capable of being conveyed by any work which has attained a certain degree of perfection of form, which has, in other words, aimed only at prettiness. True aesthetic pleasure, on the contrary, is the joy of tasting the emotional zest in an equilibrated frame of mind and body. It is the mind and the heart that are equipoised more than the body; the gross material sheaths can no longer act as obstructions to the clear vision and intuition of the soul. Add to this that the eddies of desire and the whirlpools of thought have for the time being subsided, and you have the most favourable conditions for the emergence of a peculiar kind of bliss—of which intense pleasure, peace, contentment, and self-satisfaction are the chief ingredients—out of the calm surface of tranquilised emotion. Pleasure in general, it has been shown, is a state of expansion, elation or elevation of the soul, it is the affective side of the *moreness* of the self. Aesthetic pleasure accordingly elevates the self far above its normal condition, because it is free from worldly disturbances, unobscured by the pall of passion, pure and full of peace. The self, as it were, discovers itself in aesthetic bliss, and discovers that such bliss is of the essence of itself. Keats must have had a glimpse of this truth when he wrote "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever." It is a perennial joy because it brings about preternatural peace. The drawbacks of this joy, however, are that it is impermanent—lasting only for brief moments—and conditioned. It is 'conditioned by the fact that it is enjoyable only through the reflection of emotion. Pure in itself, *i.e.*, as bliss, it is refracted through, and broken up by, the prism of emotional states, and is naturally coloured by them. \ Shelley had an intuition of this truth. \ Using "art" he might have said that

"Art like a dome of many-coloured glass
Stains the white radiance of Eternity."

Further, such bliss can be given only by the very highest art—art which is great and noble and elevating in its influence. And it can be enjoyed only by the exceptionally gifted. Under these conditions, even pain, in itself distasteful, becomes, as in tragedy, a source of purifying delight. There is no feeling or emotion indeed which cannot thus be turned into its appropriate zest or sentiment and made to yield its proper delight in art. A perfect fit of anger¹ in the wife may—in the eyes of the aesthetically-gifted husband who contemplates it—appear perfectly delightful—and therefore beautiful! If only more husbands and wives were endowed with this gift, or could exercise it more constantly in their relations with each other at home than in theatres and art-galleries, three-fourths of the tragedy of family life would disappear! But the exercising of the aesthetic capacity in *such* connections in life demands a self-control and discipline of the soul which are extra-aesthetic and can be acquired only as the fruits of a long course of cultivation of *moral* powers. Here is one explanation of the supremacy of morals over art!

20. Where exactly then does beauty appear in art? Not in the process of creation, not indeed as the ideal of the artist. The artist aims at producing beauty only at his peril. He is preoccupied with his theme—excited by his subject-matter. He is possessed with a vision and he feels an imperious necessity to express it at all costs—beauty or no beauty. It is only work produced under such inward pressure that possesses fire, genuineness of feeling, sincerity, conviction—and, therefore, let us add, beauty. For then it would possess beauty not from intention but from unconscious expression of the artist. And it is only when the contemplator—and the artist may himself turn contemplator—contemplates the picture (let us say) and is not merely pleased with the form of it but also recognises and tastes the emotional zest it embodies and discerns the imaginative in-

1. A perfect fit of real, natural anger, of course, is not an expression of art and so cannot ordinarily evoke aesthetic experience. But I am wondering why we should not cultivate an artistic attitude even towards the things of real life, why life should not be made more and more into art. The capacity so to transform it marks, I am suggesting, the greatness of the moral man.

sight it reveals (both of which are possible only under conditions of equilibrium above described), that he ascribes beauty to the work.¹ This consummation is the result partly of great merit in the picture and partly of great aesthetic capacity in the beholder—capacity to imagine the emotional meaning of the picture and ascribe value to it. This further stage, therefore, may or may not supervene upon the first stage of formal appreciation in the case of any given contemplator of a work of art. If it does not, this is either because the work itself is insipid—there is no *expression* in its countenance—or the contemplator has not the capacity. Even a work of merit then contains only the *condition*—only one condition at that—of the appearance of beauty; this beauty itself being a property emergent out of the relation of contemplation of the work by an interested and qualified subject.

21. This rather longish investigation into the nature and process of art has convinced us that art has no necessary connection with beauty. Beauty is only from the standpoint of the philosopher, the art critic, the contemplator, and consists, as said above, in the perception and appreciation of the emotional insight embodied in the work of art. It is not necessary that all contemplators should perceive the same meaning in a work of art. Provided that the contemplator possesses the gift of imagination—the power of revealing or of realising ever-new aspects of radiance and delight—a gift which the artist has also brought to bear upon the work—the work can yield different meanings to different persons. The beauty of a work then depends upon what we ourselves “do to” it. It depends upon what ideals of life we are devoted to, what delicate nuances of emotion we appreciate, what particular forms of expression we are accustomed to. The Greeks worshipped the ideals of power and sensuous perfection, the Orientals sought for the divine orientation of the human outlook and held that

1. It is this inseparable union between emotional value (truth) and aesthetic excellence (beauty) in art experience that led Keats, perhaps, to imagine that truth and beauty were simply the obverse and the reverse of the one same fact, *viz.* the object contemplated.

compassion for suffering is the highest kind of sentiment in art.¹ A "merry" race maintained that tragedy is the highest art; a so-called "pessimistic" people believed that a drama should always have an auspicious ending. And so on. If a particular form does not induce the necessary equilibrium in a person, if a certain sentiment fails to secrete its proper juice in his aesthetic palate, and to evoke the bliss of his soul, the work will have no beauty for him, and the absence of beauty in it in such a case would be as real and authentic a fact as the simultaneous presence of beauty in it to another person who can be affected in the particular ways described. This is the paradox of beauty. Beauty of this kind, however, should be distinguished from the ordinary type of beauty associated with the perception of formal perfection and the enjoyment of the pleasure it yields—the first stage of aesthetic experience, in short. Every work of art, worth the name, will possess a technical perfection of its own—as to the relationships of its line and curve, mass and space, shape and other formal qualities. The test of this skill in formal perfection is its capacity to evoke instantaneous pleasure—to "give the thrill"—in the beholder—there is no other. And in consequence we ordinarily say that a face which gives this kind of thrill is beautiful and one which does not, ugly. That is, the ugly in this context is that which is poor in proportion and relationships. This is the first type of ugliness. But pleasure of this kind is incredibly ephemeral. Probably a second or a third look will fail to evoke it again, for the perfection here may only be of the surface, and the face may be found to be insipid—devoid of the soul of emotional expression. Or, the emotion expressed may not be of the great, significant and enduring kind, it may be trivial, petty, transient. Such perfection and technical elaboration I call, not beauty, but only artistic value—loveliness or prettiness. It is vague, inchoate and indeterminate in its kind, for the beholder merely feels the thrill and is unable to apprehend the exact nature of the object that gives him the pleasure, or the reason why he feels pleased. Upon this stage of artistic value-indetermination, however, there arises the determinate stage of aesthetic beauty, described above, which is relatively more permanent and stable, revealing ever-new aspects of delight

1. Cf. Shelley: "Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought."

and bliss, reflecting ever-fresh rays of emotional radiance. This is true beauty, beauty in the aesthetic philosophic sense, and from its standpoint, there is nothing that is really ugly, *i. e.*, that, having these possibilities of emotional expressiveness, can still be called ugly. There may be only differences in the degree of expressiveness, but such differences would still fall within the pale of beauty proper. A work of this kind can be more or less beautiful, but never ugly. In its form subserves the play of emotional light and shade. The pattern is not perfected for the sake of the pattern. The pattern grows and develops under the dominating guidance of emotional insight which it systematises and objectifies. Pattern is important in art, but only because it is the pattern of a certain emotion, it is the voice of emotion. Art is indeed "significant form," but the form is significant only of the emotion. Then alone is form "beautiful." Such a work may *sometimes* be lacking in pleasing proportion and relationships, as Browning's poetry often is. Nevertheless it may be truly expressive, and hence possess real beauty. True ugliness—and this is ugliness of the second type—is insipidity, inexpressiveness, stupidity, or it is the expression of a trivial, petty and passing emotion—not of one great, significant and enduring—as, for instance, the emotion evoked in connection with one's own portmanteau. An old woman's wrinkled face, rugged and ill-sounding lines in poetry, harshness of utterance or of features, are not necessarily ugly—they may be tingling with emotional tones. There is an Indian proverb which is to the effect that every child is lovely to its mother, and every mate to the married. This, I conceive, is the sum of all aesthetic wisdom and philosophy. Nothing better or truer was ever said regarding beauty. When a child has grown dear to its parents, when the life-partner has, through long years of devotion and sharing of common joys and sorrows, literally become your better half, who has eyes for the attraction of the physical features or the lack of it? It is the delicate nuances of feeling and heart-beats, the look of utter devotion and love of the partner, the alertness with which the partner studies every want of yours and tries to fulfil it, the readiness of the response of sentiment to sentiment, deed to deed, in short, the expression of the emotional life in every nerve and fibre of their being to which the partners have long been accustomed in each other

and which has thrilled them again and again and given them constant pleasure,—the revelation of mind and character, in other words—it is this which constitutes the beauty of each to each, more than the beauty of outward form. It is this which unites the partners' hearts with the silken cords of love and keeps them eternal lovers seeing nothing but beauty in each other. Again, it is the child's yearning cry for the mother, its look of happy contentment on seeing her, of utter dependence upon her, its sparkling laughter, its spontaneous bewitching smile, its playful pranks—it is these which fasten the lively child to the mother's breast with the velvet clasp of tenderness and makes her see nothing but beauty in its features.

Whether there are things which are absolutely inexpressive in this sense is more than I can say; my own belief is, there may be. But the point is, a work of art is not ugly simply because one cannot feel the delicate emotional nuances it expresses. It may be a case of unacquaintance with a people's philosophy of life or modes of expression, or lack of sympathy for them; or it may be a case of what Bosanquet calls "difficult beauty." Nor can we compare the art products of one race, age or country with those of another race, age or country and pronounce comparative aesthetic judgments upon them. The work of an artist can be comparatively estimated only by the contemporaries of his own race. This does not exclude, however, the possibility of works which may have universal appeal during all ages.

The difference between artistic value and beauty may be said to be analogous to the difference in the intellectual sphere between knowledge and truth, and in the moral sphere between outward correctness or propriety of conduct and inward integrity and cordiality of moral impulse, or between goodness of consequences and rightness of conduct. This latter may be rough-hewn in expression but solid gold in worth. There was nothing of the bear in Dr. Johnson except his outside. Where however, the exterior perfection of form and the inward grace of beauty happen to unite in one and the same object, as not unoften happens, we have, not mere human beauty, but something wondrous, almost divine in character, superb, splendid, sublime. I call it superbness or splendour or sublimity for lack of a better term. Its logical opposite, what has neither formal pleasingness nor real expressiveness, may as a third type

of ugliness be called ugly in the absolute sense, but this conception is only of theoretic importance.

22. Employing the term "beauty," however, in its ideal sense to denote this synthesis of formal perfection and perfection of suggestiveness, we may define beauty as the satisfaction derived from the appreciation of the conformity of the formal suggestiveness of a work of art with the emotional content or suggestiveness enjoyed by a mind in the state of equilibrium induced by it.

Beauty! A word that associates itself equally with the Himalayas, the Taj, a line of Shakespeare, the music of Mozart or of Thyāgarāja, a picture of palms, a butterfly, the statue of Venus or of Natarāja, is indeed difficult to define, and the definition itself may not be beautiful. It is enough, however, if the definition offered is scientific. There is nothing in the above definition which has not been discussed before. As in the case of other values, beauty is also, when realised, primarily a form of satisfaction. Of what impulse it is the satisfaction has already been indicated in brief and will be considered further below in connection with the emergence of aesthetic value. Beauty again is an emergent out of the interrelation between the appreciating subject and the object appreciated. Here, however, a little analysis will help us to determine the relative positions of the different factors involved. "Formal suggestiveness" includes the suggestive possibilities inherent in stylisation, technical perfection, harmonious relationships, as well as in imaginative splendour, fanciful conceits, felicities of phrase and expression—every kind of excellence, in short, which conduces to the perfection of form and thereby renders it plastic and pliable enough for the expression of value. This is, of course, perfection of the work of art as such, *i.e.*, as an external object existing in time and space. But *what* value or values it expresses as a matter of fact, does not, as we have seen, entirely depend upon the work of art as such, but largely upon the imaginative and sympathetic powers of the contemplator. A work of art does not express a single uniform meaning to all people, but suggests ever-new aspects of charm to different persons. But it will be based upon a governing emotion which it is particularly adapted to express in and through the play of minor collateral

meanings. "Emotional content" thus includes all varieties and shades of emotional value clustering round a dominant sentiment as well as the emotional revelation of the artist's vision, outlook or views on life, society, man, nature or God, which we have subsumed under the term "emotional insight." Such a content, we have said, is the mind of a work of art, but it does not exist in the work itself, as its colours and lines exist in a picture. It is imputed to the work by the contemplator. Nevertheless the work should contain features which can appropriately bear such imputation. Lofty and well-built columns in the picture of a temple, for instance, seem to bear their burden lightly because they can properly bear such imputation. Thus the suggestiveness of form, in order to result in beauty, needs to conform to and fuse with the value-content suggested to the mind of the contemplator and this happens only when the suggestiveness is such as to induce in the contemplator the equilibrium already described. Where on the contrary the form suggests a meaning which does not accord well with the content yielded by the work as a whole, there is no beauty but ugliness, because discord, not equilibrium, will prevail in the personality of the contemplator in such a case. In music, for instance, it often happens that a piece, whose sentiment can be effectively expressed only in a particular musical mode or melody-mould, is composed or sung in a different mode which by itself suggests a different sentiment altogether. The song then becomes thoroughly ugly, and the effect upon the listener's mind is perfectly disintegrating. It is like the temple of God being discovered to be a bazaar or barracks inside! This is a fourth case of ugliness.

There are, however, other cases to be considered which relate, not to the work of art as such primarily, but to its relation to the contemplator. If the contemplator imagines a meaning which the work cannot appropriately bear, or if he imputes to it a collateral significance which is incompatible with its keynote, or if he fails to vibrate sympathetically with the main zest embodied in it which he still perceives, then to that extent the work will fail to appear beautiful to the person concerned. The fault is not in the work which will suggest its proper content to somebody else who can appreciate it. All the same, to the person who fails to appreciate it, because he is incapable of

enjoying the zest embodied in it, it is not beautiful, although its want of beauty is to be ascribed to the contemplator's own aesthetic insensibility. Nevertheless, its having no beauty to him is as much an objective fact as its having beauty to some one else who can appreciate it. Still, it cannot be called ugly, for the party in question perceives a content in it—either a wrong content, or a proper content which fails to appeal to him. The work is simply unbeautiful to him, not ugly. Where a person happens to perceive a wrong content in the work, it is a case of aesthetic illusion—illusion in regard to the perception of aesthetic fact, truth or value. There is again no equilibrium in the being of the contemplator in this case. ,

23. In any case beauty in art involves the conformity of expressiveness with theme, of form with content, to an imagining mind. The imagining mind, in the case of beauty, is not merely one more term superadded to the other two terms, not merely an external agent whose relation to an object determines in general the birth of value. The mind's mode of relatedness in this case is such that it supplies one of the objective terms of the relation itself, *viz.*, the emotional content which is the soul of art but which exists nowhere else than in the perception of the imagining mind! This is true even in the case of such a purely formal and non-representative art like music wherein (apart from the question whether there is any subject-matter besides the tones), as Alexander points out, even the order of the tones as tones, their rise and fall, their harmony, rhythm etc., only exist for the constructive hearing. Imaginative form, emotional content, imagining mind—of these three constituents of beauty, the first two exist in an inalienable relation of dependence upon the third which controls and enjoys them. Each is undetermined in its nature by the others, and each has a value of its own. Form has the value of body; content has the value of mind; and mind has the value of self. But their mode of existence is such that form and content can exist only as enjoyed by mind and the relation that holds between them is truly a co-operative relation in that while each contributes its proper value to the whole, the value of each is properly realised and also considerably enhanced only in the whole in which they exist as parts. And in such a unitary whole, mind is the presupposition of form and content. The perfection of the

relation between the parts is indicated by the "justice" which results from it, *viz.*, the equilibrium described. At the same time, it must also be remembered that the emotional content which is the theme, the soul, of art also plays a very important part. It is in fact the norm applied in art—the standard to which expressiveness has to conform. It is the conformity or otherwise to this standard—the success or failure achieved in embodying this emotional content—that determines to a large extent the birth of beauty or ugliness. Hence, if mind is the presupposition of form and content in the whole called aesthetic experience, as between form and content themselves, content is the presupposition of form, for form exists but to embody content.

After this, nothing more need be said on the question of the status of beauty. Like other values, beauty is a "property," not a quality, imputed to the work of art in the moment of equilibrium as a sign or mark of the ineffable satisfaction felt by the contemplator, or of the "satisfyingness" of the object. But "satisfyingness" is not a quality, but only a relational character, as Alexander reminds us. It is the superimposition upon the object of the satisfaction given by it. Alexander's answer to this question is indeed so perfect in its analysis that one cannot hope to improve upon it and one need hardly reproduce it.

24. It is customary to discuss the question of natural beauty in connection with aesthetic values. But I see no reason why we should specially stress the problem of beauty in nature. The conceptions of truth and goodness in nature are not usually discussed—why then should the beauty of nature? The fact is, these three problems in relation to nature involve metaphysical considerations which cannot profitably be discussed within the limits of their respective chapters in the present volume. So far as nature is regarded as an aesthetic object whose contemplation gives rise to the experience of beauty, the same analysis applies to it as is given here of art products. The question would then arise, not whether nature is beautiful independently of perceiving minds—a meaningless question from our standpoint—but in what sense nature can be regarded as an aesthetic object similar to an art product, and what are its philosophical implications. This question, as I said, must be treated of elsewhere.

25. There now remain but two problems for our consideration—the emergence of aesthetic values and the freedom realised in them. As both of them have been answered already and at some length in our discussion of the three main questions of this chapter, we need only gather our results here. The universe of desire conditioning the genesis of aesthetic values has been variously conceived in the discussion of the theories of artistic motivation. It has been said that the main motive to artistic production is the “inspiration” of the subject-matter, the desire to tell a story or paint a landscape etc.. The desire for communication, others hold, is the dominant motive of the artist. The desire for making something permanent, for play, for sex, all these, severally or collectively, have been at some time or other held to be the mainsprings of art. We may admit that there is some truth in all these theories, and in so far we shall find them useful for our theory. It must, however, be insisted that most of these factors, with the exception of subject-matter, are secondary motives reinforcing the primary one which we have called the impulse to expressive-creativity. The genuine artist is certainly inspired by the subject-matter, a face, a landscape, boats on a river, the memory of a friend, the fortunes of a royal house etc.. Without such inspiration, there would be nothing to exercise his talents upon. But all of us, I suppose, are to a greater or smaller extent inspired by such things in our own way, and yet very few of us are creative artists. Subject-matter then is the presupposition of artistic activity and not its *differentia*. This *differentia* lies in the desire of the artist to express himself, to express his emotional and cognitive reactions to the subject-matter,—by creating a new object representing the subject-matter. This is the dominant universe of desire to which the individual is attached in the field of aesthetic valuation, and all the other motives referred to above are only auxiliary factors. Of course, to the extent that in contemplation we re-construct the art product in imagination and share in the emotional insight of the productive artist or contribute our own light of understanding to the total illumination of the object, we are also expressively creating it. It may be said that this statement of the governing universe of desire in art is true only of representative arts and cannot be applied to non-representative arts like music. It is not possible to open here the question whether music has any subject-matter apart from its

tones, but however much we may regard the tones (the material) themselves as of the essence of music and as identical with the subject-matter—and experience contradicts any other view of the matter—still, we must insist that the tones themselves “represent” some of the profoundest values of the emotional life—solemnity, inexpressible yearning of the spirit for something not known, joyousness, gaiety, faith, hope, piety, devotion, love, peace etc.. In this sense music is also a revelation of the universal.

Communication is not a goading urge of the artist—much less is it what *makes* art, as some have wrongly supposed. It is certainly present in most artists’ minds but only as a secondary desire. But in the sense of “self-communion,” it would express much the same truth as our “self-expression.” And communication is certainly important for the artist in the sense that he wants to communicate to himself what he has objectively expressed in the work of art, in order to determine how far he has succeeded in “redeeming from decay the visitations of the divinity” in himself, and whether he has produced a work of beauty or not. But if communication, in the ordinary sense of the term, be deemed an essential part of art, then it is clear that the medium of expression—in the case of poetry and music, for instance—should be the language best known to the reader or the listener; for—apart from the tones and their value in music—the content or emotional value of a song is bound up with the thoughts and the words in which the thoughts are expressed; and surely the emotional value can be appreciated and enjoyed best only when you understand the language which clothes it. If form is significant of content in art, the form—when reduced to its lowest terms as the language and the thoughts which it embodies—must be one familiar to the appreciator. Otherwise, as already pointed out, ugliness of various kinds may be the result.

26. Thus far the subjective factors in aesthetic causation. What kinds of object are most suitable for artistic representation and what are their qualities? This is a vexed question upon which opinions are divided. There is much to be said for the view that art is no respecter of subject-matters. Provided that the artistic impulse is sound and the artist is dealing with his subject with genuine feeling and sincerity, any kind of subject-matter, it is said, can be treated artistically. Even such a

common and nasty stuff as coal-tar may inspire some one to poetic effusion, as in the following lines :—

"There's hardly a thing that a man can name
 "Of use or beauty in life's small game
 "But you can extract in alembic or jar
 "From the "physical basis" of black coal-tar—
 "Oil and ointment, and wax and wine,
 "And the lovely colours called aniline ;
 "You can make anything from salve to a star,
 "If you only know how, from black coal-tar."¹

This position is theoretically quite sound. But just as, while recognising the theoretical legitimacy of the view that any object may be expressive to some one, we still believe that some objects are not expressive to most of us, here also we must hold that some subject-matters are practically, if not inherently, incapable of receiving adequate artistic treatment. This is not the place to raise the question of art and morality,² but it is clear that there are certain matters—wanton cruelty, animal lust, violent misanthropy, extreme pessimism, etc., which are unsuitable for art. We agree that in general suggestions of the subject-matter should not be such as to overpower the formal artistic nature of its treatment, and that if art is to be condemned on moral grounds, it is art that fails of attaining beauty. But the point is that the nature of these subjects prevents them from submitting themselves to such aesthetic elaboration. And secondly human nature being what it is, it is idle to pretend that the representation of these matters, however artistically done, will not excite corresponding passions in the contemplators and predispose them to practical activities which are an expression of such passions. If men were only artists and *not also men with tumult and turmoil in their souls*, then we could trust them with the artistic representation of every feeling.

It follows then that while emotions and feeling are the best material for art—a mathematical problem cannot be treated artistically, unless we represent the difficulty or the joy of solving it!—not every feeling is quite suitable for the purpose. Secondly,

1. *Philosophy and the Concepts of Modern Science* p. 34, by Oliver L. Reiser who quotes it from *Punch* which quotes it from William Foster's *The Romance of Chemistry*, p. 378.

2. Vide, Chs. XII and XIV.

any phase of human-mental life, besides feelings, and any aspect or object of nature, can be taken up into art, but, as pointed out before, they must, in order to become fit material, receive the impress and colouring of feelings. Using the word "object" then to cover both these forms of feeling, we may mention the following characters, not of the aesthetic object, but of the object of aesthetic treatment. In the first place, the subject-matter must be capable of sensible representation. It is not correct to say, as is sometimes said, that the subject-matter of art is not what appeals to the abstract reason, but what appears to the sensibility or the image-making faculty. What prevents the truths of abstract reason from finding expression in sensuous embodiment? Why should not art treat of the objective reality of things, as that reality is visioned by the artist? Semblance or reality, the subject-matter of art must be *susceptible* of representation *under forms manifest to sense*. The infinite or the absolute, for example, cannot, *qua* infinite or absolute, be embodied in art. What can art do with a mathematical proof or a scientific or philosophical theory, *as proof or theory*? The formless is the beautyless. It is expressing the same thing in other words to say that the object of art must be capable of being individualised, particularised or concretised. Secondly, the object of art must be such as to evoke some emotion or feeling response in the artist or the contemplator. Statements of mere matters of fact, either of history or of science, or of everyday life, for instance that the French came to India after the Portuguese, that hydrogen is the lightest gas known, that I dine everyday at 8 p.m., are not suitable material for artistic treatment or experience. It follows from this, thirdly, that the object of art should reveal some *significant* aspect of life or nature. This of course refers to the idea that art is an embodiment of *values*, of *meanings*, which a mind can appreciate. No doubt the expressiveness of an object largely depends on the mind which contemplates it, but, as we have seen, there are some things which are inexpressive to most of us, to wit, an act of sneezing, snoring in sleep or other purely physiological or psychological acts. Can iron nails driven anyhow into a wall express any significance to a beholder? Fourthly, the object of aesthetic emotion needs to be a complex object. Simple sense like a sound or a patch of colour may be expressive of some

significance, but it is clear that by themselves they cannot constitute works of art. We have admitted universality as a necessary character of the emotional essence embodied in art, and this is otherwise expressed by saying that communicability (not communication) is another characteristic of the object of art. It is from this standpoint that art has from primitive times been associated with religion, for religion is the highest and the most universal form of community feeling. Great art necessarily demands subject-matter that is great, most comprehensive and enduring in its significance.

27. The natural processes of the emergence of aesthetic value are complex in character. Almost all the values that we have considered so far are predisposing factors in the natural causation of aesthetic values. Organic values, it hardly needs pointing out, play a prominent part, for the disintegration and the reintegration discussed in the preceding pages relate mainly to the organism. Aesthetic valuation is a matter of imputation of such values as joy or sorrow, exuberance, seriousness, dignity, repose etc., to the aesthetic object, and such imputation depends on one's mood at the time of contemplation which again is dependent on one's organic condition of fitness. Hence the deepening or integration of organic values predisposes the mind to the perception of aesthetic values. Hedonic and recreative values are more significant than the organic in the evolution of aesthetic values. Art is the imaginative elaboration and reconstruction of play—the spirit of both is the same, *viz.*, freedom from the pressure of practical adjustment and immersion in the immediate activity of imagination. Play is also construction of a kind but not self-expressive. Hence the co-operative interaction among organic, hedonic and recreative values creates a powerful tendency to the experience of aesthetic values. The instincts of sex and self-display are also sometimes involved in art. We may say therefore that the sublimation of organic values like sex, and their harmonious fusion with personal values like the love of self-display, encourage the creation of art values. The economic impulse is the love of possessiveness; the aesthetic

is the love of creativeness. The one is the manifestation of the spirit of attachment; the other is the expression of the spirit of disinterestedness. Consequently, the counteraction and conflict between economic and recreative values on the one hand, and between economic and hedonic values on the other, is often strong enough to transform the economic into the nascently artistic; when this is achieved, this latter is attracted by the recreative and the intellectual and is completely converted into the aesthetic. Finally, the confluence between personal and social values in so far as society approves of, and gives its sanction to, the artistic tendencies of the individual and of the age, helps also in the deepening and expression of those tendencies in the form of art objects.

28. The freedom secured in the creation and experience of art values must be approached with caution and discrimination lest one should be blinded by the exaggerated claims sometimes made for it. Nobody can accuse us of having withheld the full meed of praise that is justly due to aesthetic value on the score of the delight it brings and the freedom that it makes possible. This freedom, it has been pointed out, is of the very highest order so far reached in the scale of values. Mind is no longer discursive here, but has become intuitive, contemplative mind; it is in fact passing into spirit. If, as has been argued, freedom consists in the ability to distinguish oneself from the object while yet entering into a conscious relation of co-operation with it, such freedom would appear to be realised in an eminent degree in aesthetic value. For here the contemplator does not merge himself in the object; he retains his individuality which is in all respects enhanced; he depends least upon objects which excite particular impulses; his whole being is integrated and balanced; he is impersonal in his attitude towards things. And yet he is in a true sense co-operating with the object, for he perceives—or rather imagines he perceives—various values and beauties in it, for which of course there are objective grounds in the object. The object, that is, is on its side capable of bearing the weight of the subject's imputations. Further, in truth the individual detached himself from concrete objects and persons (as merely other egos) and attached himself to the essences of things, ideal norms etc., thereby realising a higher degree of freedom than in the previ-

ous stages. Now in aesthetic value, he re-embodies these essences—the "truth of things"—in the concrete form of art objects, and is thus able to enter into a closer spiritual union with them breathing his life and soul into them—a union which is unique in this empirical life. Such a contemplative union with truth in an embodied form therefore marks the highest level of spiritual freedom so far reached. From this standpoint it is intelligible once again that Keats should have identified beauty with truth. The contemplative union with truth *is* the perception of beauty, and while ordinarily speaking truth and beauty no doubt belong to different orders of experience, at the level of life we are now talking about, truth and beauty would appear to be different names for the same integral experience. Thus the conditions of perfect freedom would seem to be realised in aesthetic contemplation, and on its own side, *i.e.*, from the point of view of the transformation of the external object into the subject's own likeness, there is no level higher.

And yet—on closer scrutiny we find that aesthetic freedom is not so perfect after all. For this freedom, like the bliss of aesthetic contemplation, is purely transient lasting only the while that contemplation lasts. Doubtless the subject feels re-vivified owing to the experience and gains sanity and tolerance of outlook on life. But it cannot be said that these will remain the permanent possessions of the individual's spiritual character. The reason is that the experience ultimately depends on an emotional essence—a zest or a sentiment—which has been excited in the contemplator's affective life, and the sentiment is in its turn partly at least determined by the art object contemplated. Art then trusts to the physical objects (which it no doubt transforms into the likeness of the subject) of the external world for its salvation, and naturally, since these objects are ever changing their appearance, art is likewise subject to the vicissitudes of their fortunes. The individual in art finds the centre of his spiritual life, not in himself, but in an outward object, which means that the support he is leaning on is ever-shifting. The artist's freedom therefore has no stability, or permanence or even certainty. Lasting freedom is born from within, not imported from without, nor sucked from the breast of an alien mother. Secondly, what is the same argument viewed from the

subjective standpoint, the freedom of the artist is conditioned by his sensibility which is the food of the imagination, for the life of art is to be found in sensuous embodiment. The artist's grasp of reality is limited to his apprehension by the senses; whatever he cannot see, hear or handle is beyond his ken and certainly beyond his art. In these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that his vision of reality is anything but fugitive or that his freedom, depending on such vision, is anything but transient. The radical vice of art is that it does not spiritualise the life of the artist at the core, in his inmost being, but only at the periphery; what with his forms and shapes and medium and subject-matter and imagination, he is all along playing only on the surface, the shallows and sands, of life. He has no doubt a profound revelation of life to offer, he has a vision of truth; but so far as he is only an artist and nothing more, this vision he has achieved only at the level of the senses and the imagination; it has not affected the inner core of his being, the individual is not *reborn*. Having an ideal or vision is not the same thing as achieving or realising it. *Seeing imaginatively* is indeed *believing*, but it is not *being*. We believe in so many things which yet fail to affect our life. The artist doubtless achieves self-expression; but only in an external object, the work of art. He cannot express himself *in himself*, in his own life. It is a sophistication—and a very sad and dangerous sophistication—of the modern mind to believe that if only you know how to sing well or play well or draw well or write well or at least appreciate these things with the right taste and in the right spirit and the right attitude, you have achieved self-realisation, and there is nothing more that you ought to *do* or to *be*. Outward creation of beauty is truly a noble thing, but it is far nobler to make of one's life a perfect beauty, a source of joy and peace and spiritual splendour. Poetry is the noblest of arts, but is it not nobler far to make of one's life itself a perfect poem or song? These things will become clearer in the next chapter on moral value but it needs to be insisted upon here that art is not life and artistic creation or appreciation is not the sole or even the main end of life. It is possible to combine the values of art with a life valuable on other accounts, to unite in one's own being inward realisation with outward expression. It is also possible to make of life itself an art, *i.e.*, to live the life with the same detach-

ment, disinterestedness, equilibrium, joy and repose that art demands. The life-view adumbrated in these pages, will, it is hoped, be found to contain the elements of a philosophy of such detachment and freedom achieved in rising steps in the different values, but what I wish to say at present is that we have not yet placed our feet on the last step of the ascent here in aesthetic value.

CHAPTER XII

EMERGENCE OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF VALUE:

(9) Moral and Ethical Values—The Right and the Good.

1. We are now in a position to investigate the nature of ethical value—the last and in many ways the highest of the trinity of values that humanity adores. That ethical value represents the noblest flowering of the human spirit many indeed would be disposed to dispute; the palm is sometimes given to aesthetic and sometimes to intellectual value. But few would seriously contest the fact that the ethical consciousness—especially, as we shall find, in its moral aspect—is the distinctive endowment of human nature. The impulse of curiosity, as that of constructiveness, is found in many animals; one may even admit that the social impulse responsible for the birth of ethical value is present in them in no small degree; but the moral *qua* moral—the sense of ought or obligation which, as I shall argue, has little to do with the social or gregarious impulse—is exclusively a human category. It is as exclusively human as, for instance, the religious consciousness, the aspiration for the divine. It is for this reason that both religion and morality are reckoned as constituting the divine heritage of man—a heritage which traces his ancestry to a source far higher than the merely animal pedigree which the values we have so far considered would seem to warrant.

In more particular fashion, however, the nature and scope of ethical value and its place in the scale of values need to be determined. The view of those who like Prof. Dewitt Parker believe, "that there is no separate moral interest or value, but that on the contrary, morality is indissolubly connected with every branch of human activity" has already been referred to and disputed in a previous connection. Because art, religion, health, and science have a normative character and generate standards of their own, it does not follow that their "ought" is identical with the moral "ought" properly so-called. Any one can verify in his own consciousness that the obligation of properly appreciating a beautiful work of art or of producing one, or the obligation of solving a physical or mathematical problem, will not, in case of failure to fulfil it, engender that same feeling

of remorse or self-humiliation which the failure to fulfil a promise, or to distribute justice or to observe a vow of self-control, when such fulfilment or distribution or observance was within the agent's power, would naturally produce. It is only by a figure of speech that we speak of "ought" or "duty" at all in the former cases. In fact, to believe that the imperatives enjoined by these other values of life are *in pari materia* with the imperatives imposed by morality properly so-called is to return to the standpoint of primitive life when the moral, the social, the economic, the religious, the political etc., were all inextricably commingled and the moral as such could not be recognised.

{ Further the view under consideration displays an entire misunderstanding regarding the nature of morality and its relation to the other values of life. It is certainly true that we cannot pursue or realise the moral interest as such independently of the ordinary interests of life such as the economic, the hedonic, the artistic, the scientific and so on, in the same sense in which any one of these latter interests could be pursued and realised without troubling oneself about "the morality" of it all. (I am not now referring to the peculiar "morality" attaching to every one of these interests in their own nature—that has already been disposed of.) But this does not prove that there is no moral interest different in character from these other non-moral interests or that its part in relation to them is insignificant. { The very statement that "morality is indissolubly connected with every branch of human activity" is sufficient to indicate the fact that morality is something different from them all in the sense that it has a nature of its own distinguishable from the nature of the other values. It is too early to determine what that nature is, but it must be something real, positive, and unique, else it would not be indissolubly connected with every branch of human activity. It would be unintelligible how something which in itself was nothing or only of minor significance could so universally and necessarily be connected with all aspects of human life. Without anticipating later discussions, we may say that morality is in the nature of the form or spirit of life, a form which may be likened to the sensible forms, or better still, to the intellectual categories, in Kant's epistemology. The material to which this form applies is, of course, men's passions and desires of diverse sorts, their various interests of life giving

birth to various values. And just as, by the imposition of the sensible and the intelligible forms on the manifold understanding made objects of sensations and, in this sense, prescribed laws to nature, so also by enveloping these interests and values with the spirit or form of morality, moral reason makes purposes of these passions, ideals of these interests, "objects" of institutions and persons, and in this sense prescribes laws to life.¹

Morality is thus the form of life as a whole. It is the spirit, the attitude of mind, which controls all branches of human activity and regulates and co-ordinates them in the interest of life as a whole. It prescribes to each one of them the manner of its exercise and expansion. It removes the dross and purifies the gold in every one of them. It thereby lifts the otherwise merely practical pursuits into spiritual activities. Different people may entertain different beliefs as to what exactly constitutes the moral; but whatever these differences, when once certain standards are accepted, there is no escaping their imperious claims. There may be rest for the other values in life; a man may choose to put an end to his economic or political career, or even to his scientific or artistic pursuits; but there is no rest for morality and a man cannot choose when he will be moral and when not. Morality is thus co-extensive with life, it is in fact life itself lived in "good form." This is why it cannot be pursued as a separate interest. What is only a part can be pursued separately, *i.e.*, relatively independently; but the framework of the whole must continue with the whole and can never be sundered without violence and danger to that whole. Morality *is* an interest but it is not a partial interest as the other interests of life are; it is the total interest of the whole life, *so far as life is considered under the aspect of values*.¹ What this total interest is certainly needs investigation on its own account.

It may be objected that morality is not properly distinguished from normatics if the same function of regulation and co-ordination of life's interests, which was attributed to normatics in a previous connection, is here ascribed to morality also. To avoid this possible confusion, it is necessary to state that the kind of regulation which morality aims at is different from that which normatics aspires to effect. Normatics lays down the

1. The italics are necessary as indicating a qualification of the statement which will be discussed below.

standard for life as a whole. What is the highest good of man—the thing of most value for the sake of which sometimes other things are valuable and from which they seem to derive their value? This is the supreme question of normatics. Its standard is not primarily to be judged in moral terms—it is just a standard of value. Value, we have seen, is not necessarily equivalent to moral value and whatever is valuable has a claim on our attention independently of the question of its morality or immorality. The standards which are now laid down by ethics—such as self-realisation, the greatest happiness of the greatest number etc.—are normatical standards of this kind though their propounders are generally unaware of this fact. Of course, the thing of most value—if we could truly decide it—would necessarily possess moral value also, for nothing could be the ideal of life as a whole which was not also morally approvable. Its moral approvability, however, is a condition which is taken for granted—it is not what *makes* the ideal the ideal of life. From this standpoint, therefore, moral perfection, for instance, may not be the ideal of life as a whole, for such perfection is only one aspect of the ideal which might possibly include other things besides morality—art, for example, knowledge, religion etc.. Normatics is the science which tells us what these different values of life are, what should be the extent and limits of realising every one of them, what is its place in the scheme of human life as a whole and, finally, what is the kind of balance or harmony to be secured in life when due regard is paid to the different sides of human nature and the different interests which they engender. In this sense normatics regulates all departments of human activity and co-ordinates them in the total interest of life as a whole. In this sense, therefore, normatics is obviously wider than morality and has authority over moral life also as it has over the intellectual, the artistic and other moments of life.

Morality, on the other hand, while it is obviously only one of the values, is yet supreme over the other values of life in so far as it prescribes the manner in which alone these values ought to be realised. Pleasure, for instance, is certainly a value, but there are moral as well as immoral ways of getting pleasure, and morality requires that in the enjoyments of life, moral considerations should never be lost sight of. Economic values again must submit to the control of moral principles so that we

might be able to judge the moral quality of the various processes which in different industrial orders are involved in the production and distribution of wealth. The regulation of hours of work, the employment of child labour, working at dangerous occupations etc., are all economic matters that must largely be determined by moral considerations. It is the lack of a proper application of moral principles to economic life—particularly in the matter of the distribution and consumption of economic goods in relation to production—that has been the root-cause of all the economic ills of present-day society and of the rise and development of different forms of socialism. Aesthetic values, once more, as will appear towards the end of the present and the following chapters, must consult the needs of moral life in the large sense of the term. And so on.

It is clear, therefore, that while moral life is in one sense lesser than the life of values, its claims are in another sense paramount over life as a whole. It is the guardian angel of the life of values. While normatics informs us *what* values are to be realised, morality tells us *how, in what manner, i.e.,* under what control and direction, they are to be realised. Consequently, morality may in this respect be said to regulate and co-ordinate all the other interests of life.

In doing so, further, morality employs its own standard. If we mean by morality the value of character and righteousness of conduct, the standard of moral life must be formulated in terms which are an expression of the noblest character and the highest righteousness that are attainable by man. This is its proper standard with which it judges the moral worth or unworth of conduct and from the standpoint of which it regulates and co-ordinates the realisation of life's other values. Its standard, however, must be such that it should not be incompatible with, or contradictory of, the general standard of life adopted by normatics. That is, nothing that morality requires should be a negation of the legitimate interests of life in general. The moral interest, we have seen, is not a separate or exclusive interest by itself—it lives and moves and has its being in the ordinary interests of life, although it is distinct from them. Hence the moral standard must be of such a character that the other standards of life must be capable of harmoniously blending with it, and, if anything, it should make possible the realisation of interests appropriate to those other standards,

2. Another reason adduced for refusing to assign an independent place to moral value is that moral values in the limited sense are special values of ambition or love in one of its forms, *viz.*, community love. It seems to me that the reduction of morality to the value of ambition, *viz.*, prudence, is more a caricature of it than an explanation. Prudence may have its own maxims the observance of which may enable a person to "get on;" it is possible, however, to exercise the greatest prudence in the promotion of one's own interests and yet display an utter callousness to the claims of morality in the true sense. The outward acts dictated by prudence and morality may be the same—a person may exercise self-control or desist from theft from either motive; but the judgment whether such an act is properly moral or not will depend on the inner disposition brought into play in each case. The vulgar maxim often cited as a maxim of prudence indeed requires to be stated in the inverted order if prudence is to make any pretence to approach morality. One must get honest first, and then one will get honour and finally "get on." This is how Socrates disputes the prudential view of morality put forth by Thrasymachus and others in the first two books of *The Republic* and yet finally connects morality with self-interest in the tenth book.¹ Whether he *defines* duty in terms of self-interest—as, for instance, Prichard maintains²—is another question.

The alternative view that moral value, where it is not reducible to prudence, is only a species of love, *viz.*, community love, is more plausible and deserves greater consideration.

3. There are several assumptions implicitly contained in this view which it is necessary to disentangle. In the first place, it assumes that morality is only a derivative of love and that love as such is an independent and more comprehensive value. Is morality exhausted by love? Is there no conceivable situation in which a person may have absolutely no feeling of love, or anything akin to it, and yet act morally by doing his duty, as, for instance, by *paying a debt*? *Love is indeed the most fragrant flower* of a full-blown moral life, but to affirm that nothing is moral which is not inspired by love or that love exhausts the range of moral life is to assert something beyond the evidence.

1. Particularly in the description of the vision of Er.

2. In *Duty and Interest*.

In the second place, that morality is community love may mean—as it is interpreted by Prof. Dewitt Parker, for instance¹—that “only in connection with an organised community do we find the typical phenomena of ethics—customs, morals, and duties.” That is to say, in every ethical situation, there are several factors, *viz.*, a duty which is a “law” or “command,” an enforcer of the command, a person subject to it, and finally an organised group from which “in the last analysis, all duties and commands issue.” So that only within the compass of the legal constrainer, the constrained and constraints do moral duties arise. If either the enforcer, or a recognised rule of enforcement or any organised group in the name of which the rules issue, is absent, “there may be obligation, but there is no moral obligation.”² “Morality does not exist apart from the type of social situation described” *viz.*, the legal or political type of social situation.

This is the political theory of morality or moral obligation espoused by the school of Thrasymachus the sophist in ancient times (when he said that justice is the interest of the stronger and Callicles maintained that laws are a species of class-legislation), and by many honourable men in modern times who claim Hobbes with his doctrine of might making right and Bentham with his sanctions as the prophets of the new dispensation. Morality according to them is a mere convention: it represents the will of those few or many who have the power to enforce their demands on their fellows. Where there is no possibility of such enforcement—as in the relations between friends or independent states—there do not exist moral relations. The strength of this theory is that it reduces right and wrong to definite, known and knowable terms *viz.*, to what is legally or politically laid down as right and wrong, to the penal code, the law of contracts, and the law of torts, for instance. There is nothing of the dubious, the perplexing or uncertain about it. But it is notoriously untrue to facts. Law can coerce, but can never convince. Obedience as enforced by law may be a matter of prudence, but it can hardly be that disinterested morality where one comes to perform duties for the sake of duties. And when we ask the question of

1. *Human Values*: Ch. X, pp. 199-205 particularly.

2. *Ibid.* p. 201.

3. *Ibid.* p. 202.

the ground of such enforcement, the theory flounders. It is admitted that only legislation which "makes possible a type of good life from which no member is excluded," which is "actually in the interest of the community concerned"¹ is ethical. If so, this interest, the interest of the good life, is what makes law ethical and not the fact of its enforcement. And the nature of the good life is to be determined independently of its expression in laws which can be enforced. *Potentia* can never make *jus*. Enforcement itself is justified only by *jus*. Law is grounded in morality. In short, after Green's *Principles of Political Obligation*, the political theory of morals requires only to be stated to be set aside as a half-truth.

4. The third assumption contained in the view under consideration is that morality is necessarily a social affair. This theory has been of such good repute in the history of ethical thought that it seems like sacrilege to touch it. "...there is no morality in mere friendship or in war although there may be kindness and mercy. Morality is a matter of group relations, not of personal relations. Only when in serving the individual I also serve the group is my act ethically good; only when in injuring him I injure it, is my act ethically wrong."² Prof. Alexander also, in expounding his theory of goodness as coherence of willing, states that "there is and can be no rule for settling beforehand what is right and wrong...as if right and wrong were fixed for all time."³ Questions of right and wrong are settled by "the sensitivity of the community." "As there is no beauty till it is made through the artistic passion, neither are there rules of right and wrong till they are made through the slow but persistent push of the social instinct in its human form."⁴ In short..."morality is a matter of discovery under the guidance of sociality."⁵ Alexander's theory that morality is not merely a social but a co-operative product, "that the morally good is that system of willed ends which satisfies the impulse of sociality and that goodness is the claims which effect harmony between individual wills—"the artistry of the gregarious instinct"—is so well-known that I should be guilty of a misdemeanour were I to give further references.

1. *Ibid*, p. 203.2. *Ibid*, p. 204.3. *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*: p. 246.4. *Ibid*, p. 247.5. *Ibid*, p. 248.

There is no doubt that we have here landed upon a problem which gives rise to a fundamental divergence of views. And I can but state what to me appears to be the truth.

That a full moral life necessarily implies social relationships everybody will be prepared to admit. But that the essence or the nature of morality has an indispensable reference to society and to social relationships is a disputable proposition. For one thing it seems to make the individual merely a means for promoting the welfare of others. It ignores the individual and essentially personal character of morality. The social organism is doubtless a reality, but not—as we have seen under social value—in the same sense in which the individuals who compose it are real. These are the centres in which it pulsates and shows itself alive. The individual's duties to others are ultimately elements in his duty to himself, to the humanity inhabiting his person, as Kant would say. The social theory of morality does less than justice to this essentially inward and personal character of morality. Will it be said that if the social ethos did not exist, the solitary individual would not feel compelled by other and more immediate forms of approval and condemnation? Is it not the case that the more highly the individual conscience is developed, the greater is the sense of self-respect felt by the individual so that even in a lonely world these forms would retain their hold upon him and he would disdain to think of behaving, *even towards himself*, in ways which would humiliate him before himself? Social experience may develop and deepen a tendency latent in individual human nature, but it cannot create one where there was none before. It is only a *condition* of moral development but it does not define the *character* of morality. Does light create sight or is sight an original capacity *requiring* light for its exercise? All morality begins with social experience but does not arise from it.

Further, socialisation, coherence of willing etc., does not by itself constitute right. Want of coherence may involve pain and distraction; but social coherence may be achieved in most immoral ways—in ways of military or economic oppression, for instance. If good conduct as well as bad may be perfectly socialised, it does not appear as if the notion of socialisation alone afforded by itself an adequate explanation of morality. The view that the good man is identical with the good citizen may

have been satisfying to the Greek mind, but the modern man, with the note of individual destiny and value ringing in his ears, revolts against it. Good and bad, right and wrong, are not necessarily the products of social experience. Values, we have seen, are mind-born certainly, but they have no essential reference to other minds than that of the individual. In the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of his own desires etc., the individual finds ample scope for reflection and generation of value.

Goodness according to Alexander is the mutual adjustment of the claims put forth by the members of a society for ends conceived as good in the maintenance of which they may be confronted with similar or diverse claims on the part of others.¹ Here it is clear that the fact of mutual adjustment does not explain the notion of goodness, for that notion is assumed already in the claim put forth for ends *conceived as good*—even before mutual adjustment. If the goodness of ends is intelligible even before the fact of adjustment, this fact does not make it any more intelligible and is in fact supererogatory. Those who accept the adjustment are good, those who oppose it are bad.² Does the mere acquiescence in the will of the majority ("Virtue is maintained by the tyranny of the majority" says Alexander) make a man good? Is not this identical with the doctrine that justice is the interest of the stronger? Does any kind of adjustment arrived at by the majority therefore become good? Should we not ask, after the fashion of Moore, and especially as Alexander does not distinguish moral from non-moral goodness. Is adjustment good? Is *the* adjustment good?

1. *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* : p. 247.

2. In his previous writings—in *Space, Time and Deity*, *Moral Order and Progress*, and particularly his famous article on Value in *Mind*—Alexander had adopted a different position. Anticipating the criticism that in his naturalistic account of goodness or obligation he was assuming the existence of the good man, and so assuming the very element which he was required to explain, Alexander had said that "the class of good men is created at the same time as it is determined what the moral law and its ordinances are Good men and the moral ideal which formulates their desires are determined together." Thus he had sought to obliterate the distinction between fact and value. But it is clear that this explanation labours under a confusion between value in the generic sense and value in the specifically moral sense. The experimental discovery that a certain way of living together was compatible with the satisfaction of mutual claims in society *might* generate the notion of value in general, but we are not therefore entitled to call this way of living a *morally good* way. A society of robbers may have discovered a way of mutual adjustment of claims, but is their way of life therefore morally good?

5. So far we have been talking of morality, moral value, ethics and ethical value, indiscriminately. It must now be pointed out that the root-cause of the error we have been considering—the refusal to recognise the distinctiveness of morality and identifying it with personal value (ambition) or deriving it from social value—lies in the confusion between moral or character values and non-moral values in general or “goods,” the confusion which I have called the “Great Error” in modern ethics. As I have dwelt sufficiently upon this confusion, it is not necessary to traverse old ground. I shall only remark that the uniqueness and individuality of moral values can be recognised only when it is remembered that they are essentially values of character and personality which can, it is true, find a scope for exercise mainly within the field of non-moral values but which nevertheless have an ontological status of their own. Enrichment of life is possible only by means of these non-moral values, for every one of them relates to a fundamental universe of desire in man; and, what is more, such enrichment can take place for the most part only within the framework of social life. Small wonder, then, that these various strands have become woven into a tangled skein and morality is made to disappear now in the mosaic of life’s general values and now in the rubric of the special social value. It is necessary therefore to analyse the human study of the web of life and disentangle the several threads so as to display them in their proper colours.

Sociology is the general science of human life and human society. It is the parent science whose issues may be said to be the special sciences like anthropology, ethics, politics, eugenics, economics, political philosophy etc.. Sociology in its broadest meaning may be said to embrace the systematic treatment of all those interests that arise from the life of man in social aggregates. It is not of course a conglomeration of these special social sciences, nor a study of the correlation of their conclusions and standpoints. It is by itself a highly specialised study of human society *qua* society as it is affected and determined by these several factors—such as the economic, the political the eugenic, the ethical etc.. Such a study of society as a whole may have two aspects, the positive and the normative. Sociology is a positive science of human society. Normatics, on the contrary, is (as its name implies) a normative study of human

society—a study of it from the valuatory standpoint. It studies the problems relating to the laws and principles guiding our basic assumptions as to the true, the good, the right, the beautiful—in short, the valuable in general, as well as the principles involved in a synthesis of all the special types of valuation, the determination of the place and the importance in life of knowledge, morality, art, religion etc.. It is the only kind of discipline which could give us that synoptic view and attitude to life and the world which we would fain believe is the function of philosophy. It thus partakes of the nature of both sociology (as a positive science) and social philosophy. It is the re-orientation of philosophy to the problems of life thus restoring to it its ancient and true dignity as a *Way of Life*. It is a humanisation of philosophy from first to last.

From the standpoint of sociology, it will be observed, normatics is not a branch of sociology but sociology in its philosophical aspect, particularly the aspect of value. It is co-ordinate with sociology and mediates between sociology and philosophy. And therefore while sociology, in its positive aspect, differentiates itself into political science, (descriptive, historical, administrative etc.) economics, jurisprudence, eugenics etc., in its normative aspect, that is, as normatics, it discusses the nature of the value relating to these branches of human life and society. Now, one important aspect or standpoint of human life—whether that life be considered with reference to the individual in himself or to the individual in relation to society—is what is called the *moral*. Justifiably or unjustifiably, with or without reasonable ground in human nature, human beings have even from their stage of cultural infancy been accustomed 'to judge their fellowmen's conduct and pronounce it to be right or wrong, good or bad. Thus arose the science of the principles of moral judgment, whatever may have been the basis of their judgment—customs, *mores*, manners, usages etc.. (The historical inquiry is not strictly relevant to our purpose). Not only individual conduct, but the conduct of men in public capacity as well as the nature of the institutions under which men live, became subject to the moral judgment. The task of the science then which regards human affairs and activities from the moral standpoint is to determine the value significance of such activities and institutions from this standpoint.

6. The distinction between such a science of moral principles and the general science of values has been pointed out at some length in previous connections. The former is a subdivision or a special application of the principles of the latter. The science of moral principles, however, is still a general term and we must recognise further distinctions within it. As I said, the conduct of individuals towards one another at a time when there was hardly any difference made between public and private conduct was the object of the moral judgment. But as social life became more and more organised and laws and institutions were brought into being to regulate that life, the difference between public and private conduct came to be noticed, and the former (along with the institutions over which the guardians were placed) as much as the latter was brought within the focus of the moral judgment. The conception of collective well-being came to be opposed to that of individual welfare, and actions were discriminated according as they affected favourably or unfavourably the former or the latter. Acts which in themselves, *i. e.*, if performed by individuals for individual ends, would be condemned as immoral or illegal, for example, the killing of a fellow-being, were approved as highly moral when performed for the sake of social, tribal or national welfare, as for instance in human sacrifice. Gradually and almost unconsciously, a double standard of judgment forced itself on men's minds, a lenient standard for judging actions performed in the name of the society or the state, and a more stringent one for judging actions done in pursuit of private ends.

I am imagining what might have been the case in the course of the evolution of human society and moral forms. But the distinction drawn in the picture is no less true of present-day society and its standards. Even to-day we do recognise that however bad a law or a social institution be, we must hasten slowly in uprooting it, for where the welfare of a whole people is concerned, and the danger of a social upheaval is far greater than the disadvantage of present obedience to an obnoxious law, the social sense counsels against precipitate action. Individual freedom is a precious possession for which a person should be prepared to fight to the bitter end if need be; but if all people turned conscientious objectors when the enemy is

within sight, can conscription be wholly condemned? Charity should not stop after having begun at home but should extend to the alien also; but if the alien grows so powerful as to throttle my very existence and sap the roots of the very culture I live upon, is my country wrong (asks the South African) in applying discrimination? To be sure, there is much hypocrisy in all this, but is there not a core of truth also? Non-resistance and passive suffering are great Christian virtues; why then should the big powers of Christian Europe band themselves together and try to resist the aggressive policy of a Hitler or a Mussolini? Why not turn the other cheek to them? Or why should India fight for self-determination as against British domination? Or take simpler cases. The killing of animal life is morally accounted wrong in all higher religions; but how is medical science to progress if vivisection is to be made illegal? Selling the human body for filthy lucre is indeed despicable, and professional prostitution ought to be abolished; but is there no danger that, human nature being what it is and the demand continuing unsatisfied in this way, in abolishing professional you may be encouraging family or individual prostitution? Deceiving by way of impersonation is illegal as well as immoral; but should a ruler expose himself to the risk of a chance shot by attending all public functions in person and not allow himself to be represented by a dummy? Or let us suppose that a high official of the state, known for the integrity of his character, carries a document in his pocket containing important secrets of state, and that while conversing with a personal friend of the enemy country, the paper flies off; suppose further that the friend runs and picks it up and out of curiosity asks the official what the paper contains; is the latter to give out the secrets on the score that uttering an untruth is an abnegation of human personality?

It is unnecessary to multiply instances. Their drift is to show that what we call personal or individual morality—the standard expected in the private relations of individuals—cannot be applied without qualification to transactions where the welfare of a whole community, country or nation is involved. Even in private dealings, an individual will often have to think within what limits he should practise the virtues, where family interests, for instance, conflict with the unreserved practice of

benevolence (I am not referring to conflict of duties as such in individual moral life). How much more the difficulty, not to say the danger, of an unqualified translation of the precepts of universal morality where the life and interests of a whole society or nation are involved? An individual, *qua* individual, may utterly sacrifice his interests or values for the sake of virtue; can a society or nation likewise wipe itself out of existence for the sake of earning the moral laurel in history? He would be a bold man indeed who would assert that it should.

The fact of the matter is that social and national existence is more dominantly determined by the consideration of non-moral interests such as economic prosperity, cultural expansion, political freedom and unification, defence, social reconstruction etc., than by that of purely moral interests. *Values* count for more than *virtues* in collective life. Man does not live by bread alone, but neither can a nation live by virtue alone. But, it is necessary to add, while the strictly moral point of view cannot always win in social matters in their collective aspect, while the interests of social organisation and enrichment may sometimes require the sacrifice of the moral point of view to some extent, even this sacrifice is ultimately in the interests of morality itself, so that at least a certain level of moral development may be attained by all people in a society, while perfection must for ever remain only for the few. If social or life interests—the interests of self-preservation and life-enhancement for a society—did not thus predominate, even this modicum of virtue would not be possible for all.

This, as I understand it, is the significance of McDougall's distinction between universalistic ethics and nationalistic ethics in his thought-provoking work, *Ethics and Some Modern World-Problems*. I prefer to say that the science of moral principles has two applications; one, to the individual and his private relations with other individuals, the other, to the society acting in its collective capacity and with reference to the interests of the whole or a large body of the community. The former aspect I call morality or moral science, the latter, ethics proper. Call this ethics politics if you will, but in that case it must be remembered that, like economics, it is ultimately motivated by moral considerations and that it is also in a sense a value science or normative science.

7. Ethics then is the science of the application of moral principles to the social institutions of a country as embodying collective welfare and to the conduct or behaviour of individuals adopted in a public capacity. In judging the moral value of such institutions or conduct, sometimes a less rigorous application of moral principles will have to be made in the interests of the continuity and integration of social substance as well as the expansion and development of its tissues.¹ This is not the doctrine that the end justifies the means or that expediency alone should be the guiding principle of social and political life. That is an admittedly immoral doctrine as propounded by its author, unless hedged in by many qualifications and reservations.² What I am trying to say is that ultimately in the very interests of the increasing moralisation of the community as a whole, the pace of such moralisation should go slow especially as the community consists of members of varying levels of moral capacity and culture. The basic values of life and particularly of social life, such as economic sufficiency, health and sanitation, education, political unity, defence, cultural expansion etc., demand more immediate attention, and in pursuing them, it would be imprudent *always* to adhere rigorously to the principles of moral punctiliousness unless a whole nation, as I said, determines to wipe itself out of existence. A whole people cannot be divinised all at once by the moral enthusiasm of a few great souls. The path of social moralisation is strewn with degeneracies and atavisms, reactions, loops and zigzags. This is why law always lags behind morality. Consequences count more than abstract convictions in social morality. Ethics is essentially related to the given ethos of a people as determined by influences historical, geographical, economic etc.. But the goal as well as the spring of its evolution is ultimately morality itself—the attainment of moral perfection by the members of the community. As far as possible, in social, national and international matters, moral principles should be observed, but the life of a whole nation with all its rich inheritance of value and culture cannot be sacrificed for the sake of virtue. How best to realise moral value under the given

1. *Vide* the chapters on Social Value and Economic Value.

2. See the writers' paper, "Does the End Justify the Means?" in the *Proceedings of the Indian Phil. Congress*, 1941.

limitations of social and political life in a community—this is the fundamental problem of ethics. It is not a case of the absence of morality, 'or of substituting anything else in place of morality, but it is only a limiting case of morality.

The moral ideal, however stated, remains the same for the society as for the individual, let there be no mistake about that; there is no such thing as one ideal for the society and another for the individual etc.. And ultimately the moral ideal of the society is to be realised by the individuals themselves who are 'the members of the society. And the tall poppies of moral life must always be there to expose the weaknesses of society and point out the goal. The argument, however, is that while individuals *qua* individuals can place the ideal above everything else and in pursuing it undergo any kind of self-sacrifice, the society, from the collective standpoint, cannot place the moral ideal first and foremost among the objects of its realisation, or undertake any kind of sacrifice of its interests for the sake of realising the ideal. Its goal is no doubt to become a moral community of the highest order, but this it can reach only by slow degrees. The immediate objects for which it exists—for which organised life is demanded—are to secure for its members the non-moral values of life, and by securing them in an adequate degree, create a favourable atmosphere in which individuals can practise disinterested morality. Its immediate objective is thus to secure a balance of values in society in which no one interest can predominate over others. This is its primary task and in fulfilling it, it cannot follow the precepts of morality as rigorously as the individual is free to do. This does not mean that it is free to adopt any and every method of realising its immediate objective—methods which can ultimately be justified by moral considerations can alone be adopted. The trouble is, as Bosanquet observes, the instruments which alone it can wield in fulfilling its task, *viz.*, threats of punishment and hopes of reward, are not *in pari materia* with the end which it exists to realise. And therefore, just as religion cannot be mixed up with politics, public life cannot *completely* be moralised or spiritualised.

Perhaps we may be allowed to go further and say that a *strict* adherence to the principles of morality on the part of statesmen and administrators would often be definitely harmful to the collective interests of society. That means that something

less than the ideal morality, something like the average or customary morality of the land, the morality of ordinary give and take, of the prudent and the expedient, the morality which an ordinary unsophisticated person understands and appreciates, should be the guiding principle of collective social action. Is it the morality of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth? Aye, very much that indeed; anything more than that in the interests of the moralisation of a society, the practice of undiluted mercy and love, for instance, towards a criminal, would, except in special extenuating circumstances, undermine the foundations of stability and integrity of the social order. And particularly in matters of interestatal or international relationship, the soft whispers of the still small voice should not, any more than the rumbling deliverances of the daemon-voice, be allowed by the statesman to deflect him from what he knows and believes to be the unobjectionable path of advancing his country's cause. I say unobjectionable advisedly, for I can think of no better term to describe, from the moral point of view, the kind of half-moral action or policy that in my opinion state action in relation to other states requires. Call it diplomacy if you like, I prefer the less obnoxious name of prudence, political or social. "In a world where nothing is given gratis, no statesman need be squeamish about using to the fullest extent whatever powers or resources the country has in order to advance his country's interests. The possible embarrassments of your opponent constitute no part of the responsibility of political leadership," and if political leaders have a superfine conscience in dealing with their opponents, their place is not at the helm of public affairs, but in the excellent band of the disciples of that great Teacher, Jesus Christ who, however, had the good sense to say "*Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's,*¹ and unto God the things that are God's." "If they feel extremely reluctant to cause any embarrassment to their opponents who might be very powerful, such a feeling no doubt reveals fine points of their personal character" (for statesmen are also individual men who have their own moral life to lead), "but in the absence of safeguards to prevent their reluctance being exploited by the opponents to utterly selfish ends, the possession of such a fine character must

1. Thereby implying that socio-political matters should not be allowed to get mixed up with purely spiritual questions.

be reckoned a somewhat questionable asset from the standpoint of national leadership. Generosity, chivalry and saintliness are capable of proving extremely hazardous and leading to incalculable bewilderment in environments that are far from idealistic wherein sagaciousness and practical good sense often consist in matching diplomacy with counter-diplomacy."

But—and it is equally necessary to emphasise this—no action of the statesman need sink below the level of the unobjectionable course to the definitely immoral. For that would be equivalent to sacrificing the moral interest of the community for the sake of other interests. The statesman's goal on the contrary is the conservation, as far as possible, of all the values of the community in the harmony of the social substance.

Moral science, as distinguished from ethics, is the science of the principles of individual human morality. *Its* problem is the development of individual character and the consequent attainment of moral perfection by the individual in his individual capacity, as an agent subject to the moral law. Such development is doubtless possible only in a life of interpersonal relationships in a society, but it must be remembered that social reference is only a *condition* of the existence and enhancement of moral life, but does not define its nature. Its character as morality is rooted in individual human nature itself—itself the product of the play of social forces no doubt—and we must now inquire what this character is and how it develops. For we are in this chapter mainly concerned with morality and not with ethics. There is, however, such a thing as the ethics of moral life in which we are concerned with the question of the objective outcome—again to be determined in terms of the social value or good produced—of moral acts. This problem will be considered in due course.

8. Turning now to morality proper, I shall say simply, following in this Plato and idealistic thought, that morality is the realisation and maintenance of the properly human nature of man as man. That properly human nature of man consists in his being spirit. And the true characteristic of spirit is freedom. The birth and progress of freedom we have witnessed in the several values, but we must see now what exactly its import is and what final shape it takes. This will give us an idea of spirit's existence at its best, *i.e.*, as moral spirit, and of the

nature of morality which is the law of spirit's life.¹

9. Freedom is for the spirit, the inner man. It consists of two moments, a negative and a positive. In the negative moment, spirit escapes from the thralldom to the external from which it ordinarily suffers. This slavery is of two kinds, inner and outer. When a person is helplessly subject to the influence and control of his bodily members and the desires and passions appropriate thereto, and is swayed by prejudices and predilections which darken his understanding and cloud his discrimination, he is said to suffer from inner slavery. I am not here erecting passions and prejudices into entities which actually *control* the individual subject to them as if they were conscious agents, though I believe there is great advantage in thus talking in the language of "literary psychology." I simply mean that the conscious agent has so far forgotten his true nature that he behaves as if he were nothing but a bundle of passions tied together with a string of prejudices etc.. He himself is the agent behaving in certain ways, but the point is he does not realise this and therein precisely consists the bondage to the inner that I am talking of. Similarly when he responds to the influences and attractions of the outer world as iron filings respond to the attraction of the magnet, this is his outer servitude—to material objects, environment, circumstances, one's country or people, even the institutions of society. Both kinds of slavery then are slavery to the external, i.e., to that which is non-spirit. When a man cannot control the external, however free he may be from restraints, he is truly unfree; when he is master over the external, he is truly free however much he may be hampered by restrictions. Slavery thus consists in *attachment* to the external, in the sense of identifying oneself with it as external, and *detachment* from the external—recognising the distinctness of one's spirit from everything that is non-spirit—is the deliverance of the spirit.

This detachment from the external is the negative moment involved in freedom. It is a necessary moment because spirit would otherwise shrink into nothingness owing to the crabbing,

1. The dialectic of freedom in its metaphysical aspect belongs to the second volume of this work. Here those features alone, salient in the moral conception of freedom, are sketched. And the sketch is a resume, for the most part, of the ideas expressed on the subject in previous chapters.

cribbing and confining influence of attachment. Now a person is reduced to anger, now to love ; now he is ambition, now despair ; now he is immersed in work, now merged in his family. He is everything by fits and starts and nothing long. In fact, Plato's picture of the democratic man is an admirably true picture of the moral slave. The first step in freedom then lies in a conscious, mental severance of oneself from everything which seemed to swallow up spirit. Thereby spirit would be able to look at things from a disinterested point of view.

But disinterestedness is not a negative idea though there is a negative moment involved in it. The spirit distinguishes itself indeed as intelligence, activity or creativity from the objective world. But in order to give full play to its capacities and thereby achieve concrete freedom, spirit needs to enter into conscious relationships with the objects of the world, otherwise it would suffer emaciation of its being. This is a fresh kind of relatedness to objects, a re-attachment which, being in the nature of playing with those objects, as it were, rather than possessing them, does not bind spirit. It has already been shown under economic, personal and social values that attachment in the ordinary sense breeds possessiveness or acquisitiveness which means narrowness and exclusiveness. Selfishness, ego-centrism, self-appropriation and enjoyment are the characteristic marks of the possessive attitude which thus shrinks and shrivels up spirit. This is the usual mark of activity as work. But when spirit is free, it expresses itself in the realms of creativity. Creation is the embodiment of ideal meanings, ends or values in objects. In play, as already seen, the child is supremely free because it is creative, it is embodying ideas, meanings, in outward objects—building houses out of sand, making soldiers out of tin etc.. Work is distinguished from play in that it adopts an object which is more adequate to embody ideal meanings than the object adopted in play. Further, while play is creativeness pure and simple, work is creativeness plus possessiveness or attachment to the created object. This sense of attachment prevents a man from freely sharing the results of his creation with others. He would exchange it only for a *quid pro quo*. This same sense of appropriation accounts for some other differences between play and work, notably the fact that work is felt to be constraining, a kind of duty or discipline

undertaken for hope of reward or fear of punishment.

It is not, however, in the nature of work, *qua* an earnest activity of embodying meanings, that it should be felt to be burdensome or constraining. The ideal to be aimed at is to convert all work into play at a level where the material results of both would be identical. At any rate it should be possible to adopt a playful attitude to life, to bring to bear an artistic frame of mind on it. And the elements of this attitude are disinterestedness, non-possessiveness or non-attachment, spontaneity, flexibility, adaptiveness, sympathetic imaginativeness, joy in giving and sharing. None of these qualities is incompatible with a creativeness inspired by an earnestness of purpose characteristic of real life.

While detachment, then, is the negative moment in which spirit distinguishes itself as spirit from everything non-spirit, re-attachment to objects—re-relating itself positively to them—with a clear consciousness of this distinction and with the desire to express itself in them by way of moulding them as nearly as possible to its own likeness—this is the positive movement involved in freedom. This it is which makes freedom concrete and contentful whereas mere detachment would be abstract and empty. In it a co-operative whole is formed, so to say, of spirit and non-spirit in which the former breathes its life into the latter and then transforms it and in which therefore possessiveness has given place to creativeness. Spirit's freedom means creativity. It goes without saying, of course, that if such an inseparable and yet non-binding relationship is to be possible *for the majority of ordinary men*, not only should there be a transformation in the mental outlook of the subjects, but the objects also to which they would relate themselves as subjects must be capable of bearing the spiritual meaning which would be bodied forth in them. You cannot even in play take a round stone for a flat table. Likewise, if the sordid give and take of ordinary life is to be replaced by the joy and magnanimity of spiritual giving and sharing, the atmosphere in which people live, the economic, social and political institutions through which they realise their freedom, must not be choking or asphyxiating. That, however, is another story told elsewhere.¹

It is necessary to observe that the two aspects of freedom—

1. In the chapters on Economic and Social Value.

detachment and re-attachment—are not mutually contradictory, but the one a necessary condition of the other. Whereas attachment of the older type was a negation of spirit, and detachment by itself was a negation of the object, disinterested attachment is a restoration of both, of spirit in the object and of the object in spirit. It is a unity-in-difference, a unity of distincts. Each has its own reality underived from the other, and a value attaching to such uniqueness of nature. When, however, they come together in an inalienable relationship of subject and object, the object, depending as it does on the subject, is contemplated by it and so transformed as to reflect more and more the essence of spirit. The value of the object is thereby enhanced, its potentialities actualised. And spirit itself gets a chance of expressing its nature in concrete material. It is unnecessary, however, to discuss these things in this connection as they have already appeared to view in several other places. It is sufficient to remark that spiritual creativity is not an unearthly or other-worldly ideal, unless we mean by worldliness the sordid, selfish immersing of oneself in the concerns of the world forgetting one's own true nature and one's true relation to the world. It is an ideal of spiritualising life and the world, of making the kingdom of God truly live on earth.

The removal of another misunderstanding, however, is essential. It is sometimes thought that detachment leads to the perpetuation of the existing social order, the maintenance of the *status quo*. Nothing can be farther from the truth. If our ideal stopped at detachment alone, the criticism would apply ; but the further moment of disinterested relationship is solely for the purpose of rooting out the evil that there may be in things and re-fashioning them in the likeness of spirit. Reformation is actually re-formation or re-creation which is truly recreation. And reformation may sometimes involve destruction of the old.

Butler's criticism of disinterested action will be considered later on.

Spirit is free when it knows itself as spirit, distinguishes itself from non-spirit, and controls and moulds it in accordance with its own ideals and aspirations. The absence of restraints is not of the essence of the matter. Rules are restraints and neither play nor art is entirely free from them. In the absence of restraint, freedom would not be felt or appreciated as

freedom. True freedom is the ability to expand even while obeying a law—whether imposed by self or others is immaterial—which we know does not frustrate but is in the best interests of our self-development. The external material out of which the artist creates beauty itself imposes limitations of various sorts on him, not to speak of the manifold rules of the art he is practising. And yet these very limitations are his opportunities. So also in moral life.

It was said that the law of spirit's life would give us the nature of morality. That law we have seen to consist in freedom of the kind described above. It is in relation to such freedom and the possibility of its realisation that we have now to determine the ruling principle of morality.

10. We must see a little more clearly what exactly this means. Throughout the story of values, it has appeared that at each stage mind was acquiring greater and greater control over the body (*i. e.*, the external, the non-spirit). Its progress may be indicated by saying that the process of self-distinction and object control and transformation began with personal value. Social value took a step further inasmuch as it recognised the value of personalities. Truth went a step further still in so far as the individual detached himself from concrete objects and persons and attached himself to the essences of things, ideals, norms etc.. But by reclothing these essences in the vestments of beauty and holding the subject in their contemplative thrall,—a possibility brought about by the re-creation of objects in the likeness of spirit—aesthetic value marked the highest step of freedom in this direction. But we saw the limitations of this freedom achieved in art-creation. It is firstly transient. It has no stability as art-creation depends on an external object and is subject to vicissitudes corresponding to the changing fortunes of the latter. Lasting freedom, we said, is born from within, not imported from without nor sucked from the breast of an alien mother. Secondly, the artist's life is not spiritualised at the core, in his inmost being, but only at the periphery; the individual is not *re-born* to a new life. The equilibrium that the artist attains is achieved only at the level of the senses and the imagination, not at the level of reason and spirit. While the artist can express himself in an outward object, he cannot express himself *in himself*, in his own life.

11. To be free from within, to find the fulcrum of one's being within oneself—this then is the primary condition of freedom subjectively speaking. And the individual can do this when *in addition to creating external objects of beauty, he creates himself*; creates "a nature of wondrous beauty—a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time, or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example in an animal or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things"—the beauty of spirit, in short. Self-creation is the first goal of morality; to unite in one's own being inward realisation with outward expression, to make of one's life a perfect poem or song—what greater goal can be placed before man? For beholding such a beauty with the eye of spirit, will he not be enabled to bring forth not images of beauty but realities (for he has hold not of an image, but of a reality)—bring forth and nourish true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal?

Along with self-creation, I have said, goes object-creation, transforming objects into the likeness of one's spirit. This of course includes creation of art products, (for the moral life does not exclude the artistic), but in more particular fashion, in morality it means regarding and entering into communion with other persons as spirits, performing every kind of work in the true artistic spirit, and re-fashioning the institutions of society into the form of spirit. It means the creation of "social objects" so to say. This is the secondary condition of freedom objectively speaking.

Creativity is the meaning of spirit's freedom. In art, spirit creates outward objects; in morality, it creates itself as well as objects. We may recall to our minds in this connection the famous rule of Hume which Alexander follows in his explanation of value: "No action can be virtuous or morally good, unless

there is in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality."¹ Alexander thinks that this motive in human nature is sociality or the socialising impulse. This may be admitted, but only as a secondary impulse—the impulse that is responsible for the creation of social objects. Without socialisation morality is not complete, does not become concrete; nevertheless, socialisation does not explain the nature, the true inwardness, of moral life. This latter must be sought, not in detachment or disinterestedness, as such, but in self-creation, in self-realisation, of which detachment expresses the necessary condition. The primary ground of moral action is the impulse to self-creation, or self-expression. Object-creation (the result of the socialising impulse) completes the moral act (in what sense we shall see below) and gives concreteness to moral freedom. Any statement of the moral situation, to be true to fact, must unite both, but we can, and must, distinguish within it these two different aspects.

12. By self-creation or self-expression (*i. e.*, expression of oneself in oneself) is meant the *expansion* of spirit, its attainment of *moreness*, the maximum bulk (so to say) possible, living in the widest, largest horizon possible. For such largest life is the right of spirit by nature. Ordinarily spirit leads only a small life—narrowed, cramped, confined, by local, parochial, as well as by private or individual interests. It is bound down to the interests of its own particular body and mind, and of a small circle of family and friends. But its real nature is to feel its kinship with the whole of humanity, yes, even with the whole of sentient creation. In this connection I am assuming no transcendental metaphysics of a universal cosmic self of which individual selves are relative manifestations etc., to justify this conception of the unity of all spirit. The point indeed is so simple and clear to all but those suffering from the jaundice of racial superiority that although there is here abundant room for rhetoric, there is little need for argument. I merely call to witness the fact that all life, as distinguished from non-life, is one, that humanity is one, that the human spirit is one, as spirit,—facts proclaimed by mystics and religionists and poets of all ages,² facts

1. The same rule is followed in this work in explaining the origin of the different values.

2. If according to Wordsworth "a touch of nature makes the whole world kin," surely a touch divine makes the whole world one.

past the need of justifying in this age of Internationalism and International Leagues, the cinema and the radio, telepathy and television. The unity of reason is recognised on all hands. I may however, appeal to the fact that feeling, as much as reason, is trans-subjective and intra-objective. Even physical enjoyment involves sympathetic sharing of the feelings of others. The contagious nature of feeling, of pleasure, pain, sympathy etc., is well-known. Our feelings are dependent on our bodies, but as our bodies depend on the environment which contains other bodies conditioning the rise of affective processes in them, our feelings may be said to participate in, and re-act to, the feelings of others. In short, the barrier between our own sentient and rational experience and the sentient and rational experience of others, can easily be broken and mutual sharing of one another's experience is possible. Lastly, Whitehead's suggestion that feeling is always feeling of feeling, supported by his doctrine of prehensive unities, may prove helpful in establishing the universal and transcendental character of feeling.

But, as I said, it is unnecessary to burn daylight by labouring a point which is well-nigh accepted by all. I simply take it for granted and shall state it as a postulate of moral life. Realisation of this unity of spirit in all mankind is for spirit to find, and live, its largest life, its truest life, its completest life. At present it is living only a partial life—not necessarily because it is living in a particular body, in your body or mine, I do not mean this, and I do not mean by expansion that the spirit in you or in me should expand into one spirit in the universe—but partial because it is bound down by its own particular loves and hatreds, passions and prejudices, interests and attachments. It is unable to vibrate in unison with the joys and sorrows of others around it. It has forgotten its true nature—its kinship with other spirits—and lost its capacities to unite in fellowship with them. Its flowing fluid flexible life is crystallised, solidified, so to say, in one set of experiences only, in one group of interests only, with rigid impenetrable walls of attachment around it. Expansion or self-creation would therefore mean that spirit should truly live in all by allowing its heart freely to flow into every other heart. Its freedom would then be unrestricted, unhampered, for freedom

denotes the same fact which has been described above as attaining moreness of the self.

Quantitative comprehensiveness, however, is only one element in attaining moreness of the self. Self-creation also implies qualitative enrichment, increase or development in the connotation of spirit. Spirit is not an empty abstraction, but the unity of its different aspects—sensuous, emotional, intellectual, aesthetic, moral etc.. And the harmonious development of all these aspects of spiritual life is the other element of self-creation. Else, it was said, spirit would suffer emaciation of its being, moral anaemia, or poorness of soul. By means of such development spirit attains true personality. The essence of personality lies in the integration of desires into a unitary whole so that no desire simply lives for itself but every one, thus organised and correlated, becomes instrumental to the truer life of the whole. The self breathes its spirit into the impulses and objectifies them by giving them concrete form either in canvas or plaster, song or verse. It truly *finds* itself—realises its capabilities and potentialities—here as much as in recognising its unity with other spirits. As the self there grew wider and larger, here it grows stronger and richer. This is self-realisation in the ordinary sense which is thus an aspect of self-creation. And as a consequence of the organisation or systematisation of desires, there results an equilibrium which is not less, but more, salutary to the organism than the equilibrium attained in artistic creation. Self-realisation has an objective as well as a subjective side—it brings about objective good as well as subjective enrichment. But here we are concerned mainly with subjective development as a second element in self-creation, and the equilibrium it brings about. Morality has no special sphere in the ordinary sense of the term, but encompasses the whole of life; consequently the impulses to moral action are the ordinary desires for various objects, from animal wants up to truth and beauty. At the non-moral level, these desires would no doubt become organised through psychological syntheses like memory, expectation, imagination etc., but such organisation has no significance for morality. Moral synthesis needs a specific passion, a governing propensity, which will co-ordinate the various desires and make them fall into an adjustment. What is this governing passion?

13. The desire for the common good, says the idealist. It is this desire which assigns its proper place to the several impulses, which places universal ends above the merely particular, social ends above the merely individual, permanent ends above the transient, and thus brings about harmony in life. The desire for the common good may also be described as the seeking of the rational universe, for organisation of the sentient self involves subordination of it to the rational. And Alexander, as we have seen, expresses the same fact in his own way by speaking of the socialising impulse as that which directs our attention to one another's actions, to one another's wants, and which, in virtue of our sympathy "with each other's impulses to avoid conflict and to secure co-operation," establishes "an harmonious system of willing whose technique is the laws of morality."¹

It is not necessary to deny the force of these contentions. The socialising impulse is a fact and the equilibrium it brings about both in the individual and the society, a reality. But it is not the whole story nor even the main part of it. When we attend to each other's wants and notice each other's actions to fulfil them, rivalry, jealousy, the desire to outstrip others in the appropriation of material goods, or in intellectual advancement, may as often be generated as the sympathy with each other's impulses to avoid conflict etc.. And it still makes the equilibrium depend upon external agency, *viz.*, *others'* desire to avoid conflict and to secure co-operation, which may not always be given. So long as the primary reference is to *other* objects—persons or things—the equilibrium is not born from within.

The governing passion which generates equilibrium from within in moral life by introducing order and system among the impulses is the passion for self-creation or self-expansion, as originally explained. The great obstacle in the way of such expansion or expression of self is the sense of attachment which constrains spirit within the constringing limits of narrow egohood. Attachment whereby the agent identifies himself with only one or two things is the sin of spirit and it vitiates the morality of an action and brings about misery to the agent in various ways. And so the rule of conduct which is the law of expansion, the rule of moral life or of freedom, must be such as to eliminate

1. *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 252.

this sense of attachment from the agent's mind as far as possible. It requires that the agent should purify his affective-volitional nature (which is the real spring of action), cleanse his desires, by practising non-attachment or *inner renunciation of all sense of possession, appropriation and selfish enjoyment*. The affections are thereby purged of their dross and imperfection arising from their confinement to local, narrow and parochial interests. And the limits of spirit would expand by degrees till spirit finds itself living in all. And yet through this very process of soul-purification—this veritable "vale of soul-making"—objective or social good should naturally result. Liberation of spirit should mean regeneration of society.

14. With these ends in view, the law of moral life, of self-creation, may be formulated as follows: *So act that the line of your action may purify your desire, weaken the hold of possessiveness, and enlarge your spirit.*

"Desire" is used to cover every element of the affective-volitional life, all impulses which make up the conative-affective life of man. Impulses may be classified as positive, those which in their very nature are purifying and liberating, (e.g., love, benevolence, the spirit of self-sacrifice etc.) and negative, i.e., those which contrariwise strengthen the bonds of attachment to and identification with themselves (e.g., greed, selfishness, cruelty, lust etc.). Very often the best means of purifying a negative impulse would be to cultivate its opposite and then cleanse the latter (which means that even positive impulses require to be cleansed). Again impulses may be classified on the basis of the *reaction* of the individual regarded either as positive (when he identifies himself with the impulse) or as negative (when he flies away from it). Examples of negative reaction would be neglect of family duties, indifference to personal development etc.. In either case the individual betrays the mastery or superiority of the impulse over himself and so the impulse requires to be purified. Most cases of moral conflict could be resolved by asking these two questions: (1) To which impulse is the agent positively attracted most? (2) To which is he reacting negatively always? The line of action which would purify such impulses indicates the moral course to be followed in given cases.

In this connection it is necessary to recall to our minds the psychology of attachment expounded in a previous connec-

tion.¹ Attachment, it was said, is not merely to the class of objects as such, but to the desire itself: primary interest in the objects becomes overlaid with interest in the interest itself, and this personal identification with the interest or desire is what is called attachment. It is this secondary stratification of desire that is most important for ethics and value theory in general. After this stratification has been formed, attachment is primarily to the interest or desire itself which comes to dominate over the individual's life completely. Action in line with the dominant desire may and usually does follow, but psychologically and ethically this is not important. It is the attachment to the impulse or impulses that determines the colour and tone of his life and it is from such attachment that he has got to free himself. And he can do it best by purifying his desires as above described.

The law of purification of desires, then, with a corresponding decrease in the sense of possessiveness, is the secret of self-expansion or self-creation. When the problem before an officer, for instance, is whom to appoint to an office, his own relative or a stranger (when the latter happens to be more qualified), since he is positively attracted by love of his own relative (*i.e.*, attached to it), the moral law requires that he should purify it by enlarging the circle of his sympathy or love, so as to embrace the stranger. When the choice is between a candidate whom he does not like on personal grounds and one whom he does, and he wants to rule out the former, he is clearly attached to a negative impulse, *viz.*, hatred or vindictiveness which strengthens the bonds of attachment, *i.e.*, narrows the self, and so calls for purification. When a man does not marry for fear of having to maintain a family, or a wife does not bear children lest (if this be the reason) she should be put to the worry of nursing them, their action is clearly wrong as they are both reacting negatively to a fundamental impulse, *viz.*, the parental impulse. When Antigone was confronted with a choice between duty to a dead brother and the penal consequences of disobeying a king's law, her duty was to choose the former, not because it meant obedience to a divine law (which begs the question), or showing her love to the dead brother (which by itself would only show positive attachment), but because otherwise she would be

1. See Chapter V, pp. 151–154 *ante*.

yielding to a negative reaction, *viz.*, fear of consequences to herself. Promises should not ordinarily be broken because the breaking, which is usually in the interest of one's own personal convenience, involves attachment to a negative impulse, say selfishness, which strengthens the bonds of attachment to itself. Suicide is immoral because it is evidence of a negative reaction to a fundamental impulse, that of self-preservation, or possibly to that of self-improvement or self-betterment. Stealing is bad because in a society where individuals have agreed that everyone shall eat at the sweat of his brow, it shows a desire to appropriate and possess the results of another's labour (without labouring oneself), *i.e.*, attachment to a negative impulse, say greed. It thereby shrinks instead of expanding spirit. Cheating is evil for the same reason. Killing or injuring another is ordinarily wicked in that it negates the principle of expansion of spirit, finding oneself in another.

Even positive impulses, we said, may sometimes require to be purified although their nature is such that they are liberating. This happens when the attachment to the impulse is such that it prevents extension of the impulse over a wider circle, *i.e.*, prevents expansion of spirit. Love of one's own family or community or country is good; but when this love, *i.e.*, attachment to it, prevents me from loving another's family, another community or country, the impulse requires to be purified or freed from its narrow encirclement. Let it not be said that this is an advocacy of a watery altruism in which there is no concentration but only diffusion of generous impulses, that the self has no root to stand upon in a lower scheme of order than the state or humanity, that intensity is sacrificed to extensivity, and that in consequence the individual cannot develop a strong personality but cultivates only an ineffective, unindividual type of mind by identifying himself with a wide range of interests. This may be true of Plato's guardians but certainly not true of the moral individual here described. A lower scheme of order such as the family and its interests is not denied to him; in fact, neglect of family interests is considered a sin inasmuch as it exhibits a negative reaction to a fundamental impulse of life. The individual *can* pursue intensive cultivation of interests wherever they do not conflict with the larger interests of spirit as such.

15. It should be observed, further, that what is sought to be purified is not merely the will (as in some systems of ethics) but the whole nature of man, cognitive as well as conative-affective. If it is merely the will that is in question, *i.e.*, rational thought, moral reason or perception of the moral law, I may go on doing things *because* they are right, but always struggling within myself and manifesting an ever-increasing dislike to duty, a dislike, however, overcome each time by the sheer will to do the right. That way rectification of will may never be reached (if by this is meant that doing the right comes to me easily and naturally, without effort), for my inclination may remain permanently at disaccord with my sense of duty. The two may never coalesce or harmonise—a feature of Kant's view of morality so far as it characterises man's actions in his phenomenal aspect. Duty may never become habitual or a second nature of man. In order to attain this consummation of moral life, in order to be able to deny that "virtue consists in being uncomfortable," our passions and emotions need to be educated so as to make them accord with our moral perception or sense of duty. To state the moral aim as rectification of will is to put the matter in a wrong perspective. It is not the will but the heart that refuses to be the bedfellow of duty. There is no such thing as will by itself which needs to be trained. As thus conceived, will is merely moral reason, rationality acting in the sphere of moral life. Kant believed that the mere thought of what we ought to do is sometimes sufficient to incite us to action. It may be, but this does not mean that will is thereby rectified. In fact rectification of will is a misnomer. What stands in need of rectification is our affective nature which must be made to fall in line with moral reason. Willing is the result of right thinking and right feeling. $RT + RF = RW$: this may be bad mathematics, but it is good psychology. Purification is thus of the whole man, his entire personality. It involves essentially the "culture" of the emotions and passions. The equilibrium that is set up in his soul, as a consequence of such transmutation of nature, is a permanent and abiding harmony, for the individual is thereby re-created, re-born in himself. Thought accords with reason, the perception of the moral law; heart accords with thought; and the hand is bound to the heart. The result is an integration of human nature that is perfect and can be attained in no other

way—a balance or harmony which rests on no external support but is born of the very roots of one's being. Perception of duty is here equivalent to the desire to do it, in fact, duty is the desire to do duty or, better still, duty is what one desires to do, or it is purified desire.

The equilibrium attained in morality is thus abiding, soul-born and therefore self-dependent. It is not brought about by any external object, as is the case in aesthetic contemplation, and is not relative to the vicissitudes of that object. It is the result of spirit's life-process of self-creation. Further, while aesthetic equilibrium was the consequence of a *co-ordination* of the different elements of the organism, the energies of the mind, of the heart and of the body remaining matched against one another in a balanced manner, moral equilibrium is the fruition of a relationship of subordination and superordination among the elements of personality. Purification of desires and weakening of the sense of possessiveness naturally involve that some desires should be subordinated to others, some transformed, some emphasised, some suppressed, some even extinguished, if need be. For "if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off and cast it from thee; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell." While ordinarily every impulse gets a legitimate chance for self-fulfilment, all are made to serve the purpose of self-creation of spirit. Shortly, the equilibrium is the product of the *co-operation* of impulses, rather than of their *co-ordination*. The self truly creates, expresses, itself in itself. It reflects within its own inner life the laws of harmony, the principle of coherence, rhythm, balance etc.. Its very being and countenance express its inward integration, its inner self-creation. As such the self is here truly a product of art—of the art of morality. This is one meaning of self-expression.

Aesthetic equilibrium again is experienced largely at the organic level, it is the physical organism, including the mind of course, that is braced up, heightened and tautened by the experience. It is the senses and the imagination that are tranquilised. Moral equilibrium is obtained at the level of the inner life—that level where the anguish of the soul is felt and which is better felt and experienced than described or defined. For this same reason, whilst aesthetic equilibrium gives only

tranquility, repose or equipoise—a condition of outward calmness but concealing inward tension and aggressiveness,—moral equilibrium brings true peace.

16. No rule of conduct can possibly cover all cases or even all types of case unless we frame it in a purely general and futile fashion and say, for instance, Do nothing which offends anybody—not even yourself. The moral ideal of self-creation, however, will, it is hoped, be found to cover most cases of moral conflict and solve them satisfactorily. Its three facets of purification of desires, weakening of the sense of possessiveness and enlargement of spirit, provide a fairly good answer to the question, what ought I to do? What is my duty? What is morally good or bad? They give a new significance to the old adage that "there is nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so," for thinking here should be interpreted as the thinking of the moral reason, or *willing, desiring*. In any given case, that course of action is right for the individual which purifies desires, weakens possessiveness and enlarges spirit more than any other course. Right or duty in general is to be defined in terms of these three functions relating to the self. In a sense therefore which needs no pointing out, the present theory of self-creation agrees with that of Green who made the immortal statement that since in all willing a man is his own object, the will is always free. But it is unlike Kant's categorical imperative, wherein the moral law was intended to be a guide to the will alone, as distinguished from the rest of human nature. Here, on the contrary, the moral law applies to the whole nature of man—sensuous as well as rational. In consequence, it is not empty, abstract or formal as Kant's theory was. It embodies the principle of duty as such and concrete duties can easily be derived from it, as will be shown presently. Further, in a far richer sense than was applicable to Kant's categorical imperative, the moral law here is truly universal, absolute and necessary. I can conceive of no possible case in *individual*¹ moral life when we should have to think of an exception to the law of self-creation, or self-expansion. In no case could we possibly think of self-contraction as one's duty. At the same time, it will be observed that

1. The qualification is used advisedly as collective moral life (ethical life) does not, as has been argued previously, stand on a par with individual moral life (morality proper).

the principle of self-creation, embracing as it does the affective as well as the rational side of human life, is a *material a priori* which is as truly universal and necessary as the *formal a priori* of Kant. Nevertheless it does not admit of being competed for but is equally open and available to every one in society. In this respect, it possesses a feature which Green sorely desiderated in theories of moral ends and which was not exemplified even by his own theory of self-realisation, as Sidgwick has clearly proved.

17. But how, it may be asked, can we derive concrete duties from this general principle of duty? What, in other words, are the particular acts or types of act which lead to self-creation? Admittedly this can be found out only by experience, for the present theory necessitates appeal to experience. More particularly so, because the intensity of the hold of particular desires on persons—the strength of their attachment to them—varies from person to person; one may find it hard to give up drink, another may find it difficult to overcome vindictiveness, a third may own defeat in loosening the strings of his purse and so on. Naturally, therefore, individual experience alone can tell what acts lead to purification in each case, and it would be quite unavailing to lay down any specific rule about it. Nevertheless one or two indications of a specific character can be given regarding acts which have a tendency to purification. And they are indications already made plain in the preceding sections.

A desire is purified in so far as it is the outcome of a clear distinction between the subject and the object of experience. In an early stage of moral life, all is one vast whirlpool of subjectivity in which objects are looked upon as only an extension of the subject's needs and desires and where the individual is not aware of the difference between "being pulled by seductions from without" and "being pushed by seductions from within." If into such a state of empirical subjectivity is introduced the distinction between the "psychological me"—the complexus of desires and feelings—and the object which acts as stimulus, to that extent the desire in question is purified.

A desire becomes pure when after the "psychological me" has contemplated itself as different from the object, it comes to identify itself with the "social me" so that ordinarily speaking if

an impulse conforms to the demands of the "social me," it is so far pure. Here the aim is to substitute the rule of an impersonal social law or custom for the vagaries of psychological individualism. Empirical objectivity rules in the place of the empirical subjectivity of the previous stage. The "psychological me," however, continues in the "social me," for there is no differentiation in this stage between the impulse and the rational ego. It may be called the stage of customary morality where a clash is possible between the "psychological me" and the "social me."

A desire becomes pure in so far as, while still pursuing social ends, there appears in the subject's mind a distinction between the "personal me" and the "psychological me." Within the life of the subject himself there now appears a subject-object relation, the "personal me" or the rational ego being the subject which, while distinguishing itself from the impulse, desire or appetite (which is the object), yet knows that they are the inner expressions of its nature, feelers of the soul, so to say, through and by means of which spirit comes into contact with the external world. The object here is not the external world, but the desires and impulses themselves which spirit controls and develops as it likes. External objects are the concretisation of these desires and impulses. There is a genuine subject-object relation here and the interaction of both gives birth to the "personal me" or simply, personality. The essence of personality consists not only in the integration of desires into a unitary whole but in the inbreathing of the essence of those desires etc., into external material, in their objectification in plaster or on canvas, in song or verse. This leads to the development of one's capacities and the stage in general corresponds to the theory of self-realisation. External objects are thereby transformed into the likeness of spirit as far as possible, they bear the impress and seal of spirit. External objects include not only material objects, but such things as laws, knowledge and sciences, institutions of society etc., which are all refined and reformed and spiritualised in various ways. Thus spirit creates them into "social objects." And thereby spirit develops itself. Such development, however, *as an actual achievement*, is not regarded as the direct end or standard of conduct, it is treated in this theory as the natural result of the progress of moral purity having not much moral

significance in itself. The moral value of the stage consists partly in the accentuation of that distinction between "the rational I" and the impulses whereby spirit freely expresses itself indeed (in the direction best suited to its capacities) but is not troubled with the success or failure of its enterprises. The moral value also lies partly in the *endeavour* after self-expression which is a natural consequence of the integration of personality involved here; but since the integration also involves a corresponding differentiation referred to above, the self conceives that to action only it has a right, but not to the fruits thereof. It will thus be seen that disinterested action comprises not only the so-called duties proper but all action whatever, whether self-regarding or other-regarding.

Butler pointed out that disinterestedness cannot be confined to the sphere of benevolence only and that it is not the whole of virtue. The love of our neighbour is as much interested or disinterested as the love of ourselves. As a matter of fact, every motive must be interested in that it would not be a motive were it not connected with some human satisfaction, but to say that therefore it must be selfish is a misuse of language. On the other hand all the original impulses are equally disinterested if by this is meant that they do not have the self and its happiness consciously in view. The substance of Butler's contention is sound. Disinterested action cannot mean motiveless action or action in disregard of consequences. Such action is a logical fiction as well as a psychological contradiction. An action presupposes a mind and a purpose towards the realisation of which the mind is directed; it involves, that is, conscious deliberation which implies regard for the consequences judged to follow from it. Only fools and mad men act disregarding the consequences of action. Hence the performance of duty for duty's sake cannot and ought not to mean performing it anyhow irrespective of consequences. Desirelessness in this sense would only be a disguise for spiritual starvation, or anaemia, opposed to the true development of one's mental and moral capacities. If then the agent is to envisage certain consequences as those which are going to be realised by his action and must perforce will them, actively desire them, how is disinterestedness or desirelessness in regard to the action possible?

From the standpoint of the present theory, two answers

may be suggested. Disinterestedness is not the absence of all motive—that is impossible in any sane action—but the absence of a *selfish* motive. It is difficult to see how according to Butler a selfish motive can still be called disinterested simply because we aim, not at pleasure, but at the realisation of *objects*. Only when, as according to the present theory, the agent detaches himself from the motive, *i.e.*, does not expect any gain for himself, can his action be said to be disinterested. Duties, for example, are in the strict sense debts to be paid in certain situations and on certain conditions accepted by the agent and as such they must be performed without hope of reward or return to oneself. In acts of benevolence too, there is disinterestedness in this sense. And both duties and benevolent acts must be sustained by the force of desire, with a conscious striving for success. Only thus can they be done well. But if so, it may be asked, if motive is present and consequences are envisaged and chosen, how have you secured disinterestedness, *i.e.*, detachment of spirit from the motive, that is, impulse or desire, as the present theory requires?

The second and more satisfactory answer to this question is, that in the case of all actions whatsoever, self-regarding, or other-regarding, duty or no duty, the secret of performance lies in not worrying oneself about the success or failure of one's actions. By all means let the moral agent calculate the consequences; let him even desire such results as he has envisaged; but let him not be attached to the motive or desire, *i.e.*, identify himself with the results to such an extent as to make himself miserable should he fail to realise them. For the results are clearly beyond the control of the agent; when once a course of action has been set in motion in the world, its further development is clearly left to the inscrutable workings of nature. And science tells us that in nature there are such things as counter-action of causes and intermixture of effects. In the circumstances wisdom consists in doing our best and leaving the results to nature's hands. Even with regard to the duty of self-development disinterestedness requires that we should cultivate such capacities as we possess and as there are *opportunities* for developing. Nobody need incur "waste of the unfinished attempt" by trying to become an artist, a scientist, a philosopher etc., when he has no inherent capacities or when the opportu-

nities for realising them are lacking. Moral good is different from the *values* of life.¹

So far three lines of purification have been indicated. A fourth and most important characteristic of acts having a tendency to purification now remains to be mentioned. A desire becomes pure when after having distinguished himself from the impulses and their objects, the moral agent longs to attain unity of spirit with spirit. The endeavour is made in this stage of recognising himself as a transcendental subject one in nature with other transcendental subjects. Other things being equal, that desire would be the purest which would lead the individual to identify himself with the largest number of other individuals. For the desire in such a case would be purified to the greatest extent, and spirit greeting spirit in other individuals, spirit would live in the largest horizon possible. This is the stage of true self-creation. It incorporates the principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" interpreted, however, not with reference to consequences merely but with reference to purifying the motive or desire. It is the method of purifying the positive or benevolent affections by widening the circle of persons who are the objects of these affections.

18. Morality is not primarily a concern with objects or content. To think that it is leads to the conclusion that since the content of conduct does not determine the difference between good and evil—both being made of the same stuff of desires etc.,—this difference can only lie in the extent to which such content is systematised. And thus arises the coherence theory of goodness. When on the contrary it is remembered that morality is a question of will and heart, motive and intention, persons and our attitude towards persons—when the flower of morality is found to bloom in the moonlight of interpersonal intercourse—where we have to reckon with selfishness, indifference and contrariness of will—we should recognise that we require other than merely logical synthesis or systematisation. Logical synthesis is purely a question of intellectual honesty or consistency; moral synthesis is primarily a matter of heart and *will transformation*. "Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever." What we require is a "change of heart" so that we may transcend our narrow self and its interests and live and live

1. See Ch. XIV, for another meaning of disinterestedness.

truly in other selves and *their* interests. Shortly, our *attitude* towards persons is what counts for the goodness or the badness, the rightness or the wrongness, of our conduct. And the present theory insists that this attitude change from narrow concentration on self and possible antagonism to others to a large-hearted expansion and active relationship in spirit with the lives of others.

Unless we recognise the significance of this change of heart for morality and how it is based on purification of desires etc., the merely logical processes of distinguishing oneself from objects, self-objectifying, synthesising etc., cannot give us the nature or the criterion of moral action. Such processes are common to both good and bad actions. They may suffice to mark out moral action in the large sense from purely animal action by indicating that moral action is action of a being *capable* of both virtue and vice; but they cannot serve to distinguish action done under the influence of the moral ideal from action done under the impulsion, say, of some selfish desire. If the mere fact that a motive in the case of a human being is always some idea of a *personal* good or *self-satisfaction* sufficed to make the action moral, if what is *personally* chosen *therefore* becomes right or reasonable, then in every kind of action, both good and bad, this happens to be the case, the agent identifies himself with the desire and considers that the proposed action is going to realise some good of his. Is it not then open to him to plead that since at the moment of choice he considered the action to be good to him, his conduct was moral and that if it turned out to be bad in the sequel, he is not to be held morally culpable? Does this not remove the possibility of an agent doing a bad action knowing it to be bad? Are there not cases of what may be called wilful choice of evil in which the agent says: "Evil, be thou my good"? Good and bad therefore require to be determined by how we incline our self—both rational and sensuous—in relation to other persons and their needs. It is a question of everyone adjusting his focus of vision in the penumbra of life only lightly illumined by interpersonal intercourse.

19. Such a life of interpersonal relationship naturally involves devotion to social service and programmes of reform and reconstruction, of altruistic endeavour, in fact. For you

cannot pretend to enter in spirit with the lives of others and be indifferent to the kind and quality of life led by them. You cannot claim self-creation, *i. e.*, self-expansion, without endeavouring to express your mind and spirit in other lives and institutions of society. You cannot create "social objects" out of them without transforming them into the likeness of true spirit as far as possible. Working for social good is as inevitable on the present theory as on that of the socialising impulse or the common good. But the distinguishing feature of this theory is that the motive-spring here is self-creation or purification primarily while realisation of objective good is made an aspect—albeit a necessary aspect—of such self-realisation.

20. The picture of freedom, it is hoped, is now complete. Ever expanding and attaining largeness of life, quantitatively speaking, ever enriching and intensifying the content of life, qualitatively speaking; free from the narrow confines of possessiveness; soaring high in the regions of creativeness; breathing its inmost spirit into objects which are fashioned and re-fashioned in its own likeness; enjoying communion in spirit with other persons; serving in yoeman fashion society, country and humanity; withal never losing sight of inner purification; spirit creates and re-creates itself and tastes the joy of peace and freedom. Its inner life an equilibrium, its outward activity a flowing rhythm, its heart in unison with the heart of the universe, its countenance beaming with the lustre of that "wondrous beauty" of which the ancient seer of Mantinea spoke—may we not describe such a life of spirit as itself a poem or a song? Sweetness combined with light, a smile playing always on the lips of life—is it an exaggeration to describe such a state as a conversion of life into play, a combination of the earnestness of life with the light-heartedness and nonchalance characteristic of sport? A person living this kind of life may not be able to make two blades of grass grow where only one grew before, but he could at any rate keep that one blade ever green and always sprouting up.

In discussing moral equilibrium it was observed that the expression of the laws of harmony, the principle of coherence, of rhythm and balance etc., within its own inner life constituted one kind of self-expression for spirit. It is the expression of its inner "justice"—the attunement of the different elements of

spirit's nature in accordance with the laws of subordination and superordination. When this inner attunement of the soul flows into outward act, when every deed performed by spirit in its life of interpersonal relationship discloses, *i.e.*, suggests, a world of inward harmony, then indeed has spirit achieved another and a higher kind of self-expression. Its outward active life becomes a fit expression of the "justice" of its inward being. Outward performance is only a symbol of the inward significance of spirit.

Continuing the analogy of sport, we may, in the light of all that has been said above, conclude that morality is the "form" of life. A moral man is he who lives his life in "good form." A life without moral principles is a life lived in "poor form." Conscience is the principle in human nature which has a keen sense for the moral form of life.

21. One familiar criticism of this theory of morals I shall just mention and pass on. It is often said that the morality of purification is untrue to experience, for we never seem to have purification of desires as the motive of our action, and that it tends to make of us moral prigs. In performing a moral act, we never look into the moral mirror and observe by how much we have grown larger—or purer. We simply act and act for the sake of realising concrete objects or goals of life—to help a friend, to keep a promise etc.. The criticism, of course, applies commonly to the present theory as well as to the theories of hedonism and self-realisation. We eat not for the sake of getting pleasure but simply to satisfy an organic need. And we keep a promise not because we realise anything in ourselves thereby but simply in order that promises be kept. To this our reply is, this is not always so. Valuations in terms of subjective satisfaction do often enter into our moral judgments. Surely we do not eat always and merely for the sake of satisfying an organic need—did we do so, what is the explanation of hunger-strikes and fasts which are becoming so fashionable now-a-days? And if subjective determinants of action do count sometimes, why not always? The theory is that they *ought* to count always, that we ought to judge the moral value of an act by the effect it tends to have on the character of the agent, whatever may be our actual motives at present. Morality is not here annulled but fulfilled.

The other criticism is generally levelled by the "objectivists" in morality. We love a person not because it will redound in any way upon ourselves but in order that the loved one may have the joy of it. To think otherwise would be, as observed before, to make of ourselves moral prigs. Here also, questions of fact apart (about which observation may have different things to say), from the standpoint of ideals, one cannot help observing that the world would have been a much better and safer place to live in had people been a little less eager to convert themselves into reformers, saviours, and redeemers of the world and had they been a little more inclined to turn their eyes inwards and look within.

22. From all the foregoing, it should have appeared that the relation between art and morality is very close. In what manner this relationship should be conceived has been a question, ever since the days of Plato, of keen controversy and it is difficult, perhaps not possible, to decide it. But let us take the most modern and generally accepted answer and see if it is satisfactory. We may at once dismiss the suggestion that art should only treat of moral themes or that the success of an art product should be judged by how far it promotes social morality in the narrow sense. Art is not a handmaid either of morality or religion whatever might have been the case in ancient times. Art has a right to independent existence, and if art values are contributory and relative, it is in much the same sense in which values in general are relative and contributory.

The modern attitude goes further than this. It is said that at the level of artistic expression, the question of the pleasantness or the unpleasantness, the morality or the immorality, of the art does not arise and is irrelevant. That is, the consideration of art in moral terms is an irrelevance. The only proper question to be asked of a work of art, it is said, is whether it is a competent aesthetic expression of the fact it intends to express. If the expression be aesthetically competent, then, it follows, anything, whatever be its moral value, can be expressed in art. And the test of competent expression or of aesthetic excellence

is, as we have seen, that the contemplator should be led to find the satisfaction of his impulses within the limits of the aesthetic experience itself, and not be excited to practical activity to satisfy the impulses kindled. In short, while we may admit artistic ugliness as due to imperfect expressiveness, there can be no moral evil in art. Art that can be condemned on moral grounds is art that fails of attaining beauty.

To some extent this question has already been answered towards the end of the chapter on Aesthetic Value. It was there pointed out that there are some subject-matters which are unsuited for artistic treatment, however competent the treatment may be, partly on account of the intrinsic nature of the subject-matters, and partly because men, even while engaged in aesthetic contemplation, are not wholly artists but also men with tumult and turmoil in their souls. "Psychological distancing" would in such cases become difficult, if not impossible. It is necessary, however, before we proceed any further to decide the sense in which morality is to be understood. It is not merely conventional morality, the social morality as current in a particular age, that we should have in mind while discussing this question. This social *milieu* the artist is not bound to respect literally, though, of course, if he would be appreciated by his contemporaries, he cannot flout it completely. It must however be remembered that the capacity for being shocked varies greatly with sophistication and experience. And we must further distinguish between cases in which the unpleasantness or the immorality is expressed for its own sake and cases in which it is expressed for the sake of revealing a larger value. The former cases are certainly to be condemned. An artist may rightly revolt against prudery and false delicacy of various kinds. But if the intention of the artist is to get our attention focussed on the disagreeable and the repulsive for its own sake we feel we are in the hands of a diseased mind. However competent it be as artistic expression, we feel that it is a waste of artistic powers. Shelley's description of decay in the Sensitive Plant, for example,

"Prickly, and pulpous, and blistering, and blue,
Livid, and starred with a lurid dew,
Pale, fleshy, as if the decaying dead
With the spirit of growth had been animated!"

is a case in point. Who could enjoy such a loathsome description as that without turning away in a revulsion of horror?

But the true moral interest that we should bear in mind in this connection is the interest of self-purification and the consequent freedom, enlargement and enrichment of spirit and personality. In so far, the ideals of morality and of art are the same. Art, it was said, is inspired by expressive-creativity, creation of external objects in which the artist expresses himself; morality has the impulse of self-creation, *i. e.*, expression of oneself in oneself. Here, although the object upon which the impulse is directed is different in each case, that impulse itself is the same, *viz.*, the impulse to expression or creation. And in art as well as in morals, the exercise of this impulse results, as we have seen, in equilibrium or harmony of impulses, disinterestedness or detachment, expansion and stabilisation of self, freedom etc.. Catharsis of desires, both in the Aristotelian and our sense of the term, is common to both aesthetic and moral experience, and with it goes detachment or weakening of the sense of possessiveness. It is the perception of this community of nature between art and morals that has found expression in the sentiment of all great artists and thinkers that great art generally makes for elevation and ennoblement of character, for it embodies great values. As Shelly puts it: "A man to be greatly good must imagine intensively and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination, and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause."

In short art is itself moralisation in a degree. Morality is the artistry of life in a supreme degree.

23. If this is what we understand by morality and by art, will it be said that morals have no more to do with art than with the cook's pastry or the discovery of the law of gravitation as Spingarn and Swinburne have said? Or shall we agree with Mathew Arnold, Ruskin and Lionel Johnson in thinking that "A poetry of revolt against moral ideas is a poetry of revolt against life; a poetry of indifference towards moral ideas is a poetry of indifference towards life?" Let Robert Bridges, the Poet Laureate, speak for us: "If theorists assert that all things are equally beautiful because equally capable of competent expression and

that such expression makes all things equally beautiful—to this I reply that we live in a free country where every one may think and say what he pleases." Or, once more, let Dr. MacColl—a former "Keeper of the Tate"—bear testimony in our behalf: "Art itself is morally indiscriminate: it can only be measured as more or less efficient: but that a work of art is not subject to moral discrimination is an impudent 'aesthetic' superstition."¹

It is clear therefore that art must be moral in this large sense of the term, and the more moral it is, the greater art it is. Art cannot shut its eyes to the values of life, values which make for noble thinking, noble feeling, noble acting, values which make for largeness of mind and heart, purity of soul and character, integrity of personality, values which conduce to social betterment, neighbourly kindness, human love. Art cannot dispense with sanity of outlook, large-hearted tolerance, a passion for the highest and the best. Art cannot dispense with the sense for the infinite, the eternal and the universal, however particular and transient the object it portrays be. Art in short must embody and heighten our perception of the enduring values of life. And if such values are not moral values, I fail to see what other values are. I do not say of course that art must attempt to achieve these things in any narrow, direct, didactic manner—then it would cease to be art. But great art knows how to embody them and to impress them on the spectator's mind and heart without explicitly expressing them. And the greater it is as art, the better it succeeds in accomplishing this end. There is no great art without great goodness.

What one finds unsatisfactory in the traditional (and modern) view of the matter is the theory that beyond giving us pure pleasure art has no other end. It is difficult to define the nature of pure pleasure, but one can safely say that no pleasure is pure which grates upon the eternal chords of the soul upon which human nature and existence are strung. If on witnessing a play, for instance, one comes out with the feeling that the world is given up to the dance of demented devils, or that human nature is so nasty, brutish and demoniac that such things as sacrifice, faithfulness, trust etc., are only psychological aberrations or neurotic diseases, then, I ask, however perfect the art, is the pleasure derived therefrom pure and unalloyed? And if

1. *What is Art?* (Pelican Books). p 14.

it be said that with such things art cannot attain perfection or any degree of it, the whole case for art for art's sake and pleasure for pleasure's sake is given up. In fact the method of opposite effects discussed in other connections applies to art also in an eminent degree. Art sundered from life as we live it and expect to live—and who would refuse to live the moral life as pictured before—is not art but distortion, nay, distraction.

Art and morality are thus very closely related—related at a level far higher than ordinary artists and common moralists can possibly understand. If then we recognise this close relationship between them, it will not be difficult to formulate the precise nature of the relationship. In a previous chapter, it has already been concluded that the freedom and equilibrium attained in art are not of such a stable character as those experienced in moral life. It was there contended that if poetry is the noblest of arts, it is nobler far to make of one's life itself a perfect poem or song, to convert, in other words, life into art, to "snatch a grace beyond the reach of art," to live the life with the same detachment, equilibrium and repose that art demands. This possibility has been shown in the present chapter. If then life itself could be made into a prolonged art-experience by means of morality—and this is the highest morality that one can think of—then we can say that in so far morality is the fulfilment, the crown and completion, of an artistic way of life. Art fulfils itself in morality, finds its noble end nobly realised in it. Art as art touches only a part of life, morality encompasses the whole of life. And if the whole of life could be made into an art, morality, it is clear, has a more pressing call upon life than art.

24. Or look at the matter this way. Beauty, we say, is the conformity of expressiveness with theme, of form with content, in aesthetic experience. Now morality is the highest expression of life. The whole of life is the content, and morality is the supreme form of life. In moral experience therefore form and content are harmonised at the highest level—not merely at the level of imagination, as in art, but at a level which is a unification, a synthesis, of spirit and reason, activity and sense, at the level of integral personality, in short. And if aesthetic experience blossoms in to beauty, moral experience finds its fruitage in a higher beauty still, viz., sweetness and light. Shall we not say then that morality is itself the natural culmination, the final fruition, of art?

Add to the above one last consideration also. Whatever may be the case with the creative artist, with the contemplator at any rate, aesthetic experience is, in the ordinary sense of the term, *passive*. We read fine poetry, we listen to sublime music, we witness a great drama, we behold moving natural beauty, we enjoy human communion at a refined and elevated level. What is the effect of all this? A great stirring of the deeper fibres of our being, a vague and undefined longing and aspiration, a condition of tension and exaltation in which every faculty is charged with tremendous energy and power. What is the outlet for all this pent-up energy? Doubtless the aesthetic experience itself, the perception of beauty, the process of regaining equilibrium, as already described. But is this a sufficient and adequate channel through which the energy can safely be conducted without doing violence to the mechanism of the organism? The history of aesthetic experience—of great poets, of great dramatists, of great painters, of great musicians and composers, let alone the lesser fry of spectators and contemplators—amply witnesses to the fact that it is not. The surplus energy left unsatisfied induces a profound *malaise* in the psycho-physical organism which is responsible for many of the aberrations and abnormalities of behaviour noticeable in the life of artists and contemplators alike.

The fact cannot be gainsaid even by the profoundest devotees of art. What is the remedy? Action in the moral sphere whereby the surplus energy is sublimated and transformed into kinetic work. Religion affords another and even better outlet, but its discussion is not yet. For the present, suffice it to say that the passivity of art-experience is the negative, and the activity of moral experience the positive, pole of spiritual life; and when psycho-physical energy flows through both poles, the circuit is completed and the light and sweetness, the mellowed glow, of spiritual maturity is the result. Otherwise, the divorce of the beautiful from the moral, the passive contemplation of beauty as such, simply exasperates our nerves and brings on restlessness, discontent, dissatisfaction with life.

In a word art presupposes morality and the elements of this notion of presupposition discussed elsewhere hold true here as well.¹

1. See the end of the next chapter for the final answer to this question.

CHAPTER XIII

EMERGENCE OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF VALUE:

MORAL AND ETHICAL VALUES—THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD

(Continued)

A Critique of Neo-Intuitionism in Contemporary Ethics.

1. Early in the last chapter, moral science was differentiated from ethics, and the ground of this differentiation was that consequences mattered more in collective life than character, social values more than moral virtues. This does not mean, however, that the consideration of consequences does not at all enter into individual moral life. The question of value is inseparable from the question of morals. Ethics in this sense is only the other face of morality. No act, we have seen, can be performed without envisaging, or in disregard of, consequences, and morality has a great deal to do with action though it is often forgotten in these days that man can be moral or immoral in his thought and heart as much as in outward deed. The sin in the flesh is only a copy of the sin in the soul. Thinkers have in the history of thought been sharply divided on the question whether the morality of an action depends more on the consequences produced than on the motive displayed, or *vice versa*. It is usual to denote the subjective determinant of action by the term "right" and the objective outcome by the term "good." Whether right or good is the more fundamental concept is the question often debated with great acerbity.

The Oxford moralists (as they are called) have rendered signal service to the cause of ethics and moral science by the thoroughness and the lucidity with which they have analysed these concepts and tackled every side of the problem raised. In a sense they may be said to have revived the intuitionistic theory of morals and rested it on a more philosophical basis. Most of them agree in criticising the idealistic conception of an end or a system of ends as the ruling conception of moral life,

as well as utilitarianism in all its forms, hedonistic and "ideal" or "rational," and hold that the abstract impersonal concept of right alone contains the key to the solution of moral problems. Idealism and utilitarianism are equally good—in fact, identical—targets for the direction of their critical shafts. There are, however, important differences among them in the interpretation and the application of the concept of right. On the whole, it may be said that this neo-intuitionism in contemporary Great Britain is in perfect keeping with, and a logical development of, the intuitionistic tradition of British Moral Philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Idealism and utilitarianism were cross-currents which in the intervening period interrupted, it would seem, the even flow of the main native stream.

2. Is the rightness of an act a derivative of the goodness of the consequences it brings or tends to bring about, or is it intrinsic to the act itself? To this most fundamental question, Carritt, Prichard and Ross commonly suggest the answer that it is intrinsic to the act and not derived. But this general agreement hides significant differences. Carritt thinks that while rightness is intrinsic to the act, the act can't be right unless it also have some utilitarian (economic) value by way of giving satisfaction to some one. But it is not this giving of satisfaction or satisfyingness which renders the act right. Now this, it seems to me, is refusing to come to grips with the problem. Carritt must answer the straightforward question, Is an act right because it is right in itself, or because it has good consequences or because of both? We may interpret Carritt to mean that having good consequences is a condition of the rightness of an act; "It cannot be right to bring anything about" he writes in one place, "irrespective of all possible cost to ourselves or others and of the rightness of incurring that cost;"¹ and yet he thinks that our belief in the rightness of keeping some promises, paying some debts, etc., *even when more happiness might be produced by not doing these*, is inexpugnable. "Otherwise if the torture of a few victims increased the sum of happiness, we should think it right."² And so he concludes that the rightness of an act cannot be deduced, as hedonism or utilitarianism or self-realisation assumes, from the goodness of the result whether achieved or aimed at. Prichard is even more rigorous in that he

1. *The Theory of Morals*: p. 55.

2. *Ibid*, p. 40.

can see no sort of connection between duty and interest; advantageousness is never the cause or condition of right. In this connection it is necessary to point out that Prichard always means by advantageousness advantageousness to oneself, and by interest, self-interest. That right is not constituted by self-interest in the ordinary sense one may readily admit, though, as Muirhead points out,¹ when the question of the *nature* of interest or profitableness is raised, one cannot make such a ready answer; but does it follow from this that even advantageousness to others does not constitute any element of rightness?

3. Ross on the contrary is generous enough to admit that productivity of happiness is what *makes* right acts right, though it is not the *meaning* of right—it is the other characteristic in virtue of which actions that are right *are* right. He makes a distinction between "optimific" or "felicific" and "bonific" acts; an act is "optimific" when it is supposed to produce the greatest good in the universe; it is "bonific" when it simply produces good consequences in general. Further Ross admits again and again that *prima facie* rightness and wrongness can be judged only in terms of productiveness of beneficial and adverse effects respectively on human beings,² and he distinguishes right acts as such from wrong acts "as being those which, of all those possible for the agent in the circumstances, have the greatest balance of *prima facie* rightness.....over their *prima facie* wrongness....."³ This is how conflict of duties is to be resolved. Now, I ask, does it not follow from this that right acts are those which produce the greatest beneficial effects possible for the agent under the circumstances? And in fact Ross seems to admit as much when he writes: "It is clear that the most we could possibly say is that a large variety of typical acts that are judged right appear, so far as we can trace their consequences, to produce more good than any other acts possible to the agent under the circumstances."⁴ What he denies is (1) that right *means* optimific, and (2) that we can perceive the coextensiveness of the right and the optimific intuitively or prove it either deductively or inductively. But is

1. *Rule and End in Morals*: pp. 24–25.

2. *The Right and the Good*: pp. 9, 11, 31, 33, 39, 41 etc.,

3. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 36. Also p. 162 where Ross even more definitely admits that "when we think of an act as right, we think that either something good or some pleasure for another will be brought into being."

utilitarianism *necessarily* committed to the optimific or felicific theory? Would not "bonificity" be sufficient to establish the theory? Ever since the days of the *Principia Ethica*, it has been the fashion to criticise utilitarianism on this ground, but, it would seem, it should be sufficient to prove the truth of utilitarianism to show that a right act is one which, so far as the agent can calculate, on the whole produces better consequences than other possible acts. If in science we are satisfied with one immediate result as the effect of a given cause, one can see no reason why one should sit calculating an infinite number of effects on an infinite number of persons in infinite time before one performed a moral deed. This is something far worse than even the hedonistic calculus; in fact Ross (and Moore also in this respect) is making practical action itself impossible in moral life. Morality remains still-born and intrinsic goodness (or rightness) alone remains. All that is required therefore to make utilitarianism workable is that we should be able to calculate the general tendencies of actions; this, together with the assumption that human nature is very much the same at all times and all places, should constitute a sufficient basis for us to act upon in practical human morality. The most surprising thing, however, in Ross is that although he admits that where we are under no special obligation, we ought to do what will produce most good, and where we are, the tendency of acts to promote general good is one of the main factors in determining whether they are right,¹ he still asserts that "an act's being optimific is not even the ground of its being right" and that "the question whether they [acts] are optimific has no importance for moral theory."²

Utilitarianism may have many sins to answer for, but the soul of the doctrine that no human act or agency can be called good or right unless it in some way be related to human interests and produce beneficial results, seems to me to be fundamentally sound. Of course not beneficial results simply or alone; else, as Carritt argues, if the torture of a few victims increased the sum of happiness we should think it right. Human act or agency is necessarily connected with intention, with motive, and these as we shall see, will also have to be taken into consideration

1. *Ibid.* p. 39.

2. *Ibid.* p. 37, cf. however p. 47: "..... its (an act's) being the production of an increase in the general welfare is the salient element in the ground of its rightness."

in judging the act; but this granted, it is impossible to subscribe to the doctrine that advantageousness has nothing to do with the rightness of an act and that the question of happiness has no importance for moral theory. Suppose that a garrison is besieged by the enemy and food-stuffs are running short. If the food is divided equally, everyone will get only starvation rations and the fort will have to be given up. But if only the young and the able soldiers get the greater portion of the available food, and the rest starve themselves, the fort can be defended till a time when fresh contingents and fresh food-supply could arrive. Is the adoption of such a policy *in the interest of the freedom of the country* to be condemned? Or suppose that a ship is about to sink and only one single life-boat is at hand in which only a few people can find room. Shall we drown all in the interest of an abstract justice or allow only a majority to be drowned in order that at least a few may be saved? Is not the determining factor in such cases the production of the greatest happiness possible under the circumstances and on the whole?

4. It is duties of perfect obligation, as Kant called them, for example, keeping a promise, paying debts, rewarding merit, etc., that the neo-intuitionists make much of as illustrating their theory of right acts unconnected with good consequences. The reason is that such duties—being in the nature of contracts—represent legality more than morality. Fidelity, reparation, gratitude etc., are all more or less legal in character and do not represent the heart of morality. It is the duties of beneficence and self-improvement that give the lie direct to the contract theory of morals. I believe that Rashdall¹ has proved clearly and conclusively that the duty of justice is unintelligible apart from reference to consequences or ends regarded as good or bad. Laird has exposed in a masterly way² the fallacies lurking in the contention of Ross that we should keep a promise *just* because it was made. But I wish to discuss this question here in general terms. Ross himself admits that a calamity to others may be a sufficient moral reason for breaking a promise.³ He also admits that where I could produce an appreciably larger amount of good by breaking a promise than by keeping it, I am morally justified

1. *The Theory of Good and Evil*.

2. *An Enquiry into Moral Notions*; pp 176—178.

3. *Op. Cit.*: p. 18.

in doing so.¹ How, if a promise, just because it was made, is to be regarded as sacred and inviolable, could I ever be justified in breaking it whatever and however great be the amount of good I realise by so doing? If I am thus justified in breaking it, does this not show that the consideration of productivity of good is more imperious than promise-keeping as such? And if, in cases where there is only a slight disparity of value between the total consequences of keeping a promise and of breaking it, I am not, according to Ross, justified in breaking it, this is again only because consideration of benefit, *viz.*, the belief that the general maintenance of a system of mutual trust and confidence is more important for social welfare than the slight surplus good that may be realised by disregarding such a system in any given instance, prevails in such a case. Was not this system disregarded in the former case where the surplus good was much larger in amount, it may be asked. The truth is, where the surplus good to be realised by breaking a promise is very large, nobody would be led to think that the system of mutual trust is *disregarded*, but only that this rule, like others, has its own exceptions; where, on the contrary, people set aside the rule light-heartedly for all trivial and frivolous reasons, be it once or many times, it would have a very deleterious effect on the mind of the average person who comes to think that promises are made only in order to break them. In view of these fundamental considerations, the moral algebra that Ross works out² to prove the inviolability of promises made in fact proves nothing. And the suppositious case he puts forward of two men dying together alone of whom one has made a promise to the other, is too abstract to admit of any definite answer as to whether 'the promiser has the duty of fulfilling before he dies his promise made to the other. As Laird points out,³ a promise is, by definition, a pledge to perform a service or it is not. In the one case, the promise is to be fulfilled because it is by definition beneficial, whoever might be the beneficiary in this case (it certainly cannot be the dead person); in the other, it is not at all clear that an entirely futile or harmful promise should be kept. Should a person keep a promise made to his enemy that he will blow his brains out, or another to his friend's wife that he will elope with her? Should I return a sword deposited with

1. *Ibid*, p. 35.2. *Ibid*, p. 38.3. *Op. Cit.* p. 177.

me to a person who after depositing it has gone mad, or money to one who in the meantime has become a drunkard and wastrel, while having a large family? It is not a question of greater duties over-riding the smaller ones, as Ross seems to suggest;¹ the question is, are these duties at all? If they are not, what determines that they are not?

It is impossible to put forward a case, however ingeniously conceived, which cannot satisfactorily be explained in terms of benefit, individual or social.

Utilitarianism is often distinguished into "hedonistic" and "ideal." The former has been defended in the chapter on hedonic value in which it was shown that there is no necessary opposition between egoistic and altruistic hedonism or utilitarianism of the type of Mill's or Bentham's theory. It was also maintained therein that ideal utilitarianism was ultimately reducible to hedonistic. Even if it is not (and the question of its connection with hedonism apart), ideal utilitarianism, in so far as it stresses the necessary connection of right with good, would be impregnable, and in this, idealistic doctrines such as self-realisation, the common good etc., emphasising the importance of the conception of a system of ends or purposes as constituting the goal of life, would join hands with utilitarianism. The truth of utilitarianism, in this broad sense, does not, it seems to me, require any special pleading.

5. If good has no part or lot in the constitution of right, what is meant by a right act? What is the nature of rightness? To this the answer suggested by the neo-intuitionists is that rightness, (as goodness on another view) is indefinable, that right is right and there's an end on't. More specifically, the right act, according to Prichard and Joseph, is that which possesses a definite character or characteristic (other than that of being advantageous). This characteristic, Prichard thinks,² is that it is action of a particular kind or class which is indicated by the general words by which we refer to the action, for instance, fulfilling a promise made, looking after our parents etc.. Ross and Carritt hold that right is what we ought to do, the merely obligatory. Now in all this is lurking the belief that we know by intuition, *i. e.*, without reference to consequences,

1. *Op. Cit.* p. 18.

2. What the character is according to Joseph we shall see later on.

that actions of a certain kind are right and their opposites wrong, and this view is again and again attributed by these writers to the ordinary moral consciousness. It is a question whether the moral convictions of our ordinary life are of this type of intuitionism. Even if they were, ordinary moral consciousness, we should say, is uncritical, unreflective, unthinking, not knowing the grounds on which its beliefs rest. It is the task of moral philosophy to elucidate these grounds and thereby to explain or justify the unreflective deliverances of the ordinary moral consciousness. That is the only justification for moral philosophy, and when it begins to rationalise these deliverances, it finds that reference to the conception of some kind of good or desirable end is implicitly contained in moral consciousness and is inextinguishable from it.

Further, the view in question would establish a number of types of duty such as keeping a promise, helping the poor, looking after the aged and the sick etc., as each an independent duty, unique in nature, and thus lead to a moral pluralism of a most chaotic character. For there is no correlation or unification of these duties by a single, general, co-ordinating principle, no one ideal or standard of morality which accounts for the rightness of these different kinds of right act, indeed, no one character common to all right acts as such. Whether actual moral life is thus lived according to a number of such henotheistic types of duty with no centralising, organising, unifying principle to inspire, guide and sustain life as a whole, is again a question.¹

Intuitionism in moral theory bears several meanings, and intuitionistic ethics as a whole (including the moral sense theory as well as the doctrine of fitness) has been criticised so often and ably by idealists and utilitarians alike that I have no desire to repeat a familiar story. I should like to approach the subject here from a different standpoint so as to lead up to what I have got to say on the problem of the relation of right to good.

1. Whether neo-intuitionism should be characterised as perceptual or philosophical is a matter of interpretation. Joseph says that according to this school I ought to keep a promise *because* I have promised (rightness of *particular acts*), not because keeping a promise is right (rightness of *types of act op. cit.*, p. 59). But if so, what are we to understand by the "certain" and "significant" *kinds* of which particular given actions are instances? Both interpretations are applicable to Ross (*op. cit.* pp. 17, 19-20 sqq.)

6. The crux of the neo-intuitionistic criticism of teleological morality is that it involves the distinction between means and end which according to neo-intuitionism is unwarranted and false. This is a question which requires investigation on its own account but here we must attend to the way in which the rejection of this distinction—and ultimately of the conception of purpose—has been utilised in neo-intuitionistic theory. Carritt pleads that we must intuitively judge the whole act to be right or wrong without distinguishing between motive, act, consequences etc.. Acts are not right *because* (the mistake of traditional moral philosophy, according to Prichard!) they *achieve* or *realise* a good or end. There is no way of proving to a man that justice is a duty, for example. He must either see or fail to see that it is a duty. It is not first judged to be best in any other sense than that it is the one we ought to bring about. Ross likewise believes that "An act is not right because it, being one thing, produces good results different from itself; it is right because it is itself the production of a certain state of affairs. Such production is right in itself, apart from any consequence."¹ Now one would like to ask: Are there not cases in which I may do a certain act and yet fail to produce or realise the desired state of affairs? A crying child, in the absence of its mother, must be comforted; I do my best to comfort it, but it won't be. I attempt to save a drowning man, but all my efforts prove in vain. Is there no distinction between act and consequence in these cases? Is my act to be called wrong because in spite of it I could not secure "the production of a certain state of affairs"? If it is not wrong, how is it to be judged morally? Perhaps, according to Ross, it is not, morally speaking, an *act* at all, because it does not include the consequence? If the whole act is to be judged right or wrong, why ought we to bring about a particular state of affairs only and not another?

The truth of the matter is that unless we are prepared to sunder an act into its various elements such as motive, thinking, act, consequence etc., we cannot maintain the primacy of the rightness of an act. We now praise truth-telling because it usually conduces to good results on the whole. Suppose that it usually produced the opposite consequences, would it still be

1. *Ibid*, pp. 46—47.

right? ¹ This is making an impossible supposition, you will say, an impossible abstraction. But that is not the point. Whether such consequences could be produced or not, the question concerns the *reason* for calling the act right. In a different universe with different laws, as Moore would say, such opposite consequences might conceivably be produced. What then? If the moral judgment were an analytic judgment, saying that truth-telling *can* or *should* produce only such and such consequences, we could emphasise the nature of truth-telling alone and ignore the consequences as unimportant for judging the action. But as there is no such necessary connection between an act and its consequence, as the moral judgment is only a synthetic judgment, ² the consequences that we connect with the act are important (for they might conceivably be otherwise) and it is upon them that we base our judgment of the act.

But if we are still dissatisfied with this result and think that the rightness of an act does not depend upon its producing a better state of things than would be produced by not doing it, this can only be from the standpoint of the willing, the motive, of the agent who foresees the usual consequences of the act, judges them to be good or bad, and decides and acts accordingly. Hence not the consequences as such, but *willing* them, the adoption of a certain *motive*, would count in judging an act to be right or wrong.

7. And just here we light upon the crucial point in neo-intuitionistic theory. The neo-intuitionists put up their hands in horror at the suggestion that motive has anything to do with the rightness of an act. Carritt, for example, distinguishes a right act as that which is right in itself, a duty, from a moral act which is an act done because it is *thought* right, *i.e.*, with the motive of its rightness. He holds that the doing of a right act which is not also either moral or virtuous (*i.e.*, done from a kind of desire leading to right action) has little value. And yet he concludes that the whole value of a moral act depends on the belief that it is

1. Carritt says: "The goodness 'produced' by truth-telling may reside wholly in the telling of truth which we cannot distinguish from its expected hearing by others" (*op. cit.* p. 72). If we can't distinguish the one from the other, then why say that goodness wholly resides in the telling? It may reside partly in the one and partly in the other. Surely, *uttering* words, *oral communication*, is intended to be heard by others?

2. Provisionally we shall say so; it will receive a qualification later on.

really right. That is, while the motive of rightness or thinking the act to be right certainly makes the act *moral* or have moral value, this rightness itself is independent of the motive, and it is this independent or intrinsic rightness of the act that confers value on our thinking it to be right. Prichard similarly believes that to be morally bound is to be bound to do something, and even were we to do it from the lowest of motives, we should still have done something which we ought to have done. The question of motive is independent of the question of rightness or wrongness; but it has a bearing on the question of the goodness of the act, i.e., on the question of its value. Joseph likewise holds that while an agent may know that an act is productive of good results, he may do it either for this reason, in which case his act would be *moral*, or for a different reason and then the act would still be right but not moral. But it is in Ross that we find the culmination of this strange doctrine. Right simply means that which ought to be done, and an act that ought to be done is not the same as a morally good act. Not only so, since a morally good act is an act that proceeds from a good motive, nothing that ought to be done, i.e., that is a duty, is morally good. What is morally good is never right or a duty. He further distinguishes between act as the thing done, the initiation of change, and action which is the doing of it, the initiating a change, from a certain motive; so that we could talk of a right act but not of right action (for right is independent of motive) and of a good action but not of a good act. It further follows from this that the doing of a right act may be a morally bad action, and the doing of a wrong act may be morally a good action.¹

8. One or two preliminaries require to be touched upon first. If a moral act is to be distinguished from a right act on the ground that it involved also thinking the act to be right, what exactly is the relation of thinking or belief to the rightness of the act? A right act is right in itself apart from consequences and apart from my thinking of it to be right. But what precisely does my thinking of it to be right here come to? I can intuitively, i.e., without assigning any grounds, perceive one act to be right and another to be wrong, or blindly believe it to be the case on

1. In spite of all these paradoxes, Ross admits in one place that "what we ought to do depends to a large extent on the goodness or the badness of the things we can in our acts bring into being (*The Right and the Good*: p. 102, italics mine).

the authority of sacred text or priestly injunction or immemorial tradition ; but if I am to *think* or logically *believe* or *know* the act to be right, surely I should have some grounds to go upon, and what can they be? Besides being an act of a particular kind, such as promise-making, the act must possess certain other attributes either intrinsic or extrinsic. We are not told what intrinsic characters right acts possess and we are forbidden to look at the extrinsic characters such as the consequences. In such a case, what difference does the mere thinking. *i.e.*, imagining, an act to be right make to the moral value of the act?

Further, in moral life, "I think this course of action is right" is not different from "It *is* right," just as in practical life "I think X is my friend," is different from saying "X *is* my friend." For whether my knowledge is based upon acceptance of the views of the community I live in, or upon my own reflection (supposing that I have sufficiently reflected), I can consider an action right only on the basis of the knowledge I possess at the present moment, and so what *is* right is constituted by what I *think* to be right, or what the communal self in me thinks to be right. I have no access to any other kind of right. The thinking and the being right are here identical. But—this would be the consequence of accepting the distinction under question—what I or others think to be right may not coincide with what is "absolutely" or "in itself" right (if such a thing exists). That is known only to the high gods, and there is no use of my concerning myself with it in any manner. What then is the good of drawing a distinction which cannot be translated into the terms of practical moral life? What is the point in talking about a right which must for ever remain unknown to me? .

There is thus an irreducible subjectivity about moral knowledge which cannot be converted to objectivity. There is of course an irreducible subjectivity in *all* knowledge, as we saw in the chapter on Intellectual Value, owing to the fact that we have got to think always in human-mental terms. But, it was there contended, a certain measure of objectivity is possible in logical knowledge by virtue of the fact that people have commonly agreed to denote certain things by the names they have come to use for them. Is not this same kind and measure of objectivity possible in morals? It is, but then we cannot talk of a right-in-itself.

Objective rightness, then, in the sense of a right-in-itself, does not exist. It is a more unreal notion than objective goodness which at least refers to consequences thought of as good (though even this, as we have seen, is fundamentally relative). Subjective rightness meaning rightness of motive, willing certain consequences taken to be good, is intelligible and a reality. (Subjective and objective in this connection, it is necessary to remark, refer, not to the question whether each individual thinks an act to be right or good for himself or all people think so, but to the question whether rightness or goodness belongs to the act or its consequences on the one hand or to the agent's mind on the other). It is the failure to differentiate between subjective rightness (or "righteousness" as we may call it) and objective goodness meaning goodness of consequences (not objective rightness) that has led neo-intuitionists like Carritt to say that even when a wrong act is done from the moral motive that it is thought right, it would have full moral value.

The strange thing in Carritt, Prichard, and Ross is that whereas ordinary moral consciousness (to appeal to an authority to which they always appeal) takes motive as constituting the rightness of an act and goodness as belonging to consequences, *they* determine goodness by the motive (as referring to which an act becomes moral or otherwise) and rightness by the consideration that the right act is one which ought to be done irrespective of motive. And only a moral act has *value*, and goodness and value are identical, so that a right act may not be (decidedly is not, according to Ross) moral and a moral act may not be right.

9. Now to come to the heart of the contention that rightness has nothing to do with motive which is concerned only with goodness. Ross brings forward two arguments to prove this thesis.¹ If right (meaning morally good) equals "I ought," and "I ought" implies "I can," I cannot always produce a motive to order, and when I do not have the required motive in a given case, there is no meaning in saying that I ought to act from that motive. And even when I do have the required motive, it is not my *duty* to act from it. Motive never forms part of the content of our duty.² In reply, it may be pointed out, firstly, that simply because in some cases an agent does not have the required

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6

2. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

motive for moral action, it does not follow that even when he has it, it is not his duty to act from it. It is like saying that because it is not the duty of a person to pay a debt when he is absolutely destitute and a pauper (for ought implies can), it cannot be his duty to pay it when he gets money either. If a person can do his duty and do it with a good motive also, can we say that "what is morally good is never right?"¹ Does the presence of a good motive take away from the rightness of an act? Secondly, while it is true that motives cannot be produced to order immediately, it is not true that motives cannot be produced at all and that it is not our duty to cultivate the habit of acting as far as possible from good motives. Rational reflection and volition have a great influence upon our desires and emotions and the theory of self-creation is based on the possibility of such transformation of the affective by the cognitive and the conative aspects of mental life. If we do not believe in such possible reformation, we may as well bid good-bye to morality. And what the theory of motives demands when it says that one ought to act from a good motive is that one must so culture one's impulses and desires that one will always be able to act from the proper motive on a given occasion. Where the proper motive is not present, the minimum of morality is, of course, that one ought to do the act irrespective of motive.

Kant well knew that the culture of emotions and impulses is not an easy task to achieve and that if we always insisted on the presence of a proper motive for a moral act to be done, morality would be in jeopardy. He therefore laid it down that apart from a motive of passion or emotion which cannot always be relied upon, morality requires the motive of *duty* for the performance of a moral act in all cases. An act is moral only when it is done, not simply in accordance with, but from the sense of, duty. To this Ross brings forward the objection that it leads to a *regressus ad infinitum*: "It is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty to do act A from the sense etc.." This regress is interestingly similar to that other absurd *ad infinitum* which we examined in Perry regarding the relation of cognition of value to the existence of value. Here as well as there, there is really no regress *in thought* but only in a deliberately worded clever mode of statement. We must distinguish here between

1. *Ibid.* p. 4.

(1) the sense of duty as a feeling or at least as a mental accompaniment of action; (2) doing the act simply or doing the duty; and (3) doing the act *from* a sense of duty. Now the *act* of duty is different from the *sense* of duty. This latter is of two forms. There, in the first place the general consciousness of duty as such, of oughtness or obligation, which is presupposed in every being capable of morality. It is innate in a moral person though it may require to be cultivated. Secondly, there is the consciousness of specific duties arising out of particular situations. This sense of a specific duty may or may not exist in a given person. The former helps the growth of the latter. Further, what is the *act* of duty which is to be done from a sense of duty? Ross starts with the statement that "it is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty to do act A," and believing that the whole expression here is in contradiction with a part of itself, he fears that any attempt to amend the latter part of the expression so as to bring it into accord with the whole, would result in the alleged regress. Now according to Ross' statement there seems to be two moral duties here, *viz.*, (1) act A which is my duty (and which is expressed in the latter part of the statement); and (2) doing act A from the sense that it is my duty to do it (which is expressed in the former part). And since in any concrete situation there is only one moral duty to do, the formulation of the situation in such a fashion as to make it appear that there are two duties, naturally makes the whole thing absurd, and any attempt to correct the absurdity leads to an infinite regress. As a matter of fact, there is only one proper *i.e.*, moral, duty here, *viz.*, doing act A. Doing it from a sense of duty is not another or an additional duty supervening upon the first, but the same duty done in a particular light; for we must admit that duties can be done in different ways. A debt may be paid with anger in the debtor's heart against the creditor, or with gratitude, or with the sense that it is the proper thing to do, *i.e.*, the sense of duty, or with no mental accompaniment at all, *i.e.*, with indifference. What the Kantian moralist contends is that paying the debt in the third manner, with the consciousness that it is the proper thing to do, *i.e.*, that it is a specific duty, alone makes the act *moral*; otherwise the payment may be purely *legal*, or it may be a purely *natural* act, as when a man is prompted by natural impulses of grati-

tude, love etc.. Thus understood, there is nothing absurd in holding that it is our duty to act from certain motives, particularly the sense of duty. The sense of duty here from which the act is to be done is not the general sense of duty but the sense *that this particular given thing is a duty*. Granted the presence of this sense in the agent's mind, the thing becomes a *moral* duty. Otherwise, the act may be done in any of the other ways specified above, and then it would be merely a legal or a natural duty done. In any case a duty it remains, as that which is the proper thing to do, and so right also. But this duty, propriety or right has nothing moral about it, in the strict sense of the term. It is purely a legal or natural right, so to say (not, however, independent of the goodness of consequences). Hence in Ross' statement, "it is my duty to do act A" signifies only a non-moral, may be legal, duty; "from the sense that...A" signifies the transformation of this legal into a moral duty proper. Consequently, there is no regress here.

The whole mischief relating to the regress arises because of the form "It...that...", particularly the that-clause. If we should state the same thought in the form, for instance, "I must do act A from the sense of its (i.e., the act's) being my duty," where only one doing and one moral duty appear to view, the whole regress disappears. Moreover this kind of regress arises, *pace* Ross' opinion to the contrary, whatever other motive we substitute for the sense of duty. If I say, for example, "It is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is pleasant to do act A," the same formal contradiction (here between "It is my-pleasure-to-do-act-A" and "It is my-duty-to-do-act-A-from-the-sense-that-it-is-pleasant-to-do-act-A"), the same amendment, and the same regress, follow.¹ Finally, after arguing so subtly against the connection of motive with right or duty, Ross, all unconsciously perhaps, admits not only that it is possible to act from the sense of duty but that "the man who acts from sense of duty" is "the better man."² Again, "the man who acts from a sense of duty without fuss or conflict appears to be a better character than the man who acts from inclination without any thought of duty."³ Well he might make these admissions, for otherwise why cultivate the sense of duty

1. Not only so, but as Mr. P. Leon has shown in his article on "Right Action and Motives" (*Philosophy* VIII, pp. 196-197), the same *ad infinitum* arises with regard to knowing, rejoicing, willing etc..

2. *Ibid*, p. 164.

3. *Ibid*, p. 165.

upon which he so strongly insists? Or shall we say that, motive being connected in Ross only with goodness but never with right, the better man is the man who never does right? The Kantian dualism between sense and thought, reason and feeling, duty and desire, good will and consequence, is reinstated here more vigorously still as the separation of right from good.

10. The (to say the least of it) surprising consequence of such a separation is that rightness, although intrinsic to the act, has, according to Ross, no moral value. The right act may produce good or bad consequences, but the world would be neither better for the first, nor worse for the second, kind of consequences. While the right act may be instrumentally good as producing good consequences, it has no intrinsic goodness or value. (Carritt, however, is prepared to denominate the intrinsic rightness of an act as itself its goodness¹). This is again the natural result of the fallacious distinction in morals between what is *in itself* right and what is *thought* right, *ie.*, done with the motive of rightness or duty. Why one should do a right which is without value and which in no way affects the balance of goodness in the world is a question which can be smothered only by the interests of a theory.

Joseph gives an example to show how Ross' position at least comes to be plausible.² But he himself gives the sufficient reply to this appearance of plausibility when he next raises the question of why, if the right act were in itself valueless, and the world in no way a better place for its being done, should X judge that he *ought* to reveal the scheme to the governor? This question discloses the truth that there is no right in itself apart from the production of some value in the world (though in the mind of Joseph the value need not necessarily pertain to consequences but to an inherent goodness in the act). If this be granted, it follows further that there can be no right apart from motive either, for if the addition of some value to the world is contemplated by the agent, that by itself forms the motive for his action. Suppose that his motive in revealing the secret was not the betterment of society but the base one of his own promotion; Joseph says that he would still, in divulging it, have done a right action, but no longer one morally good. Whether

1. *The Theory of Morals*: p. 72.

2. *Some Problems in Ethics*: pp. 31-33.

his action in such a case should be called strictly right at all is a question we shall consider in the sequel.

11. Motive then (along with consequences) is indispensable to constitute the rightness of an action. The refusal to admit this truth in the interest of a radically pluralistic intuitionism or deontology is the source of all the difficulties and perplexities in neo-intuitionism. Admitting the importance of motive or end need not, as will be shown later, mean admitting the supremacy of the teleological, or sacrificing the significance of the deontological, point of view. However, before undertaking to show how this is possible, one more perplexity of neo-intuitionism must be examined. Neo-intuitionists like Prichard and Ross are anxious to ask—and to attempt to answer—the question, what makes right acts right? The question is important for Prichard mainly because even asking a question like this implies according to him that the questioner already *knows* what particular actions are right, and he only wants to find out what the character is which is common to all right actions. Even the very asking of the question as well as the attempting to answer it thus implies according to Prichard the truth of deontological intuitionism. But such a question, he thinks, cannot be raised, for every right action has its own character of being such and such an action, for example, fulfilling the promise we made to X yesterday, or looking after our parents etc., and no one generalised character can describe them all fittingly. There is no moral universal like conduciveness to happiness, self-realisation, self-creation etc.. That this is not true, that morality has its own universal like freedom or self-creation, a universal which finds room for particulars, i.e., from which the rightness of particular acts can be deduced, has been abundantly shown. But it is necessary to point out that Prichard's assumption that the very possibility of asking a question like what makes right acts right implies that the questioner knows already what particular acts are right, is unjustified. It is possible for a person to know *something* of just acts or right acts so as to be able to identify them in some cases at least. May be from hearsay or tradition or custom or public opinion, he may have dimly come to feel that some acts are right and some others wrong; but he may not know enough of or sufficiently about the matter so as to be able to declare always with assurance that a given case of acting is right or another

wrong. For aught he knows, some acts that he or his friends supposed to be *prima facie* right (to use Ross' expression) might turn out finally to be wrong, and *vice versa*. All this is possible precisely because he is not in possession of that universal character which makes actions right, he is not aware of the *kinds* of right act and wrong act. It is not from particular just acts that we derive the notion of justice—Plato is constantly upbraiding this method—but we start with an idea of justice on grounds of common experience of life and society, and, working out its implications, see how it applies to concrete particular cases.

It strikes me that neo-intuitionists like Prichard and Ross, while all along appealing to the plain moral consciousness, deliberately state questions in a wrong and misleading manner so as to get support for their theories. We seldom ask, what makes *right* acts right, but usually, what makes *acts* right? We seldom ask, what makes good people good, but ordinarily, what makes people good? To ask, what makes right acts right, *seems* to imply that we know already what the particular acts which are right are (though this is not the case), and that we now want to know only the criterion by which we can determine the presence or the absence of rightness in given cases. To ask, on the contrary, what makes acts right, is to ask for the meaning or the nature of rightness as such. And unless we know beforehand what the notion of rightness is or means, we cannot say what kinds of act are right and what kinds wrong. And this meaning or nature of rightness is not made clear by Prichard or Ross except by saying that right is what ought to be done, for they do not believe that right can be explained in terms of any other notion. (But "obligatoriness," as Joseph has maintained, is not a character of actions; there is no "ought-to-be-doneness" of actions; that an act is obligatory simply means that the doing of it is obligatory on me). Hence they naively ask, what makes right acts right? But the fact that the question more usually asked is, what makes acts right, which is the same thing as, what *is* a right act, clearly belies the intuitionistic position, for this question tells us that men may not know what particular acts are right, and if they would know this, they need to know beforehand the meaning or nature of rightness.¹

1. But see later, section 20, for an answer to Ross' question, "What Makes Right Acts Right?"

Ross' answer to the question, what makes right acts right, is revealing in many respects. He sums up his answer in words which have already been quoted and whose gist is that the right act is one which, of all the acts possible for the agent under the circumstances, is likely to produce the greatest balance of good over evil.¹ Productivity of good then is what makes right acts right, *i.e.*, (on our interpretation) the test or criterion of right acts. Even according to Ross and Prichard, it is not of course the meaning of rightness, but the strange thing is that Ross appears to forget this and states it as the *universal nature* of all acts that are right²—their "general character" as he elsewhere calls it.³ Productivity of good cannot obviously and on his own showing describe the nature of right but only its cause or condition. Apart from this, however, the point is that the answer brings out unmistakably the universal and invariable connection between rightness and productivity of the best possible consequences—a connection which Ross so persistently denies.⁴ As a matter of fact in one place⁵ he goes to the extent of saying that in all types of duty—in the thought of any duty—there is involved the thought that "what the dutiful act is the origination of is either any objective good or a pleasure . . . for some one else." And it falsifies of course Prichard's repeated assertion that duty has nothing to do with interest or advantageousness (not necessarily one's own). The point comes home with added significance in Carritt who, for all his severance of right from good, admits that the existence of desires in the world is the presupposition of there being not only any merit but duty also.⁶ If there were no desires in the world, or interests as we should say, duty and right and moral action would be meaningless and impossible conceptions. But when desires are thus insisted upon they cannot be understood apart from some good which they realise or should realise.

12. When Ross turns to consider the nature of individual right acts the difficulties of his view—particularly the implicit connection of right with good lurking in it—come into clearer relief. He holds, it must be remembered, that neither motive nor

1. In this respect one can hardly see the difference between Ross' standpoint and Moore's "ideal utilitarianism" which he (Ross) professes to criticise; *ibid*, p. 16 sqq.

2. *Ibid*, p. 41 (*italics mine*).

5. *Ibid*, p. 162.

3. *Ibid*, p. 16.

6. *Op. Cit.* p. 134.

4. *Ibid*, pp. 34-39.

consequence affects the rightness of an act and that act means the act as fulfilled, the production of a certain state of affairs, the thing done or the initiation of change. In consonance with these beliefs, he maintains that what is obligatory on me when I have promised to return a book to a friend is not the aiming at my friend's reception of the book, nor doing that which is likely to produce the result, nor even doing that which will actually produce the result, but actually putting the book into my friend's possession, or securing my friend's reception of the book. That which is right is right, he has told us, not because it is an act, one thing, which will produce another thing different from itself, *viz.*, some good result; it is right because it is itself the production of a certain state of affairs. Therefore doing that which is *likely to produce* the result is not what is obligatory on me. Nor is it even doing that which will actually produce the result, for this, while sound enough in emphasising the fulfilled act or the thing done, is wrong in implying that our duty is what we do *directly*, the packing up and posting of the book, for instance. Rightness does not belong to what I *do directly*, considered in its own nature, it belongs to my act *qua* being an ensuring of one of the particular states of affairs of which it is an ensuring, *viz.*, in this case, of my friend's receiving of the promised book.

The neo-intuitionists rage against utilitarianism and idealism as doctrines of ends or purposes in moral life, but the above view of Ross is utilitarianism run riot. What I do has no moral significance in itself, but only because of its consequences—the actual securing of the book by my friend, for instance. It is true that Ross objects to such a sundering of the act and its consequences and considers the whole act—the act as fulfilled or completed in its consequences—as the act that is right. The practical effect of such a doctrine, however, is to glorify the consequences, for unless the intended consequences—the receiving of the book by my friend—ensue, the act is neither complete nor right. What is this but an exaggerated version of utilitarianism—welcoming by the back-door a doctrine unceremoniously hustled out through the front? Ross is naively upholding the theory of Mill that intention, not motive, is what counts for the rightness of an act. But Mill misinterpreted motive as meaning only a feeling which accompanies the performance

of an act, whereas in reality motive stands for the end as willed, the desire chosen, by the agent. On this interpretation, Mill's intention would include the motive of the idealists as well, for it denotes all the consequences which flow from an action and which could have been anticipated by the agent, while motive refers only to the end, or the thought of a desirable end. A motive is that consequence *for the sake of which* an act is done, intention includes this as well as other consequences *in spite of which* an act is done. Hence in agreeing that "much the most plausible" account of a right action is that which says that "acts are never right by their own nature but by virtue of the goodness of their actual results,"¹ Ross is in effect upholding the doctrine of consequences in its most naked form though he rejects the significance of *direct doing*.

It seems to me that such a view is nothing short of a travesty of morality. I bring up my son in the best manner that my circumstances and lights allow, and yet he turns out a wastrel, a ne'er-do-well in the end. I have not succeeded in making him a worthy son or citizen. Have I failed to do my duty, then? The "rightists" should say, yes. I plunge into a river in order to save a drowning person, but my efforts to save him prove unsuccessful. Have I failed to do my duty? I owe a duty to myself in the matter of improving myself. In spite of hard attempts I fail, luck being against me. Is my action wrong? Take even a contract case (such cases are peculiarly apposite to support neo-intuitionism). Regulus promised to the Carthagenians that he would return to Carthage. Suppose that when he was half-way to Carthage, some one kidnapped him and took him to some country other than Rome and there prevented him from ever going to Carthage. Here has Regulus done his duty or not? Or consider a simpler case. To a friend of mine who is in America, I promise to send information of a particular kind within one month of the date of promise. Suppose further that the information is of such a nature that after this date it would be absolutely of no use to my friend. I first send a letter by ordinary post and then another by air-mail to make assurance doubly sure. Unfortunately both the letters miscarry and my

1. *Ibid.* p. 43. On p. 44, Ross interprets the utilitarian's position in such a manner that even the appearance of its difference from his own doctrine disappears.

friend does not receive the information in time.¹ Have I failed in my duty? Even in the case of Ross' book, suppose that that is the only copy of the book available and I send it by registered acknowledged post, and on the way it is accidentally destroyed, say, by fire. Have I done my duty or not?

Such cases—which could easily be multiplied—make it amply clear that if *securing* the result required were to be my duty in every case, morality would be still-born. On the contrary, *trying* to secure it, to the best of my lights and ability, is my duty. If "ought" implies "can," how, I ask, can actually securing the result (which is beyond my control) be my duty? Why, if the actual securing of the result be my duty, does the law consider it sufficient, in the matter of contracts, to notify offer and acceptance by posting a registered letter merely and not by securing the receipt of the letter by the party concerned?

"We get the curious consequence that however carelessly I pack or dispatch the book, if it comes to hand I have done my duty, and however carefully I have acted, if the book does not come to hand, I have not done my duty." This is further confirmed, thinks Ross, by the consideration that if the book does not come to hand, I have still got to send another copy, while if it does, I have not got to send another.

Nothing can be a clearer confession of the failure of neo-intuitionism. An uncriticised intuitionism runs into an uncritical utilitarianism. If, spite of my carelessness, the book reaches the party—suppose that it is stolen by a thief and is restored to the rightful owner by the police—I have emphatically *not* done my duty (morally speaking), only my friend is lucky, that is all. And if I have not got to send another book—this is doubtful in the case above supposed—that only brings out the more clearly the purely legal, contractual, character of such acts.

Even duties of imperfect obligation are interpreted by Ross in the above manner. When Ross emphasises the intrinsic rightness of a certain type of act not depending on its consequences but on its own nature, he is making an odd use of Kant's doctrine of duty for duty's sake, in order to hit utilitarianism; when he insists on the actual securing of the result as constituting the rightness of an act, he is out-doing

1. We may even suppose that as an incidence of war cables to the new world are cut off so that even this last source of communication fails!

Mill in order to have a fling at Kantian rationalism.

13. The defects of Ross' view may be summarised as follows :—

- (1) Its rejection (in this being one with utilitarianism) of motive as important for duty.
- (2) Its rejection (in this going against utilitarianism) of the distinction between an act which is most likely to secure a result and the actual securing of that result, as having a bearing on the rightness of an act.

In both these respects we must go back to Kant.

- (3) Its rejection of an end or universal ideal as necessary for morality (in this going against the "ideal utilitarianism" of Rashdall, Moore, Green etc.) and accepting only intuitional pluralism (rightness of particular kinds of act intrinsic to those kinds).

Ross' insistence that rightness has a unique nature irreducible to goodness is quite sound, but the grounds that he urges to maintain its uniqueness are not sound. Morality—and rightness—cannot be saved unless we sunder an act into motive, act and consequence. Such a severance is not incompatible with the integrity of the act and is actually called for by the demands of moral life. But before this view can be substantiated, a brief examination of one more thinker of the neo-intuitionistic school seems necessary.

14. Of all the current views in the contemporary revival of intuitionistic ethics, that of H. W. B. Joseph is the least unsatisfactory.¹ His improvement upon Ross, Prichard and Carritt consists in that he refuses to countenance the view that an act may be right apart from all reference to motive and that a right act can be right without having any goodness or moral value. While rejecting these extraordinary theses of the neo-intuitionists, he does not, however, fall into the camp of the

1. Whether he can properly be classed among the neo-intuitionists is itself a question. He strikes the note of the Return (as Muirhead calls it) more than that of the Reaction.

utilitarians, old or new; he is opposed to the view that rightness is merely conduciveness to good results. His positive doctrine brings him into close quarters with the idealistic tradition, but he reaches that position through a meandering course of argument started by the question: How to maintain that obligation is neither derived from the goodness merely of the consequences of the action to which I am obliged, nor yet independent of relation to any goodness?¹

Joseph also accepts the distinction between a right act and a moral act; but the distinction turns for him upon whether an agent, knowing that an act is productive of good results, does it for this reason, in which case his act is right and moral, or does it knowingly for a different non-moral or even immoral reason, in which case his act would still be right indeed but not moral.² Thus productiveness of good results is one reason for an act's being called right (it is evidently not the *meaning* of right, but whether it is the *cause* of right is not made clear by Joseph). An act, however, may also be right without being productive of good results. In this case, its rightness means its having an intrinsic goodness which is related to the agent's motive.³ In both these accounts of right, Joseph ranges himself against Carritt, Prichard, Ross, and others of the neo-intuitionistic school, for these hold that rightness is neither causally related to good results nor related to any kind of intrinsic goodness (*i.e.*, goodness of motive.)

What is meant by this intrinsic goodness which is not the goodness of results produced? A man is hungry and he eats food; he finds a child in distress and he comforts it. There is no question here of means and end or of a causal relation between means and end. Eating to satisfy hunger is doing it for its own sake. No line need be drawn between action as such and some consequences which are expected to follow from it.⁴ In so far, Joseph agrees with the neo-intuitionists. But his development of this doctrine takes him away from the camp of the neo-intuitionists. Joseph's argument, which is rather complex and involved, may be summarised thus. No act could be right apart from some motive or other.⁵ An act necessarily implies a motive, for a motiveless action would be merely move-

1. *Op.cit.* p. 27.

2. *Ibid.* p. 28.

3. *Ibid.* p. 28.

4. *Ibid.* p. 29.

5. *Ibid.* IV, pp. 37-44.

ment of bodies. There may be unconscious motives, so to say, but this only means that mind works purposively at lower levels than is commonly thought. And to constitute an action right, the motive, moreover, must be a good motive. The motive, however, may be related to action in several ways. A man might perceive the good consequences of his action and yet do it not because of these consequences but for some other reason or motive. Here the action would indeed be right (because productive of good results) but not moral. Or he might do it just because of these consequences ; but this, (though Joseph does not say so) involves conflict, deliberation, and choice of a particular desire (because of the good results to be produced) after rejection of contrary desires etc.. That is, it would be a case of duty proper where a man feels a sense of obligation to bring about a particular state of affairs rather than another because of the enrichment of the world thereby. Thus the rightness of an action, depending as it ordinarily does upon motive and consequences, is yet to be distinguished from my obligation to do it because of this rightness, for obligation arises only when I choose a better result in place of a worse in a conflict of impulses.¹ Or again, a man might perform the same act without reference to consequences at all, simply because he is moved by a strong desire to do the kindly deed, which prevails over other desires, or because upon consideration he prefers the former to the latter. In either of these two cases, he might never ask himself which course of action he ought to do, nor therefore be moved by a sense of duty ; his action would not therefore be moral but would still be right, and that because of his motive.² If instead of simply preferring here one impulse to another or being moved by it, he hesitates, being uncertain whether to choose this or that, and after deliberation resolves the conflict by the sense that he ought to do the right, then he would act morally as well as rightly. This also, one should suppose, is a case of duty.³ Finally a man may do an act without having any kindly or other good impulse or even without any sense of duty as above explained. That is to say, he may have no sense of duty in general but only be conscious of "a duty to realise a goodness connected with the particular principle of the action which is recognised as his duty

1. *Ibid*, pp. 34-35.2. *Ibid*, p. 47.3. *Ibid*, p. 47.

now, though he may have no desire to do the action which this principle requires."¹ Duty always arises only in a particular situation and in order to be obliged, one must be conscious of the situation and all the relations in it. Consciousness of obligation, in its primary and direct form, is thus consciousness of a determinate obligation to do this act here and now.² A man may generalise such particular situations and thereby evolve for himself the notion of universal duty or obligation, but that is secondary.³ And in the consciousness of a determinate obligation, there need be no sense of "I ought" at all; the thought of himself acting thus in this situation may be a sufficient goad to move him to action, and the thought of this goad or "urgency" is a motive as much as affection or gratitude is.⁴ There need be no sense of duty in general, we have said, in such cases; it must now be added that there need be no *feeling* of obligation either, unless when a contrary inclination is stirred.⁵ Nevertheless consciousness, understanding of obligation—of a particular obligation, that is—there will be, and that understanding or thought is enough to "move" him to action. In short, "acting rightly is being moved by the thought, being moved by which makes the act right, to do the action," and "being moved by this thought is being obliged."⁶ It is a self-realising process in that the thought of effecting some new state of affairs gradually fulfils itself in action or execution.⁷ The agent need not think how he ought to act before he acts.⁸

15. Before we proceed further in the exposition of Joseph's positive views, we must pause and see what has emerged from the above labyrinthine argument. Joseph is using the terms "duty" and "obligation" in a sense which they do not ordinarily bear. Ordinarily duty is taken to involve a conflict between reason and inclination, and obligation a feeling of compulsion almost amounting to pain. The feeling of compulsion is not an indispensable element in the notion of obligation, any more than a conflict is necessary to constitute duty. A man may simply be *aware* that his duty is one thing and his inclination another and choose the path of duty without feeling any conflict in his inner being. Likewise the sense of obligation need not necessarily be a

1. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 48.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 54.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-57.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

feeling of pain. But what appears doubtful in Joseph's argument is his contention that a man may have no sense of duty or obligation in general and yet be conscious of "a duty to realise a goodness connected with the particular principle of the action which is recognised as his duty now" although there may be no *inclination* to do the act required. How, one is tempted to ask, can a person be conscious of any particular act as a *duty* at all unless the notion of what it is to be a duty is already active and presupposed in him? And what is the import of a "sense of duty" to which it is immaterial whether the agent thinks how he ought to act or not? He may certainly be impelled by a strong desire which overrides other desires to do a particular deed and in doing it not think at all how he ought to act. But there is no "sense of duty" of any kind in such an action. And the kind of obligation that Joseph is upholding is free from any kind of desire or inclination. And, what is a different aspect of the same question, how can we say that an action in which desire has no part or lot and which the agent performs thoughtlessly (for that is what "whether he thinks how he ought to act or not" amounts to) is a *motivated* action, and, least of all, a right action? Joseph understands by a motive in this connection simply that which "moves" to action, and that which moves to action is simply the *thought* of doing the action,¹ and being moved by this thought is what makes the act right and the obligation thereof.² In other words, Joseph is reinstating Kant's belief that the mere *thought* of duty is sometimes sufficient to impel a man to the performance of duty. But he is reinstating it in an attenuated form, for it is now freed from the context of conflict with inclination which is of the essence of Kant's conception of duty, and as such, it cannot present itself to the agent as a duty at all and much less have the "urgency" to move him to action. Unless desire or inclination is in some form present in the "thought" of an action, mere thought cannot move to action. A motive is *an end thought of as desirable and therefore chosen*, it is essentially a desire resolved upon. Since this desire aspect is absent in Joseph's conception of obligation, it cannot properly speaking form a motive at all.

Joseph thinks that the mere urgency in the thought of duty

1. *Ibid*, pp. 51, 53.

2. *Ibid*, p. 54.

makes the act done from a sense of it an act done from a sense of obligation. Anything that presses on our mind with some urgency or force obliges us of course to realise it in action, but can this be called obligation in the moral sense of the term, particularly as it is free from any consciousness of a contrary inclination as well as from the sense that "I ought" to do this? Is it not action merely on the ideo-motor level—in spite of the "thought" of the action involved in it—to which ethical terms are inapplicable? Such an action is "right" according to Joseph, although it is not moral. Here is the meeting-point in fundamentals between Joseph and the other neo-intuitionists. Merely being moved by the thought of the action to be done makes the act right, thinks Joseph, for this being moved supplies the motive to the action so sorely needed and found lacking in Prichard, Carritt and Ross by Joseph. I must fulfil a promise made to A and it is right, says Ross, simply because I have made the promise. Here also, one can presume the presence of the "thought" of the promise made (Ross explicitly says so¹) and the thought would certainly influence action with some urgency. If this is the real analysis of the matter, the kind of motive desiderated by Joseph—to wit, the urgency of the thought of the action—may be taken to be present in Ross and others also, (who, when they denied motive for the rightness of an act, did not mean this kind of motive) and then the difference between Joseph and them would be more verbal than real. Joseph, along with them, is saying in effect that my taking Paul to see the race is right because I have promised to take him there. It is clear that such a view will not secure the rightness of the action. The rightness of an action is secured for Joseph merely by the urgency of the thought of the action;² if so, even the thought of a wicked action usually works with terrific urgency in the mind of the wicked agent; should we therefore think the action right? If it is said that only a good motive can constitute rightness, what makes a motive good is not explained when in particular reference to consequences is ruled out.

1. *Op. cit.* p. 17.

2. *Op. cit.* p. 51. Curiously enough, however, he writes on pp. 57–58: "This urgency of what we feel obliged to do connects with a consciousness that it is better to act thus at the sacrifice of inclination than *vice versa*." Is not the sense of "I ought" as well as that of "how I ought" to act, present here?

In fact, Ross' position, in this respect, is more defensible than Joseph's, for he at least recognises the necessity of the consciousness of "I ought" in doing a right act,¹ which Joseph completely dispenses with. How then can a person, devoid of the consciousness of "I ought" and without deliberating upon how he ought to act, be moved by "the sense of the rightness of some particular principle of action" to the action required by which, in the actual situation, he may have no inclination even? Joseph seems to think that the right action he is describing is akin in nature to actions like eating food in order to satisfy hunger, comforting a child in distress etc., in which there is no causal relation of means to end, and the agent is not thinking of the consequences of the action. But clearly the two actions are not parallel, for in the latter there is a strong desire or inclination to do the deed which is absent in the former.

16. We must now point out the major weakness in Joseph's theory of obligation which will bring out the fact clearly that in essentials he is one with the neo-intuitionists. The fundamental feature of neo-intuitionism is its intellectualism which in some respects far outdoes the rationalism of Kant. Kant at least saved the face of morality by bringing in the empirical human nature as the arch-enemy of reason in morals which reason had to contend against and conquer at every step. Morality became significant by thus having desires and impulses related to itself negatively at least. In neo-intuitionism, on the contrary, empirical human nature has completely disappeared leaving only abstract reason or thought—disguised by the name of ordinary moral consciousness—behind as the determining factor both of the form as well as the content of morality. This reason perceives the rightness of certain acts with a self-evidence which is unerring. An erring reason is a chimera, according to the neo-intuitionists. Obligation is nothing but the sense or consciousness of the rightness of certain acts. Motives are immaterial to morality, says Ross, because you cannot get motives to order. A motive is necessary to constitute the rightness of an act, says Joseph, but this motive need be only the urgency of the thought of the action. In either case, actual desires—the concrete life-impulses of the living man of flesh and blood—are thrown overboard by the votaries of right-

1. *Op. cit.* p. 17.

ness.¹ They have of course their part to play in ethical life. When a person acts from a good motive such as benevolence, gratitude, affection etc., his act is indeed morally good. But it is not necessarily right. Goodness and rightness completely fall asunder. It is true Joseph re-introduces goodness as the essence of the rightness of all right acts but this goodness belongs to a system or whole form of life in some community, and not to the particular actions, each considered right by itself. Goodness is not welded with rightness at the ordinary level of the particular act done but only at the highest level of the system which the act forms with its context.

17. It is this abstract intellectualism which is responsible for the vicious particularism of the rightness of the particular acts that makes Joseph say that the consciousness of duty in general—or "oughtness"—need not be present in performing particular duties, and inclines Ross to the opinion that you cannot perform a duty from a sense of duty. Kant himself had suggested the way out of this *cul de sac*, when he said that for a perfectly righteous will in which inclination was perfectly at accord with the sense of duty, there would really be no duties at all as there would be no conflict. This should have opened the eyes of the neo-intuitionists, particularly Joseph, to the possibility of such a transmutation of impulses and desires that they would willingly obey the behests of reason; of purification of desires and impulses such that while remaining in essence what they are they nevertheless would lose the alloy in them; of a moral synthesis of the affective and the cognitive nature which while leading to self-creation would bring about an equilibrium in which there would be no conflict indeed. This ideal of self-creation always present before the moral agent's mind forms the consciousness of duty in general—it is a duty which the individual owes to himself in the first instance. This is the origin of the sense of duty or obligation. Morality we saw is primarily individual or personal. It expresses the continuous attempt of spirit to create itself both in volume and depth of being. Obligation is primarily the obligation to create oneself and this is the meaning of "I ought." Otherwise there is no meaning in

1. In Carritt, however, the situation, as we saw, is saved by the fact that he freely admits the importance of desires for the constitution of both right and merit. Only he does not see the implication of this admission for a system of values constituted by desires.

saying that I *ought* to keep a promise etc.. What indeed obliges me, constrains or compels me, to keep the promise? Not the fact that I have promised, for no mere *fact* of the world has authority over a moral individual; nor the promise, nor the law, nor the society, for none of these can bring home to me that *conviction* which moral compulsion implies. Ultimately it is one's own freedom—expressed in self-creation—that can compel an individual, compel him by convincing him. This is the meaning of duty in general and it inspires—and informs—every particular duty; every particular act becomes a duty only because of the need of soul-creation. But of course the consciousness of a specific occasion of duty is different from the consciousness of the general obligation of self-creation, only the one cannot exist without the other. No amount of apprehension that a particular act is a duty will tell me what it means to be a duty unless I have apprehended before what it means to be an obligation; and no amount of contemplation of the obligatory character of acts in general will tell me that this act is a duty unless I actually perceive it to be so.

On this view, then, an act is right, not because it is an act of a particular kind—fulfilling a promise made etc.,—nor yet because it manifests a goodness lying far beyond itself in some social system or whole of life, but simply and solely because, in the respects in which and to the extent that it is a moral act, it is an act of soul-creation. So far, there is no question of means and end here; the right act is not a means to, but is itself an act of, self-creation. And yet, as will be shown later, it truly conduces to a good lying beyond itself, in the form of the good consequences it produces. Further, motives, in the form of specific desires for specific objects, play their part in moral life in this theory, and the abstract intellectualism of a right act being constituted purely by the thought of the action is replaced here by a healthy emotionalism which, while giving free expression to concrete desires, constitutes, in and through that very expression, duties of them. A moral act is indeed *like* an instinctive act, *like* an ideo-motor act; for acting rightly becomes a spontaneous expression of the integrated personality; but the sense of duty and of obligation, of the difference between duty and inclination, is present in the agent's mind and lifts the action out of the natural to the moral and

spiritual realm. For, as Martineau observes, my conscience does not perish the moment my wishes are in harmony with it. Only, conflict and pain and the sting of it all are removed, and the act becomes an expression of inner joy and peace.

18. In the light of the foregoing criticisms, the rest of Joseph's positive thought can easily be appreciated. Rightness, in the sense in which Joseph is using the term, means a character in the act because of which we ought to do it. For Prichard also, it will be remembered, rightness meant a definite character in the action, but this character was simply that it was action *of a certain kind*. For Ross and Carritt, rightness is merely obligatoriness, right is merely what we ought to do. But for Joseph, rightness means a character which is the ground of our obligation to do the act.¹ And this rightness is a sort of goodness intrinsic to all acts commonly, not specific to each right act. In this sense, the notion of right presupposes that of good.²

What, however, is this goodness common to all right acts? Joseph contends that it is not always a utilitarian goodness which we try to bring into being and which did not exist before—the goodness of consequences.³ While Moore and Rashdall believe that right is always connected with the goodness of the results caused, and Ross, Prichard and Carritt hold that right is never related to good results, Joseph partly agrees with the former and partly with the latter. While it is true that in some cases we are directly interested in bringing about good results, in other cases, the goodness is to be found, not in the single act itself or what it brings about, but in a wider context, in the whole form of life in some society to which all the actions expressing a particular rule belong. It is the goodness of this system that determines the rightness of a particular act as belonging to that system.⁴

It is not necessary for our purpose to follow Joseph further in his brilliant exposition of ideas which are quite familiar to students of idealistic ethics, such as the unity and substantial nature of good, or good as the realisation in the thing of the form of its own being, the common good which is at once my own good etc., etc.. But we may be permitted to ask one or two

1. *Op. Cit.* p. 59.

2. *Ibid.* p. 92.

3. *Ibid.* p. 92.

4. *Ibid.* pp. 97-103.

questions. Joseph rejected the instrumental view of rightness, as he calls it, because it could not according to him satisfactorily explain certain cases, or rather, types of cases, for instance, acts of indirect virtues (or what Kant called perfect obligation) such as justice, veracity, fidelity to promises etc.. If from a single act that one of these virtues demanded, no benefit but the reverse would result, and there was no likelihood of the disposition to practice them being weakened thereby, it would be our duty to forbear the act rather than perform it.¹ Again, how can utilitarianism help us, Joseph asks, in a case where two courses of action are open to me each leading to an equal amount of good, but one where *I* would enjoy that good, another, where *another* would enjoy it.² It is only when we consider not each act by itself or what it immediately leads to, but the form of life as a whole in a community which cannot be lived except from a principle that requires this act, that we come to perceive the imperativeness of doing it.

But how—this is our question—does the recognition of the goodness of this system enable us to resolve the perplexities in the cases considered by Joseph? If the utilitarian good—if we may so call it—of a community does not suffer appreciably from a single lapse from the path of justice etc., neither does the spiritual good of the community as a whole, obviously. And while utilitarianism at any rate would not insist that in such cases the letter of the law should be adhered to, on what grounds would the idealism of Joseph defend such adherence? Again, how does the good life of the community as a whole require that I should judge my giving a holiday to another better than my taking it for myself? In all such cases, Joseph's position, it seems to me, is not very much different from that of Ross or Prichard or Carritt. A debt ought to be paid first not for the sake of the better consequences ensuing from the payment, "but in consideration of the fact that you had borrowed."³ Even when a man claims to know his own immediate obligation to do a certain action without regard to any ulterior good, Joseph thinks that this is an admission on his part that he ought to do it because it is of a certain *kind*, and that leads him, in Joseph's opinion, beyond the act already.⁴ So much was indeed evident in the thought of

1. *Ibid.* p. 93.

2. *Ibid.* pp. 96-97.

3. *Ibid.* p. 98.

4. *Ibid.* p. 106.

Ross and Prichard already, what is the step forward that Joseph has taken except that he states that rightness is a character forming the ground of our actions and that this rightness is an intrinsic goodness—not of the particular right act—but of the system of life whose principle requires the particular act which is right? The difficulty lies precisely here, *viz.*, in showing, or in not showing, how, or why, this goodness of the whole system—supposing that it is good—demands of me this particular act which is said to be right—for example, my sacrifice of my own interests for the sake of another's—and not another. The goodness of the system is not shown logically to necessitate this or any other principle—truth-speaking, fidelity to promises etc.,—nor is the principle shown logically to imply such and such particular acts alone. Concrete moral life is not shown logically to develop out of the goodness of the system assumed. Does Joseph maintain, in the alternative, that the goodness of the system means and requires that at all times a man shall speak the truth, for instance or fulfil promises irrespective of the consequences of so doing?

And why, going a step further, should we consider a particular form of life alone good and not another? It may be said no doubt that it has intrinsic goodness. But apart from the difficulties of this conception, could it not be argued, as Muirhead suggests,¹ that this goodness is something which issues in non-moral goods, in other words, just in the goods in which the "form of life" consists? Does not even this kind of goodness imply contributoriness?² "Whether you call that towards which it contributes," writes Muirhead, "a consequence or not is a good deal a matter of language. At any rate it is something which would not come about except by the existence of such conduct and character..."³

Intrinsic goodness, then, of the character that Joseph describes will not help us to understand the rightness of particular actions. It is indeed philosophically desirable to postulate a goodness of life—of a system of social living as a whole—as an ideal controlling and inspiring and informing every particular act, but if it is to serve this purpose, the goodness must touch

1. *Op. Cit.* pp. 87–88.

2. "Value," writes J. E. Turner, "always implies contributoriness"—*Philosophical Basis of Moral Obligation*, p. 185; quoted by Muirhead, *Op. cit.* p. 87.

3. *Ibid.* pp. 87–88.

the rightness of the particular act at closer quarters—at a more immediate level—than is provided for in Joseph's theory.

19. A theory then must be found which would conserve the right in intuitionism without its dogmatism and atomistic pluralism and the good in idealism without its whole-making monism. (What is required in moral life is not whole-making but soul-making, though the former may be important in relation to ethical life, as I have defined it). It should do justice to the significance of motives in morality but at the same time it should not disregard the role of consequences or override the rightness of particular acts. Right and good must be shown to be interlaced in close embrace and to descend from a central root, like the two serpents in the Rod of the Caduceus.

The elements of such a theory, scattered throughout the preceding pages, must now be collected and presented in systematic form. Needless to say, it would be an analysis of the moral theory of self-creation adumbrated in the last chapter, in terms of the concepts of the right and the good. And, what is more, its possibility is shown to depend upon an analysis of the notion of value which Muirhead so strongly desiderates as affording the key to the solution of the difficulties in the ethical thinking of the Oxford school.¹ Nevertheless, I can only submit the following "for consideration" chastened by the reflection that fools should not rush where angels have feared to tread.

Two or three facts may be taken to have been established by the foregoing criticism of neo-intuitionism. Right always has reference to the motive of an individual in performing an act. Ross contends that while we speak of a right act, we do not usually speak of a right person but only of a good person, implying that motive is related not to the rightness of the act but only to the goodness of the agent. But do we not speak of a "righteous person" and is not the reference here to the motive of the agent? And good ordinarily denotes the goodness of the consequences, contributoriness or valuableness, so that when we speak of a good man, our meaning is that he generally brings about good results. A moral act therefore, in the strictest sense of the term, is one which has its roots in the purified motive of the agent and which bears fruit in good consequences. But as our actual moral life is not always blessed

1. *Op. Cit.* pp. 91,99-102, 107-110, 114-118.

both with such pure paternity and with such good progeny, we must be content with a less rigorous formulation of the standard of the moral. And this is the reason why it has been repeatedly pointed out that in the very interests of morality we must sunder a moral act into motive, act and consequences. Only when we do so can we answer the question, "What makes right acts right" satisfactorily.

20. A moral judgment has, logically speaking, a two-fold nature. On the one side, it is a synthetic judgment connecting right with results—the causal aspect of the judgment. On the other side, it is still an *a priori* judgment, *i.e.*, it is the expression of the meaning of right. This meaning of rightness must be found not in any factor external to the act, but in the very constitution or structure of the act. Right, I would say, means WILLING good consequences. To will the good is the reason of an action's being right, it is the explanation, the intelligible nature, of right. But causally speaking, an act is *made* right by the production of good consequences. An action *is* right by reason of the willing of good consequences; it is caused to be right, *i.e.*, it *becomes* right when it issues in good results. Good results are what make *right* actions right (using the very terminology of Ross and Prichard). An action is right by virtue of the willing; it is, however, made right by the consequences.¹ Hence when any one makes a judgment and says "this action is right," one of two things may be meant. It may mean that the agent willed the production of certain good consequences, or it may mean that the good consequences envisaged have actually been produced. It is the failure to make this simple distinction that has not unoften led to differences in moral judgment and that has caused a good deal of difficulty in understanding Kant's doctrine that the goodwill is *its own* guide and not directed to any external end such as pleasure etc.. In the light of the doctrine of purification of desires, it can now be seen that what the will primarily realises in action is the self's own purification effected, however, by the adoption of certain consequences envisaged as good as against other consequences anticipated to be bad. The difficulty with Kant lay in that he could not bring himself to consider consequences at all as

1. This distinction, it must be noted, is not the same as Ross' distinction between *prima facie* right and actual right.

in any way related to morality.

Willing good consequences is just what right *means*. This, the neo-intuitionist may say, is a most unnatural method of defining right; it is defining right by means of the goodness of consequences, subordinating right to good; it is just what idealists and ideal utilitarians like Rashdall and Moore do. This, however, is not the proper interpretation of the present view. We may accept the position that the willing of good consequences only is implied in the notion of rightness. But it is not the good consequences as such, but *willing* them, that constitutes the meaning of rightness. Without relation to good consequences, there is no rightness, of course. But if good consequences are produced without willing, the action is not right either, but only fortunate or at best good. If willing is present and yet as a matter of fact good consequences do not follow, the act is still right but it does not become right.¹ In an act becoming right also, willing is present, *i.e.*, the good consequences that follow must have been willed by the agent, but willing is not what *makes* the act, *causes* it to be, right, but the actual production of good consequences. Willing here persists but does not insist—on itself. It simply consists in willing good results. But it insists in connection with the nature of the rightness of the act. That nature is explained by the fact that those consequences were willed by the agent. Hence both for an act's being right, *i.e.*, its rightness as such, as well as for its becoming right, *i.e.*, its being made or caused to be right, relation to good consequences is indispensable, just as on the other side, in order that these good consequences may fall within the fold of moral life and not merely be the result of chance, relation to willing is equally ineluctable. Still the aetiology of right action needs to be distinguished from its teleology.

21. To avoid the confusion that is likely to arise in talking of an act being right, and its becoming right, we may make use of Ross' distinction between act and action, slightly adapting it for our own purpose. We may talk of a right "act" when it is the rightness, the being right, *i.e.*, the aspect of willing, that is desired to be denoted; we may speak of a right "action" when

1. The act is still right because good consequences were *willed* by the agent. This is the only possible justification of Carritt's view that even when a wrong act is done from the moral motive that it is thought right, it would have full moral value.

it is the act's becoming right by the production of good consequences that is desired to be conveyed. A right act is one which was prompted by the willing of good consequences but which was not attended with good consequences. A right action is an action which was both prompted by the willing, and attended with the realisation, of good consequences. Further, if we should make a distinction between the realisation of good consequences as originally anticipated, and the mere happening of good consequences not originally envisaged, and consider moreover that you may merely desire a certain result and obtain it without actively and deliberately choosing it in preference to other results as in a conflict of impulses, the realisation of anticipated good results may be signified by the term, good act, and the mere happening of good results by the phrase, good action.

22. The rightness of an act—meaning by this the willing of good consequences, and this may persist even in a right action—alone has supreme moral significance and this significance I call "worth," or "moral worth." The right act would thus be the moral act (in the full sense of the term, as will appear shortly) and we can avoid the strange possibility present in neo-intuitionism of an act that is right but not moral. By worth, or worthiness, is to be understood an excellence of character that cannot be measured in terms of value, that in fact transcends the value conception altogether, being equivalent to what is sometimes called "*intrinsic value*," a phrase which is self-contradictory as *value* is always relative and contributory. Worth does not belong to the order of values but constitutes an entirely different order by itself. It is not, necessary, however, to dilate upon this conception just now.¹ The goodness of the consequences as willed may be designated "*moral value*" and value in this context retains the same force and significance as it has in the general theory of value. This moral value is the rightness of an action as *made* right by the production of good consequences. "*Ethical value*" may be reserved to denote the value of consequences not willed or anticipated in individual moral life while in social or collective ethics proper it would denote the value of all kinds of consequences, both willed and unwilled. Nations like individuals have indeed a moral life and willing is significant in their collec-

1. See the next chapter.

tive action as much as in individual action. But from the standpoint of social psychology, the source of collective willing is so obscure and indeterminable that it is of small profit to discuss this matter in the present connection. An act is right or moral; the agent is moral or *righteous*; and good may be used both of the act and of the agent, being distinguished, with reference to consequences, into moral value and natural good or ethical value.

23. To take up the thread of exposition. Right is defined as willing the good. The good that is willed therefore constitutes, in one sense, the motive of the action. A right action is always a motivated action and it is in pursuance of this motive, *viz.*, the good that is willed, that the act enters the threshold of morality. The discussion of interestedness in relation to action may be recalled in this connection. To adopt a motive for one's action is to be interested in the success of that motive and in the choice of the proper implements which would make it a success. It is in short to desire the end as well as the proper means of carrying out the end. And yet this very interestedness conceals a disinterestedness which purifies the desire—as has already been shown—and lifts the act from the natural to the moral plane.

A motive, however, may be present in the form of a mere desire for a certain good result; the agent may not consciously choose a course of action in a context of conflict with another possible course. In other words, he may not feel that the act is obligatory upon him. Here then there is no willing the good as a matter of deliberation, no rejection of the opposite course; hence the action is not right but only good or fortunate. That means, it is not merely the presence of a motive, but rational choice of it as against other possible motives, that determines the rightness of an act. And as thus involving a choice of motives, the act becomes moral and obligatory. It is felt to be *a duty*. The sense of duty is thus indispensable for the rightness of an act.

But, it is necessary to point out, while the motive may in this sense be inspired by a sense of duty, it need not always be the sense of duty itself. Is duty ever a motive to action? If duty means that the performance of a certain act is obligatory upon me, the sense of duty, *i.e.*, the consciousness that the act

is so obligatory, may sometimes act as a motive, in the sense that it is this consciousness which moves me to action. But for this consciousness, I would not perhaps do the act at all. Such a consciousness, however, is never entirely devoid of the element of desire in however meagre a form. The sense of duty may convince me that a certain thing ought to be done, but it cannot compel me to do it until I acquiesce, *i.e.*, desire to do it, however reluctantly. In other cases, what directly moves me to action is the thing to be done, the good consequence that I desire and choose to bring about for somebody, and this therefore is the motive. The relation of duty to motive here is something like this. The thing to be done may indeed be a duty, *i.e.*, what ought to be done in the given case. But I must choose it after deliberation and as against other possible courses of action for it to become obligatory upon me. And further, what is a duty and felt to be obligatory also, may not be done from the sense or in the spirit of duty. It may be done with indifference, indignation, reluctance; or with love, affection, gratitude; or again with the feeling that it is a duty, *i.e.*, the proper thing to do. Ordinarily some one of the numerous impulses will be present, and presenting the particular course of action in its own proper lines, form itself into a motive. If I am moved by it immediately, or prefer it to some other motive of a like sort, or even choose it after reflection in a conflict, and act accordingly, but in no way influenced by the thought that for me under the circumstances it is the one thing proper to do, then in none of these cases is my action right or moral. What I love, what is a duty, what is felt to be obligatory, must still be done *because* it is a duty, from a sense of duty, in the spirit of duty—then only is my act truly right or moral.¹

The sense of duty then is not always itself the motive, but it should inspire the motive present in order that the act be right or moral.

24. The motive of a right action is always some good consequence willed. The willing constitutes the rightness, the good consequence, the goodness, of the action. It is not therefore correct to speak of subjective right and objective right.

1. The distinction between moral and non-moral duties, or different ways of doing the same thing, drawn in a previous connection, must be borne in mind here.

Good is subjective in the sense that it is subjective interests that determine the goodness or value of things. But still we can talk of objective good meaning by this the goodness (subjectively determined as above) of the consequences of an act. Right is always subjective in so far as it is the subjective willing that constitutes rightness. At best by objective rightness can be meant only the rightness of an action as made right by the production of good consequences—moral value as it has been called. No act is in itself, or absolutely, right. It is right only as willed by an agent and willing depends upon so many fluctuating considerations, not the least of which is whether the act is likely to produce good results or not. Accordingly, it does not follow that every act that is willed is therefore right: consequences will have to be looked into—not all the consequences, of course, but those willed and intended. Willing is to be checked at every point by consideration of consequences; production of consequences is to be hallowed by the spiritual touch of volition. Apart from these two kinds of determination—natural and moral, causal and teleological, so to say—an abstract objective rightness in the sense of fittingness is merely in the air. For as in the case of the intellectual intuitionists of a previous age, we must perforce raise the question, fittingness for what and under what circumstances etc., and when we do raise these questions, objective or absolute rightness has all but disappeared.

25. Even talking of subjective right as meaning the willing of the good, what constitutes the ground of the willing? Not the good, as it may superficially appear to some. Willing has a content indeed, *viz.*, the good that is willed; this it is that constitutes the motive of the act, in the sense of that which attracts me, that which I will. But why do I will what I actually do will, or as I will? For—in the case of a duty proper—this particular thing, say a benefit to my friend, is not the only thing that attracts me; there may be other alternative courses of action equally if not more attractive still. The production of the greatest good, it may be said, is the reason of my willing a particular act. But no, that is *what* I will in willing the particular act,—the universal content of the particular act—the ground of my willing that is still to seek. The intensest love that I may feel for some person, you may say; but if I will the act and do it merely

because of my love, we have agreed that it is not a right or moral act at all: it is merely a desireful act. When the act is properly a moral act, why do I will what I do, or as I do?

Because of self-creation, purification of desires, self-expansion, the attainment of freedom, the maintenance of the properly human nature of man.

This is not a motive to moral action, in the ordinary sense of the term. A motive is generally an extra-subjective value, some good to be realised, some object or thing to be achieved, though, as we have seen in previous connexions, reference to subjective elements like pleasure is not altogether absent. The motive is the object of the action, and the object is different from the *ground* or *reason* of the action. When a person subscribes to a charity fund, the object of his action is that some cause may be helped and furthered—this is his motive. But why does he will this particular object, *i.e.*, adopt this motive? Or if you still insist that the motive category is ultimate in moral explanation, the present question would be, what is his motive in adopting this motive? This is an entirely different question, having its own significance. It is the failure to distinguish between these two different questions that has led critics of subjective theories like Hartmann, Carritt, etc., to exclaim that in moral action a man is concerned not with his own inner moral being but with the whole existence of another person. The morally good man does not want to see his own exalted and moralised picture in the actional mirror, says Hartmann. (The same view is expressed by Muirhead¹). Perfectly true, but our question is, why does he even turn to look at another's picture in the mirror? What is the *ground* of the volition at all? That the moral agent is not generally conscious of this ground of his action is irrelevant; there are so many things in the world that we do of the grounds of which we are not explicitly conscious. He would be conscious of the suppressed ground if only he cared to analyse his action, it is a case of a moral enthymeme. And our point is that whenever possible he should try to become conscious of the ground.

Willing the good constitutes the rightness of the action and self-creation the ground of the willing. Worth or worthiness has reference to self-creation. An action is right, *i.e.*, has

1. *Op. cit.* p. 88.

worth, or is worthy, when it is an act of self-creation. Utilitarianism—an impregnable doctrine which is the bulwark of value theory—is only one half of the story of moral life. When we reach the conception of worth, the story of values ends, and that of character, moral excellence, the inward disposition and attunement of spirit, its equilibrium, self-creation, begins. It is the story of the invaluable, the inestimable. Morality as worth falls outside the sphere of value.

That the truest notion of morality is contained in this doctrine of moral worth and self-creation or purification may be illustrated by an example from Carritt. Two men are in a situation where only one can be saved, the food, let us say, sufficing only to keep up one. For either to kill the other forcibly is wrong. But for either to try to save the other by sacrificing himself is, we think, right. But why do we think so? The blending of values with virtue, of good with right, may be seen in this case. To try to kill the other forcibly is to stain one's own self, apart from the fact that the opportunities of the other person for self-creation are denied to him. The second course of action is right because either would thereby purify his soul and enable the other to realise himself.

To put the case more significantly still: suppose that each tries to save the other, and both, without taking food, starve. How shall we judge their acts? Strictly from the standpoint of consequences, their action is thoroughly immoral—apart from being stupid—in that they have allowed two lives to be lost between them where at least one could have been saved. And yet this is not our actual moral judgment, I hope.¹ But if not, why not? Because we respect and admire their spirit of self-sacrifice which is ultimately based upon self-creation in the best sense of the term. But if self-creation is good for one, why should he not give the same opportunity to the other also and why should he try to save that other? In answer, I would say, if that other also protests and agrees to take food only after great pressure, we respect him and consider his action not wrong; if he immediately jumps at the opportunity offered, his action is clearly wrong. If he completely refuses, we consider

1. Casabianca's self-sacrifice was—stupid, of course, in one sense; but is that the sense we think of while reading the story of "the boy (that) stood on the burning deck"?

him absolutely moral and his action absolutely right (unless there was a great benefit at stake for family or country to realise which he should live). In any case, the strictest rectitude requires that each should not only refuse to eat himself but try to persuade the other to eat. For there is yet another alternative possible here: each may sullenly abstain without trying to persuade the other to eat! This would not be completely right on their part.

In view of the significance of purification of desire (effected by willing the good) for the constitution of a right act, it will now be seen that if the Secretary to the Colonial Governor in Joseph's illustration finally reveals the secret to the latter out of self-interest, say promotion to himself, his act would neither be moral nor right.

26. Right and Good are each of them unique notions irreducible to the other. Right, however, as expressing the will of man in his act of self-creation, belongs to the noumenal realm, as Kant would say, to which nothing corresponds in the phenomenal world. Still goodness, in so far as it is willed by the agent, is hallowed by the touch of spirit and is midway between righteousness and natural goodness. In practical moral life, good represents progress, development, while right represents order, stability. In common language, an act is moral when it takes the individual or the race one step further in self-development and leads to greater stability of character. Rightness is worth or worthiness and this notion appears to be more ultimate than "oughtness." If we ask, why something ought to be, there is still an answer possible in terms of consequences; but if we should answer, because it is worthy-to-be, no further significant question arises. This worthiness is the unity of all virtues, it is the source and spring of all moral excellences. It is not something acquired by willing or conferred by it or the consequences. It is something all along possessed by spirit and only revealed or manifested in willing. Spirit alone is worthy-to-be, or possesses moral worth which may otherwise be called holiness. The highest rule of moral life is to be worthy or holy. In being worthy, or possessing a purified nature, spirit is truly free. It seeks no end beyond itself, no purpose other than its own being. The conception of means and end, so omni-competent in the world of value and permeating its very being, is

simply inadmissible in the realm of worth and spirit.

There is, however, another aspect to the matter. This worthiness-to-be or worthy being possesses at the same time an inherent attractiveness, a spiritual beauty which is of an entrancing character. It is not only holy but lovely. It is not only freedom but joy, bliss. It is not only the law of spirit's being but also love supreme. Love and law are different expressions of spirit's nature, *viz.*, worth. Just as worth as right expresses the highest law or rule of moral life, worth as love embodies the highest end of moral life—that towards which all other ends tend. These latter are all good, valuable, as means. This supreme end of love is intrinsically valuable, it is invaluable.

While righteousness emphasises worthiness-to-be, love emphasises worthiness-to-do. Love is the dynamic of moral life, as of life in general. Without love, no great thing was ever done. And love hallows all deeds as it prompts most deeds. Rightness is willing or *being* moral, love is *doing* moral. Self-creation as self-expansion involves, we saw, recognising the kinship of spirit with spirit. The individual has to identify himself with the largest number of other individuals and thereby his desires would be purified to the greatest extent. Such recognition of and identification with spirit is possible only because of the well-spring of love that bubbles up in spirit's nature. It may have been dried up in individual hearts owing to perversion and neglect and indifference, but so has the sense of rightness been blunted in many people. But kindled and educated in the proper manner, as Plato teaches us in the *Symposium*, love is sure to become the lord of life, an all-domineering but well-meaning tyrant. It is the source of all union, the soul of all progeny, the inspiration of all becoming. If rightness of will is the philosopher's stone that transforms the alloy of passion and emotion into the pure gold of holiness and freedom, love is the elixir of life that confers immortality upon spirit and spirit's doings. Righteousness and love combine together to form the life-giving waters of spiritual life.

27. Worth therefore is the inwardness of spirit's nature in its two-fold form of righteousness and love, worthiness-to-be and worthiness-to-do. Between them they explain the moral chemistry of spirit's life. Neo-intuitionism, as we saw, is vitiated

by a radical pluralism of virtues which refuse to fall into a system, which do not own any one ideal as their master, *i.e.*, as a central organising principle bringing about unity and integrity of moral life. The principle of self-creation on the other hand, as so far explained, stands for such a moral universal. The different virtues have each a unique character of their own no doubt; but they are not unrelated among themselves. Animated by the informing presence of self-creation or worth, they naturally constitute a whole of moral life in which each has its significance enhanced and fully brought out. Now the relation of moral value to worth in general needs a few words of explanation. Moral value is the goodness of consequences actually willed and produced or rightness as become. This rightness or goodness is an emergent value, being emergent upon the interrelation of a contemplating will and the object contemplated, *viz.*, the good consequences produced. It is a product of the natural as well as the teleological processes of causation. It is relative inasmuch as it is conditioned by the kind of consequences envisaged and produced, which means that it is relative to the interests, the aims and aspirations, of given societies and individuals. This is the explanation of the ethical relativity oft-repeated by critics of intuitionist morality. The principles of moral life, such as fidelity to promises, truth-speaking, benevolence, chastity, justice etc., are eternal and immutable, *i.e.*, *a priori* and original to human nature. But these first principles of morality are not the objects of the moral judgment, what is judged is the act with its consequences—or the institution with its social effects—as expressing these first principles; and since these vary from people to people depending as they do upon their interests and attractions, the value attached to them also varies, *i.e.*, is relative. But moral worth or worthiness is not acquired by or conferred upon spirit, it is an expression of spirit's nature as will. It does not emerge either but is the ground of the emergence of moral value. It is because spirit possesses inherent worth or is worthy that it wills the good. Willing the good is merely the revelation of spirit's inward nature. Here then we must distinguish between worth, good and moral value. Worth, *i.e.*, rightness as one aspect of worthiness, and good, *i.e.*, love as another aspect, are unique notions each underivable from the other. Each has its own separate

individual nature which cannot be reduced to the nature of the other. They both meet in spirit which expresses them as righteousness and love, worthiness-to-be and worthiness-to-do. But when spirit as worthy being wills the good (which is worthy doing),—this is Kant's goodwill willing itself—moral value—which is rightness as become or goodness as produced—is born as the progeny of both. In such an interrelationship, it is righteousness that controls good, that reveals and enhances the significance of good. It is because something is worth being that it is worth doing. This is the explanation of the common belief that we ought to be just before we are generous, that we ought to do our duty by our neighbour before we can love him.

28. In this ultimate sense then good is dependent upon right. However, they enter as elements of an organic union, a co-operative whole, to which each contributes its significance and in which each has its significance enhanced. Moral value which is the child of both may be defined as the satisfyingness of an action derived from appreciating it as an expression of the conformity between the socialising impulse and the impulse to self-creation, or between productivity of objective good and the tendency to purification of desires. Since objective good can be produced for the most part only by the exercise of the functions of a moral personality, the conformity which an action expresses and whose appreciation generates moral value, may also be said to be between functional realisation on the one hand and purification of personality on the other. Or since purification and functional realisation both relate to the raw-material of moral life, *viz.*, impulses or desires which the will has to renounce and yet to regulate, we may express the conformity as one between the form of the will and the contents of the will, *i.e.*, of the will with itself. In some such fashion is to be understood the categorial structure of moral value.

Moral value, being relative, may be said to represent the inchoate and indeterminate stage of moral life, for the agent is not aware what values his act is going to realise or whether any values would be realised at all. All is left to the mercy of chance and circumstance. But morality as worth or worthiness represents the determinate stage of moral life inasmuch as the agent, in willing the good, knows definitely what he is aiming at (motive) and the reason for his aiming at it (self-purification).

Morality becomes not merely conscious, but self-conscious, so to say, in this stage.

29. The ideal of moral life is to bring the conformity discussed above to such a point of perfection that the will spontaneously wills the good and effectively realises it also—this is the consummation of moral life devoutly to be wished for. Not that the sense of the difference between duty and inclination, between what conduces to personal good and what to social good, would ever be obliterated; only the moral agent would feel no conflict in his breast, and would always and freely choose that line of action which brings about the greatest good to society. He will not sit down in a cool hour and calculate the consequences both for self and others, weighing the pros and cons of the whole situation; the sense for social harmony will have been developed in his heart to such perfection—by a long process of purification and self-expansion—that he immediately does the thing which brings about the greatest good. And in doing so he does the right thing also, that which expresses the most spotless purity of character, the clearest righteousness, the noblest worth. The realisation of "goods" would indissolubly be connected with the perfection of character, the magnificent edifice of values would rise on the bed-rock foundation of virtue or worth. Virtue comes spontaneous and easy, virtue unobtrusive and unconscious. This is indeed the stage of "Beyond Good and Evil" dimly perceived by thinkers like Bradley and Taylor but questionably adumbrated in the pages of Nietzsche.

What will a man lose if by profiting the whole world he gains his own soul?

"I slept and dreamt that life is beauty,

"I woke and found that life is duty."

But need there be a conflict between the two? Does not the ideal of worth in its two-fold form of righteousness and love enable us to discover that a countenance hallowed by the spirit of duty is at the same time a countenance brightened with a halo of divine beauty?

CHAPTER XIV

VALIDITY, VALUE AND WORTH

1. The survey of concrete values has now been completed. The task was undertaken, it will be remembered, with a double object in view, *viz.*, to show that value emerges at important levels of human-mental life, and to show how it emerges. The question how values emerge takes us to the problems of a standard, conformity or otherwise to the standard, and appreciation of this conformity. These explain the general nature of value, and the point had to be substantiated with reference to each type of specific value. The interpretation of each type of value as an emergent, and the description of such emergence, therefore, necessitated the explanation of the nature or character of each value. And thus it was that the problem of origins was bound up in our theory with the problem of the validity, the meaning, the significance of each type of value. Hence the discussion of the normative and philosophical character of every kind of value.

One last question remains for this volume. Throughout it has been assumed—and the very definition of value in general and of specific values in particular has suggested—that value is essentially contributory or instrumental and not intrinsic. This goes counter to the traditional view which regards values like truth, beauty and goodness as intrinsic. It is necessary therefore to discuss this question at some length in order to determine what exactly is to be understood by the usual distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values and in what sense it has been maintained that value is always instrumental.

Closely connected with the above is that other problem which must have been haunting the reader's mind from the very beginning, to wit, whether there is no value in that part of the universe where reflective consciousness does not obtain, in the activities of animals and plants, for instance, or, lower still, in the inorganic kingdom. And towards the end of the last chapter, we came across a new concept, the concept of worth

which, it was said, marks the entry into a new realm altogether other than that of value. These questions also call for clarification. It is convenient to begin with the second.

2. Is value to be found in the natural world? Some would reply that the concept of value is a non-natural or moral concept and as such, to seek for its existence in the natural world would be to come at close quarters with the naturalistic fallacy. This would on the one hand be giving short shrift to the whole problem, and one need not believe in such short and easy solutions; and it would on the other open up once more the vexed question of the relation of value to fact or existence which has already been sufficiently, I hope, discussed. The present problem is more specific. Should we not so define value as to find it capable of being exhibited by beings below the level of conscious mind, should we not so generalise it that it may be capable of being extended below the psychological, and even perhaps below the organic, level? Alexander, for instance, maintains that value (as he interprets it) in a more extended sense not only reaches lower down than man, but perhaps is a common feature of all finites,¹ nay, is founded in the nature of Space-Time itself.²

It is the belief of the present writer that below the level of self-conscious mind what one finds is not value, but the base of value. We must believe that nature has been preparing at the conscious, the subconscious and the unconscious levels for the emergence of value at the self-conscious level. This preparation shows itself in the form of a natural adaptation of one object for the needs of another. Such adaptation at the natural level may be called *validity*.³ Milk is valid for the infant, but the infant does not see its *value*, i.e., milk has no value for the infant. In the same sense, we may say that food is valid for hunger, drink for thirst; water for fishes, the atmosphere for birds; iron filings for the magnet, the breast for the babe. Shortly, any kind of adaptability, suitability, fitness in the nature of things, or attraction of one thing for another, or interest or appetite below the level of self-conscious appreciation, is guided, not by value, but validity, and it may be said to be an example of such validity in nature.

1. *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. II. p. 302. 2. *Ibid.* p. 311.

3. *Vide*, ch. VIII (Economic Value), section 14.

3. An analysis of this notion of validity would yield two fundamental factors present in it. First, it indicates the reality of some kind of sentience or feeling present at the natural level of existence. Of course the term feeling is used here in a very wide and comprehensive sense so as to include all kinds of appetite or attraction and aversion or repulsion exhibited by all forms of life and even by the members of the inorganic world, such as, for example, the attraction of the magnet for the iron filings, or the impulsion involved in the formation of crystals etc.. I do not know if this usage of the term feeling is psychologically justified, but there can be no objection, I think, to the philosophical extension of the term to cover the cases mentioned and their like, much in the same way in which Whitehead has extended the term "prehension" to cover cases not necessarily involving consciousness. Second, the analysis reveals the existence of a natural affinity between two objects of which one is said to be valid for the other. There is an affinity, for example, between food and hunger, water and thirst, between water and sunshine on the one hand and plant growth on the other. This affinity is nothing but a kind of fitness or suitability of the environment for that which is environed, a kind of adaptiveness of one thing for another. Not only is there an appetite in the crop for rain-water, but there is also a natural affinity between the two, as there is not, for example, between the crop and the fire. There will be no appetite in objects for objects with which they have no affinity. There is no affinity, for instance, between human hunger and, say, green grass or hay as such; hence no appetite exists in us for the latter. Or there is no affinity between fish and sandy desert, therefore fish have no appetite for sand.

Affinity, then, between two objects, *a* and *b*, at the natural level, and the consequent appetite in the one for the other, are the two elements in the notion of validity which enable us to say that *b* is valid for *a*. But *b* is not valuable for *a*, or *a* is incapable of seeing value in *b*, simply because *a* is not a creature who can be aware of his appetite—or interest as we say—for *b* or aware of *b* as capable of satisfying his appetite. Thus understood, validity expresses the same fact as that denoted by Laird's principle of "natural election." The difference, however, between the two conceptions is quite obvious.

4. It must be noted in this connection that when we talk of affinity, appetite and validity, the sense or direction of these processes and relations is important. Affinity or fitness is reciprocal. The affinity between fish and sea-water is mutual; the sea is as much adapted to the needs of fish life as the fish are to live in their watery environment; the mechanism of the bovine stomach and intestines is as well suited to digest fodder as the fodder itself is to become food for stomachs and intestines of that kind. Appetite on the other hand is largely a one-sided relation; the organism may be said to have an appetite for a particular environment, but we cannot speak of the environment as having an appetite for that which is environed. When, however, we regard the appetite that may subsist between two organisms, say the male and the female of a species, the appetite may be said to be reciprocally manifested. In like manner, validity which is the principle governing the relation between two objects at the natural level in respect of their affinity, is generally asymmetrical, particularly where we are concerned with the relation between an organism and its physical environment. It is the environment that, we say, is valid for the organism, and not *vice versa*. The breast is valid for the babe, but there is no meaning in saying that the babe is valid for the breast. The atmosphere is valid for the flying bird, but not *vice versa*. Where, however, the objects that are thus related are in themselves two organisms, either may be said to be valid for the other.

5. The notion of validity, thus understood, plays a significant part in the explanation of phenomena. To say that rain is valid for the crops in the field is to say that rain is a good means to promote the crops, to bring them to fruition etc.. In general, to say that *a* is valid for *b* is to suggest that *a* is conducive to, or facilitates the existence or development of, *b*. Validity is thus, like value, also instrumental in character. Nevertheless, its importance lies in that, through the underlying conceptions of affinity and appetite, it suggests the existence of, or helps us in seeking for, the possible causes or conditions of phenomena. "Marshes are valid for malaria" suggests that there is some causal relationship between marshy land and the prevalence of malaria. And if we could trace in any given case, the ramifications of affinity and appetite involved in the conditions of a

malarial patient or village and the environment, we should be able to arrive at the cause, or at least a part of the cause, of the phenomenon under investigation.

But validity does not *mean* the principle of causation. Validity is a philosophical concept whose essential meaning is expressed by the notion of suitability, fitness, well-groundedness etc., which again gives rise to the notion of adaptation or adjustment. Because milk is valid for a hungry cat, it does not follow that milk is the cause of the hunger of a cat; what does follow is that milk is so related to the hunger of a cat that drinking it would satisfy the pussy's hunger. Milk is adapted to satisfy hunger, and in this sense milk may be said to be causally connected with the phenomenon known as satisfaction of hunger. "Medicine is valid for the patient," means that it is causally connected with the patient's illness by way of curing it. If we care, we may say that causal relatedness or causality is a third element, in addition to affinity and appetite, *involved* in the notion of validity. Such causality would only be another name for the instrumental character of validity already discussed.

6. The full significance of validity may be brought out by contrasting it with value. Value is essentially subjective, mind-engendered, though it has an objective reference and is grounded in the object. Validity is purely objective belonging to the nature of things themselves. It is not, like value, caused by the desire of a finite object primarily, for it is part of the constitution of things themselves and their relations. It is part of the natural order of things that the sea should be valid for fish, whales, crocodiles and sailing ships and that the breast should be valid for the babe. That is to say, the internal structure and organisation of the breast is such that it helps or conduces to the growth of the babe; likewise ships, fish etc., are so constituted in their internal structure and properties that they are adapted to swim in water. A babe may cry for the breast; its instinctive liking, however, is only a concrete expression, through a particular organism, of the objective validity of breasts for babes in general, inherent in the nature of things.

Validity is thus purely a naturalistic conception and involves no idea of *moral* appreciation even in the large sense of the term. There is no question of ought-to-be, or conformity to a standard, and appreciation of this conformity etc., applicable to

this conception. There is no meaning in saying that sea-water ought to be valid for fish. But—and it is important to notice this—while validity excludes value, is something less than value, and does not, as such, apply to human actions or desires, value always implies validity in some sense and is something more than it. If I say "A ought to get a promotion," I make a judgment of moral value. But on analysis this will be found to imply, first, that promotion is valid for A, *i.e.*, that giving promotion is suitable in his case, that he is fit for it, and second, that his getting a promotion is a thing which I desire. Value then is possible only on the basis of validity. The fact that an object valued possesses certain powers or capacities (in virtue of its internal structure and properties) which are conducive to the satisfaction or fulfilment of the need or desire of the valuing agent, is, we saw, of the essence of value on its objective side, and this conduciveness to another's satisfaction (or interest in general) is of the essence of validity also. What value requires, over and above this objective validity or fitness, is that the valuing agent should appreciate this validity as conforming or not conforming to a particular standard laid down by him. Such a conscious appreciation converts validity into value.

But there is this difference between value and validity. Value no doubt requires the notions of objective fitness or conduciveness, but that the object valued always possesses the value ascribed to it is not guaranteed. For aught the agent knows, he might well be mistaken in his belief that the object fulfils or is capable of fulfilling his need or desire, and yet attribute value to it in the belief that it does or is so capable. Value, that is, belongs to things which might be otherwise than what they are thought to be. This is what is meant by saying that to value is to dare, to risk, to entertain an "as if." Validity, on the contrary, as between two things, being completely grounded in the objective nature of the things themselves, could never be otherwise than it is, and consequently validity is not value. The attraction of one object for another is an *expression* of validity; the attachment of a person for an object is the *cause* of value. As energising a person to strive for that which is not, and even perhaps may not be, value leads to morality; as governing the principles of actual attraction and repulsion between objects, validity leads

only to the naturalistic order.

Validity is not only objective or inherent in things, it is universal and timeless—not indeed as eternal or supertemporal—but as out of relation to any particular instant of time. It is, however, an existent, for only as holding for, or embodied in, concrete existents has it any significance. Value, as we have seen, is a "transistent," a particular variety of existents, being both universal and particular in nature, and occurring in time only.

The question naturally arises in this connection, what is the explanation of validity in nature? Value no doubt is explained by human teleology; can we postulate a natural—or supernatural?—teleology to account for the fact of validity in nature? This question raises metaphysical issues whose consideration must be postponed to another volume of this work.

To sum up our discussion so far, all appetite and attraction, unconscious affinity, suitability or adaptation, below the level of reflective consciousness, may be explained by saying that they are expressions of the principle of validity in nature. We may answer then our original question by observing that there are no values in the world of nature but only validities. Validity, however, is the base of value. It is the fertile soil tilled and prepared by nature; human beings sow the seeds of conscious desire and reap the rich harvest of value.

7. The concept of validity also appears to throw some light on a very ancient problem in philosophy, *viz.*, that pertaining to individuality and self-realisation. According to the Great Tradition in philosophy, the highest value consists in the complete realisation of one's own nature or essence, in the fullest expression of the capacities that constitute or underlie one's being. According to both Plato and Aristotle, the natural is that which has attained the full stature of its being. The natural state of an acorn is to grow into a giant oak; the natural form of a foetus is to develop into a full-fledged man, for such development or growth is "according to its nature." And the natural in this sense is the good, the valuable. Good in short meant to the Greek mind efficiency, realisation of the purpose or end of one's being, the end or purpose which nature intended one should realise. And this end or purpose Plato expressed by the term "idea," and Aristotle by the term "form." Any

object is good in so far as it expresses "the idea" or the true type, of its being. And the way in which this Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine has been utilised by modern idealism so as to give rise to the ethical theory of self-realisation, and the political doctrine of "institutions as ethical ideas," is too well-known to need any exposition in this connection. It has already been briefly touched upon in several other connections in this work.

From the standpoint of our doctrine of validity, it would appear that the realisation of the essence of one's being is just valid for one's nature and that there is nothing of value in it. A plant puts forth flowers valid, *i.e.*, appropriate, to the nature of the plant. This is just a natural process, as natural, one would suppose, as water from the plains collecting in a valley or a volcano bursting forth. There is no beauty or goodness or value in any other sense in such a process. Nor does such a process generate any value in the universe except for a mind which appreciates the flowers. We may even say that the plant has an appetite towards the bearing of flowers, towards the realisation of its possibilities, and that there is a natural affinity between plants and flowers, between frees and fruits, as there is between a cause and its appropriate effect. But none of these things can possibly give rise to a value, or in itself be the expression of a value. They only show that there are validities in nature. But should a tree fail to bear fruits, would it not be a loss to the universe, and in so far, a disvalue? If fruit-bearing is valid for a tree, failure to bear fruits simply shows that some other natural cause is operating in such a case to nullify or neutralise the tendency to bear fruits, and if this be true, then failure to bear fruits would be just as valid for the tree under the new condition as fruit-bearing would have been if the new cause had not interfered with the tree's original tendency. So far as fruit-bearing and fruit-failing are both effects of certain natural causes, what makes us say that the operation of one kind of cause alone is valuable while the operation of another kind is considered a disvalue? Obviously, our own interests or desires, whatever they may be. Fruit-failing is a loss not to the universe as such but to the universe of minds. And when the interests of a mind are projected into the situation, it is not the realisation of the essence, the idea, or the typical nature as such that gives

rise to value but the contemplation of such realisation by a mind, or (in the human world), the conscious pursuit of such a realisation as an end devoutly wished for.

The trouble in such cases often relates to the failure rigorously to bear in mind the distinction between end as a mere terminus and end as a conscious goal or destiny, a purpose consciously kept before the mind. Doubtless in many cases the two coincide, the terminus is the purpose, especially in the world of human volitions. But the case is different in the non-human world. Flower-bearing is the natural terminus of a plant's life; but in what sense is it to be understood as the *purpose* of the plant? Is the plant aware of any such destiny and does it consciously strive for its realisation? If it does not—and so long as mind does not enter the scene—how is the category of value appropriate for such a process of self-realisation? Cutting is valid for a knife, good speed for a race-horse. Here cutting and good speed express certain functions which are appropriate for the knife and the horse respectively. And so we may say that the fulfilment of the function of an object is valid for that object, but in what sense is it a value? If every case of the fulfilment of a function which is valid for an object is a case of value, then getting tipsy is valid for the sot and living a debauched life for the rake and killing for the murderer, and we should then say that all such people are realising their selves and thus contributing to the world's value. Then there would be nothing in the world which, as realising *something appropriate to itself*, would not be a generator of value. The science of value, in short, would be merely another name for the study of the nature and functions and causation of objects in general. If we cannot reconcile ourselves to such a conclusion, if we insist that a line must be drawn somewhere between functions which alone ought to be realised and functions which ought not to be realised, then we have already introduced into this distinction the conception of value and given up our theory that the realisation of the essence of an object, of its idea, its typical nature, is as such valuable.

8. The argument, however, does not stop here. When it is pointed out that it is not any and every form of self-realisation that is valuable but only certain forms, it is not necessary to assume, so the argument proceeds, that the concept of the valuable has been

surreptitiously introduced. At any rate, the notion of value is not the primary basis of the distinction. It is used only at a secondary stage. What is primarily taken to distinguish certain forms of fulfilment as alone forms of self-realisation is, it is said, the concept of wholeness or unity, based upon the principle of non-contradiction. Contradiction is always a sign of unreality. The real is the coherent, and the coherent is the self-consistent whole. Reality is essentially a system characterised by inclusiveness and harmony. The more completely an object realises the essence or the universal nature of what it ought to be, or the more completely it expresses what it has in it to be,—and such completeness of expression or realisation is possible only with a concomitant harmonisation or integration—the more completely individual it is or the greater whole it is. It is this wholeness or completeness of individuality that every being strives to attain, that is the end of its existence. It is the logical notion of wholeness, system, individuality—the result of comprehensiveness attended with non-contradiction—that is the primary basis of distinguishing certain forms of fulfilment as better forms of self-realisation from others, for they express better this wholeness, or the "spirit of totality." Such forms alone are valuable, but to say that they are valuable does not express the primary fact or characteristic about them, this latter consisting only in their being more complete individuals. They are greater wholes not because they are valuable, but they are valuable because they are greater wholes. Their wholeness is the expression of reason; logic is the "spirit of totality," and non-contradiction the operative principle not merely in philosophy but also in life.

Shortly, the point of the argument is that it is the logic of a fact, and not the ethics of it, that is of primary consideration in explaining it. To say that a thing is good is to say that it is a good individual of its kind. Moral distinctions are only derivative aspects of logical or metaphysical distinctions. To be a perfect whole is for every object its destiny; the more completely it succeeds in being this, the greater value does it have. Value means completeness of individuality, and so the problem of value or goodness is identical with the problem of "truth" or wholeness.

This view-point emerges most clearly and significantly in

the realm of morals. A man's life is moralised to the extent that it is systematised. He is good in as far as his being is unified at all in any sphere of wisdom or activity. That is, moral activity is only one aspect of the process of the integration of the self which is characteristic of its cognitive and other aspects of experience. Thought and will are merged into one. Moral evil is nothing in itself, it is only an inevitable stage in that completer synthesis of activity which we call goodness. Both good and evil, in fact, are only appearances each of which is over-ruled and transmuted in the whole. It is not in morality that the true nature of reality is most perfectly exhibited. Reality—or the Absolute—is beyond good and evil.

Such a view of morality and goodness has already been examined at some length in a previous connection.¹ Here we need consider it only in its general bearings on the problem of value. It is small wonder that such a view lends itself easily to the charge that it leads to an excessive intellectualisation of the moral problem. Ethics becomes but a branch of logic, and the historical evolution of fact becomes identical with the dialectical movement of thought. But it is not necessary for us to pursue this line of criticism. We shall concentrate attention only on one point significant for our purpose. Absolutism lays stress first and last on coherence, harmony, integration, on the attainment of wholeness etc.. Now attainment of wholeness is essentially a natural—call it logical, if you will—process, where is the value about it? An acorn would, if no other factors interfered with it, naturally grow into an oak. It cannot choose but grow into an oak any more than a child can choose but grow into a man. Becoming a whole then is *valid* for objects, but how does it give rise to *value*? For we attach value, as we have seen, only to that which might have been otherwise, *i.e.*, which might have *chosen* to be otherwise, but a whole could never be otherwise than it is, and in consequence neither has value nor does produce value. Only the whole has value, says the absolutist, for only the whole can be fully systematised and self-coherent. Granted. But if only the whole can be fully systematised etc., its becoming systematised is a property inherent in its very nature as a whole, just as inability to become fully systematised is a property inherent in the very nature of a part because it is less than the

1. *Vide* the chapter on Personal and Social Values.

whole. In such a case, attaining self-coherence is never a virtue in the one case, nor failure to do so a defect (in the moral sense) in the other. You cannot morally approve a man for being six feet five inches tall nor can you condemn another for being only four feet six inches. Whole-making then illustrates only validity but not value. It is valid for every object to attain its destined end—i.e., to become as perfect a whole as may be, as bright an example of its kind as possible. If it succeeds in doing so, it has only realised its natural tendency; if it fails to do so, some other natural factor is responsible for the failure. Value categories are here simply inapplicable.

9. But, it may be said, while the above argument may hold of the natural world, it is not true of the moral realm where a person does not, through the sheer force of natural tendency, attain to wholeness of being but has consciously to strive after it building it up bit by bit. The reply is that herein precisely is revealed the difference between the systematisation required for natural—and logical—purposes and the systematisation required for moral purposes. The attainment of comprehensiveness in the natural as well as in the logical universe is purely by the incorporation of facts, more facts and still more; even the ideal of truth by which it is guided is ultimately (as we have seen) an appeal to facts. Ultimately, the completest whole is the universe as a whole, the whole of reality, and *such* a Reality, *if it is nothing more*, is, the idealist is justified in saying, neither moral nor immoral—it is simply amoral. Moral systematisation, on the contrary, is not primarily a question of more comprehensive or less comprehensive inclusion of facts—things, impulses or persons; it is essentially a problem of *will* and its *attitude*. What you make of your impulses depends on how you will to train or discipline them; how you incline your will towards other persons is different from what you think of them. You may think a person or impulse to be highly undesirable, yet you may hug them to your bosom. The activity of will in systematising moral life is concretely of a different kind from the activity of thought in organising knowledge; the one is essentially personal, stirring up the whole inner man; the other is impersonal concerned largely with the intellectual ordering of external facts. "Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever."

10. Further, an evil deed can present as much coherence

about it as a good one. A case of forgery requires far more planning and systematisation than a plain document. To be thus systematised is just as valid for its purpose as systematisation is for the purpose of the latter. Both require the same kind of logic and it is this logic that is here being called validity. But, it may be said, bad deeds cannot completely unify life, and if the attempt is made, sooner or later they would reveal their fragmentary character by failing to harmonise with good deeds. Comprehensiveness in such a case would tell against non-contradiction. Very true, but this gives away the whole case. For, how do bad deeds become discrepant with good ones? As mere deeds, facts or events of the natural world, there is absolutely no discrepancy between one deed and another: discrepancy arises only between one act as bad and another as good; *i.e.*, when the consideration of value has already and vitally entered into the whole question. The absolutist started with mere coherence, systematisation and comprehensiveness, shutting out the aspect of value from its primary position in the whole scheme of things; it is not now open to him to say that one deed would fail to harmonise with another, for all deeds, whatever their moral nature, are capable, as deeds, of falling into line with one another in the natural world. If they fail to do so, that is only on account of their differential values which have no place in this logic. The absolutist's fallacy in the realm of goodness is on all fours with his fallacy in the sphere of truth where, having started by relying entirely upon coherence and self-consistency, he was forced to come round and recognise the importance of brute facts for truth.

11. And now we come to the concept of value. The universe of consciousness is the universe of value. Value is always for some conscious being. It is in the nature of an ascription and does not belong to the object itself. The object by itself is neutral as to value. We ascribe value to the object. The object does not prescribe its own value. Nor does value describe the intrinsic nature of the object. People attribute

value to objects because objects are capable of satisfying some human purpose. The validity in the object becomes a value by means of human appreciation. The interest in the object is different from the value attributed to it. In common language, we speak of science, progress, freedom, morality, democracy, religion, culture, art etc., as *values*. It is, however, by a sort of transferred epithet that we so describe them. What we mean is that we, or some of us, place a value upon them, or that they are objects of valuation. If freedom and democracy and religion were themselves values, how is it that so many people—and nations—do not embrace them? The truth is that such people do not *see* any value in these things which other people happen to perceive, that is, they do not judge them to be valuable.

What then is meant by intrinsic value? This question has been pressing for an answer from the very beginning of this inquiry, and it is time that we devoted some attention to it.

If by intrinsic value is meant the value that is supposed to belong to an object intrinsically, *i.e.*, in itself, apart from the valuing subject of experience, a value that is supposed to be inherent in the object, this is just the kind of intrinsic value that is denied in these pages. It is necessary to observe here that by denying objectivity in this sense, *i.e.*, by holding that all kinds of value are "subjective," or that they spring out of a subject-object relation, it is not intended to maintain that values are "objective" in that other sense which Moore takes pains to point out, *viz.*, that they are *naturalistic* or *positivistic*.¹ Objectivity in both senses is negated of value and intrinsicity, so far defined, is only one kind of objectivity.

12. If on the contrary intrinsic value means the value we ascribe to objects in virtue of their intrinsic *character* or nature—what a thing is in itself—not in virtue of what a thing is by reason of its relationships, accidents, properties etc., then we must admit that all things have their own proper intrinsic values in this sense. Every object has its own inner essence, differentia, which constitutes it the object or thing that it is, and if we find that this essence is what renders the object valuable to us, the object may in so far be said to possess intrinsic value. For instance, we value a person on account of his essential good

1. "Conception of Intrinsic Value" in *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 255-259.

nature or character irrespective of his personal peculiarities, idiosyncrasies, likes, dislikes etc.. Quinine is valuable on account of its essential healing quality irrespective of its bitter taste. In this signification, the conception of intrinsic value may be admitted though what in this sense constitutes the intrinsic nature of an object—what a thing is in itself—it is difficult to determine.

13. The *locus classicus* for the distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic characters is Moore's discussion of the subject in his *Philosophical Studies*, Ch. VIII, pp. 261—275. He begins by saying that the phrase "having a different intrinsic nature" is not equivalent to the phrase "intrinsically different" or "having different intrinsic properties." For he thinks that two things may be exactly like and still they may be intrinsically different and have different intrinsic properties, merely because they are two. Their numerical difference itself constitutes an intrinsic difference between them and each will have at least one intrinsic property which the other has not got, *viz.*, that of being identical with itself. To say therefore that two things have different intrinsic natures should imply not only that they are numerically different but also that they are *not exactly alike*.

Moore is evidently distinguishing here between the intrinsic properties which are intrinsic in the sense that they depend solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them, and that intrinsic nature of the thing itself. We shall have to revert to this distinction in a subsequent connection.

Next, Moore tells us that intrinsic difference is not the same as qualitative difference either. He admits that all qualitative difference is difference in intrinsic nature, but contends that all intrinsic difference is not qualitative. For two things may possess the same quality in different degrees and yet or consequently be intrinsically different; for instance, a loud sound and a soft one, or two things of different sizes, or a yellow circle with a red centre and a yellow circle with a blue centre, although not these wholes but only single elements of them are qualitatively different—a case, says Moore, which can only loosely be called a difference in quality. Now in regard to these examples, it must be observed that if a loud sound and a soft one, or a big stone and a small one, cannot be said to be qualitatively different, *i.e.*, if loudness and size are not qualities,

much less can two circles with differently coloured spots in the middle be said to be identical in quality. To avoid this absurdity, we should have to say that if, as is admitted, two such patches differ in intrinsic nature, this is because they differ in quality, *any* difference in quality—not necessarily qualitative difference throughout—constituting difference in intrinsic nature.¹ And if, as Moore contends, it is true that the difference between a big and a small stone is a difference in intrinsic nature but still not in quality, then we should have to say that the intrinsic nature of a thing includes quantity also in addition to its quality. Quality of course includes colour as well.

Moore seems to be satisfied with distinguishing intrinsic difference from numerical and qualitative differences in order to determine the intrinsic nature of a thing. What about form and shape? Consider, for example, two coins one made of copper round in shape, the other made of bronze square in shape. It is evident that so far as shape is concerned there is a difference in the intrinsic nature of the two coins in the sense that any coin which was round in precisely the same manner as the given coin would *necessarily* or *must* always, under all circumstances, possess in virtue of its roundness certain properties which another coin, which was square in precisely the same manner as the other given coin, could not in virtue of its squareness possess. Likewise differences in form refer to the internal structural constitution of the two coins, the arrangement of their particles which makes the one a copper coin and the other a coin in bronze, and these differences of form are certainly differences in intrinsic nature in the sense that any coin made of copper would *necessarily* or *must* always possess certain properties (chemical and mechanical) which a coin made of bronze could not possess. Note that formal differences are not always identical with qualitative differences. Bronze differs from copper in quality inasmuch as it is an alloy of copper and tin; but the difference in form consists in that the internal or objective structure of its particles is necessarily different from that of the particles of copper. Ice and water again are qualitatively identical but formally different.

14. We have so far said then that the intrinsic nature of an

1. *Vide, The Right and the Good*, Ross p. 117.

object is to be determined by its quality (including colour), quantity (including both volume and weight), form and shape. An objection might be raised in this connection that we are taking the whole object—the quality, quantity, form and shape included—as representing its intrinsic nature. If the object whole and entire is thus to be viewed, it might be said, what is left to form the extrinsic nature of an object? Should we not look to something ulterior or more ultimate in the object which might give us its intrinsic nature? The objection appears to be legitimate and that brings us to consider the question of relations. Have relations no place in the determination of the intrinsic nature of an object? Relations are of three kinds: the relation of an object to objects other than it and its elements, the relation of the object as a whole to its own parts, and the relation of the parts to one another. I should at once hasten to explain that the mention of relations in this connection need not arouse any anxiety in the reader's mind that we are plunging into a discussion either of Whitehead's theory of prehensions or of the time-honoured distinction of substance and qualities. For our purpose we may assume on an empirical basis the reality of given particular things each unique after its kind: I can make nothing out of the doctrine that a particular thing has no being of its own, but is merely a unity of the aspects of other things having no definite spatial and temporal location of its own, that the world consists of nothing else but relations which are not relations between things.

The relation of an object to objects other than it and its elements is, I think, pre-empted, by the very conception of the *intrinsic* nature of an object which we are investigating, from finding a place in that nature. However important and unique such a relation may be, it yet is not part of what an object is "in itself." Cook Wilson, who discusses this relationship in connection with the problem of substance and attribute, says that while an orange was in itself yellow and round, its being on the table we should not call "what it is in itself."¹ But in the case of a reality whose being is entirely constituted by relation to something else, say, the movement of a body, we have to say that its relation to the body is part of what it is in itself, though its relation to another movement of the same body, or to the

1. *Statement and Inference*, pp. 152–158.

movement of another body, would again be excluded from what it is in itself.

The relation of the parts of a thing to one another need not be brought into our account of what a thing is in itself over and above its quality, quantity, form etc., for such a relation is but the internal structure of the parts, the objective arrangement of its particles etc., whereby the thing is determined to have such and such properties (both chemical and mechanical) and so it falls under the category of form.

The relation of the whole to its parts or elements, however, stands on a different footing. There are of course wholes of different kinds—physical such as a table, a violin etc., organic such as a human body, a plant etc., aesthetic (under which I include the intellectual also) such as a poem, a scenery, an argument or a system of thought etc., and moral or spiritual such as a community, an association, a life as a whole etc.. The analysis so far given of what a thing is in itself applies pre-eminently to physical wholes though mental and moral wholes are not excluded from it. The consideration that I shall now present in regard to the question whether the relation of a whole to its parts (which involves also the correlative relation of the parts to the whole) enters into the determination of what a thing in itself, applies more particularly to organic, aesthetic, and moral wholes than to physical. Nevertheless it does apply to the physical also.

We may recall in this connection the distinction that was drawn elsewhere between the constitutive and the subsidiary parts of a whole. The subordinate parts of a whole are no doubt equally essential with the constitutive parts to the making of the whole and both co-operate to achieve the destiny of the whole; but the nature, the essence, of the whole is expressed chiefly by the constitutive parts. The knife is the blade primarily, a man is his mind essentially, social and moral life are largely the life of freedom. A musical mode has certain characteristic notes called *jivaswaras* (life-notes, in Indian music), and while these express the soul of the tune, the other notes serve as its vestment. A painting is intended to express a certain sentiment which is its soul, but it can be expressed only through a certain disposition of line, curve and colour, light and shade etc., which constitute its body. Likewise we can distinguish between a thesis and its supporting considerations in the development of an argument.

In all these and similar cases the constitutive part or parts may be said to stand for what a thing is "in itself". What a thing is in itself is what it is in its *essence*, in its constitutive nature, that without which a knife would not be knife, man would not be man etc.. This is its intrinsic nature. The subsidiary parts are those which help to make the thing what it is as it appears, in its *existence*. When we talk of the relation of the whole to its parts, we mean or ought to mean this relation of the constitutive to the subsidiary parts, for otherwise there is no whole, over and above the unity of the parts, which can be said to stand in a relation to the parts. This relation of whole to the parts is what may be called ontological involvement. Likewise there is no relation of the parts *to the whole*, but only of some parts to the rest of the whole, and this relation in this case of the subsidiary to the constitutive parts, may be called dependence.

I should hasten to correct one possible misunderstanding of my position. The unity of the parts certainly engenders a life of the whole which is richer, and in every sense higher, than the life of the parts individually as shown by the fact that while the thing as such—*i.e.*, as a whole—is relatively independent of other things, any part *i.e.*, an attribute-element—say, the point of a needle,—can exist only as an element in a thing, and is not conceivable otherwise. But to say that this stands in a relation to the parts is incorrect, for it is nothing apart from the unity of the parts *qua* unity, and this unity is inconceivable apart from the parts. The unity and the parts which make up the unity do not exist as two separate facts, and though the unity has a life richer far than the life of the parts individually, the case is not similar to the formation of water out of hydrogen and oxygen, for in this latter the constituents do not exist as parts of a whole, but have disappeared entirely giving rise to a novel existent altogether. If, however, it be insisted that the unity *qua* unity is different from the parts and as such must stand in some cognisable relation to the parts, we can say that the whole *embodies* the parts or "enforms" them or that it *intrigues* them to enter into a union. But these are only metaphors. Moreover, what we are in search of, it must be remembered, is what the thing is "in itself" and the thing in itself is certainly not the thing as it is in its unity, *i.e.*, in all its developed complexity of relations both internal and external.

If the full-fledged self-realised thing were in question, we need not have asked at all what the thing was "in itself." The thing in itself is the constitutive part which is the thing's intrinsic nature ; the thing as it appears, *i.e.*, exists, is the fully developed unity of the constitutive and the subordinate parts, their determinate existence, so to say.

It follows therefore that what a thing is in itself is neither the ideal, nor the average of the thing ; it is not the substance or the support of the attributes ; it is not the subject as the bearer of the attribute-elements (for the substance or the subject, as at present understood, is simply the unity of the diverse parts). It is rather the constitutive part or parts of a thing which alone, though in conjunction with the accessory parts, are capable of truly expressing the inner meaning of the thing. From this standpoint, the form of the thing acquires a new significance, for the objective structure of a thing, philosophically speaking, is the objective meaning, the soul-significance, the intelligible essence, which it bears, and this is what it is *in itself*. It may also be described as the idea or the universal of the thing, and such a conception of the universal would afford an excellent explanation of the relation of the universal to the particular. It may as well be called substance or subject whose relation to qualities or attributes would thereby get illumined. But these are separate problems which do not call for discussion in this connection.

If the essence of an object, as determined by its constitutive parts, is its intrinsic nature, how is this conclusion to be reconciled with the one previously reached, *viz.*, that the object whole and entire represents its intrinsic nature ? The intrinsic nature as represented by the object in its entirety is to be distinguished from its extrinsic characters acquired by it in relation to other such objects ; relational properties in this sense do not form part of the intrinsic nature of an object. This is undoubtedly an important sense of the concept "intrinsic character." But when we are thinking of the object by itself out of relation to any other external object, surely the question of what constitutes the intrinsic or inner nature of the object is also important, and it is from this point of view that it is suggested here that the constitutive, as distinguished from the subsidiary, part or parts of a whole should be taken as representing its intrinsic character.

Doubtless it would often be very difficult to determine what in this sense forms the constitutive element of a given object, but difficulties of empirical investigation ought not to stand in the way of logical distinction if it is found to be of help for a clearer understanding of the nature of things.

If what a thing is in itself is what it is in its *essence* only, which is obviously different from what it is in its *existence*, a question arises as to whether this essence exists or not. In reply, it must be stated that logically speaking, it could exist by itself, but factually it always exists in conjunction with the subsidiary part. The subsidiary parts, while having an essence of their own cannot exist at all, either logically or factually, except in unison with the constitutive.

15. It may be recalled that according to Moore, the intrinsic property of a thing needs to be distinguished from the intrinsic character of the thing upon which the property solely depends. But he does not point out how in any given case we have to distinguish the property from the intrinsic character. We have tried to analyse the intrinsic character of things. And this intrinsic character may have its own qualities which may be called the intrinsic *attributes* of the object, for example, the sharpness of a blade, the qualities of a mind etc.. The intrinsic *property* of an object is the property which it acquires in virtue of the union of the constitutive with the subordinate parts, for instance, the health and vitality of an organism, its alertness, the length, topical distribution and qualities of style of an essay, the elaboration of a musical mode or melody-mould, the disposition of line and curve, light and shade, mass etc., in a painting, the social and moral institutions of a society etc.. When two or more relatively independent objects as they exist enter into relation with one another, the properties which emerge out of the relation may be called emergent or consequential properties such as the properties of a molecule emerging out of the relatedness of atoms, the values of truth, beauty and goodness etc..

16. And finally a word about the kinds of necessity operative in the formation of the different kinds of whole. Moore is of opinion that the necessity by which, if one patch of colour is yellow or beautiful, another having the same intrinsic nature must be yellow or beautiful, is neither a necessity of material implication, nor one of logical implication, nor one of causality

even. It is a peculiar kind of necessity different from all the three sorts mentioned. I should suggest that the necessity by virtue of which if one coin is red or round, another having the same intrinsic nature must be red or round, is nothing but a logical necessity, for it refers to the attributes constituting the intrinsic nature of the object. The necessity which generates consequential properties out of the interrelation of two or more independent things is plainly a causal or empiric necessity whether it be of the natural or of the teleological order. But the necessity by virtue of which the constitutive part is joined to the subsidiary parts and thereby the thing in itself is converted into the thing as it appears, is truly neither causal merely nor logical solely, but partakes of the nature of both. That an organism is a union of body and mind, that a painting is an embodiment of a dominant sentiment (emotional tone, zest) in a particular combination of form and colour, that a given moral institution is the incarnation of a people's cultural soul-universal in their sociological space-time particular, are neither analytic nor synthetic propositions. The limits of this chapter prohibit my discussing this question further, but I shall here content myself with observing that we have here a sense of "must" different from the causal or the logical. We can see neither a causal nor a logical necessity about such unions or syntheses.

17. In accordance with the distinction drawn above between two kinds of intrinsic nature, the meaning of intrinsic value would also vary. In either case, it should be remembered, intrinsic value signifies only the value that we attribute to objects in virtue of their intrinsic character or nature. It is interesting to notice here that Moore, in his *Philosophical Studies*,¹ gives an interpretation of intrinsic value which seems to lend colour to the view advanced in these pages. A predicate of intrinsic value, he says, is that which depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the object, yet it is not the same thing as an "intrinsic property" of the object. Although, for instance, both "yellowness" and "beauty" depend solely on the intrinsic nature of the object which possesses them, while "yellow" is an intrinsic predicate, "beauty" is not. In fact, while many predi-

1. pp. 253-265 (italics mine). See for a detailed criticism of Moore's views on the subject the present writer's article on "Values as Objective" in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, October 1930.

cates of value are intrinsic kinds of value, yet none of them are intrinsic properties like yellow. What then is the difference between value and intrinsic properties? Moore can only answer "by saying that intrinsic properties seem to *describe the intrinsic character* of what possesses them in a sense in which predicates of value never do. If you could enumerate *all* the intrinsic properties a given thing possessed, you would have given *a complete description of it*, and would not need to *mention any predicate of value it possessed*; whereas no description of a given thing would be *complete* which omitted any intrinsic property." If this is true, then the question arises, In what sense may a predicate of value be said to depend upon the *intrinsic nature* of what possesses it as distinguished from both subjective and objective (naturalistic) predicates? What is the nature of the "must" in the statement that if A possesses a predicate of value which B does not, the two *must* be different, which is said to be the meaning of the dependence in question and which is not true of intrinsic properties? It is clear therefore that values are called intrinsic as depending upon the intrinsic nature of an object only in the sense that we attribute them to the object *in respect* of its intrinsic nature, however this nature be defined. The necessity would in this case be simply a causal or empiric necessity as value would be an emergent property of the subject-object relation.

18. We may give yet another interpretation to intrinsic value and see whether objects possess such value or not. Understanding by value only the value that is engendered in the subject-object relationship, never the value that is supposed to exist in objects themselves, we must ask the further question, Do we value an object, *i.e.*, attribute value to it, for its own sake or for the sake of the effects it produces on the life of sentient beings? Is anything valuable in and for itself? Shortly, is value always a means value or is it ever an end value? Such end values have often been called intrinsic values, and the means values, instrumental values.

In his work, *Principia Ethica*, Moore suggests the above meaning of the term intrinsic value.¹ An object is said to have

1. This meaning, it will be observed, is different from the meaning ascribed to the term in *Philosophical Studies* as value depending upon the *intrinsic nature* of an object.

intrinsic value when it is something which is worth having for its own sake, when it would possess that value even if it existed quite alone, and even if nothing further were to come of it. On the other hand, when something is only a means to the existence of that which has value in itself, it is said to possess only instrumental value. The method then which must be employed to determine whether anything possesses intrinsic value and in what degree, is what Moore calls the method of isolation.¹ Isolate an object as completely as possible from all possible relations, consequences and accompaniments, and then ask yourself whether, even as existing in such a state, the object would still be considered good or better than its non-existence. Should the answer be in the affirmative, the object possesses intrinsic value. As has already been hinted at, the necessity which dictates the existence of the means for the existence of the valuable end is only a natural or causal necessity so that if the laws of nature were different, exactly the same good might exist, although what is now a necessary condition of its existence did not exist. The existence of the means, that is to say, has no intrinsic value and its utter annihilation would not in any way affect the intrinsic value of that for whose existence it is now a necessary condition.

It has often been pointed out that the method of isolation by itself is not competent enough to decide the question of intrinsic value. For even when one attempts to isolate a given object as much as possible and consider it by itself, there is always an unconscious, unacknowledged under-current of suggestion of its possible relation to and effects upon the considering mind in the half-light of which our judgment of its intrinsic value is liable to be coloured. Secondly, such isolation, necessarily involving as it does abstraction of the object from its proper contexts and just relations, may conceivably destroy or greatly lessen its intrinsic value, for an object exists as it does largely by virtue of its relations and contexts. Thirdly, it may sometimes so happen that a strict application of the method of isolation would destroy the very object to which it is applied, and in such a case, we should be determining, by the employment of this method, the value, not of the existence, but really of the non-existence, of the object under consideration. Moore's criticism of Sidgwick's Hedonism is a case in point.

1. *Principia Ethica* : pp. 83-96, 187-189.

On account of these inherently vital defects, I consider the method of isolation inappropriate to decide the question of intrinsic value. In its stead, I should like to employ what I have called "the Method of Opposite Effects" which consists in supposing that the thing in question produced, not its present effects or consequences, but uniformly and throughout just their opposite effects or consequences,¹ and then asking oneself whether, as thus metamorphosed in its productivity, the thing would still be called good or bad. I have absolutely no hesitation in asserting that a conscientious employment of this method together with Moore's own method of isolation (wherever possible), would convince any unsophisticated person that there is nothing in this world which is absolutely good, or good-in-itself, or possesses intrinsic value, and that the goodness or badness of things is always relative, relative to the effects or consequences which they produce upon the life of sentient beings. Even taking Moore's own illustration of the two worlds,² the one the darkest and foulest, the other the brightest and fairest, (and we must remember Moore has put his case here at its strongest), is it not crystal clear that in the very act of contemplating each such world, the contemplating mind is insensibly, unconsciously *affected* by the loathsome colours of the one and by the roseate hues of the other, and that its verdict upon their intrinsic value is really decided by this surreptitious reference to the effects of the two worlds respectively upon human life and consciousness? Else, were this not the case, I should challenge anybody to tell me how he is able to pronounce (if he does make a pronouncement under such circumstances) the one world to be an unalloyed good and the other an unredeemed evil. In fact, if all question of the relation to and effects upon human life and consciousness *could* be utterly brushed aside, good and evil could hardly be distinguished from each other, any more than light and darkness could be distinguished by a person born blind, or heat and cold, pleasure and pain, could be differentiated by one rendered completely anaesthetic.

It may be said that the method of opposite effects is an impossible method as it requires us to make an impossible

1. *Vide* the paper on "The Methods of Ethics," in the *Proc. of the Ind. Phil. Congress*, 1931.

2. *Principia Ethica*, pp. 83-85.

supposition, viz., that a given cause could produce, not its appropriate effects, but quite their opposite ones. Science—and common sense—are flouted here, it may be urged, because science does not know of any cause producing effects quite opposite of those usually or uniformly produced. In reply, it must be pointed out that this criticism misses the point of our argument, which is, not whether such opposite effects *could* be produced or not, but the reason for calling an object intrinsically valuable. In a different universe, with different laws, as Moore would say, such opposite consequences might conceivably be produced. If the causal judgment were an analytic judgment stating that the nature of an object is such that it must or necessarily and always produce such and such effects only, we could dismiss the method of opposite effects as an impossible conception. But as there is no such necessary or logical connection between a cause and its effect, or an object and its qualities; as a judgment of cause, or a judgment of nature, is only a synthetic judgment, the supposition that an object could be attended with effects opposite of those usually produced is not an impossible one.

In short, the method of opposite effects is not more impossible or absurd than Moore's method of isolation. The latter supposes that no effects at all would be produced from a given cause, the former, that opposite effects would be produced. And, of course, when we regard the empirical nature of an object whose value is under question, both suppositions are equally abstract, fantastic and impossible. How can you have an object without having at the same time its proper qualities and the effects of these qualities? For isolating an object from its proper contexts and just relations *is* to make such a supposition. How can you swallow a dose of prussic acid and still suppose that it would not act? Both arguments presuppose and rest upon the nature of the object, and both, *for the sake of argument*, deny the efficacy of this nature. What a thing does or leads to, its relations and effects, in short, the expression of its own nature in concrete existence, is not significant for its being according to Moore's supposition. For the method of opposite effects, on the contrary, such effects or expression of nature *is* all-important, and that is why it asks what we would think of the object if it produced quite opposite effects. But, as was observed before,

the point of both arguments lies, not in the *fact* of the object producing or not certain given effects, but in the *logic* behind the suppositions.

19. The conclusion of the whole argument is *not* that all values are instrumental only. The conception of means and end, valuable as it is for life, is essentially a relativistic conception. There is no rigid distinction between means and end. Prof. Laird has made an excellent study of the whole conception and besides pointing out that what is taken as end in one context may itself become means in another and *vice versa*, he differentiates a "means" from an "instrumental good" and discusses a number of ideas which, though they are more or less intimately connected with "ends," are still distinct from one another and from the conception of "ends."¹

For our purpose, it is sufficient to emphasise the fact that no value, so long as it remains a value, can be said to be purely a means value or solely an end value. Means and end change places according to the context of human need and desire. It has already been shown that economic utilities are not merely means to ends beyond themselves but that while in one sense they might be regarded as means to a good life, in another sense they are themselves elements of the good life. Eating is in one sense a means to the end of self-preservation, but who would deny that it possesses value on its own account? Conversely, love is often regarded as a supreme end—intrinsically valuable; but is not physical love at least in many cases looked upon as the expression of the desire for offspring? Knowledge is doubtless an end in itself, but do we not hold that in a very real sense it is a means of increasing the sum of human happiness? Nay, goodness itself is valued by many only by reason of its capacity to promote social equilibrium, harmony, and welfare. In these circumstances, it is venturesome to assert that there are certain things which are only good-as-means and certain other things which are only good-as-ends. No value, I repeat, not even the highest, can, so long as it remains a value, be considered as an end-in-itself only, *i. e.*, desired for its own sake, and not also as a means for the sake of something else. Prof. Laird says somewhere that truth is not an intrinsic value. Ross argues that beauty is not an intrinsic value. Bradley has said

1. *Idea of Value*, pp. 32–62.

that goodness is only an appearance and of course what is only an appearance is not intrinsically valuable. And Sidgwick has declared that none of these so-called intrinsic values can be taken as intrinsically or ultimately good independently of the effects they produce upon the happiness of sentient beings.

20. But now we must subject the conception of means and end to a little more scrutiny. Very often a means, as denoting a process preparatory to some given consummation, is taken as a particular instance of the relation of cause and effect. Hence all causes, instruments, tools etc., are regarded as means.¹ This is not quite correct. If I get sleep by means of ortol, no doubt ortol is the cause of my sleep. But if a pair of spectacles is the means whereby I am enabled to study books, in what sense can the spectacles be said to be the cause of my study? Money is the means with which one can buy goods or utilities, is it the cause of our buying them? Can possession of a degree, which is the means of getting a job (let us say), be treated as the cause of getting the job? If we can use the term "cause" in these latter connexions at all, we should distinguish causes into formal, instrumental, material etc., and speak of the means as the instrumental cause. But the real cause of my study or buying goods is my desire to do so and this is the formal or final cause, the reason of my action, and that is the same thing as the end of my action. Failure to distinguish between causes would thus seem to convert a means into an end.

A means we have said may be called an instrumental cause. An instrumental cause in the above cases would appear to be equivalent to a condition. Even this, however, is not free from ambiguity. While causes may in a sense be said to be conditions, conditions are not always causes. As Laird points out, a man's character may be conditioned by about half a hundred factors relating to his organism such as the circulation of blood, the condition of his thyroid gland etc., but none of these may be called the cause of his moral qualities. In the above cases also, a degree as a means of getting a job involves a logical condition which is different from the cause-conditions of the other examples. If the possession of a degree is the logical condition of securing a job, the cause-condition in such a case would be perhaps the actual existence of a vacancy

1. Laird: *The Idea of Value*, p. 42.

demanding a hand, the good will of the appointing officer etc.. We should distinguish then (as Laird does not) between cause-conditions, logical conditions and substantial conditions and relate means—as instrumental causes—only to the first two.

21. Even this distinction, however, cannot be held to be ultimate. Substantial conditions of the sort mentioned above bear to that which they condition the relation of parts to a whole. Shall we say that parts do not in any circumstances stand to the whole in the relationship of means to end? According to Moore, the whole-part relation does not exist unless the part is, not merely a necessary condition (like a means) for the existence of that which has greater value but, (unlike a means) itself a necessary part of this more valuable existent. If a part is removed, the whole would suffer in value, but suppose a means removed, what remains is just what was asserted to have value. That is, while the relation between the means and the end is only causal or instrumental, that between the part and the whole is organic.¹ But is it not just possible that an element in a whole may be both a part in Moore's sense (a substantial condition in our present terminology) and a means (cause) at the same time? This appears to be the true feature of the parts of an organic whole. The human body, for instance, is not an organic whole for Moore, for only causal relations hold between the several members of the body, they are only means to one another. But *ex hypothesi*, a something which is only a means to an end does not form a necessary part of that good thing for whose existence it is necessary. We are thus led to think that the members of the body are not necessary parts (in Moore's sense) or substantial conditions, of the body. What a strange conclusion! Is not the existence of the arm, for instance, a necessary part of the good of the body as a whole? Would the human body retain the whole of its value intact (the arm being only a means, according to Moore) even after the arm is removed? Moore would say, perhaps, that in a universe of different causal laws, the arm might not be found to be so indispensable as it is in this universe of ours. Possibly, but then who could assure us that in such a differently constituted universe, the body would retain the same value as it does in the present? It is clear therefore that the parts of a whole may be

1. *Op. cit.* p. 27 sq.

organically knit together, that is, have value on their own account, or be substantial conditions, notwithstanding that causal relations (the relation of means and end) hold among them. If we consider again a work of art, such as a play, which is undoubtedly a whole, we should find that the successive parts of it exist not only in consequence of but also for the sake of one another as well as of the whole. In other words, the parts of such a whole are not only means but also ends to one another. In short, causal are not incompatible with organic (teleological) relations, and that the purposive relation may itself act as a cause has been the burden of this work. If in particular we remember that the whole, as interpreted in this work, may be a union of constitutive and subsidiary parts, it needs few words to show that the parts may both be purposive as well as causal in relation to one another and the whole.

But, it may be said, does this not necessitate the further conclusion that a part must be looked upon as a cause of itself and of the whole? And, pray, why not? It is a cause (in the only intelligible sense of the term cause, *viz.*, an indispensable condition) of itself-as-in-its-present-state-in-the-whole. In the consciousness of beauty, for instance, the beautiful object—a part—is certainly a cause of itself in its present state as a contemplated beauty in consciousness. In sooth, unless we believe that the parts are thus, partly at least, conditions of themselves in the wholes to which they belong, strange conclusions would result as, for instance, the one that Moore draws that in the case of a dead arm, so far as those parts of it which are identical with the parts of the living arm are concerned, they are exactly identical and that "in them we have an undeniable instance of one and the same thing at one time forming a part, and at another not forming a part, of the presumed 'organic whole.'"¹ But when we say, as we generally do, that "the arm which is a part of the body would not be what it is if it were not such a part," what we mean by the "arm" is not the *dead* arm in contrast to the living arm, but the arm as *discharging* its own specific and unique function in the economy of the organism. And by saying that this function would not be what it is if the arm were not a part of the body, we mean that it is only in relation to the body, only in relation to the economy of the whole organism,

1. *Ibid.* p. 34.

is this causal function brought into play. But if so the arm, or rather the specific function, must be the cause, or the condition, of its own existence as this particular element, *viz.*, the arm of the body; otherwise we may mistake the leg, for example, for the arm or think that it discharges the same function, simply because it also happens to belong to the body. On the one side the condition (or cause) of the existence of the arm in the body is its own specific function as an arm; on the other, this unique function—together with all the properties that are connected with it—finds expression or "has a meaning" only because the arm is a part of the body.

22. The long and short of the whole matter is that substantial conditions—or parts—of a whole may also act as causes or means. If so, the whole conception of means and end seems to be so viciously relativistic that it is of small profit to build any doctrine of intrinsic and instrumental values (in the ordinary signification of these terms) on its basis. On a general view, all values appear to be intrinsic-instrumental. Every behaviour-process by means of which we realise some higher end, (e.g., labour, sleep) gives us its own immediate satisfaction. And no sooner have we realised some given end which prior to realisation we had deemed to be of intrinsic significance, than it appears to be a means to something else. The whole of a man's life, in the realm of values, is thus a vain and never-ending pursuit after successive absolutes successively overthrown and replaced by other things absolute still. This is, as some would say, the very adventure of life. No doubt, but the point is, where in all this chase of the will-o'-the-wisp are we to look for the true and definitely ascertained intrinsic value which is valued for its own sake and for the sake of nothing else? And, what is worse still, one man's intrinsic value is another's instrumental, and *vice versa*. And even when people agree as to the verbal content of a certain intrinsic value, they rarely agree as to its objective content or as to the best means of translating it into practice.

23. The fact of the matter is that there is no one meaning definitely fixed either for instrumentality or intrinsicity. Let us first agree to distinguish a means from a cause, in spite of all that has hitherto been said regarding the coincidence of both. A cause is a natural means (so to say), a means is a

moral cause. That is to say, a cause is any natural object or phenomenon which is naturally fitted (or valid, as we might say) for bringing about a certain result. In itself, it has no value. It is just one of a number of conditions, or groups of conditions, any one of which is, objectively speaking, equally available for producing a given effect. (The question of plurality of causes is irrelevant in this connection). A means, however, is one such cause *chosen* by a moral agent. He may have his own reasons for choosing a particular cause out of a number of otherwise equally valid ones. Anyway, as soon as he chooses it, it acquires a peculiar value in his eyes, the value that any contributory object would acquire. It is no doubt ordinarily true that the end determines the means. But very often the available means also determines to some extent the end to be chosen. Hence means and end become closely correlated—this definite means, and no other, for this definite end, and no other. It is natural therefore that the means should acquire a value now which as a merely natural cause it did not have before. Causes are to be found in the natural world; means can be found in the human-moral world alone.

24. We are now in a position to distinguish the several senses of contributoriness or conduciveness, and the several kinds of end.

In the first place, there are certain things which in their very nature reveal themselves as more of a means to some other things than as ends. Their value consists largely in being instrumental to ends beyond themselves. A knife, for example, a pen, a machine, belong to this class. They are pure instrumentalities and little more. They have no existence of their own in the sense that their existence is justified only by the ends they serve. They generate instrumental values in a special sense. These values have a significance only in special contexts and have no connection with the general spirit or scheme of life as a whole. They should not, however, be mistaken for economic values in general or the values connected with the welfare of men on the material side. The material welfare of man, forming part of the general scheme of his well-being, is not, as we have seen, merely a means, but also an end. Economic values are the sum-total of such instrumental and other kinds of value, but as related to one important aspect of human welfare,

they acquire the character of ends in their collective capacity which the value of a knife or a watch does not as such possess.

Then there is the large class of objects and things of the natural world which in a sense exist for themselves, no doubt, but, as objects of value, exist only for the sake of fulfilling some desire or interest of a human subject. A flower has indeed a right to exist on its own account; but if it is a thing of beauty it is only because it pleases a beholder after a fashion—by satisfying his creative-expressive impulse. A river follows its own meandering path unconscious of any end beyond its own flow; but it becomes humanly valuable only when a dam is thrown across it for irrigation purposes or its path deflected for generating electricity. Either Plato set down his master's teachings in the Dialogues and probably improved upon them also, or he gave the world in dialogue form mostly his own philosophical lucubrations; either of these two possibilities was a fact as it took place in ancient history. But it becomes a truth only for the philosophic investigator when it satisfies him after a fashion—by satisfying his impulse of curiosity. An act of charity is an event of the natural world; it becomes a moral act, however, when it satisfies the agent after a fashion—by being an expression of his self-creative impulse. Thus all objects and phenomena of the natural world are, from the standpoint of value, real only as they contribute in some sense or other to the fulfilment of some aspect of human interest or desire. The real is in this sense the valuable.

25. We may say then that the values thus generated are all of them contributory. They contribute to the larger life of the appreciator, and are values only because they so contribute. In the very nature of things, no value—not even truth, beauty or goodness—can be sought for its own sake, for by its very constitution it is a value only in so far as it fulfils some human interest or desire, *i.e.*, in some sense contributes to human well-being. It may be that in the case of certain values, immediate reference to any practical aspect of life may not be perceptible—and in this sense they are said to be “disinterested”—but the ultimate reference to human happiness and progress is always there and nothing is a value that does not, for instance, contribute to the sum of human knowledge, or lead to a better appreciation of what is truly great or noble in human or natural

creativeness, or to a better regulation of inter-personal relationships in society.

An intrinsic value then is not something which would be valuable even if it existed quite alone with nothing else in the world. As value, it could neither exist apart from consciousness nor be valuable even if it could. It is a value only because it satisfies human interest or conduces to human happiness in some sense or other. It is to state the same thing in other words to say—as has often been said in this work—that all values are instrumental or contributory. There may be mere instrumental values (this is doubtful), but undoubtedly there are no mere intrinsic values.

26. Sometimes intrinsic value is attributed to wholes of experience, to states of mind such as aesthetic enjoyments and pleasures of human intercourse. Moore and Parker are of this opinion. Parker in particular distinguishes between value as a real factor in experience and value as an assigned predicate of the object of interest. There is real value, he thinks, in an aesthetic experience, *i.e.*, value is intrinsic to such an experience, but a "work of art" possesses value only as assigned to it by one who "appreciates" it.¹ But, we must ask, if an aesthetic experience is a whole containing a real value, *from the standpoint of whose experience* is there value here? For it would be admitted, I think, that value cannot exist apart from an experienter. The value cannot be from the standpoint of the experience of the contemplator of the aesthetic object, for he is himself part of the experiential whole in question which is said to contain value, and a part of the experiential whole cannot arrogate to itself the value belonging to the whole as such. For that matter, we might as well say that value belongs to the aesthetic object itself—another part of the experiential whole. The whole then must contain value for another being who contemplates it, and if such a contemplation also forms a whole and value belongs "really" only to this whole, the position obviously leads to a *progressus ad infinitum*. To escape from a such an *ad infinitum*, we must declare that value is indeed for the contemplator, but it is not "in" the whole as a real factor, but it is "created" in the whole, or "emerges" out of it. Values are "struck" in the whole by the interrelation of

1. *The International Journal of Ethics*, XLIV, p. 294.

subject and object. In a sense, value is "outside" the whole, for the whole is the cause or condition of value.

27. It does not, however, follow from anything that has been said so far that all values are of the same order or significance. While all values are contributory, there are degrees and kinds of contributoriness among them. We may first of all classify values under conditional and immediate. Conditional values are illustrated by organic, economic, personal and social values. They form the conditions of the proper and successful functioning of personality. They are not, of course, the causes of personality but only determinants. Unless a man possesses sound health, for instance, or economic competency, it would be difficult for him to give of his best to the world. Of such conditional values, economic and personal values form a special class. They are more purely auxiliary or accessory to life than any other value and so may be called instrumental values. Immediate values are distinguished from conditional values by the fact that each of them represents a more or less complete moment of experience, each of them is a self-contained unity and harmony. They have no ragged edges or torn ends like the conditional values. The hedonic, the recreative, the intellectual, the aesthetic and the moral values are examples of such immediate values. They are called immediate because they are, relatively speaking, the immediate objects of interest as each of them is, again relatively speaking, a self-coherent whole of experience. Immediacy of this kind, however, is not equivalent to ultimateness or intrinsicity (as usually understood) for reasons already suggested. Of such immediate values, again, personality values such as the intellectual, the aesthetic and the moral, form a special class. They constitute the essence of personality, they reveal the soul of a man's inner life. They represent the highest, the best and the noblest in human life from a purely human point of view. Without them, man would lose his distinctive endowment and nature as a moral personality and sink to the level of the brutes. Hence their special significance and glory sung by all poets, saints, preachers and philosophers.

28. Thus though the categorial pattern and the schematism of all values are the same, there are vital differences among them in the way in which they concretely relate themselves to life

and promote life's interests. Having sufficiently studied these differences in our survey of values, it is our duty in this chapter to investigate a little further the general nature of all values so as to justify, if possible, the contention that no value is, as value, pursued for its own sake. We have shown that all values share in the character of contributing to life's purposes. We must now see that all of them are relative. This relativity of value has been tolerably fully discussed and confirmed in the course of this work,¹ but here its significance for the thesis under consideration needs to be pointed out. It means in the first place that no value carries on its own face an evidence of its own value, so to say. Value is born in an appreciation of the conformity of an object to the norm of expectation, and the degree of this conformity—which expresses the degree of the object's value—is judged by the individual experient according to the degree in which the object is found to fulfil his interest. It is small wonder therefore that the value of an object is relative to the interest of the agent and cannot claim any absolute-ness in its own behalf. Relativity in this sense makes it clear that when the situation is philosophically considered no value can in itself be the object of aspiration. For it is fulfilment of interest that is primarily sought for in appreciation and the object derives its value only as accessory thereto.

Relativity means in the second place that no value carries on its own face the *imprimatur* of authority. Values do not contain within themselves the reason for their existence, nor are they by themselves imperative. They do not validate themselves. Some of them may be complete and self-contained moments of experience but that does not signify that they are obligatory or authoritative. Some of them, persistent like organic and hedonic values, insistent like truth, beauty and goodness, may be powerful enough to constrain us to seek and realise them. Nevertheless they have no title, no lawful authority, no right, to compel us. Shortly, no value is, as value, self-justified. For as value, it is relative to the experient, and it is created by the experient. And the experient pursues, not these values *qua* values, but the objects of value. He pursues knowledge which is true, objects which are beautiful, and acts which are good. Truth, beauty and goodness cannot exist apart from a personality which is a

1. *Vide* ch. IV.

whole and in whose life they figure as revealing moments. It is the reality we speak of as personality, or spirit, that is the true moral sovereign and that can alone persuade us, or coerce us, to seek these values. The authority of values is derived from the authority of personality in whose life alone they live, move and have their being. Such values, therefore, relative as they are to personality, cannot be regarded as intrinsic or absolute.

But the relativity of values has a deeper significance. All our values are bound up with finite objects and the finite, in so far as it is essentially finite, is never intrinsically valuable. All our values are bound up with physical existence, and physical existence is relative through and through. Not even truth, beauty and goodness—not to speak of other values—are, in so far as they are conditioned by the elements of the finite physical world, capable of escaping this vicious relativity. Who that hath watched a mastiff slay a poor lamb, who that hath read of the Lamb of God having been slain by the hound of humanity, can declare that the goodness of this world is absolute? Who that hath heard of Galileo's tortures at the hands of the Inquisition, or of Socrates' drinking the cup of hemlock, can believe that the truth of this world is intrinsically valuable? Who that hath seen the bloom of a bonny cheek, or of a frail flickering flower, fade at the merest touch of the hand of time can feel that the beauty of this world is unconditioned? In this finite world of ours, justice can be established only by bloodshed, patriotism can be pursued only by cutting your fellow-men's throat, social reforms can be ushered in only by imprisonment of people, culture and civilization can be defended only by wholesale destruction of cities and populations. In this finite world of ours, love can be realised only by relinquishing kingdoms, beauty can survive only by continually baulking the beast, knowledge can be pursued only by forsaking family ties, human service can be rendered only by contracting fatal disease. Bound as our life is to the conditions of space and time, the realisation of values involves keen struggle for existence, harm to your fellow-men, competition of not always a healthy character. Even the good we do to some one is often—nay, always—tainted with evil to somebody else. The tears that we shed in sympathy for one ill-treated will often force in others—the aggressors—tears

that are shed in *their* own sorrow and distress. The freedom that you would like your people to enjoy can be purchased only by the slavery or starvation of some other people. Even your non-violence will cause violence and injury of a terrible sort to your opponent—what need to describe the effects of violent methods of securing justice? The angel of righteousness and reform sends not peace but a sword.

Think again of the disappointments and disillusionments of life. What we prize most, that eludes our grasp. What we consider most valuable turns out, even when we are able to realise it, most undesirable or most trivial. The things of this world are such that the pursuit of them is like the pursuit of our own shadow—the faster we pursue it, the farther it flies away from us. Turn your back upon it, and it follows you more closely than the dog at your heels; even so, you cannot catch it. Similarly, when you are most eager and anxious to realise and enjoy something, destiny generally raises a forbidding finger and you are doomed to disappointment; when you have lost your zest for it, or are unable to enjoy it, it comes to you a-begging for acceptance. A man loves a woman with all his soul and heart, with the purest and holiest love imaginable—she throws herself upon a sot or a rake. A father puts his complete trust in his son and bequeaths his whole property to him—the son turns out a vagabond and a wastrel. A man devotes a lifetime to the discovery and propagation of a new truth, or to the service of his fellow-men—an ununderstanding world jeers at him or stones him. We rear a family in the faith that the members will grow to their manhood and realise the best in them—the hand of death silently steals them one after another. Where in all this are we to look for a value which always completely satisfies, which is self-justifying, which is truly intrinsic? For such a value should not, above everything else, ever *disappoint* us; and there is not a single human value which does not disappoint us at some point or other, at some time or other. The world of human values indeed seems to say: "Gild me, and I will jilt you; build on me, and I will pull down the edifice." What we take to be the first proves to be the last.

29. The very conditions of our finite existence, then, make our human values relative. It is futile to seek for absolute (or intrinsic) values in this world. *If* there are absolute values—like

absolute goodness, absolute truth and absolute beauty—their pattern is laid up in heaven, at any rate beyond this sensible world as we now experience it. Our present values—*human* truth, *human* beauty etc.—they but suggest, but do not themselves signify or reveal, absolute value. If on the contrary we would realise absolute value in this world alone, our present physical existence must be so completely transfigured that it ceases to be finite physical existence, properly speaking. It must be completely spiritualised. The scales must fall down from our eyes. The veil must be torn off from the face of our being. We must recognise ourselves as what we truly are, spirits borne on the bosom of the Infinite. Then we shall recognise that the world also has another and higher appearance.

30. Without entering at present into a discussion of the nature of spirit and other like questions, it may be sufficient to mention here that the road to the realisation of intrinsic value lies through the transcendence of the merely purposive attitude. Purposiveness—or, better, purposefulness—is, we have seen, the heart of value theory, and that is the third great characteristic of value (the other two being contributoriness and relativity) which disentitles it to be called intrinsic value. Value in fact has been interpreted in terms of fulfilment of purpose, and that is the meaning of saying that utilitarianism (in the broad sense) is the last word in the philosophy of value. It is this which renders the conception of means and end so apposite, indeed so indispensable, to the conception of value. All this, it is hoped, has been abundantly discussed throughout this work. What remains to show is that *pari passu* with contributoriness, purposefulness (as ordinarily interpreted) also militates against the right of value to be considered intrinsic or absolute. In this connection, Stocks' criticism of the category of purpose is extremely illuminating.¹ The gravamen of his attack on that category is that the purposive attitude splits up action into two factors, the end and the means, thereby giving rise to two or three possible sources of danger. Firstly, the end gets such exaggerated importance that every effort is concentrated to bring it about so much so that the agent comes to feel that any means is good means so long as it is capable of bringing about the result, that, in other words, the end justifies the means. This

1. *The Limits of Purpose*, pp. 11-96.

involves secondly the devaluation of the means, so to say, the view that the means, the effort, by itself has no value, its only significance consisting in being a means to a given end. And thirdly the whole situation is thus rendered abstract in that means and end fall apart from each other losing the organic unity which actually binds them together in concrete human action.

Art and morality, thinks Stocks, redeem the situation. Art supervenes upon purpose, is "parasitic on purpose," in Stocks' language, only, however, to complete purpose by giving a significance to each smallest detail of the execution. The words and phrases of a poem are not merely vehicles of expressing the meaning of the piece as a whole, they themselves are supremely significant in such wise that the alteration of even a single word alters the sense of the whole. Art therefore hallows the means and converts it into a thing of value. In doing so, it knits means and end into a closer unity. Morality supervenes upon the artistic process and perfects it by giving a significance to every detail of the moral process. While art is concerned with the external, morality takes for its scope the whole field of action and conduct and the human will as manifested in them. The forward-looking attitude, which is characteristic of purpose in so far as it looks to results, is given up here, for the moral value is in the action itself, not in any result external to itself. "The moralist gives from moment to moment a judgment which is final and irreversible. Justice is not altered though the heavens fall."¹

Thus art and morality perfect between them the process of what Stocks calls the supercession of purpose. They transform the abstract universality of means and end into the concrete life of individuality. Moral acts in particular are characterised by the fact that they are not *purposive* so much as *expressive*. They express a man's will and personality just as a work of art may be said to express the feeling of the artist. In this sense moral values are intrinsic and absolute.

31. This meagre sketch of Stocks' thought does no justice to his searching analysis and penetrating criticism of the ordinary categories of moral life. But it would appear that while his insight in this matter is fundamentally sound, his

1. *Ibid.* p. 31.

explicit arguments lead to conclusions far from clear of difficulties. The doctrine upheld in these pages is in many respects similar to the view of Stocks, especially in respect of the supremacy of willing in morality, but when he says that morality, like art, cares nothing for results (so long as they are practically acceptable),¹ he is on questionable ground. We have seen that the rightness of an act means willing the *good*, though the *ground* of the willing lies in something else. And the act is made good by realising the good. The goodness of the result therefore plays a fundamental part in morality and constitutes moral value, as we have called it. Stocks' argument would seem to lead to a will—we cannot say that wills nothing—but a will that is essentially unrelated to the results of its willing. His position again is suspiciously near to the moral pluralism of the neo-intuitionists when he declares that the moralist gives from moment to moment a judgment that is irreversible. But what is most open to objection in his whole thesis is his *total* rejection of the distinction of means from end so far as this distinction is ordinarily applicable to art and morals. It is not correct to say in the first place that the utilitarian counts the means for nothing so long as the end is attained. This is a caricature of the utilitarian's position who assuredly values the means just because, as we have seen, there can after all be only one proper means to a given end. And in the second place, neither art nor morality is able completely to transcend the character of the means as means. Means, we have shown, can act as causes whilst having their own peculiar values. A particular word or phrase in a passage is certainly a means of enhancing the beauty of the passage as a whole whilst its own artistic value is undoubted.² And in performing a moral act, the purpose of the act—say, the building of a hospital—is still different, and distanced by an appreciable time-interval, from the subsidiary act or series of acts, *viz.*, the collection of donations for the

1. *Ibid.* p. 30.

2. "Such I created all th' Ethereal Powers
And Spirits, *both them who stood and them who failed*;
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell" —*Paradise Lost*,
Book III, line 100.

Mr. John O'London remarks as follows on the use of "them" in the italicised line: "The drum-beat effect of the two "thems" is of great importance to the lines. Alter "them" to "those" and you lose half the effect (*Is It Good English and Like Matters*, p. 90).

purpose, which is clearly a means having of course its own value. And the purpose might not finally be realised, *i.e.*, the moral act might not be done, at all. And, further, we must recall to our minds Muirhead's suggestion that even the goodness of a moral system is something which issues in non-moral goods. Such goodness, he thinks, implies contributoriness, bringing about some kind of consequence.¹

Stocks' depreciation of the exaggerated importance ordinarily placed upon the end is certainly intelligible, but when he goes to the length of repudiating altogether the conception of end in morality and suggests that even the end of self-perfection, being only an end, suffers from the defects of the ordinary teleological morality, he is overshooting his mark. Acts are right before they build up righteousness in the future, says Stocks, because they are a fit expression of the human will and character. What, however, is the standard of fitness, and what should the human will or character be an expression of? It is crystal clear therefore that when such questions are raised, the conception of a deeper purpose cannot easily be escaped from. And one is not sure that with his doctrine of membership in a spiritual kingdom Stocks does escape from that conception.

32. It is not in this sense that I am suggesting that intrinsic worth transcends the category of purpose. Purpose is inexpugnable from conscious human action, but human action at its best is not necessarily *ruled* by the idea of purpose. True it is that the causal relation of postulating an end and adopting a particular means to realise it is characteristic of all moral action in so far as action pertains to the stage of conflict, struggle, choice etc.. But it is possible to conceive of a stage when the agent will have carried the process of self-creation to such perfection that moral action in both the subjective and the objective senses of the term would become thoroughly natural—almost instinctive—to him.² He would not need to deliberate, ponder and choose; he would not need to struggle and strive to attain; he would not feel the disruption between the present state of want or imperfection and a future one of fulfilment or greater perfection. In his case, and his case alone, would the act and the character shown in it be co-existent and not

1. *Rule and End in Morals*: pp. 87—88.

2. See section 29, Ch. XIII

antecedent and consequent. In his case alone would means and end be truly unified losing their distinction. And the end would be realised not consciously but almost unconsciously. For his perfection is such that all good purposes naturally flow from him and translate themselves into action and realise themselves, just as a fruit naturally issues out of the bud or flower of a tree and ripens itself. Of such a perfected spirit it may be said with truth that he is like the vine that bears her grapes and seeks nothing more, like a horse that has run its race, like a bee that has gathered its honey. He indeed is one who has attained "unself-consciousness in well-doing." His action is purposive but not purposeful.

Such a stage, far from being identical with the moral state known to us as human beings, is a consummation of that state devoutly to be wished for when the human being has succeeded to the spiritual heritage latent in him. It is his goal and destiny, the spiritual estate to which he is called by virtue of his nature as spirit. It is in short the stage of worth or intrinsic value.

33. The relation of art to morality must be discussed at this deeper level of the transcendence of the ordinary purposeful attitude. In aesthetic value, there is still the prevalence of purpose—the creation of beauty, according to some thinkers, or the need for expressive-creativity, according to others. The artist is interested in his disinterestedness. He still has to choose his instruments or tools. He still experiences a sense of struggle and striving in embodying his vision. There is still a gap between the norm and the possible conformity or otherwise of the object to this norm in appreciation. Aesthetic value is an emergent out of the perception of this conformity etc.. In moral worth, on the contrary, particularly when the agent has attained to the stage of "unself-consciousness in well-doing," the purposeful attitude totally disappears, and "expressiveness" in Stocks' sense supervenes. The acts of the agent would be purely a natural (not naturalistic) expression of his mind and character. He has no need to choose his means or ends. He does not feel any sense of struggle or striving. His inclination would be perfectly in accord with his sense of duty. The reality would perfectly coincide with the norm. What sense of struggle is there when the vine bears her grapes lightly and ripens them into fruit? This is the real significance of disinterestedness in

morality. It is the real meaning of self-expression also.

In so far as this view of morality is significant and true, morality is a more perfect example of artistic expression than aesthetic expression itself. And if the attainment of such a moral perfection is the end of life, art must subserve this end of life. But, it may be said, is not morality here higher as an art, and not as morality? No, art *qua* art is not morality, nor is morality art in the usual sense. Art stops with representation; morality rises above representation and lives the life—the artistic life, we shall grant. That means, the method of art, the artistic outlook and approach, the artistic orientation to life, is no doubt taken up by morality and perfected, but morality perfects it or realises it in *practice*, in *life*, and as such, as leading to practical activity, it is no longer art. Hence morality is not higher as art but as a life of art, or an art of life, so to say. Art is inferior to morality because it contents itself—and must perforce content itself—with representation, and does not reach the reality which in this case is life. In this sense we may interpret Plato's contention that art is removed from reality. The artist can live the life of art only as he transcends his limits as an artist and rises to the level of a moral being. Only then would he enjoy the complete life of art. Moral life is thus the crown and completion of the aesthetic life. Aesthetic life is only a half-way house in the journey to the plenitude of the artistic life.

34. A philosophy of value is a philosophy of power. When we talk of the values of life, we generally mean powers of various sorts—economic, political, social, intellectual etc.. Even moral value, in the sense of goodness of consequences, is not free from this connotation of power. Man instinctively loves and craves for power. And so it would appear that in one sense the moral and social institutions of a people are so many devices for the distribution of power among the different classes of the society. Not content with the power of man over man, man has succeeded to a large extent in asserting his power over nature also, in harnessing the forces of nature to serve his own ends. This philosophy of power has found its most persuasive tongue in the writings of Nietzsche in whom also value philosophy first found its voice in modern thought. Value in fact is valour which is the same thing as power. It is virtue in the renaissance style, *virtu* free from any

moralic acid. Small wonder then that such a conception of value has throughout the history of humanity meant struggle among men, competition and survival of the fittest, i.e., the most powerful. It has meant division and disruption, good for some, evil for others, or good for a person in one set of circumstances, evil for the same in another set of circumstances. It has meant incompatibility, for many values are incompatible with one another. It has meant attachment, and attachment to given persons or objects involves hatred of other persons or objects. It has in short spelt unfreedom, for the freedom secured by the possession of value (power) by some must necessarily imply the loss of freedom for others. Value cannot be shared freely by all without constantly diminishing the quantity of value that is thus shared.

35. These are not the only defects and short-comings of the conception of value—others of a like nature can easily be imagined as following from its besetting sins like relativity, finitude, contributoriness, competitiveness etc.. It is true that a person achieves a progressive realisation of freedom at each step of the ascending scale of values, but even at the highest, moral value, the realisation is still incomplete and imperfect. That is, value even at this level is not equivalent to intrinsic or absolute value. In its aspect of rightness or righteousness, however, morality, it was pointed out, contains a value which is truly intrinsic or absolute. We called this worth or worthiness, in both of its aspects; viz., worthiness-to-be and worthiness-to-do. Worth as *willing* the good and *loving* the good, as righteousness of character and love of the self (in oneself as much as in others), is a category that transcends the kingdom of values and pertains to the empire of the spirit. In the kingdom of values, we worship abstractions like truth and beauty; in the empire of the spirit, these abstractions become concrete realities clothed with flesh and blood. Love and righteousness are by themselves abstractions still, though they are more nearly concrete than values; but as expressing the very life and nature of spirit they become truly concrete. Spirit is an Agent who wills and loves. The agent cannot be sundered from his nature; his nature cannot be set over against him as an other which he has to reckon with. The agent as with a certain nature is what we call a person and it is such a person or Spirit-Agent that

constitutes true intrinsic or absolute worth.

36. Worth then, conceived as Person or Spirit-Agent, is unique in being and significance. Spirit is individual, and the individual is the indivisible. It is irreplaceable and unrepeatable. Its life is a never-resting creative activity full of significance. Its worth (as illustrated in willing the good and loving other spirits) does not admit of being competed for. All spirits can share in this worth to the fullest extent possible, and yet it is not diminishable by a jot or tittle. It is not derived from anything else, but is inherent in the very nature of spirit. It does not emerge from out of any complex, as value does. It is self-justified, it validates itself. It is absolute and most truly universal. It is value incorruptible. It is good in all circumstances and at all times and for all people. It does not participate in anything evil or inimical. Its very nature is to integrate and unify, to include and harmonise. It is most comprehensively compatible with all (other) values. Worth is not in any sense opposed to pleasure, happiness, truth, beauty or goodness. It is indestructible and invariable, for spirit is deathless and immortal. It conquers—but by love. It coerces—but with its goodness. It thrills—but with its ineffable bliss. It dazzles with its splendour, it illumines with its inherent truth, it hypnotises with its PEACE. It is light that never was on land or sea.

Worth or worthiness of spirit, in its two-fold aspect of worthiness-to-be and worthiness-to-do, is again the norm or standard of all the values we have considered so far. For worth is fullness of being, life abundant, value inexhaustible and incorruptible. And it has nothing in it antagonistic to any of the ordinary values of human life, it is in fact their ground and source and support. It is the bliss of spirit that we are all seeking in our ordinary satisfactions, unknowingly, of course. Even the sensualist's craving for gross physical sensations is ultimately a feeling for that supreme bliss. That being so, since it is satisfaction that we are seeking in every kind of value,—and the satisfyingness of a given object is to be measured in terms of a standard of satisfaction not ordinarily realisable—this supreme standard which is higher than the highest that we can realise in our human outlook of things, is the worth of spirit or its bliss. It is this which lies at the back of all our valuations, which lies in the subliminal regions of our consciousness, so to say,

dimly cognised, and struggling for expression on the material plane. It is this which manifests itself in varying degrees as *the highest standard known to us* in every kind of value, as described towards the end of the second chapter.

Spirit is Freedom for one and all. Spirits indeed bind each other, but with the chains of loving tenderness. Righteousness and love are only synonyms for freedom.

37. The finite spirit is indeed self-justified. But is it *sufficient unto itself*?

The answer to this question must be sought through another volume of this work.

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End of Volume One.

E R R A T A

- Page xx for Hodonic Value (*line 9*) read Hedonic Value
- „ xxv for Keats' (*line 4*) read Keats's
- „ 63 for 21 (*Sectional number on top of page*) read 9
- „ 113 for 15 („ „) read 14
- „ 129 for Philosophy Theism (*foot-note*) read Philosophy of Theism, by W. G. Ward, vol. I, p. 333
- „ 225 for 143 (*Sectional number on top of page*) read 33
- „ 273 for re erence (*foot-note*) read reference
- „ 318 for throught (*line 28*) read thought
- „ 325 for 5 (*Sectional number on top of page*) read 6
- „ 356 for stand-point (*line 25*) read standpoint
- „ 402 for it (*line 1*) read is
- „ 411 for opposite (*line 2*) read apposite
- „ 492 for . after "non-moral goodness" (*line 26*) insert ,
- „ 500 for interestatal (*line 12*) read interstatal
- „ 529 for 13 (*Sectional number on top of page*) read 23
- „ 531 for next chapter (*foot-note*) read final chapter
- „ 550 for May be (*line 36*) read Maybe
- „ 600 for a thing in itself (*line 22*) read a thing is in itself

